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September 16, 2014
  Martinez v. Caribbean
Headline: Ninth Circuit Affirms the Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of a Tort Lawsuit Against French Company.

Area of Law: Civil Procedure

Issue(s) Presented: Whether, under Burnham v. Superior Court, service of process on a corporation's officer within the forum state creates general personal jurisdiction over the corporation.

Brief Summary:
Plaintiffs, the heirs of decedent Lorenzo Mendoza Cervantes, appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against Avions de Transport Regional ("ATR") for lack of personal jurisdiction and denial of their request for additional jurisdictional discovery. The Ninth Circuit granted review to determine whether, under Burnham v. Superior Court, service of process on a corporation's officer within the forum state creates general personal jurisdiction over the corporation.

The Court rejected Plaintiffs reliance on Burnham to argue that in-state service of process on a corporate officer who is acting on behalf of the corporation at the time of service creates "tag jurisdiction" over the corporation. The Court held that "while a corporation may in some abstract sense be 'present' wherever its officers do business, such presence is not physical in the way contemplated by Burnham." The Court also reiterated that it has never indicated that Burnham applies to corporations.

The Court next emphasized that it has required an analysis of a corporation's contacts with the forum state even when tag jurisdiction would have made the analysis unnecessary. The Court found that the five sets of ATR's contacts with California that plaintiffs relied on were plainly insufficient to subject ATR to general jurisdiction in California.

The Court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for additional discovery, reasoning that nothing plaintiffs could discover about ATR North America's contacts with California would make ATR "essentially at home" in California.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that ATR is not subject to personal jurisdiction in California, Burnham does not apply to corporations, and ATR's contacts with California are insufficient to support general jurisdiction - and, thus, affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against ATR for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Extended Summary: Lorenzo Carazon Cervantes was a passenger on an airplane that crashed in Cuba, killing everyone aboard. ATR, a French company, designed and manufactured the airplane. Cervantes' widow and his three sons sued ATR in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California, alleging claims for products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and wrongful death against ATR.

Plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on ATR at its headquarters in France. ATR moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court gave plaintiffs two months to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. During the discovery period, plaintiffs served copies of the summons and complaint on ATR's vice president of marketing while he was in California attending a conference on ATR's behalf.

First, the Court discussed the two kinds of personal jurisdiction that a state's courts may exercise over an out-of-state defendant - special jurisdiction and general jurisdiction - which can be traced back to the Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The Court then discussed International Shoe's reconceptualization of the personal jurisdiction approach famously described in Pennoyer v. Neff and development of "a new concept of contacts-based jurisdiction as a flexible and context-specific alternative to Pennoyer's focus on a defendant's physical presence within the forum."

The Court reiterated that, in Burnham, the Court held that "Pennoyer's category of 'jurisdiction based on physical presence alone' survived International Shoe as an independent basis for personal jurisdiction, at least for natural persons." In Burnham, the Court reaffirmed "tag jurisdiction" rule, which provides that "personal service upon a physically present defendant suffice[s] to confer jurisdiction, without regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of action was related to his activities there."

The Court then rejected Plaintiffs reliance on Burnham to argue that in-state service of process on a corporate officer who is acting on behalf of the corporation at the time of service creates tag jurisdiction over the corporation.

The Court noted that none of the various opinions in Burnham discussed tag jurisdiction with respect to artificial persons. The Court reasoned that, unlike natural persons who can be physically present in a single ascertainable place, corporations can only act through their agents, can do so in many places simultaneously, and can be present only through their contacts with the state. The Court thus held that "while a corporation may in some abstract sense be 'present' wherever its officers do business, such presence is not physical in the way contemplated by Burnham."

Second, the Court emphasized that it has required an analysis of a corporation's contacts with the forum state even when tag jurisdiction would have made the analysis unnecessary. The Court discussed Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., where the decision turned on the extent of the company's contacts with the forum state and not on the in-state service on the company's president.

The Court reiterated that it has never indicated that Burnham applies to corporations. The Court then distinguished the only two federal courts of appeals that have reached decisions arguably contrary to the Court's holding - the First Circuit did not explain or cite any supporting cases and the Second Circuit case involved a partnership.

The Court opined that personal jurisdiction would exist over ATR only if ATR's contacts with California support either specific or general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs did not argue that specific jurisdiction exists over ATR, given that no part of the lawsuit arose out of or related to ATR's contacts with California.

The Court then found that the five sets of ATR's contacts with California that plaintiffs relied on were plainly insufficient to subject ATR to general jurisdiction in California. The Court noted the demanding nature of the standard for general personal jurisdiction over a corporation, as evidenced in Daimler, which emphasized that "the 'paradigm' fora for general jurisdiction are a corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business." The Court thus held that this case is not an exceptional case that would allow general jurisdiction anywhere else - reasoning that ATR is organized and has its principal place of business in France; it has no offices, staff, or other physical presence in California; it is not licensed to do business in the state; and its California contacts are minor compared to its worldwide contacts.

Last, the Court addressed plaintiffs' request for additional jurisdictional discovery about ATR North America. It noted that nothing plaintiffs could discover about ATR North America's contacts with California would make ATR "essentially at home" in California. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for additional discovery.

Based on the above discussion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ATR is not subject to personal jurisdiction in California, Burnham does not apply to corporations, and ATR's contacts with California are insufficient to support general jurisdiction - and, thus, affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against ATR for lack of personal jurisdiction.

For the full opinion: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da...14/08/21/12-16043.pdf

Panel: Barry G. Silverman, William A. Fletcher, and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Date of Issued Opinion:
August 21, 2014

Docket Number: 12-16043

Decided: Affirmed.

Case Alert Author:
Beverly E. Bashor

Counsel: Brian J. Malloy (argued), Thomas John Brandi, and Daniel Dell'Osso, The Brandi Law Firm, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants; Eric C. Strain (argued), Cameron Robert Cloar, and Brian C. Dalrymple, Nixon Peabody LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

Author of Opinion: W. Fletcher, Circuit Judge.

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Ryan T. Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 09/16/2014 01:09 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

September 15, 2014
  Tara King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit rules that New Jersey law that prohibits professional counselors from trying to change the sexual orientation of minors is constitutional

Area of Law: Constitutional

Issues Presented: Does a New Jersey statute that prohibits counselors from engaging in "sexual orientation change efforts" with individuals younger than 18 violate the First Amendment?

Brief Summary: New Jersey passed a law that prohibited professional counselors from trying to change the sexual orientation ("sexual orientation change efforts" or "SOCE") of individuals under 18 years of age. This law was challenged by counselors who wanted to engage in such activities on the grounds that the law violated both the free speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the law did not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution because the Frist Amendment allows for certain limits on speech by licensed professionals. Likening it to commercial speech, the Court said the law was entitled to an intermediate level of scrutiny. Under that standard, the law was constitutional because it "directly advances" the government's interest in protecting minors from SOCE counseling, which has been shown to be harmful. The Court also rejected the appellants' argument that the law violated the First Amendment on religious freedom grounds by saying that the law is neutral and generally applicable and does not reference any religion or religious belief. The Court affirmed the District Court's decision that the New Jersey prohibiting SOCE counseling to minors does not violate the First Amendment.

Extended Summary: The New Jersey legislature enacted a law that prohibits licensed professional counselors from engaging in "sexual orientation change efforts" ("SOCE") with individuals under the age of 18. The legislature determined that it had a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of its minors. The legislature cited research that SOCE counseling poses a significant risk of harm to minors and can lead to low self-esteem, depression, and even suicide. Counselors who previously engaged in SOCE counseling filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to free speech and to free exercise of their religion. The District Court rejected the Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims on the basis that SOCE counseling should be categorized as conduct and therefore is not protected by the First Amendment.

The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court's ruling, but not with its reasoning. The Third Circuit dismissed the trial court's conclusion that any SOCE counseling session should be categorized as "conduct" and not speech, thereby denying it First Amendment protection. The verbal communication that occurs during counseling is speech and should be given protection under the First Amendment. The real question, however, is how much protection it should receive. Because counselors administering SOCE counseling are licensed by the state and are participating in a professional relationship with their clients, the Court found that the level of protection afforded their speech is diminished.

The Third Circuit likened professional speech to commercial speech, which has been given an intermediate level of protection rather than the strict level of protection from governmental interference provided to personal speech. The main reason commercial speech has been granted less protection is that there is a long, well accepted history of governmental regulation of commercial speech for the purpose of protecting the safety and economic well-being of the public. The Court found that the same is true of professional speech. Accordingly, the government can regulate professional speech if that regulation directly advances the State's substantial interest in protecting citizens. Because the New Jersey legislature had uncovered substantial evidence that banning SOCE was necessary to protect minors from a serious risk of harm to their physical and psychological well-being, the Court concluded that the law banning SOCE counseling to minors satisfied the burden of intermediate scrutiny and was therefore constitutional.

The Court was careful to point out that regulation of speech by a licensed professional was permissible only in certain forums. The Court's holding was not meant to limit a professional from speaking in a public place or from speaking in a private conversation outside the strictures of his or her profession. Instead the Court limited the effect of its decision to a professional providing personalized services to a client based on the professional's knowledge and judgment.

Finally, the Third Circuit determined that the law did not violate the First Amendment on religious freedom grounds. The plaintiffs argued that the statute targeted counseling that is generally religious in nature. The Court looked to determine whether the statute was "neutral" and "generally applicable." The statute was found to have no mention of religion and did not target any religiously motivated conduct and therefore only triggered rational basis scrutiny. Under rational basis, the Court decided that the New Jersey statute did not violate the Plaintiffs' free exercise of their religion. The Court affirmed the District Court's decision.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/134429p.pdf

Panel: Smith, Vanaskie, and Sloviter, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: July 9, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: September 11, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-4429

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Shanna Lafferty

Counsel: Mary E. McAllister, Esq., Daniel J. Schmid, Esq., Anita L. Staver, Esq., Demetrios K. Stratis, Esq., Counsel for the Appellants and Robert T. Lougy, Esq., Eric S. Pasternack, Esq., Susan M. Scott, Cousel for the Appellee and Shireen A. Barday, Esq., David S. Flugman, Esq., Andrew C. Orr, Andrew Bayer, Esq., Shannon P. Minter, Esq., Christopher S. Stoll, Esq., Amy Whelan, Esq., Counsel for Intervenor Appellee and Mordechai Biser, Esq., Ronald D. Coleman, Esq., Goetz Fitzpatrick, Esq., Jonathan C. Dalton, Esq., Kristy K. Marino, Esq., Eileen R. Ridley, Esq., Suman Chakraborty, Esq., Curtis C. Cutting, Esq., Hayley J. Gorrenberg, Esq., Lisa A. Linsky, Esq., Sandford J. Rosen, Esq., Tanya E. Kalivas, Esq., Emily B. Goldberg, Esq., Amicus Appellee

Author of Opinion: Judge Smith

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Mark Anderson

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/15/2014 09:04 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

September 10, 2014
  United States v. Howard - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Provides Guidance on Meaning of Federal Statute Prohibiting Attempts to Coerce Children into Sex.

Area of Law: Criminal law of attempt; 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

Issue Presented: Whether a person can commit the offense of attempting to induce a child to engage in sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) if the person does not make travel plans to see the child; whether 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

Brief Summary: As part of a sting operation, a government agent impersonated a mother offering up her two minor daughters for sex. Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Howard sent the agent sexually explicit photographs and asked that she show the photographs to the girls. He also suggested that the agent procure birth control for and perform sex acts on her daughters to get them ready for him. The government agent tried to get Howard to commit to book a flight and make other travel plans, but Howard ultimately refused. Three months later the police arrested Howard. Howard was convicted by bench trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas of attempt to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Howard was sentenced to 120-months imprisonment, the mandatory minimum. Howard appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the statute. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Howard's conviction and sentence and held 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) constitutional.

Extended Summary: As part of a sting operation, a government agent impersonated a mother in Corpus Christi, Texas, offering up her two minor daughters for sex. Defendant-Appellant Howard, residing in California, unemployed and bed ridden from a back injury, sent the agent sexually explicit photographs and asked that she show the photographs to the girls. He also suggested that the agent procure birth control for and perform sex acts on her daughters to get them ready for him. But Howard did not make travel arrangements to Corpus Christi, Texas, where the fictional mother and her two daughters lived. Further, the government agent tried to get Howard to commit to book a flight and make other travel plans, instructing Howard to "take it or leave it," and Howard responded, "okay, I'll leave it." Three months later the police arrested Howard in California. Howard was convicted by bench trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas of attempt to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). At the close of the government's case in chief, Howard moved for a directed verdict. Howard argued the government did not prove that he took a "substantial step" because his conduct amounted to mere preparation. The district court orally rejected Howard's motion for a directed verdict. Howard was sentenced to 120-months imprisonment, the mandatory minimum. Howard appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Howard sought reversal of his criminal conviction on two grounds. First, Howard argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for violation of § 2422(b) because he did not take a "substantial step" toward enticing a minor to have illegal sex. Second, Howard contended the "attempt" provision of § 2422(b) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it criminalizes free speech.

Sufficiency of the Evidence: The "substantial step" approach asks whether a person purposefully does or omits to do anything that is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. Acts that are merely preparatory are not enough. To determine whether Howard's conduct crossed the line between preparation and attempt, one must define the conduct that § 2422(b) criminalizes. Section 2422(b) does not require that the sexual contact occur but only that the defendant sought to persuade the minor to engage in that contact; it criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve a mental state - a minor's assent - regardless of the accused's intentions vis-à-vis the actual consummation of sexual activities with the minor. Howard argued that his actions were mere preparation because he made no firm travel plans. The Fifth Circuit had already held that travel to a meeting place is sufficient to establish attempt, but it had never held that travel or plans to travel are necessary. The Fifth Circuit and other circuits' case law supports the rule that grooming behavior plus other acts strongly corroborative of intent to entice illegal sex - such as detailed discussions to arrange a meeting with the minor victim - can suffice to establish a substantial step under § 2422(b). The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Howard took a substantial step toward enticing a minor to engage in illegal sex simply by sending a sexually explicit photograph of himself and asking that it be shown to the girls. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Howard's argument that travel or a definite plan to travel is required to sustain a conviction under § 2422(b). However, the Fifth Circuit held that that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Howard's conduct approached the line between despicable lawful conduct and criminal attempt - through his sexually explicit conversations, transmission of sexual photographs, and discussion of specific travel details - and crossed it when he instructed the undercover police officer to perform sex acts on and procure birth control for the girls to get them ready for him. The finding of criminal attempt in this case was a close call, and the Fifth Circuit expressed its hope that this case represents the outer bounds of cases the government chooses to prosecute under § 2422(b). The Fifth Circuit affirmed Howard's conviction and sentence.

Constitutional Challenge: Howard challenged the constitutionality of § 2422(b) on two grounds. He asserted (1) that the term "attempt" is unconstitutionally vague and (2) that § 2422(b) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. The government argued § 2422(b) is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, noting that the Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have analyzed the statute and rejected similar constitutional challenges. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the government and held § 2422(b) constitutional.

For the full opinion, please see:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/op...ub/13/13-40767-CR0.pdf

Panel: Circuit Judges Higginbotham, Jones, and Prado

Argument Date: 7/9/2014

Date of Issued Opinion: 9/9/2014

Docket Number: No. 13-40767

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Kirsty Davis

Counsel: Eileen K. Wilson, AUSA, for Plaintiff-Appellee United States; Simon Brian Purnell, for Defendant-Appellant Howard.

Author of Opinion: Judge Prado

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 09/10/2014 09:28 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

September 8, 2014
  U.S. v. Salahuddin - Third Circuit
Headline: No Overt Act Required for Conviction Under the Hobbs Act

Area(s) of Law: Criminal Law

Issues Presented: Does conviction for conspiracy under § 1951 of the Hobbs Act require an overt act?

Brief Summary: Defendants Ronald Salahuddin and Sonnie Cooper were both convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Defendants raised several issues on appeal, the most important of which dealt with whether a conspiracy conviction under the Hobbs Act requires an overt act. The Court rejected this argument, finding that there is no over act requirement for a conviction of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act. After rejecting their remaining arguments, the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions of both Defendants.

Extended Summary: Defendant Ronald Salahuddin was the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety in Newark, New Jersey and Defendant Sonnie Cooper owned and operated several New Jersey businesses, including a demolition business called Cooper Brothers Trucking. During his time in public office, Salahuddin allegedly conspired to use his official position to obtain charitable and political contributions and to direct Newark demolition contracts to Cooper. Evidence presented at trial in the District Court of New Jersey suggested that Salahuddin was a "silent partner" in Cooper Brothers Trucking.

A grand jury in Trenton, New Jersey returned a five-count indictment against Defendants. Following a trial, the jury found them guilty only on Count 1 - conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). On appeal, the Court first addressed Defendant Salahuddin's claim that an overt act is required for a Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction, which was an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit. The Court looked to Supreme Court precedent which explained that "if a statutory text is modeled on § 371, the general conspiracy statute, 'it gets an overt-act requirement,' but if it is modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, which omits any express overt-act requirement, 'it dispenses with such a requirement.'" This is commonly known as the Whitfield test. The Court reasoned that because the statute omits any express over-act requirement here, one was not required in order to sustain a conspiracy conviction.

The Court rejected Defendant's attempt to distinguish the Hobbs Act from the Whitfield test because, according to Defendant, the statute was not "plain and unambiguous." The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court "did not establish that a statute must be plain and unambiguous as a precondition to the application of [the Whitfield test]." The Court further explained that § 1951 of the Hobbs Act is, in fact, plain and unambiguous. The Court ultimately concluded that the language of § 1951 was comparable to the language of the Sherman Act. As a result, under the Whitfield test, the Court joined the First, Fourth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits in finding that there is no overt act requirement for a conspiracy conviction under the Hobbs Act. The Court then rejected Defendants' remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's judgments of conviction for both Defendants.
To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131464p.pdf.

Panel (if known): Fisher, Cowen, and Tashima, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: June 10, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: September 3, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-1751

Decided: Affirmed.

Case Alert Author: Aaron Spencer

Counsel: Counsel for the Appellant: Thomas R. Ashely, Esq., (Argued); Counsel for the Appellees: Alan L. Zegas, Esq. (Argued), Mark E. Coyne, Esq., and David W. Feder, Esq.

Author of Opinion: Judge Fisher

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/08/2014 12:59 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  USA v. Kamaal Mallory - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit holds that where an exigency exception exists to justify a warrantless search, that exigency dissipates when the suspect is found and placed into custody and suppression of an illegal firearm found subsequent to the suspect's arrest is therefore warranted.

Area of Law: Criminal Procedure

Issues Presented: Is a search warrant required where a suspect was found and arrested pursuant to the exigency exception, but after the suspect was firmly in custody another search produced an illegal firearm?

Brief Summary: In the middle of the night, Defendant Mallory and friends were outside his stepmother's home when a police officer pulled up to the scene. One of Defendant's friends caused a disturbance and was taken into custody. More officers arrived after a man was observed carrying a firearm. Later identified as Defendant, the man with the firearm ran into his stepmother's house. The officers conducted a search for both Defendant and the firearm. Police found Defendant in the home unarmed, and they arrested and handcuffed him. Before escorting Defendant out of the house, the police conducted a final search of the doorway and located the illegal firearm.

Finding that this case fell just outside the Fourth Amendment's exception to warrantless search and seizure, the Third Circuit held that the exigencies that existed while in pursuit of Defendant dissipated when he was apprehended. As such, the warrant requirement reattached to any further search and seizure. The subsequent search that produced the gun was, therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and properly suppressed. The Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Extended Summary: In the early morning hours of January 15, 2012, Defendant and several family members were at Defendant's stepmother's home. Defendant did not live at his stepmother's home full-time but he and his two daughters often stayed with her. At around 2:00 a.m., Defendant was standing outside when an officer approached in a police cruiser. A minor incident occurred that ended in Defendant's stepbrother being briefly detained. Two other officers, Officers Hough and Lynch, received a dispatch that there was a group of men outside on the same block, one of which had a gun. The officers saw that Defendant matched the description on the dispatch and a chase ensued for Defendant. Defendant ran into his stepmother's house. The officers forced entry into the home with weapons drawn and ordered the other occupants to exit. Two other officers then arrived on the scene, totaling at least five officers. The officers searched the house top to bottom, looking in places where either a person or a firearm could be hidden. The officers found Defendant in a downstairs bathroom, arrested and handcuffed him, and began to take him out the front door. He did not combat or resist arrest. After his arrest but before he was ushered out the front door, the officers realized that the area behind the front door had not been searched. Upon searching the area, the police recovered a revolver located behind the front door.

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant moved to suppress the gun. The district court granted the motion to suppress and the Government appealed. The question on appeal was "whether, after police had located and secured Defendant, an exigency remained that justified Officer Hough's search behind the door, which produced the revolver."

Before the Court could make a determination on the merits, the Court was faced with a matter of first impression as to what standard should be used when reviewing the exigent circumstances exception to a warrant for search and seizure. The Third Circuit drew a distinction between when a district court makes factual findings supporting a conclusion that exigent circumstances exist and whether the historical facts of a warrantless search or seizure meet the legal test of exigency. The Court held that the former must be reviewed with a clearly erroneous standard and the latter with a de novo standard. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen a district court makes factual findings supporting a conclusion that exigent circumstances existed, it makes the type of credibility determinations that district courts are best suited to make, and accordingly we will defer to them unless they are clearly erroneous. But whether the historical facts of a warrantless search or seizure meet the legal test of exigency is the type of question that involves the careful consideration of legal precepts and the values that underlie them, questions that favor de novo review." The Court thus reviewed de novo the district court's decision that the previously-existing exigency had dissipated.

It was undisputed that the police officers had probable cause and exigent circumstances that justified the officers' entry into the home and subsequent search for Defendant. Defendant argued that the exigency no longer existed when Defendant was found. The Government asserted that the exigency continued past Defendant's discovery because the search for the gun was necessary first to protect the officers and to prevent escape and second to prevent the weapon from being moved and hidden while the warrant was being procured.

The Court applied several factors to determine whether the search was justified by a reasonable belief that it was necessary to protect officer safety. Although not an exhaustive list, the Third Circuit looked at the following factors: "how soon after the alleged offense the search occurred; whether the alleged offense was violent in nature; whether the search occurred prior to or contemporaneous with Defendant's apprehension; whether the premises as a whole had been secured, or whether it was possible that unknown individuals remained in the house; whether Defendant or any of his family members had acted in an aggressive or threatening manner toward the police; whether other members of the family were free to move about the house unsupervised by an officer; how easily Defendant or a family member could have obtained and used the firearm; and the degree of intrusiveness of the search." The Court found that the exigency had dissipated due to the presence of many officers, the fact that Defendant did not combat or attempt to resist arrest, the house had been thoroughly swept before they found Defendant, and there was no evidence that Defendant's family posed a threat to the officers. The Court explained that those factors demonstrated that any exigent circumstances had dissipated by the time Officer Hough recovered the gun, rendering the warrantless search unjustified. Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132025p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes and Fisher, Circuit Judges; Stark, Delaware District Judge (sitting by designation)

Argument Date: January 22, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: September 3, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-0379

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Antoinette Snodgrass

Counsel: Virgil B. Walker, Esq., and Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq. for the Appellant, Office of United States Attorney; Catherine C. Henry, Esq., Joseph M. Miller, Esq., and Brett G. Sweitzer, Esq. for the Appellee, Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Author of Opinion: Judge Fisher

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/08/2014 12:57 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  USA v. David George Husmann - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit holds that the act of placing pornography onto a shared computer that is available to other users of a file-sharing network does not constitute distribution of child pornography where no proof was offered that any person had actually downloaded or obtained the materials.

Area of Law: Criminal Law

Issues Presented: Does the act of placing child pornography materials in a shared computer folder, available to other users of a file-sharing network, constitute distribution of child pornography?

Brief Summary: Defendant David George Husmann was on supervised release for a child pornography conviction when his probation officer was alerted that his computer was being used for child pornography. After an FBI search, pornographic images and a video were found and many of those illicit files had been uploaded onto file-sharing networks. The Government did not produce evidence that any person actually downloaded or viewed the files that Defendant uploaded. A jury found Defendant guilty of possession and distribution of child pornography. Defendant appealed the verdict and argued that merely placing the files onto a file-sharing network does not constitute distribution. Declining to adopt the Sentencing Guideline's definition of distribution, the Third Circuit held that the ordinary meaning of distribute should apply, which requires the actual transfer or downloading of the illicit materials to another person. The Third Circuit thus found that the District Court committed plain error in sentencing Defendant. The Court held that "[a] conviction for distributing child pornography cannot be sustained without evidence that another person actually downloaded or obtained the images stored in the shared folder." The Court therefore vacated Defendant's convictions for distribution of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and remanded for resentencing on the remaining count of possession.

Extended Summary: While on supervised release for a child pornography conviction, the probation office received an alert that Defendant's computer had accessed pornographic websites and images. Defendant's probation officer found him at his home viewing an image of a girl between ages six and eight posed in a bathing suit. The probation officer seized four flash drives from Defendant and found pornographic images on them. The FBI then obtained a search warrant and seized computers and computer-related items from Defendant's home. Child pornography images and a movie were found on the devices as well as two file-sharing programs. Illicit files had also been uploaded onto the file-sharing sites from Defendant's computer. At trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of possession and three counts of distribution of child pornography. Combining the verdict with his prior child pornography convictions, Defendant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, several months over the calculation for his recommended guideline.

On appeal, Defendant argued that placing child pornography onto a shared folder available to other users does not constitute distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Defendant also argued that the use of his prior conviction to raise his sentence five levels and his ultimate sentence of twenty years were procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

In order to define the term "distribute," the Court looked to dictionaries, statutory context, and case law. The Third Circuit declined to adopt the definition of "distribution" set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines and held that the ordinary meaning of distribute requires that the child pornography actually be transferred or downloaded by another person. Because the Government did not produce any evidence showing that another person downloaded Defendant's shared files, the Court found that this element of the statute was not met. The Third Circuit, thus, vacated Defendant's convictions for distribution of child pornography and remanded the case for resentencing on Defendant's remaining count of possession of child pornography.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132688p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes, Greenberg, and Van Antwerpen, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: March 24, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: September 3, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-0141

Decided: Vacated and reversed

Case Alert Author: Antoinette Snodgrass

Counsel: Zane David Memeger, Esq., Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq., and Michelle Rotella, Esq. for Appellee, United States of America; Theodore C. Forrence, Jr., Esq. and Kenneth C. Edelin, Jr., Esq. for Appellant David George Defendant

Author of Opinion: Judge Fuentes

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/08/2014 12:53 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Hernandez-Cruz v. Attorney General USA - Third Circuit
Headline: Pennsylvania Conviction for Endangering the Welfare of a Child Does Not Constitute a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude - Pennsylvania EWOC Offenders Are Still Eligible for Cancellation of Removal Review

Area of Law: Immigration and Criminal Law

Issues Presented: Does a Pennsylvania Conviction for Endangering the Welfare of a Child Constitutes a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude?

Brief Summary: Defendant Luis Alberto Hernandez-Cruz, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 1998. Eleven years later, he pled guilty to simple assault and endangering the welfare of a child. The Department of Homeland Security eventually issued a Notice to Appear, charging that Defendant was removable as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and was removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Defendant conceded that he was removable as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, but denied that he was removable as an alien convicted of CIMT. He subsequently applied for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Defendant was removable as an alien convicted of CIMT. The IJ determined that simple assault was not a CIMT, but that endangering the welfare of a child constituted a CIMT, and thus made Defendant statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Defendant appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the IJ's rulings. Defendant filed a petition for review. The Third Circuit granted review of the BIA's conclusions and held that Pennsylvania child endangerment conviction does not constitute CIMT. The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA and remanded for further proceedings.

Extended Summary: Defendant, a thirty-four year old citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 1998. Eleven years later, he pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania to simple assault and endangering the welfare of a child. The charges stemmed from an incident in which Defendant struck his stepson, who was ten years old at the time. A few months after the guilty plea, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging that Defendant was removable as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. DHS later filed additional charges that alleged Defendant was removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for his simple assault and endangering the welfare of a child convictions. Defendant conceded to removability as an alien present in the United Stats without being admitted or paroled but denied removability as an alien convicted of a CIMT. Defendant subsequently applied for cancellation of removal as a nonresident, asserting that his United States citizen children would experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal.

The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Defendant was removable as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. The IJ also concluded Defendant was removable as an alien convicted of CIMT. Having determined that Defendant was an alien convicted of CIMT, the IJ concluded that Defendant was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and denied his application. The IJ also concluded that Defendant had successfully established that his removal would result in extreme and unusual hardship to his children, and had Defendant not been convicted of a CIMT, the IJ would find Defendant statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal and would grant his application.

Defendant appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the IJ's rulings that Defendant's simple assault conviction was not a CIMT but that the endangering the welfare of a child conviction was a CIMT. Thus, the BIA also found Defendant statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Defendant filed a petition for review.

The Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania's child endangerment statute prohibits a broad range of conduct, and since the least culpable conduct punishable under the statute was not morally turpitudinous, Defendant's child endangerment conviction does not constitute CIMT. The Third Circuit used examples that would qualify as endangering the welfare of a child but would not be considered morally turpitudinous. Examples included leaving a child unattended in a vehicle for several minutes or negligently placing an infant in a bathtub with hot water that caused second or third degree burns. The Third Circuit reasoned that though these offenses are condemnable, they are not morally turpitudinous. Therefore, the Third Circuit held Pennsylvania's endangering the welfare of a child conviction does not constitute a CIMT.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133288p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes, Greenaway, and Nygaard, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: June 24, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: September 4, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-3288

Decided: Reversed and remanded for further proceedings

Case Alert Author: Katie Cooper Davis

Counsel: Jamie Jasso, Esq. for the Petitioner Luis Alberto Hernandez-Cruz; Stuart F. Delery, Esq., Shelley R. Goad, Esq., Regina Byrd, Esq., Katharine E. Clark, Esq for Respondent Attorney General Of The United States Of America.

Author of Opinion: Judge Fuentes

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/08/2014 12:50 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC--Third Circuit
Headline: Asbestos Cover-up Uncovered

Area of Law: Tort

Issues Presented: (1) Did the district court err in dismissing a fraud claim because the New Jersey litigation privilege immunized the defendants; (2) Did the district court err in dismissing the fraudulent concealment claim because the plaintiff did not prove that she would have prevailed in the merits of her asbestos-injury case; and (3) Did the district court err in concluding that it would be unable to order the relief requested because it would be deciding matters to be raised in other litigation.

Brief Summary: Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Defendants covered up the existence of asbestos in a talc product that was marketed to the public as an asbestos substitute. According to the complaint, Defendants destroyed and hid evidence of asbestos in the product. They also fabricated evidence that asbestos did not exist in the product. Plaintiffs brought claims for fraud and fraudulent concealment. They claimed that because of the cover-up they were forced to settle or dismiss lawsuits for asbestos-injury that they otherwise would have pursued.

The Third Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the fraud claim and in determining that the New Jersey litigation privilege immunized the defendants. The Court also held that the district court erred in dismissing the fraudulent concealment claim. The Court explained that plaintiff did not need to prove that she would prevail on her asbestos-injury claim but only that Defendants' conduct affected the size or existence of the damages awarded at trial. Finally, the Court determined that the district court could grant relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, for the fraud and fraudulent concealment claims but that to the extent the requested relief invited the district court to decide matters to be raised in other litigation, the issues were not ripe. Thus, declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from invoking res judicata, laches, statute of limitations doctrines, or other similar issues in future proceedings could not be granted. The Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Extended Summary: This putative class action lawsuit is brought by survivors of original asbestos injury suits against Defendants Engelhard and its successor BASF Catalyst LLC based on the alleged actions of BASF and Cahill Gordon & Reindel to prevent asbestos injury victims from obtaining recoveries for their injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants destroyed and concealed documents that revealed that there was asbestos in their talc product. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' fraud caused them to settle or dismiss their initial claims that they would otherwise have pursued.

According to the complaint, Defendants mined talc and tests concluded that this talc contained asbestos. Defendants ignored those findings and represented to customers, the industry, and the government that the talc was free from asbestos. The survivors of a former employee of Defendant sued for asbestos-related injury and Defendant law firm represented the company in the suit. That litigation produced tests and results confirming that the talc had asbestos in it. One of Defendant's executives at the time gave a deposition in which he confirmed knowledge of asbestos in the talc. The case was settled and the agreement included a confidentiality clause which prohibited the parties from discussing the case or sharing the evidence. After that litigation ended, the company issued a memo to its employees that they should collect for disposal all documents relating to the talc because "it is the policy of Defendants Corporation to avoid undue accumulation of documents that are no longer likely to be needed in our business operations." These documents were either destroyed or hidden. Plaintiffs also alleged that the company, with the help of its counsel, manufactured favorable evidence, which was used to frustrate future asbestos injury claims and resulted in dismissal or smaller settlements of the cases.

The alleged cover up was discovered when a former research chemist for Defendants testified, in a New Jersey case, that he had discovered asbestos in the talc and was later instructed to turn over all his documents related to the talc. During discovery into what documents Defendants had destroyed or concealed during litigation, documents were found that showed tests from multiple years confirming that there was asbestos in the talc.

The Court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the fraud claim based on the New Jersey litigation privilege. The Court reasoned that the privilege has never been used to shield systematic fraud directed at the integrity of the judicial process and should not be used for that purpose. The privilege was intended to protect attorneys from civil liability arising from words used in the course of judicial proceedings, promote open communication, and provide the parties an opportunity to explore the truth without fear of recrimination. Defendants thwarted these goals by allowing deceit and deception and permitting false and misleading statements in the course of judicial proceedings. The Court analyzed decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court on the issue and declined to extend the privilege to false statements and evidence given by Defendants to plaintiffs. Because the district court erred in extending the privilege, the district court's dismissal of the fraud claim was reversed.

The Court next turned to the issue of fraudulent concealment. The Court focused on the requirement that the plaintiff was "damaged in the underling action by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence defendant concealed." Looking to New Jersey law, the Court rejected Defendants' argument that the plaintiffs would have to show they would have prevailed in the underlying action. Instead, the Court reasoned that under New Jersey law, it is enough to show that the conduct affected the size or existence of the damages awarded at trial and that the plaintiff can recover whether he was successful in the original litigation or not. The Court explained that it was sufficient that plaintiffs alleged that they received diminished recovery, the lawsuits were impaired, or that they expended time and money to attempt to litigate around the spoliated evidence.

The Court affirmed district court's determination that certain declaratory and injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs could not be granted because those issues were not ripe. The Court determined that plaintiffs could not seek determinations of legal issues anticipated in subsequent proceedings. It, thus, affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims that sought to enjoin Defendants from invoking res judicata, laches, statute of limitations doctrines or other similar issues in future state court proceedings.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131089p.pdf

Panel (if known): McKee, Chief Judge, Ambro, Fuentes, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: March 13, 2014

Argument Location:

Date of Issued Opinion: September 3, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1089

Decided: Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings

Case Alert Author: Cheri Snook

Counsel: Michael Coren, Esq., Harry M. Roth, Esq., Christopher M. Placitella, Esq., Jeffrey M. Pollock, Esq., for appellants; Stephen M. Orlofsky, David C. Kistler, Eugene F. Assaf, Esq., Daniel A Bress, Esq., Peter A. Farrell, Esq., Michael F. Williams, Esq., for appellee BASF Catalysts LLC, Robert E. Ryan, Esq., Marc D. Haefner, Esq., Craig S. Demareski, Esq., John K. Villa, Esq., David S. Blatt, Esq., Kannon K. Shanmugam, Esq., Matthew B. Nicholson, Esq., Richard A. Olderman, Esq., for appellees Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Eric Tunis, Esw., Olivier Salvagno, Esq., for appellee Thomas D. Halket, Walter F. Timpone, Esq., Walter R. Krzastek, Jr., Esq., Michael B. Devins, Esq., for appellee Glen Hemstock, Kevin H. Marino, Esq., John A. Boyle, Esq., for appellee Arthus A. Dornbusch, II

Author of Opinion:Judge Fuentes

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/08/2014 12:48 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

September 1, 2014
  USA v. Christopher Erwin - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Holds That Government Is Excused From Its Plea Agreement Obligations When a Criminal Defendant Violates the Agreement by Filing an Appeal

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Issues Presented: What remedy is available to the Government when a criminal defendant knowingly and voluntarily executes a waiver of his right to appeal in return for promises from the Government and then violates his plea agreement by filing an appeal?

Brief Summary:
This case presents a question of first impression -- what remedy is available to the Government when a criminal defendant violates the plea agreement, including a waiver of right to appeal, by filing an appeal. The Court concluded that Defendant's appeal was within the scope of his appellate waiver, to which he knowingly and voluntarily agreed. Therefore, Defendant breached the plea agreement by appealing, and the appropriate remedy for this breach was specific performance of the agreement's terms. In this case, the agreement called for de novo resentencing in which the Government no longer has the obligation to request downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court reasoned that de novo resentencing was just and consistent with the basic principles of contract law. Further, it complied with the plain language of the plea agreement. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for de novo resentencing.

Extended Summary:

Christopher Erwin ("Defendant") managed a large-scale oxycodone distribution ring that operated throughout the State of New Jersey as well as other locations. On May 9, 2011, the Government filed a criminal complaint against Defendant and twenty-one co-conspirators in the United States Court for the District of New Jersey. The complaint charged each defendant with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance.

On May 8, 2012, Defendant executed a written plea agreement with the Government. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy in return for the Government's agreement not to bring further criminal charges against Defendant in connection with the conspiracy. The parties agreed that the Sentencing Guidelines offense level applicable to Defendant was 39, and that a sentence with that Guideline range was reasonable. Additionally, Defendant voluntarily waived the right to file any appeal. The agreement dictated that if Defendant violated any provision of the plea agreement, the Government would be released from its obligations under the plea agreement. Following a letter from the Government to the court asking to depart downward from the otherwise applicable Guidelines range because of Defendant's cooperation with the Government, the court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 188 months, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assignment.

Defendant timely appealed, arguing that the District Court's use of offense level 39 as its starting point for downward departure was in error because the statutory maximum was 240 months, a sentence less than the 262- to 327-month Guidelines range for offense level 39 and criminal history category of I. Defendant averred that this deprived him of the benefit of his plea bargain and the full five-level downward departure the District Court agreed he would receive. The Government did not cross-appeal but contended that the Court should vacate and remand for resentencing where it would modestly increase Defendant's sentence in light of his breach of the plea agreement.

The Court rejected Defendant's argument that the District Court deprived him of his due process right to receive the full benefit of his bargain with the Government. The Court held that Defendant's due process claim failed because it found that the record did not indicate any promise from the Government that it would specifically request a five-level downward departure, much less that the court would apply the departure to the statutory maximum.

The Court then addressed the appropriate remedy for the Government as a result of Defendant's breach of the plea agreement. The Government argued that merely dismissing Defendant's appeal and affirming his sentence would not be sufficient because Defendant's breach incurred substantial costs for the Government, and because it would not adequately deter other defendants from similar breaches. The Court explained that plea agreements, as bargained-for exchanges, are evaluated by contracts standards. Reviewing Defendant's sentence de novo, the Court looked to the plain meaning of the agreement. The Court found that the relevant language was unambiguous and that, by waiving his right to appeal, Defendant relinquished the right to appeal and promised not to exercise it. Citing contract law, the Court explained that a party should be prevented from benefitting from its own breach. The Court reasoned that Defendant received the full benefit of the bargain, while the Government was forced to devote valuable resources to litigating an appeal that should never have been filed. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the Government that resentencing was warranted in this case. Therefore, the Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing where the Government will be relieved of its obligation to seek a downward departure.

The Court concluded that de novo resentencing was just and consistent with basic principles of contract law and the plain language of the plea agreement.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133407p.pdf

Panel (if known): McKee, Chagares, and Nygaard, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: May 20, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 26, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-3407

Decided: Vacate judgment of sentence and remand to the District Court for resentencing before a different judge

Case Alert Author: Jaclyn Poulton

Counsel:
Counsel for Appellants: Jeffrey M. Brandt, Esq.
Counsel for Appellee: Mark E. Coyne, Esq., Norman Gross, Esq.

Author of Opinion: Judge Chagares

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/01/2014 10:05 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Collette Davis v. Abington Memorial Hospital - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Holds That To State a Plausible Fair Labor Standards Act Overtime Claim, a Plaintiff Must Sufficiently Allege Uncompensated Time In Excess of Forty Hours of Work in a Given Workweek.

Areas of Law: Employment; Civil Procedure

Issue Presented: Whether plaintiffs alleged a plausible Fair Labor Standards Act overtime claim

Brief Summary:
The plaintiffs, nurses and other patient-care professionals, brought suit against their employers for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as for violations of other state and federal employment statutes. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant healthcare systems and affiliates implemented timekeeping and pay policies that failed to compensate them for all hours worked. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' third amended complaints, finding that the complaints did not state a plausible claim. The Third Circuit Court, focusing on the FLSA overtime claim, held that to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that he worked forty hours in a given workweek as well as some extra hours that were not compensated. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints.

Extended Summary:
This is an appeal from the District Court's order dismissing the third amended complaint in five cases. Each of these cases is a putative collective and class action which allege that the plaintiffs' employers implemented timekeeping and pay policies in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The plaintiffs are nurses and other patient-care professionals acting as representatives in class action suits. The defendants are their alleged employers.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants maintained three unlawful timekeeping and pay policies. The first, the "Meal Break Deduction Policy," dictates that the timekeeping system automatically deducted thirty minutes of pay daily for meal breaks without ensuring that employees actually received a break. The "Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule Work Policy" prohibited employees from recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts. The "Unpaid Training Policy" stated that employees would not be paid for time spent at "compensable" training sessions. The plaintiffs alleged that because of these policies they were not compensated for hours worked, both under and in excess of forty hours per week.

The plaintiffs filed complaints in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting violations of the FLSA and several other employment statutes. The plaintiffs' third amended complaints sought relief solely under the FLSA and Pennsylvania law. The District Court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege employer-employee relationships between the plaintiffs and all of the defendants, or that any of the named plaintiffs had worked overtime and were not compensated.

The Third Circuit Court focused on whether the plaintiffs alleged a plausible FLSA overtime claim. The District Court found that the plaintiffs' overtime claim was factually inadequate because the plaintiffs failed to allege a single specific instance in which a named plaintiff worked overtime and was not compensated for that work. The plaintiffs argued that they were not required to plead to exact dates and times that they worked overtime. While some courts have held that to recover overtime compensation under the FLSA, an employee must show the amount and extent of his overtime work as a matter of just and reasonable inference, other courts have found for a more lenient approach, by which a FLSA complaint will survive dismissal so long as it alleges that the employee worked more than forty hours in a week and did not receive overtime compensation.

The Third Circuit adopted the approach set forth in Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc. In Lundy, the court held that to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that he worked forty hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of that forty hours. A plaintiff's allegations that could theoretically put her over the forty-hour mark will not suffice. While a plaintiff need not identify the exact dates and times she worked overtime, a plaintiff must at least claim that she "typically" worked forty hours per week, worked extra hours during such a forty-hour week, and was not compensated for extra hours beyond forty hours.
While the plaintiffs alleged that they "typically" worked shifts totaling between thirty-two and forty hours per week and "frequently" worked extra time, none of the plaintiffs indicated that they in fact worked hours in excess of forty hours. Therefore, the District Court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for overtime under the FLSA.

The Court also briefly addressed the plaintiffs' contention that the District Court erred in denying them another opportunity to amend the complaint. The Court reasoned that the District Court had discretion to deny the plaintiffs leave to amend because they were on notice as to the deficiencies in their complaints but chose not to resolve them.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints for failure to state a claim. To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/123512p.pdf

Panel (if known): Chagares, Shwartz, and Aldisert, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: February 10, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 26, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-3512

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Jaclyn Poulton

Counsel:
Counsel for Appellants: Jared K. Cook, Esq., Michael J. Lingle, Esq., & J. Nelson Thomas, Esq.
Counsel for Appellee: Kristen E. DiMaria, Esq., Julie A. Donahue, Esq., Andrea M. Kirshenbaum, Esq., Christopher J. Moran, Esq., Jan P. Levine, Esq., Andrea T. Ohta, Esq., Sara B. Richman, Esq., Robin P. Sumner, Esq., Justin J. Williams, Esq., Eric J. Bronstein, Esq., John M. Elliott, Esq., Mark J. Schwemler, Esq., Gregory S. Voshell, Esq., Sean P. McDevitt, Esq., Kali T. Wellington-James, Esq., Larry R. Wood, Jr., Esq., Alexandra Bak-Boychuk, Esq., Shannon D. Farmer, Esq., David S. Fryman, Esq., John B. Langel, Esq., & Rebecca L. Massimini, Esq.

Author of Opinion: Judge Chagares

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/01/2014 10:01 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  D.E., a minor, on his behalf, by his parents Maria English; Ronald Sheffy v. Central Dauphin School District - Third Circu
Headline: A party who receives a favorable ruling on an IDEA claim is not required to appeal that decision in order to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a federal claim to enforce the favorable ruling.

Area of Law: Education Law and Administrative Law

Issues Presented: Under the IDEA, is a party, who received a favorable award at an administrative hearing, required to appeal that favorable ruling in order to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a claim for enforcement of the administrative remedy in federal court?

Brief Summary: D.E. attended Central Dauphin School District ("District") from kindergarten to seventh grade. D.E. had a learning disability and emotional and behavioral problems throughout his time at the District. D.E.'s parents asked the District numerous times to evaluate D.E. and place him in the appropriate programs, almost yearly for eight years. The District, on multiple occasions, failed to properly evaluate D.E., failed to place him in proper classes, and incorrectly denied him extended summer school programs between fourth and seventh grades. Additionally, the District improperly classified D.E. as mentally retarded for two years, and placed him in an incorrect program. D.E.'s parents brought due process hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). An impartial hearing officer found in favor of D.E., ruling that the District must pay for education D.E. missed out on because of the improper practices by the District. Neither party appealed. After a year, D.E.'s parents sued in federal court to enforce the award and also brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The District court dismissed both claims, ruling that D.E. must exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and reasoned that since D.E. received a favorable decision during the administrative proceedings, he had exhausted all administrative remedies because a party would not and could not appeal a completely favorable outcome.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: D.E. attended Central Dauphin School District ("District") from kindergarten to seventh grade. Prior to entrance, D.E's mother and father determined that D.E. needed special help in classes, and after several evaluations determined D.E. needed and was eligible for speech and language therapy. When D.E. began in the District, the District created an individualized education program ("IEP") to address these problems, but the District never placed D.E. in specialized courses. D.E.'s mother asked the school to reevaluate D.E., which was done seven months after the request. The report came to the same conclusion as D.E.'s previous evaluation and subsequently the District created a new IEP. D.E. had not acquired the skills necessary to move onto first grade and had to repeat his kindergarten year. D.E.'s mother requested an evaluation at the beginning of his second year of kindergarten, which determined that D.E. had a learning disability and needed special instruction. D.E. was placed in full-time learning support programs for his second year of kindergarten and first grade, during which time D.E. behavior became more erratic. The Parents had an external medical provider evaluate D.E., which determined D.E. as having borderline retardation, extreme difficulties with motor and visual skills, and bi-polar disorder. The District placed D.E. in full-time learning and emotional support program during second grade. D.E. regressed and was eventually diagnosed with depression. The District did not reevaluate D.E. nor place him in a behavior support program. During third grade, the District modified D.E.'s IEP to read "seriously emotionally disturbed" which is a classification associated with mental retardation. As such, they put him in a Life Skills Support program, which D.E. stayed in during third and fourth grades. When D.E.'s mother realized D.E. was identified as mentally retarded she withdrew him from the program, and the District found the designation error, fixed it, and changed his status. The District also inaccurately found D.E. to be ineligible for extended school year services for the next four years. During fifth and sixth grades, D.E.'s IEP were changed to recommend participating in regular education and D.E. was dropped from programs for his emotional and behavior needs. During seventh grade, D.E.'s teacher was not trained in giving adequate support to D.E. nor was provided his IEP to inform the teacher what was necessary to help D.E. The District did not promptly reevaluate D.E. and his evaluations were delayed.

D.E.'s parents requested a due process hearing, claiming that D.E. was deprived of a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") and that he was discriminated against based upon his various disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). An administrative hearing was held with an impartial hearing officer who found the District violated the IDEA. The officer also concluded D.E. was denied a FAPE for all eight years at the District. The officer ordered that D.E. receive compensatory education in the amount of one hour for each hour of school day for each year attended and fifteen hours for each of the six weeks for missed summer programs. Neither party appealed the hearing officer's order. Almost a year later, D.E.'s parents brought an action in the District Court against the District to recover monetary equivalent of the hearing officer's orders as well as compensatory damages under the ADA and IDEA. The District Court dismissed D.E.'s claims, citing D.E.'s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the fact that there existed no evidence that the hearing officer's order required enforcement due to the unavailability of damages with respect to the IDEA claims. The District Court ruled in favor of the District on D.E.'s ADA claims because there was no evidence to prove the District intentionally discriminated against D.E. D.E. then appealed to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit first addressed the issue of the district court's grant of summary judgment on D.E.'s ADA claim. The Third Circuit found that the District did not intentionally discriminate against him, nor showed a deliberate indifference to his rights.

As to his IDEA claim, the Third Circuit agreed with D.E. and reversed the decision of the District Court. The Court reasoned that administrative remedies are exhausted when the party seeking to file suit received a completely favorable outcome in the administrative proceedings. The Court reasoned a party could not appeal a completely favorable outcome and such an outcome satisfies the requirement that administrative remedies first be exhausted. Additionally, the Third Circuit reasoned that D.E. was suing for nonperformance of the order by the District, and therefore, D.E.'s suit could be heard in federal court.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131294p.pdf.

Panel (if known): Fisher, Van Antwerpen, and Tashima, Circuit Judges.

Argument Date: June 12, 2014

Argument Location: Philadelphia, PA

Date of Issued Opinion: August 27, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-1294

Decided: Reversed and vacated in part, affirmed in part.

Case Alert Author: Ilya Gomelsky

Counsel: Carolyn M. Hazard, Esq., Joel Mallord, and Brian P. Savage, Esq. for Appellant; Thomas A. Specht, Esq. for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Fisher, Circuit Judge.

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 09/01/2014 09:58 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 29, 2014
  Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya
Headline: Kenyan government's assistance resettling appellant in United States as a refugee does not bring their contract dispute within the ambit of the "commercial activity" exception of the FSIA.

Area of Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Issue Presented: Whether a suit fits within the "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA when a Kenyan national was resettled in the United States by the Kenyan government for his own protection after his role in the underlying commercial transaction was revealed.

Brief Summary: Enticed by the Kenyan government's offer of monetary awards for information about potential tax evasion, appellant, a bank employee, tipped the government off about hundreds of account holders with potential tax deficiencies. Kenya made some but not all of the reward payments to which appellant believed himself entitled. When appellant's role as an informant became public, Kenyan officials helped him move to the United States as a refugee. Appellant then brought suit against the Kenyan government in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging breach of contract due to the underpayment. The district court concluded that the FSIA barred the action and dismissed.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. The panel found "the closest question" related to the third clause of the FSIA's commercial activity exception, which authorizes suit where plaintiff's claim is based upon "an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States." The court noted that its precedents had drawn "a very clear line": the requisite "direct effect" exists only when the contract establishes or necessarily contemplates the United States as the place of performance. Because Kenya had never promised reward payments in the United States, the court concluded that this case lacked a "direct effect" in the United States. The court rejected appellant's argument that Kenya's assistance in his asylum application ought to influence the inquiry, reasoning that Kenya had not promised to perform any specific obligations in the United States and that a refugee exception, however meritorious it might be, does not exist in the FSIA itself.

Judge Pillard dissented from this conclusion. She argued that a different result should obtain where the foreign government causes plaintiff to leave the country and directs him to resettle in the United States. She also argued that the majority's express or implied place-of-performance requirement conflicts with the decisions of other circuits.

For the full text of this opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...3-7100-1509948.pdf.

Panel: Griffith, Kavanaugh, and Pillard

Argument Date: April 8, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 29, 2014

Docket Number: 13-7100

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Elizabeth Earle Beske

Counsel (if known): Robert W. Ludwig, W. Clifton Holmes, and Thomas K. Kirui for appellant. David I. Ackerman and Daniel D. Barnowski for appellee.

Author of Opinion: Williams

Dissent by: Pillard

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 08/29/2014 01:27 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 26, 2014
  Sierra Club v. Jewell - D.C. Circuit
Headline: D.C. Circuit finds threat to aesthetic enjoyment of neighboring, privately-owned property is sufficient "injury in fact" to confer Article III standing.

Area of Law: Standing; Federal Courts

Issue Presented: Whether environmental and historic preservation groups have Article III standing when their alleged injury is to an aesthetic interest in viewing property that they have no legal right to access.

Brief Summary: Environmental and historic preservation groups brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior after Blair Mountain, West Virginia, site of the largest armed labor conflict in American history, was removed from the National Register of Historic Places. The groups claimed that delisting from the Register would leave the battlefield site, which was privately owned by various mining interests, vulnerable to damage from surface coal mining. They challenged the decision to delist as arbitrary and capricious, and sought vacatur of the decision and relisting of the site. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment against the groups, finding that they could not establish the three requisite components of Article III standing.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court deemed the groups' aesthetic and historical interest in the site cognizable and accepted that surface mining would give rise to a concrete and particularized injury even though the site was privately owned. The court found that appellants' interest did not depend on any legal right to physically walk on the battlefield and that appellants' interest in observing the site from surrounding areas, including public roads, sufficed. Because coal companies have mined in the vicinity of the battlefield using permits that encompass the battlefield, the court found appellants' interest sufficiently imminent. The court noted, in this regard, that the coal companies had objected to listing the battlefield in the National Register, citing their expectation of future mining operations. Finally, the court concluded that appellants could satisfy the causation and redressability requirements because West Virginia mining laws protected properties listed in the Register and there was an adequate possibility that West Virginia regulations would apply to mining permit renewals.

Senior Circuit Judge Sentelle dissented on the basis that Lujan requires that an injury involve an "invasion of a legally protected interest," and appellants had no legally protected aesthetic interest in viewing others' property.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/12-5383-1509259.pdf.

Panel: Garland, Srinivasan, and Sentelle

Argument Date: February 6, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 26, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-5383

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Elizabeth Earle Beske

Counsel: Daniel P. Selmi, Aaron S. Isherwood, Peter M. Morgan, Andrea C. Ferster, and Elizabeth S. Merritt for appellants. Katherine J. Barton, Robert G. Dreher, and David C. Shilton for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Judge Srinivasan

Circuit: D.C. Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske and Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 08/26/2014 01:51 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 25, 2014
  U.S v. Joseph Donahue - Third Circuit
Headline: The Fourth Amendment's automobile exception authorizes a warrantless search of a car seized when a fugitive from post-sentencing surrender is apprehended.

Area of Law: Search and seizure

Issue Presented: Does the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment authorize the government to search a car without a warrant if it has probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime?

Brief Summary: After being convicted for fraud and money laundering, among other charges, Joseph P. Donahue was sentenced to a ten-year prison term. Donahue avoided surrendering by driving across the country in his son's Ford Mustang. A U.S. Marshall apprehended Donahue and searched the Mustang; a second search lead to the finding of a firearms magazine and semi-automatic pistol. The District Court granted Donahue's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the Mustang, finding that the arresting officer did not subjectively think there was probable cause to believe the car contained contraband and that the crime had been completed before the search. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that there was objective probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of the crime of failing to surrender.

Extended Summary: This case concerns Joseph Donahue's motion to suppress evidence after U.S marshals searched a Ford Mustang that Donahue used to avoid surrendering to prison and found a semi-automatic pistol. Joseph Donahue was originally convicted for 16 counts of bank fraud, money laundering, accessing an unauthorized device, and making false statements. On December 3, 2010, he was sentenced to a ten-year custodial term and directed Donahue to surrender by January 4, 2011.

Donahue, however, did not surrender as ordered, and instead drove across the country in his son's red Ford Mustang to Las Cruces in an attempt to avoid imprisonment. Consequently, the District Court issued a warrant for his arrest. United States marshals and New Mexico police arrested him in Las Cruces. On orders from a supervisor and the Marshall in Pennsylvania, the arresting officer seized the car and searched it. Several marshals then photographed the vehicle, searched the trunk and cabin, and removed loose items. An FBI agent made a second inventory search and discovered a firearm magazine and later found a semi-automatic pistol in a bag.

These events caused a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to return an indictment against Donahue for failure to surrender and for weapons charges. Donahue then moved to suppress all the evidence seized from the Mustang. Donahue argued that the warrantless searches were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted Donahue's motion, holding that the conditions for the automobile exception, which allows the government to make a warrantless search of an automobile if applicable, had not been met because the government lacked probable cause to believe that there was contraband in the vehicle.

The Third Circuit reversed, holding that there was probable cause to search the Mustang because it was reasonable to believe that Donahue would have items such as false identification that could help him avoid detection and thus would constitute evidence of the crime of failing to surrender. The Third Circuit emphasized that the automobile exception permits vehicle searches without a warrant if there is "probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime." The Third Circuit then noted that no precedent states that the automobile exception justifies only a single search of a seized vehicle - any subsequent search "should be viewed as part of ongoing process." Thus, the Third Circuit reasoned, the validity of the search solely depends on whether the government had probable cause to believe that the Mustang contained evidence of a crime when it seized the car.

The Third Circuit concluded that it was "reasonable to believe that the Mustang contained items showing that Donahue knowingly failed to surrender," in violation of a federal statute. By knowingly failing to surrender, Donahue was likely to have false identification documents, which would commonly be found in places where items are "ready and available . . . to gather up and leave quickly, such as their cars." The Third Circuit also rejected the District Court's suggestion that an officer could establish that there was probable cause for a search only if he subjectively believed that the search would reveal contraband. The standard is objective and evidence of a crime is not limited to contraband. The search was lawful even if the government already had compelling evidence that Donahue had committed the crime of failing to surrender. Thus the Third Circuit reversed.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/134767p.pdf

Panel (if known): Ambro, Greenberg, and Barry, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: June 10, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 22, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-4767

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Joe Mathew

Counsel: Peter J. Smith, Esq., Todd K. Hinkley, Esq. for the Appellant the United States of America; and Gino A. Bartolai, Jr., Esq. for Appellee Joseph P. Donahue

Author of Opinion: Judge Greenberg

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/25/2014 03:55 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  United States v. David Bagdy - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Holds Supervised Release May Not Be Revoked for a Violation of an Implied "Good Faith" Obligation to Discharge Restitution

Area of Law: Criminal Law

Issue Presented: Whether supervised release may be revoked where the offender acted in bad faith in relation to his obligation to make restitution but the District Court found no violation of a specific provision of the restitution order.

Brief Summary: David Bagdy pled guilty to a charge of wire fraud for embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars while he served as a consultant for a small family-owned business. He was sentenced incarceration, followed by supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution at 10% of his income. During his supervised release, Bagdy received $409,799.13 in inheritance and paid $41,000 toward restitution. The government moved to modify the order of restitution because of this material change in Bagdy's economic circumstances. Bagdy asked for numerous extensions on the motion and met with the government in an attempt to reach a settlement. Although no formal agreement was reached, Bagdy contributed an additional $60,000 of his inheritance toward restitution and remained in communication with the government. He also received an additional $25,000 in inheritance. At the hearing, the government reported that Bagdy had spent all but $52,000 of his inheritance. The court ordered Bagdy to pay the remaining inheritance money toward restitution. The District Court later held a revocation hearing and found that Bagdy had not acted in good faith in repaying his restitution, constituting a violation of the restitution order, and sentenced him to six months incarceration. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that Bagdy's failure to preserve a greater portion of his inheritance for satisfaction of the restitution order was not, on its own, a violation of the explicit conditions of supervised release.

Extended Summary: David Bagdy pled guilty to a charge of wire fraud for embezzling hundreds of thousands of dollars while he served as a consultant for a small family-owned business. The District court sentenced Bagdy to 36 months incarceration, three years supervised release, and ordered Bagdy to pay $566,115.57 in restitution. As conditions of his supervised release, he was to pay at least ten percent of his monthly income toward restitution and provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information to determine an appropriate payment schedule. During his supervised release, Bagdy received $409,799.13 in inheritance and reported it to his probation officer in March 2012. Bagdy paid $41,000 toward restitution.

On April 9, 2012, the government filed a § 3664(k) motion to modify the order of restitution because of this material change in Bagdy's economic circumstances. Bagdy asked for numerous occasions to extend the motion hearing and met with the government in an attempt to reach a settlement. Although no formal agreement was reached, Bagdy contributed an additional $60,000 of his inheritance toward restitution and remained in communication with the government. While negotiations between the government and Bagdy continued, Bagdy requested several extensions of time to file a response to the government's § 3664(k) motion, representing to the District Court that he was engaged in "good faith negotiations to resolve all restitution issues by agreement" with the government. For months, the government did not oppose Bagdy's extension motions and the District Court granted five of them. When no settlement had been reached as of early November 2012, the government emailed Bagdy's counsel to express its concern that Bagdy may be stalling the hearing while depleting his inheritance. During this time, Bagdy received an addition $25,000 in inheritance.

At the hearing on December 3, 2012, the government reported that Bagdy had spent all but $52,000 of his inheritance. The court ordered Bagdy to pay the remaining $52,000 inheritance money toward restitution. The government filed a motion to hold a revocation hearing to determine whether Bagdy violated the terms of his supervised release. The District Court found that the defendant had not acted in good faith in repaying his restitution, constituting a violation of the restitution order. The District Judge then sentenced Bagdy to six months incarceration.

The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the District Court did not identify an explicit condition that Bagdy violated. The Third Circuit noted that a District Court may revoke a defendant's supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a specific condition of supervised release. The Third Circuit also cited precedent stating that conditions of supervised release must be sufficiently clear to enable individuals to freely choose between compliance and violation, and conditions of supervised release must provide specific standards which avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

The Third Circuit acknowledged that there was nothing in the record that suggested that Bagdy failed to make payments as directed by his probation officer. The Third Circuit stated that Bagdy's failure to preserve a greater portion of his inheritance for satisfaction of the restitution order was not, on its own, a violation of the explicit conditions of supervised release. Furthermore, the conditions did not require that Bagdy make good faith efforts to pay his restitution.
The government also argued that Bagdy violated an informal agreement with the government reached in early 2012 where Bagdy agreed not to deplete his inheritance prior to reaching a settlement with the government. The Third Circuit decided that, even if Bagdy's conduct breached such an agreement, honoring that agreement however was not a condition of supervised release. Thus, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and remanded for additional proceedings to determine whether Bagdy's conduct violated other conditions of supervised release.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132975p.pdf

Panel (if known): Smith, Vanaskie, Shwartz, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: May 13, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 21, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-2975

Decided: Vacated and remanded for further proceedings

Case Alert Author: Katie Cooper

Counsel: Candice Cain, Esq. for the Appellant David Bagdy; and Donovan J. Cocas, Esq., Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq., for Appellee United States of America.

Author of Opinion: Judge Vanaskie

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/25/2014 01:50 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia - Third Circuit
Headline: Police Officers can give money to PACs

Area of Law: First Amendment

Issues Presented: Whether the restriction imposed by the City Council to prevent members of the Police Department from contributing to their union's political action committee violates the First Amendment?

Brief Summary: Philadelphia City Council enacted a Home Rule Charter to combat corruption by city employees. One restriction prevents police officers from contributing to their union's political action committee. The Court found that the restrictions imposed by the city were not narrowly tailored enough to prevent the harms the government was concerned about. The ban on contributions unnecessarily abridged the associational freedoms of the officers and was held to be unconstitutional.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: This case centers on a Home Rule Charter enacted by the Philadelphia City Council in 1951. Concerned with widespread corruption among city employees and especially members of the police force, the Charter restricted certain political activities by city employees including preventing members of the Police Department from making contributions to their union's political action committee. The provision at issue prevents employees of the Philadelphia Police Department from making contributions for any political purpose. The members of the Police Department cannot donate to their political action committee (COPPAC) because it uses some funds for partisan political purposes. The police are the only city employees that are subject to the contribution ban.

In 2006, Philadelphia City Council passed a city bill that would allow members of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to authorize payroll deductions to contribute to COPPAC. The members of the FOP would not be able to choose how this money is spent. That is left to the discretion of the FOP's executive board. The bill is still on the books but the current Mayor refuses to implement it because it is believed to be violative of the Charter ban.

There are other regulations which also attempt to insulate the police from political influence. Regulation 8 has been interpreted to forbid city employees from engaging in political activity while on duty, in uniform, or using city resources. Employees cannot use their authority for any political purpose including serving on a committee or as an officer or managing the affairs of any partisan political group. The employees can vote and belong to a political party. City employees, including police officers, can contribute time and money to non-political organizations that promote causes they care about.

The Court used the Pickering framework because the ban restricts the police officers' right to speak on matters of public concern. This balances the interest of the public employee to comment on matters of public concern and the government of promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Because the ban prevents speech, the government has the greater burden and must show actual harm that will result because of the speech and that the regulation will stop these harms in a direct and material way. The Court found that, while there are real harms presented, the Charter ban is not an appropriately tailored means to address them. While the city failed to show that corruption is still rampant within the city government and employees, the Court exercised judicial caution because the legislation has remained essentially unchanged since the time of the corruption and the FOP provided little evidence to combat the city's concerns that lifting the ban would not cause a reversion to partiality and politicized personnel practices.

The Court found that the Charter ban failed the second part. The Court refused to defer to the legislative judgment for determining if the restriction on political activity adequately balanced the interests of the government and employees. It distinguished this case from others because the police officers wish to contribute to a political action committee which is an intermediary between donors and candidates. The police do not wish to contribute directly to a candidate or political campaign. The donors have no say in how the funds of COPPAC are distributed. The Court also found persuasive the Supreme Court's skepticism of political speech restrictions based on broad anticorruption rationales.
The Court noted that the city failed to explain how the contribution ban directly mitigated the concern of corruption and the patronage system. The Court also found unpersuasive any reasons the city gave for the ban to apply only to the police including that the ban is a part of an integral and carefully calibrated scheme to insulate the police from all political activity and that to end it would result in a parade of horribles. The Court found that the regulation was under inclusive because applies only to individual officers and does nothing to prevent the stated harms of the FOP's practice of handing out courtesy cards and endorsing and financing local candidates.

The Court did find merit in the city's concern to protect officers from politically motivated practices but found that the problem is not with the officer's ability to make contributions but with the way the FOP wants to get donations by taking it directly from officer's pay. The concern is that this becomes a mark of an officer's merit and could lead to politically motivated hiring and advancement. The Court determined that the solution to this would be to repeal the city bill allowing the FOP to take contributions directly from payroll. Because there are other alternatives that are more tailored to serve the government's interest, the Court determined that the ban was not tailored in a direct and material way to prevent the harms. It was not closely tailored enough to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms and so it unconstitutionally restricts the police's participation in the political process.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131516p.pdf

Panel (if known): Hardiman, Scircia, and Nygaard, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: November 12, 2013

Argument Location:

Date of Issued Opinion: August 18, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1516

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Cheri Snook

Counsel: Thomas W. Jennings, Marc L. Gelman, Jennings Sigmond, for plaintiff-appellants; Eleanor N. Ewing, Robert D. Aversa, Mark Maguire, for defendants-appellees

Author of Opinion: Hardiman

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/25/2014 09:00 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 20, 2014
  Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections et al. - Third Circuit
Headline: Inmates entitled to pre-deprivation non-judicial process before fines and costs are deducted from their prison accounts.

Area of Law: Constitutional Due Process

Issues Presented: What notice and process are required when deducting court ordered fines and fees from inmate bank accounts?

Brief Summary:

Montanez and Hale, inmates in the Department of Corrections prison system who had court ordered fees and fines deducted from their prison managed bank accounts by DOC officials, allege that they were not given notice of the deduction policy, made pursuant to state law, nor were they given due process before the institution of deductions. The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that Montanez's claims were time-barred and that there were no reason to equitably toll the statute of limitations. The Third Circuit held that Hale was entitled to notice and to non-judicial process before DOC officials could begin deductions from his bank account. Finally the Third Circuit upheld the finding of qualified immunity while stressing that this immunity applied only to claims for monetary damages and that the claims for injunctive relief could go forward.

Extended Summary:

Montanez and Hale are inmates of the Department of Corrections (DOC) prison system in Pennsylvania. Montanez was sentenced to jail time and ordered to pay fines and restitution of $248.60 and undefined court fees. At the sentencing hearing the judge did not inform him of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9728(b)(5), amended in 1998 by Act 84 of the Pennsylvania Legislature, which authorizes deductions from inmate bank accounts for the purposes of paying court ordered fines and costs (DOC Policy). DOC officials and Montanez disagree whether Montanez was ever provided with a statement of the DOC Policy or provided a "300B" form showing the amount of court ordered obligations DOC understood him to owe. Montanez did receive a receipt each month that included an "Act 84" charge. DOC officials began making deductions from his account in April 6, 2000. Montanez filed a grievance with DOC on November 17, 2002 and on November 29, 2004 filed a complaint in District Court.
Hale was sentenced on January 6, 2004 to jail time and ordered to pay fines, fees and costs totaling $2783.86. It is disputed whether Hale received notice of the DOC policy during his intake into the DOC prison. It is undisputed, however, that the "300B" form shows $4373.64 owed and overstates the restitution owed significantly. Hale filed a complaint in District Court on December 15, 2004.
On appeal from summary judgment in favor of the DOC, Montanez argued that his claim accrued at a later date than found by the district court and therefore was not barred by the statute of limitations. In the alternative, he argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled under the continuing violation doctrine or the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The Third Circuit found that Montanez's complaint was filed several years after the statute of limitations had expired. The continuing violation doctrine did not apply because Montanez was aware of the relevant injury at the time it occurred and also because the alleged violation of Montanez's rights was the singular act of initiating deductions from his account rather than each instance of deduction. Fraudulent concealment was also found not to apply because Montanez was aware at all relevant times of the source of his injury and therefore was not delayed in seeking relief due to fraud.
Hale argued that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to contest the amount DOC understood to be owed by him. Hale also argued that DOC officials were acting in a "ministerial" capacity and therefore not entitled to immunity. The Third Circuit weighed the burden on the State to provide additional process, the effectiveness of that process, and Hale's property interest in his bank account. Noting that DOC's documents overstated the amount Hale owed, an easily remedied error, the Third Circuit held that Hale was entitled to due process in the form of notice and a non-judicial opportunity to contest the sums DOC officials based their total deductions on. The Third Circuit stressed that due process did not require judicial review however.
The Third Circuit upheld the District Court's finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law was not sufficiently clear at the time the deductions were made. In addition because the officials were not performing ministerial functions in regards to the decision to not provide a pre-deprivation hearing the Third Circuit found DOC officials were not exempt from qualified immunity.
Find the full opinion at:
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131380p.pdf

Panel: Greenaway, Jr., Vanaskie and Roth, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: November 7, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: August 14, 2014

Docket Number: Nos. 13-1380 and 13-1478 (consolidated)

Decided: Affirmed in part, reversed in part

Case Alert Author: Philip Jones

Counsel: Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Esq., for Appellant Montanez; Su Ming Yeh, Esq., for Appellant Hale; Howard G. Hopkirk, Esq., for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Judge Roth

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/20/2014 01:45 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 18, 2014
  United States v. Timothy McGee - Third Circuit
Headline: SEC rule on misappropriation of confidential information is a valid interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act provision banning insider trading

Area of Law: Criminal, Securities

Issues Presented: Whether the SEC rule imposing insider trading liability for misappropriation of confidential information is invalid because it extends to non-fiduciary relationships?

Brief Summary: Timothy McGee, a financial advisor, became the confidant of Christopher Maguire through their involvement in the AA program. McGee received information from Maguire, who was an insider, about the unannounced sale of Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corporation ("PHLY"). Subsequently, McGee's portfolio changed from having 10% to 60% holdings in PHLY stock which were then sold after the sale. When the SEC investigated this unusual trade activity, McGee testified under oath that he knew nothing of the PHLY sale. McGee was found by a jury to be guilty of securities fraud under the misappropriation theory of insider trading in violation of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) and perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1621. On appeal, McGee challenged the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) saying that it exceeded the SEC's rulemaking authority. The Third Circuit found that, under Chevron, the SEC had not exceeded its rulemaking authority. Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) is owed Chevron deference because it has not been congressionally or judicially foreclosed and is "based on a permissible reading" of § 10(b). The conviction was affirmed.

Extended Summary: Timothy McGee appealed his conviction by a jury for securities fraud and perjury. Between 1999 and 2001, McGee, a financial advisor with 20 years of experience, became acquainted with Christopher Maguire through AA meetings. They developed a friendship that extended outside meetings and they would regularly go biking together and train for triathlons. They would share intimate and confidential information, but only as it pertained to their continued sobriety. McGee gave assurances to Maguire that their conversations were confidential and offered his services as a financial advisor. In the beginning of 2008, Maguire was in negotiations to sell Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corporation ("PHLY"). The stress of the sale caused him to relapse and he started to again attend AA meetings. It was there that he met up with McGee and talked to him about the sale of PHLY, information that had not been released publicly and that Maguire assumed was told in confidence. After this conversation, McGee changed his stock portfolio from 10% of PHLY stock to 60%. He even borrowed money to finance the purchase of such a large amount of shares. After the sale of PHLY, their stock rose from about $35 a share to $58 a share. Due to the suspicious nature of McGee's stock purchases, the SEC began an investigation. In September 2012, he gave a sworn testimony to the SEC in which he claimed no foreknowledge of the PHLY sale before buying the stock.
In May 2012, McGee was indicted by a grand jury for securities fraud under the misappropriation theory of insider trading in violation of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) and perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1621. McGee moved to dismiss the indictment saying that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) is invalid because it allows for misappropriation liability without a fiduciary relationship between the perpetrator and his source, but the District Court denied his motion. On November 12, 2012 he was convicted by a jury of the two counts.
On appeal, McGee argued that the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2). In reviewing McGee's argument, the Court began by looking at §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the statute that enabled the SEC to create Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2). The Court established that the Act created two kinds of insider trading: traditional and misappropriation. Misappropriation happens when a person, "misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty [to disclose] owed to the source of the information." The Court emphasized non-disclosure as a main factor in misappropriation violations. To determine whether the SEC overstepped in creating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2), the Court reviewed the Chevron deference framework which has two steps: (1) it must be determined whether the statute create by Congress was ambiguous on the precise issue in question and (2) if it is determined that it is, the rule will be upheld so long as it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." McGee argued that the Chevron doctrine did not apply because the statute was not ambiguous. The Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that the statute did not define the term "deceptive" and it also did not address the issue at hand, thus allowing the gap to be filled by the SEC rule. The Court cannot fill the gap since the Chevron doctrine requires the courts to defer to an agency's interpretation, in this case Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2). Therefore, even if the Court disagreed with the rule, it had no authority to overrule it.
The Court determined that §10(b) was ambiguous and so the Court moved to the second part of the Chevron doctrine to determine whether Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) was based on a permissible construction. The Court reasoned that the Rule was a tool to hold misappropriators accountable. It determined that the Rule was in line with the Act's purpose and thus was permissible. The Court held that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) was valid under the SEC's rulemaking authority.
The Third Circuit also rejected McGee's arguments for reversal based on insufficient evidence to support the convictions and newly discovered evidence. McGee argued that no rational trier of fact could have found that McGee and Maguire had the relationship of trust or confidence needed for misappropriation liability, or the inside information was disclosed within the scope of such a relationship. The Court rejected the contention that McGee and Maguire did not have a relationship of trust and confidence. Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)-(2) requires a "history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences" between the two parties which the jury believed existed between the two men. There were many years of confidences shared between the two men and Maguire testified that he believed that when he was telling McGee about the sale of PHLY, he was telling him in confidence. The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court's determination that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
The Court also agreed with the District Court that McGee's unusual trading activity was enough evidence to corroborate the Maguire testimony. McGee had no previous history of such trades and his activity seems only to stem from the information he acquired from Maguire. The Court rejected McGee's argument there was insufficient evidence that his statement was false asserting that Maguire's testimony was unclear. Although Maguire was unsure of the exact date of his conversation with Maguire, he was able to give enough detail about the timing of it to satisfy the jury. The Court also disagreed that the SEC's questioning was ambiguous. The Court found McGee's attempt to find extreme ambiguity to be flawed. The Court held that Maguire's testimony was corroborated and there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that McGee had committed perjury.
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected McGee's claim that he was entitled to a new trial because of new evidence. The new evidence that McGee cited was a new affidavit from Tyler D. that was discovered during a civil case after his criminal conviction. The affidavit denied the statement "what you hear here, stays here" was made at the AA meetings McGee and Maguire attended. The Court determined that this evidence did not meet the five requirements for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and would not have been strong enough to overturn McGee's convictions. For all the above reasons, the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133183p.pdf

Panel (if known): Chagares, Schwartz, and Aldisert, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: February 12, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 14, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-3183

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Shanna Lafferty

Counsel: John C. Grugan, Esq., Christine R. O'Neil, Esq. for Appellant; and Jay M. Feinschil, Esq. for Amicus Appellant; and Zane D. Memeger, Esq., Frank R. Costello, Jr., Esq., Bernadette A. McKeon, Esq., for Appellee

Author of Opinion: Judge Aldisert

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/18/2014 02:38 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 15, 2014
  Solomon v. Vilsack - D.C. Circuit
Headline: Flexible work schedule may be a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Area of Law: Rehabilitation Act; Employment Law

Issue Presented: Whether the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 permits a "maxiflex" schedule as an accommodation for an employee's disability.

Brief Summary: Appellant Linda Solomon, a Department of Agriculture employee, sought substantial flexibility in her working hours, a so-called "maxiflex" schedule, to accommodate her disability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The Rehabilitation Act requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability." When her employer denied the requested maxiflex schedule, and after exhausting administrative remedies, Solomon filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Secretary's refusal to permit the maxiflex schedule violated the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the flexible work schedule Solomon requested was unreasonable as a matter of law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in part. The court rejected the Secretary's argument that "the ability to work a regular and predictable schedule" is, "as a matter of law, an essential element of any job," finding nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that takes such an accommodation off the table. Quite the contrary, the court found that the Act's incorporation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its regulations signified an endorsement of modified work schedules. The court distinguished Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994), as a case in which the employment at issue involved "tight 4:00 p.m. deadlines." Carr, an admittedly "unusual" case, did not purport to set forth a categorical legal rule that a regular and predictable schedule was an essential function of all jobs. Because Solomon had submitted sufficient evidence on all four elements of her accommodation claim, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment.

For the full text of the opinion, please visit: http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...e/12-5123-1507755.pdf.

Panel: Henderson, Millett, and Ginsburg

Argument Date: March 17, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 15, 2014

Docket Number: 12-5123

Decided: Reversed in part

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: John F. Karl Jr. for appellant. Brian P. Hudak, Ronald C. Machen Jr., and R. Craig Lawrence for appellee.

Author of Opinion: Millett

Case Alert Circuit Supervisors: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 08/15/2014 03:36 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 14, 2014
  Vici Racing, LLC vs. T-Mobile USA, Inc. - Third Circuit
Headline: Once a Plaintiff proves damages from a breach of contract, the Defendant has the burden of proof on whether the Plaintiff had opportunity to mitigate damages.

Area of Law: Contract Law

Issues Presented: Who has the burden of proof to show a plaintiff in a breach of contract case did not adequately mitigate damages.

Brief Summary: T-Mobile USA, Inc. ("T-Mobile") entered into a contract with VICI Racing LLC ("VICI") to sponsor a racecar. After the racecar had an accident and could not race, T-Mobile did not provide the money as promised under the sponsorship contract. VICI sued in the District Court of Delaware for breach of contract, and T-Mobile cross-claimed for the same. The District Court ruled in favor of VICI in the claim because T-Mobile claimed VICI breached a provision of the contract, which was ultimately unenforceable and severable from the contract. The Court only awarded VICI with $7,000,000 even though T-Mobile still owed $14,000,000 because VICI could not prove there was no way to mitigate damages. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in the decision except with respect to mitigating damages. The Third Circuit ruled the defendant has the burden of proving a plaintiff in a breach of contract case could have mitigated damages once the plaintiff proves the amount of damages. The Third Circuit remanded the case to determine the expectation damages under contract law for the remaining amount as VICI does not still race cars.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: T-Mobile USA, Inc. ("T-Mobile") entered into a contract with VICI Racing LLC ("VICI") to sponsor a racecar or March 30, 2009. The contract provided T-Mobile would give VICI $1,000,000 by April 1, 2009 and $7,000,00 by January 1, 2009 and 2010 in exchange for VICI driving once T-Mobile sponsored Porsche racecar during the 2009 season, and two during the 2010 and 2011 seasons. VICI further promised to have T-Mobile be the exclusive wireless carrier supplying wireless connectivity for the Porsche, Audi and VW telematics programs beginning in cars produced after 2011. Additionally, the contract contained a standard force majeure clause, a standard severability clause, and an agreement to limit liabilities (sounding like a liquidated damages clause). In July 18, 2009, the T-Mobile sponsored racecar sustained severe damage from an accident, and could not race for approximately two months. After T-Mobile did not pay $7,000,000 at the beginning of 2010, VICI sent a notice of default. In response, T-Mobile sent a letter terminating the agreement claiming VICI materially breached the contract because of their failure to secure telematics contracts and because the racecar had not raced in a specific race, where T-Mobile had business guests. On September 30, 2010, VICI filed suit in the District Court of Delaware claiming breach of contract against T-Mobile seeking $14,000,000 in damages. T-Mobile asserted an affirmative defense and counterclaim asserting VICI did not perform its obligations under the contract.
At a bench trial in the District Court of Delaware, the judge awarded VICI $7,000,000 in damages based on expectation under the contract. The District Court judge did not award $14,000,000 because the judge placed the burden of proof of mitigating damages upon VICI, and believed VICI could successfully mitigate damages for year 2011. In addition, the District judge ruled T-Mobile breached the contract first because the section detailing VICI's promise to T-Mobile to be the exclusive wireless carrier was ambiguous, even after admitting parole evidence, therefore unenforceable and severable under a separate clause of the contract. T-Mobile appealed the verdict arguing they owe no damages because VICI breached the contract originally because of its failure to provide T-Mobile with an exclusive contract and because the racecar accident did fall under the force majeure provision of the contract. VICI appealed the verdict because it believes it is owed $7,000,000 for both 2010 and 2011, not just 2010.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of VICI on all matters. First, it affirmed the District Court in severing the contract provision dealing with the exclusive wireless carrier due to ambiguous terms and no clear error of fact-finding in the district court. The court reasoned the rest of the contract would still be enforceable without this provision and there were no facts that the parties would not have entered into this contract without this provision. Second, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court ruling that the force majeure provision excused VICI's breach of contract since VICI conformed to the necessary steps under the provisions. Additionally, since T-Mobile did not raise the issue originally in the District Court, it could not bring the issue up during appeal. The Third Circuit addressed the issue of foreseeability in the issue of force majeure under Delaware Law, but ultimately did not reach a conclusion because the issue was not raised in district court. Next, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's award of $7,000,000 damages even though T-Mobile claimed the contract damages should have been lower because VICI had lower costs because it did not participate in races during 2010. The Third Circuit deferred to the fact finding of the district court and found no clear error was committed. Lastly, the Third Circuit overturned the District Court's assertion VICI has the burden of proof when mitigating damages under the expectation theory of contracts. The Third Circuit ruled a plaintiff must prove damages, and therefore, the defendant has the burden of the proof to show possible avenues of mitigation of damages after the plaintiff proves damages exist. In the present case, the District Judge expected VICI to prove damages and then show it was not possible to mitigate damages. The Third Circuit remanded the question of damages for the year of 2011 based on what costs VICI would avoid because it did not participate in racing cars.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131615p.pdf.

Panel (if known): Ambro and Greenway Jr., Circuit Judges, and Baylson, District Judge sitting by designation.

Argument Date: January 14, 2014

Argument Location: Philadelphia, PA

Date of Issued Opinion: August 13, 2014

Docket Number: Nos. 13-1615 & 13-1780

Decided: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

Case Alert Author: Ilya Gomelsky

Counsel: John D. Lowery, Esq., Gavin W. Skok, Esq., James C. Martin, Esq., Colin E. Wrabley, Esq., Peter J. Walsh, Jr., Esq., and Jennifer C. Wasson, Esq. for Appellant in 13-1615 and Cross Appellee in 13-1780. Juan C. Antorcha, Esq., Joseph P. Klock, Jr., Esq., and Christopher D. Loizides, Esq. for Appellee in 13-1615 and Cross Appellant in 13-1780.

Author of Opinion: Baylson, District Judge.

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/14/2014 02:38 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 12, 2014
  Griswold v. Coventry First LLC - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Affirms Sidestep of Arbitration Clause in Life Settlement Fraud Case

Area(s) of Law: Corporations, Contracts, Standing, and Appellate Jurisdiction

Issues Presented: Whether the Third Circuit has appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing; and whether the District Court erred when it denied a motion to compel arbitration.

Brief Summary: Lincoln Griswold created a trust which engaged in a life settlement deal with Coventry First, LLC through Mid-Atlantic Financial and its broker, Kevin McGarrey. Mr. McGarrey entered into an allegedly fraudulent agreement with Coventry to refrain from seeking further bids for Griswold's life insurance policy and to report any competing offers and their terms, in exchange for the right to name his own commission. Upon finding out, Griswold sued Coventry for common law fraud, fraudulent concealment, conversion, aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, and violation of state life settlement acts, the Sherman Act, and RICO. Coventry, in response, moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing, or in the alternative, to compel arbitration pursuant to the purchase agreement. The District Court denied Coventry's motion to dismiss, finding that Griswold had standing due to possessing a proprietary interest in the property that was injured, and denied the alternative motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was "unenforceable as to Plaintiffs who are non-signatories." The Third Circuit found that it had neither interlocutory power nor could exercise pendent jurisdiction over the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss. It also affirmed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration because Griswold was not a signatory to the original purchase agreement and because the alleged fraud stemmed from the antecedent agreement between McGarrey and Coventry.

Extended Summary: This case arises from an alleged fraud in connection with a life settlement, or the sale of a life insurance policy for more than its cash-surrender value, but less than the net death benefit. The purchaser pays the premiums until the death of the original policy owner, then collects the death benefits.

In January 2006, Griswold purchased an $8.4 million life insurance policy and established the Lincoln T. Griswold Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) under Georgia law for the "sole and exclusive purpose" of owning the policy and he disclaimed any personal "right, title or interest in or power, privilege or incident of ownership" in the trust property. He appointed Wells Fargo Bank to serve as Trustee. Two weeks later, Griswold named Griswold LLP as its sole beneficiary. According to the terms of the partnership agreement, Griswold LLP would dissolve once it fulfilled its limited purpose of receiving the proceeds of the life insurance policy.
In January 2006, the Trust appointed Mid-Atlantic Financial as its exclusive agent to "identify, select and appoint" a life-settlement broker, who then selected Kevin McGarrey. In March 2008, McGarrey contacted Coventry First LLC (Coventry), a Pennsylvania-based insurer, indicating that Griswold's life insurance policy was for sale and that he was the authorized broker for a commission of $84,000. Griswold alleges that Coventry rigged the bidding process by having McGarrey sign an agreement (the "Secret McGarrey Agreement") promising not to seek any further bids and to report any competing offers and their material terms to Coventry, which McGarrey did. In exchange, Coventry allegedly allowed McGarrey to "self-determine" his new commission of $145,000.

Coventry offered $1.675 million for the Griswold policy which included McGarrey's commission. Coventry and McGarrey did not disclose the amount of broker compensation to the Trust or to Griswold. On March 31, 2008, the Trust sold its policy to Coventry without having received a competing offer and the written purchase agreement contained a broad arbitration clause.

Once Coventry acquired the life insurance policy, the Trust dissolved, having fulfilled its sole purpose. The Trustee, Wells Fargo, then transferred the proceeds of the sale to Griswold LLP, the sole beneficiary. In December 2008, the partners of Griswold LLP filed a "Cancellation of Limited Liability Partnership Election" in Georgia state court pursuant to the LLP's partnership agreement.

In September 2010, after learning of Coventry's alleged fraud, Griswold sued Coventry, Coventry Group, Montgomery Capital, Coventry Financial, and Reid S. Buerger, Coventry's Executive Vice President, in Pennsylvania state court on behalf of himself, as the former majority partner of Griswold LLP, and on behalf of a class of persons who had sold their life insurance policies to these Defendants. Griswold alleged that Coventry's collusion with McGarrey to conceal his self-determined commission and rig the bidding process constituted common law fraud, fraudulent concealment, conversion, aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, and also violated state life settlement acts, the Sherman Act, and RICO.

Coventry removed the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved to dismiss for lack of standing because neither Griswold himself nor Griswold LLP had signed the purchase agreement, only the Trust. In the alternative, Coventry moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the purchase agreement.

In response, Griswold filed an "Election to Revive and Reinstate and Otherwise Become a Limited Liability Partnership," followed by an Amended Complaint adding Griswold LLP as a Plaintiff. Coventry moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. The District Court denied Coventry's motion to dismiss, finding that because "Griswold possesses a proprietary interest in the property of Griswold LLP that was injured, both Lincoln T. Griswold and the LLP have Article III standing." The District Court then denied Coventry's alternative motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was "unenforceable as to Plaintiffs who are non-signatories."

The Third Circuit first found that it had jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to compel arbitration stemming from 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). It then turned to the parties' dispute over whether it had appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of Coventry's motion for lack of standing. Coventry argued that, under Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Development, Inc., the court had both the authority and the obligation to review the denial since standing is a "threshold jurisdictional requirement." The court, however, distinguished the issue in Majestic from the case at bar since there the issue of standing had been first raised at appeal and was "inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case."

Instead, the court said, it must decide whether it is required to adjudicate a standing issue already decided by the District Court. The court found that once a district court has determined that plaintiff has standing, an appellate court has limited interlocutory power to review that determination. The court also rejected Coventry's argument that the court should exercise pendent jurisdiction over the District Court's ruling on standing since it had already exercised jurisdiction over the compelled arbitration motion. The standing issue, it said, turns on whether Griswold LLP remains in existence and can bring claims on behalf of the Trust as its sole beneficiary, whereas the question of arbitrability turns on whether Griswold LLP, a non-signatory to the purchase agreement, can be bound to its arbitration clause because it reaped the benefits of the contract. Because it could reach the arbitration question without addressing the standing question, "the jurisdictional question was not sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the appealable order, requiring us to 'exercise restraint' and forego review until the unrelated issue is appealable in its own right.'"

The court then turned to the issue of the District Court's denial of Coventry's motion to compel arbitration. Neither party disputed that the purchase agreement included a broad arbitration agreement requiring the parties to arbitrate any disputes arising out of the contract itself.

The court noted that, while the FAA does create a presumption in favor of arbitration clauses, that presumption does not extend to non-signatories to contracts who have not agreed to be bound by the clauses. However, Coventry argued that both Georgia and Pennsylvania law, as well as Third Circuit precedent, allow for non-signatories to be bound by arbitration agreements in contracts through equitable estoppel. The Third Circuit agreed, noting, however, that for that to occur the non-signatory party must: 1) have knowingly exploited the agreement containing the arbitration clause despite never having signed the agreement; or 2) have insisted on the arbitration clause itself due to "the close relationship between the entities involved, as well as the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non[-]signatory's obligations and duties in the contract ... and [the fact that] the claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations."

Because Griswold clearly did not insist on the arbitration clause himself, Coventry claimed that he was bound by the first of the above conditions because he "embrace[d] the agreement and directly benefit[ed] from it." Third Circuit precedent has established that, "A non-signatory can 'embrace' a contract in two ways: (1) by knowingly seeking and obtaining direct benefits from that contract; or (2) by seeking to enforce terms of that contract or asserting claims [based on the contract's other provisions]."

The Third Circuit disagreed with this analysis as applied to Griswold because in order to compel a non-signatory to arbitration, the claims must be based directly on the contract that contains the provision. The court found that the arbitration agreement in the purchase agreement did not bind Griswold here because the "contract" at issue on appeal is not the purchase agreement itself, rather the "Secret McGarrey Agreement" antecedent to, and separate from, the purchase agreement.
To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131879p.pdf.

Panel (if known): Ambro, Hardiman, and Greenway, Jr., Circuit Judges

Argument Date: January 14, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 11, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-1879

Decided: No appellate jurisdiction as to motion to dismiss, affirm denial of motion to compel

Case Alert Author: Aaron Spencer

Counsel: Counsel for the Appellants: Kannon K. Shaunmugam, (Argued), Steven D. Andrews, Kenneth J. Brown, Sarah K. Campbell, David Forkner, Marcie R. Ziegler, F. Warren Jacoby, and Jennifer M. McHugh; Counsel for the Appellees: Ronald J. Mann (Argued), Gerard M. McCabe, Daniel P. Goetz, R. Eric Kennedy, Mark D. Griffin, Thormon Petrov Griffin, Peter Hardin Levine, J. Matthew Linehan, and Christopher P. Thorman.

Author of Opinion: Judge Hardiman

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/12/2014 03:58 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Dwyer v. Cappell--Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Holds that New Jersey Supreme Court Guideline Limiting Dwyer Law Firm's Use of Court Opinion Quotations Lauding His Performance is Unconstitutional Infringement on Speech

Area of Law: First Amendment

Issues Presented: Is New Jersey Supreme Court Guideline 3, which prohibits use of quotations from court opinions about an attorney's abilities or legal services on websites or other advertisements outside the context of the full opinion, an unconstitutional infringement on speech as applied to Andrew Dwyer and his firm?

Brief Summary: Andrew Dwyer posted three excerpted quotations from judicial opinions which addressed his performance as attorney on his firm's website. In response, the New Jersey Bar's Committee on Attorney Advertising promulgated, and the New Jersey Supreme Court approved, Guideline 3, which prohibited quotations from court opinions about an attorney's abilities or legal services from websites or other advertisements outside the context of the full opinion. Dwyer filed a 1983 action, calling Guideline 3 an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The District Court found that Guideline 3 was not a restriction on speech, but a disclosure requirement, because it was "self-evident" that a judicial quotation without context was inherently misleading. It also found that Guideline 3 was "reasonably related to the [S]tate's interest in preventing the deception of consumers" and was not "unduly burdensome." On appeal, the Third Circuit found that it did not have to reach the question of whether Guideline 3 was a restriction on speech or a disclosure requirement because it was not reasonably related to preventing consumer deception and was unduly burdensome, and thus failed even the lower scrutiny hurdle assigned to disclosure requirements. It reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case.


Extended Summary: This case addresses a New Jersey Supreme Court Guideline 3, which prohibits quotations from court opinions about an attorney's abilities or legal services from websites or other advertisements. This guideline came about in direct response to the website of Andrew Dwyer and The Dwyer Firm, L.L.C. (Dwyer) - www.thedwyerlawfirm.com - which went online in 2007. On the home page of the site, two quotations from unpublished opinions by the Honorable Jose L. Fuentes, J.S.C. and the Honorable William L. Wertheimer, J.S.C. were featured prominently. The quotations were "made in the context of the [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination's] fee-shifting provisions, which require judges to assess the abilities and legal services of plaintiffs' attorneys."

Judge Wertheimer sent Dwyer a letter in April of 2008 requesting that he take his quotation down for fear potential clients would interpret it as a blanket endorsement. Dwyer refused on that grounds that the language, as presented, was neither false nor misleading. Judge Wertheimer then forwarded his letter and Dwyer's response to the New Jersey Bar's Committee on Attorney Advertising (the Committee). In February of 2009 the Committee published a Proposed Guideline providing that, "[a]n attorney or law firm may not include, on a website or other advertisement, a quotation from a judge or court opinion (oral or written) regarding the attorney's abilities or legal services."
In response to this Proposed Guideline, Dwyer added a third quotation from an opinion by the Honorable Douglas H. Hurd, J.S.C. to his website. He also submitted a comment on the Proposed Guideline calling it an unconstitutional ban on speech. In April 2013 the New Jersey Supreme Court approved Guideline 3 after amending it to allow for advertising with the full text of judicial opinions. The official comment to the guideline made clear that it was promulgated in direct response to Dwyer's website.
Dwyer filed a 1983 action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. He also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Guideline. The District Court denied the request for a temporary restraining order and set a full briefing schedule for the preliminary injunction motion. An agent for the Committee testified that: quotations with hyperlinks to the full opinion would still violate Guideline 3; it had no evidence that the excerpts misled potential clients, rather it had deduced that based on "common sense;" and that, aside from Judge Wertheimer, no one had complained of being misled by the excerpts.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that Guideline 3 was not a restriction on speech, but a disclosure requirement, because did not ban an attorney from posting judicial evaluations of performance, but merely required that the attorney provide the entire opinion for context. Further, it held as "self-evident" that a judicial quotation without context was inherently misleading. Finally, the District Court evaluated Guideline 3 under the Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio test for disclosure requirements, finding that it was "reasonably related to the [S]tate's interest in preventing the deception of consumers" and was not "unduly burdensome." Dwyer appealed these decisions as applied to himself and his firm.

On appeal both parties agreed that the attorney advertising in question was commercial speech which is "entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded noncommercial speech," and cannot be subjected to "blanket suppression." The Third Circuit addressed both possible analytical tracks proposed by the District Court: restrictions on speech and disclosure requirements. The Committee maintained that Guideline 3 was merely a disclosure requirement subject to the scrutiny outlined in Zauderer, while Dwyer argued that it was a restriction on non-misleading speech and should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.

Zauderer applies a lower standard of scrutiny to disclosure requirements. Disclosure requirements must only be "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers," but must not impose an unjustified or undue burden. This, the Third Circuit said, is because the Supreme Court has shown a marked preference for disclosure requirements to outright prohibition as a remedy for potentially misleading speech, especially in the attorney advertising context, "because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, advertising by attorneys poses special risks of deception."

The Third Circuit found that it did not have to reach the question of whether Guideline 3 was a restriction on speech or a disclosure requirement because it was not reasonably related to preventing consumer deception and was unduly burdensome, and thus failed even the lower scrutiny hurdle. It said that the District Court hyperbolized that the excerpts prohibited by Guideline 3 were inherently misleading and that, even if they were to some people, the Committee failed to show that providing the full opinions would dispel the potential deception.

To be reasonably related to a state's interest in preventing deception of consumers, a disclosure requirement must plausibly dispel the misleading nature of the advertisement to those who read it. Guideline 3, the court said, does not require disclosing anything that would dispel confusion, and further, providing the full opinion to a layperson might only add to potential confusion. The court then provided a more reasonable disclosure requirement in the statement, "This is an excerpt of a judicial opinion from a specific legal dispute. It is not an endorsement of my abilities."

The Supreme Court, in Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, clarified that a disclosure requirement is unduly burdensome when the required disclosure is so lengthy that is "effectively rules out" the desired advertising. The Third Circuit found that Guideline 3 effectively ruled out the possibility that Dwyer could use even an accurately quoted excerpt from a judicial opinion on his abilities given the length of full judicial opinions and the preclusion of using hyperlinks.
The court also noted that if the intent behind Guideline 3 was to "make it so burdensome to quote judicial opinions that attorneys will cease doing so," that would constitute a restriction on speech and be subject to Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny. The court also noted, in a footnote, that though Dwyer's challenge was directly related to his website, the effect of Guideline 3 is "all the more stark" when applied to attorney advertising in a newspaper, a magazine, on television, or on the radio. However, the court did not reach whether Guideline 3 potential restriction would be valid in other cases. Because it was not reasonably related to the state's interest in preventing consumer deception, and was unduly burdensome to Dwyer, the court held that it violated his First Amendment right to advertise his services.
To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133235p.pdf.

Panel (if known): Ambro, Hardiman, and Greenway, Jr., Circuit Judges

Argument Date: February 18, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: August 11, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-3235

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Aaron Spencer

Counsel: Counsel for the Appellants: Andrew W. Dwyer, Esquire (Argued); Counsel for the Appellees: John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey; Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General; Susan M. Scott (Argued), Deputy Attorney General

Author of Opinion: Judge Ambro

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/12/2014 02:01 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 11, 2014
  United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez- Tenth Circuit
Case Name: United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez

Headline: Tenth Circuit Affirms Conviction Despite Government's Presentation of Anonymous Witness Testimony Without Establishing Safety Concerns

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Evidence

Issue Presented:

1. Did the District Court err in permitting a Border Patrol agent to testify about the outcome of his investigation of two undocumented individuals when he did not personally observe it?

2. Did the District Court err in permitting a Border Patrol agent to testify as an expert witness about the undocumented alien-smuggling trade?

3. Did the District Court permit a reversible error in allowing two Government witnesses to testify anonymously when the Government raised general concerns for their safety and provided defense counsel with background and impeachment material?

Brief Summary:


The Tenth Circuit held that a Border Patrol Agent's fact testimony did not violate the confrontation clause or the rules of evidence, that the same agent's expert testimony about the smuggling of undocumented individuals was helpful to the jury and permissible expert witness testimony. The District Court erred in finding that the Government provided adequate safety concerns to allow witnesses to testify anonymously, but because the defense was given the opportunity to conduct an effective cross-examination, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Extended Summary:

Defendant Maria Gutierrez de Lopez (Gutierrez) appealed her conviction of one count of conspiring to transport undocumented aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). On appeal, she argued that Border Patrol Agent Brian Knoll's testimony about the undocumented individual's immigration status was hearsay, that his expert testimony about alien-smuggling was not helpful to the jury, and that the Government's use of anonymous witnesses was a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court affirmed the conviction.
Gutierrez was arrested after a sting operation where federal law enforcement officers caught Jesus Cabral-Ramirez and Gutierrez attempting to transport an undocumented alien to Denver, Colorado from El Paso, Texas. At trial, Agent Knoll testified about the status of the undocumented individual, and acted as an expert witness on the subject of transporting undocumented aliens, stating that moving undocumented individuals away from border regions decreased the odds that they would be apprehended.
The government also relied on testimony from confidential informants who testified anonymously at trial about conversations they had with Gutierrez. The Government supplied the witnesses' criminal backgrounds, compensation records, and immigration status to the defense, but did not provide the witnesses' actual identities. The defense was able to cross-examine the witnesses, but was not able to conduct a typical independent pre-trial investigation.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and United States Border Patrol arrested "John Smith" (John Smith is an alias used by the government) for attempting to transport an undocumented alien during a sting operation known as "Operation Desert Tolls," meant to investigate alien-smuggling operations in the Southwest. Mr. Smith then went to work for the FBI as a confidential informant. It was through investigation of Mr. Smith's interactions with Gutierrez regarding the transport of an individual from El Paso to Denver that the FBI apprehended Gutierrez.
The court first ruled on the hearsay issue. Agent Knoll testified that he processed the undocumented individuals in the same way that he would have processed anybody under the same circumstances. The court allowed Agent Knoll to testify that one of the individuals who was apprehended during the investigation was sent back to Mexico, while another stayed in the United States awaiting a hearing in front of an immigration judge. Although defense counsel objected that Agent Knoll did not have personal knowledge of what happened to the undocumented individuals, the trial court ruled that there was a sufficient foundation for the testimony, because Agent Knoll was an experienced Border Patrol agent and personally conducted the investigation.
The court noted that evidentiary issues are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but reviewed Confrontation Clause claims de novo. The court stated that testimony should only be excluded for lack of personal knowledge if the witness could not have actually perceived what he was testifying about. Therefore, if a rational juror could conclude that the witness had personal knowledge, the witness is allowed to testify. Because Agent Knoll was involved in the processing of the undocumented individuals and only used the immigration file to refresh his recollection of the individuals' names, a reasonable jury could conclude that he had personal knowledge sufficient to testify about the end result of the investigation. The court held that his testimony was sufficient to support the notion that he had personal knowledge of the individual's fate under Fed. R. Evid. 602. The court also held that the statements were not a violation of the Confrontation Clause because Agent Knoll appeared at trial, and testified about his own observations. Further, defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Next, the court addressed the expert testimony issue. Agent Knoll testified at trial that transporting undocumented individuals away from border towns "furthered" their ability to stay in the country undetected. The court reviewed the standard for expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702, as set forth by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and United States v. Garcia, 635 F.3d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 2011). According to Rule 702, in order to give opinion testimony, an expert must have scientific, technical or specialized knowledge that will help the jury understand the evidence or determine a fact. The court held that Agent Knoll's testimony about the alien smuggling trade was helpful because the average juror was unlikely to know anything about it. The court also noted that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits had allowed experts to testify about the alien smuggling trade in criminal cases. The court also noted that Agent Knoll's comment that moving undocumented individuals away from the border "furthers" their presence was also permissible, because it was neither incorrect nor likely to cause the jury confusion, and thus was admissible.
The court then turned to the issue of anonymous witness testimony. Gutierrez argued that allowing anonymous witnesses to testify violated her Confrontation Clause rights. Additionally, she argued that the government's failure to use a curtain or disguise the witnesses' voices undermined the seriousness of the need to have the witness testify anonymously. At trial, the government explained that the ongoing alien smuggling investigation was ongoing, and that there were cartel connections to the case that made it dangerous to disclose the witnesses' names in open court, even though Gutierrez was not directly a danger to them. After the defense renewed its objection following the direct examination, the government explained that it had witnesses testify the same way in another trial because the witnesses were still part of the investigation. The government also brought up a drug and money laundering case that led to a cooperating witnesses' decapitation. Because the government relied on security concerns as the basis for not disclosing the names of the witnesses, the court allowed them to testify anonymously. The defense then cross-examined them on their criminal history, compensation, immigration status, and ties to Mexico.
The court explained that the Confrontation Clause requires the literal right to confront witnesses, and that Gutierrez had that opportunity. Additionally, the Confrontation Clause allows the defense to bring facts to the jury's attention that could allow them to draw inferences regarding the credibility of the witness. The court explained that in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 120 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the right to confrontation includes the right to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. However, the Supreme Court also noted that lower courts have a duty to protect witnesses from questions that go beyond the scope of proper cross-examination. Justice White, concurring in Smith, would have included in this category questions which endanger the safety of the witness, in addition to questions that harass, annoy, or humiliate witnesses, as noted by the majority. The court stated that in United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 318 (10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth Circuit interpreted the holding in Smith to include protecting the witness from danger.
Although the Tenth Circuit has not previously provided a standard for determining if anonymous testimony is permissible, it has adopted the standard used in several other circuits. Anonymous testimony should be evaluated "by asking (i) whether the government has demonstrated a threat and if so, (ii) whether anonymous testimony deprived the defendant of an opportunity for effective cross-examination."
With respect to the first prong, whether the government demonstrated a threat, the government must demonstrate why the witness need not answer the question. Smith, 390 U.S. at 134 (White, J., concurring). The threat does not have to come from the defendant. United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2010). However, the statement must be more than a generalized statement and not just speculation. United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 486, 501 (4th Cir. 2012). In Smaldone, the Tenth Circuit prevented the defense from presenting the address of a government witness who was involved in a relocation program.
After the threat has been established, a court must consider whether the defendant has been deprived of an effective cross-examination. Effective cross-examination means that the jury must have sufficient information to make a "discriminating appraisal" of the issue. Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 402 (10th Cir. 1992). Again referring to Smaldone, the Tenth Circuit noted that it affirmed the district court's restriction because there was no lack of knowledge of the witnesses' background, and the defense was able to conduct a detailed cross-examination. The court noted that other circuits consider whether the defendant was given the witness's real name before testifying, and whether the defendant was allowed to cross-examine the defendant on his background.
The court noted that although one way of satisfying the effective cross-examination requirement is to provide defense counsel with the witness's name, but allow the witness to testify under an alias, there are other options. The witness's name should be considered part of a balancing inquiry. The court noted that several circuits held that the right to effective cross-examination was not violated even when the defense was not provided with the witness's name. In Ramos-Cruz, the Fourth Circuit stated that the witnesses were allowed to testify anonymously because the government disclosed the subject of the testimony. In United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 493 (5th Cir. 2011), the Fifth Circuit held that the defense had access to the witnesses' "employment, nationalities, and backgrounds in order to conduct meaningful cross-examination."
Based on these decisions, the court held that if the government gives sufficient background information on the witness it wishes to call anonymously, the right to effective cross-examination is not violated. The court then conducted a de novo review of the facts in the present case to determine if the right to effective cross-examination had been violated.
Gutierrez argued that the government "failed to justify secrecy" and that the anonymous testimony deprived her of the opportunity to conduct an effective cross-examination. The government disagreed with these assertions and also argued that any error was harmless.
The court agreed that the Government did not adequately prove the need for the witnesses to testify anonymously, and that the court abused its discretion in determining that it had. The court held that specific evidence of a threat was not provided, and that the Government failed to support its generalized assertions with specific evidence of a threat.
Despite the error with regard to secrecy, the court determined that Gutierrez still had an opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witnesses. Gutierrez was able to face the witnesses before the jury and had ample impeachment material provided by the Government. The cross-examination by the defense was able to give the jury sufficient information to determine how much credibility to give to the witnesses, including a felony conviction, misdemeanor convictions for fraud and perjury, and a receipt showing payment for the testimony.
Even though the Government did not adequately show a threat to the witnesses' safety, the court determined that this was harmless error, because the Government's disclosures allowed the defense to conduct an effective cross-examination. The court noted that Confrontation Clause analyses are subject to a harmless error standard, where the beneficiary of the error must show that the error did not contribute to the guilty verdict. United States v. Chavez, 481 F.3d 1274, 1277 (10th Cir. 2007). In determining whether the error was harmless, the court considers the importance of the witness's testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, whether there is any corroborating or contradicting evidence on material points, the extent of the permitted cross-examination and the strength of the prosecution's case. United States v. Woodard, 699 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2012).
Here the prosecution had to show that the threat was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. One witness's testimony about his conversations with the defendant about their trip from El Paso to Albuquerque was not important to the Government's case, and the other evidence presented by the Government was sufficient to convict Gutierrez beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined that much of the anonymous witness testimony was cumulative, and that on the material points of the testimony, the Government provided corroborating evidence. Additionally, the substantial cross-examination of the anonymous witnesses based on the information provided by the Government allowed the defense to undermine the credibility of those witnesses. Finally, the Government had such a strong case that the error was harmless. The Government, in addition to surveillance evidence, had a post-arrest confession from Gutierrez. Given all of these factors, the court found that the admission of the anonymous witness testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

To read the full opinion, please visit: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2141.pdf

Panel: Kelly, O'Brien, Matheson

Date of Issued Opinion: August 1, 2014

Docket Numbers: 13-2141

Decided: The District Court's admission of anonymous witness testimony was affirmed.

Counsel:

Marc H. Robert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, appearing for Appellant.

James R.W. Braun, Assistant United States Attorney (Steven C. Yarbrough, Acting United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, appearing for Appellee.

Author: Matheson

Case Alert Author: Ashley L. Funkhouser

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Barbara Bergman

    Posted By: Barbara Bergman @ 08/11/2014 07:41 PM     10th Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 7, 2014
  Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc. - Third Circuit
Headline: Employee testimony is enough to rebut presumption for mailbox rule

Area of Law: Family Medical Leave Act/ evidence

Issues Presented: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on retaliation and interference claims under the FMLA

Brief Summary: Lupyan was terminated from her job after exceeding her twelve week leave under the FMLA. Under the FMLA, employers must provide general and personal notice of the FMLA. The Court found that Lupyan's testimony that she did not receive personal notice in the mail was enough to rebut the presumption of receipt provided by the mailbox rule and create a material issue of fact to be determined by the fact finder. The Court also determined that the employee's credibility as to whether she would have conducted her leave differently, within the restrictions of the FMLA, if she had been properly notified was an issue to be determined by the fact finder. Finally, the Court found that the employer's reasons for termination could be dismissed as pretextual and that this created a material issue of fact in dispute. The Court vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment and remanded.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: This case centered on whether Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (CCI) properly notified Lupyan that her leave fell under the FMLA and whether she was terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Lupyan was an instructor at CCI. She took leave after her supervisor noticed she seemed depressed. She originally applied for personal leave but her supervisor suggested she apply for short-term disability coverage. She saw her doctor and received certification of a mental health condition which made the leave time eligible to be covered under the Family Medical Leave Act. Lupyan met with CCI's Supervisor of Administration who changed the leave to FMLA instead of personal leave and changed the return date to April 1, 2008. Lupyan notified CCI on March 13, 2008 that she was eligible to return to work. She obtained the release requested by her supervisor on April 1, 2008 but, before returning to work, was notified on April 9 that she was being terminated from her position because of low enrollment and because she had not returned to work within twelve weeks allotted by FMLA.
The FMLA requires employers to provide general and individual notice about the FMLA. While CCI did provide general notice of the FMLA in the employee handbook, the Court rejected the District Court's finding that there were no material issues of fact in dispute regarding the personal notification. The Court looked to the "mailbox rule" to determine if the letter sent by CCI to Lupyan was sufficient to provide personal notice. Under the mailbox rule there is a rebuttable presumption of receipt. The Court determined that Lupyan's contention that she had not received the letter was enough to rebut the presumption, especially because CCI could provide no corroborating evidence that Lupyan actually received the letter. Proof that the letter was sent was not enough. The Court determined that the denial of receipt of the letter is enough to create a genuine issue of material fact that should be resolved by the fact finder and thus summary judgment should not have been granted.
The Court next turned to the prejudice claim. Under the FMLA it is not enough that the employer did not provide personal knowledge of the FMLA leave. The employee must show that knowledge of the FMLA would have caused her to structure her leave differently. The Court finds that, while Luypan's testimony to this fact would be enough to establish prejudice, there is also corroborating evidence that she was able to return to work on March 13, 2008. While this date is past the twelve weeks available under the FMLA there was nothing in the record to establish that she was not able to return to work before the twelve weeks were up. The Court holds that Luypan's credibility that she could return to work needs to be determined by the factfinder.
Finally, the Court turned to the retaliation claim. The Court found that the District Court correctly analyzed this issue under a burden-shifting framework. The fact that the termination came after the FMLA leave expired does not preclude a retaliation claim under the FMLA. The Court found that after the burden shifted to CCI, it failed to establish reasons for Luypan's termination that could not be dismissed as pretextual. The Court vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment and remanded.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131843p.pdf

Panel (if known): McKee, Chief Judge, Fuentes, Circuit Judge, and Schiller, District Judge

Argument Date: December 17, 2013

Argument Location:

Date of Issued Opinion: August 5, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1843

Decided: Remanded

Case Alert Author: Cheri Snook

Counsel: Jeffrey B. Balicki, Esq., for appellee; Adam R. Gorzelsky, Esq., Susan N. Williams, for appellant

Author of Opinion: Chief Judge McKee

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 08/07/2014 02:22 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 5, 2014
  Stop This Insanity Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Federal Election Commission
Headline: D.C. Circuit rejects First Amendment challenge to corporate segregated fund restrictions.

Area of Law: First Amendment, Federal Election Commission Act

Issue(s) Presented: Whether restrictions on solicitation by corporate segregated funds withstand First Amendment scrutiny after Citizens United.

Brief Summary: Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, corporations cannot contribute directly to candidates for federal office or parties. Prior to Citizens United, corporations could not use their treasuries to pay for independent expenditures, i.e., funds used to advocate for or against a candidate. They could, however, create separate segregated funds and engage in limited participation in the political process. These funds were subject to reporting and organizational requirements and faced solicitation constraints. Funds could only solicit corporate employees and family members twice yearly. In exchange, because the funds were so closely tied to the corporate entity, they were not required to report expenses. The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), eliminated the ban on corporations' independent expenditures. The separate segregated funds, now functionally obsolete, remained.

Appellant, Stop This Insanity, Inc. (the Corporation), sought to use the segregated fund mechanism, with its concealed expenses benefit, to solicit the general public. The Corporation filed suit challenging the restrictions on separate segregated funds - including the solicitation restrictions - as unconstitutional. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

The court first concluded that Citizens United was inapposite because there was no "outright ban" on political speech and because the corporation retained the right, through the less burdensome and more robust option of independent expenditures, to make unfettered political speech. The court noted that the corporation and the fund are two parts of the same whole. If the fund cannot speak on an issue, the corporation can, thus making any burden on speech "merely theoretical." The court held, moreover, that appellant had not adequately refuted the Commission's "sufficiently important interest" in preventing corruption and in knowing who is funding political speech. As such, the court concluded that the fund may solicit freely but "must do so in the light."

For the full text of the opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/13-5008-1506093.pdf.

Panel: Brown, Griffith, and Sentelle

Argument Date: November 19, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: August 5, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5008

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel (if known): Tara A. Brennan, Tillman J. Breckenridge, Patricia E. Roberts, and Dan Backer for appellants. Erin Chlopak, Anthony Herman, Kevin Deeley, and Steve Hajjar for appellee.

Author of Opinion: Brown

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 08/05/2014 04:02 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 4, 2014
  Bishop v. Smith- 10th Circuit
Case Name: Bishop v. Smith -- 10th Circuit

Headline: Tenth Circuit upholds district court decision declaring Oklahoma state constitution prohibition on same-sex marriage unenforceable

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Issue Presented:

Is the State of Oklahoma's ban on same-sex marriage licenses unconstitutional?

Brief Summary:

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Oklahoma's ruling that Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional, using the court's previous decision in Kitchen v. Herbert. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the laws, and that the Tulsa County Court Clerk was a proper defendant. The plaintiff's non-recognition claim, however, was not properly preserved for appeal.

Extended Summary:

The majority addressed the issue of standing prior to discussing the facts or the merits of the case. First, defendants challenged whether state constitutional provisions can be attacked without also challenging similar state statutes. Second, defendants challenged whether the Court Clerk is a proper defendant for the non-recognition aspect of the case. The majority concluded that state constitutional amendments subsume all existing state laws in Oklahoma. Therefore, an injunction against the constitutional provision would provide relief for the claimed injury. With respect to the second issue, the court held that because the Tulsa County Court Clerk does not have the power to redress the non-recognition issue, plaintiffs Gay Phillips and Susan Barton do not have standing to sue.

The majority noted that its ruling from Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014) controls the outcome of the case. The majority noted its holdings from that decision:

(1) plaintiffs who wish to marry a partner of the same sex or have such marriages recognized seek to exercise a fundamental right; and (2) state justifications for banning same-sex marriage that turn on the procreative potential of opposite-sex couples do not satisfy the narrow tailoring test applicable to laws that impinge upon fundamental liberties.

Using this criteria, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Plaintiffs Bishop and Baldwin sought a marriage license from the Tulsa County Court Clerk in February 2009 and were denied because they were of the same gender. Bishop and Baldwin alleged that they had to pay $1,300 in legal fees for power of attorney and health care proxy procedures because of their inability to marry. Additionally, they alleged that their inability to marry tells others that their relationship should not be respected. Plaintiffs Bishop and Barton took part in a civil union in Vermont in 2001, were married in Canada in 2005, and were married again in California in 2008. Oklahoma, however, refused to recognize their marriage. Bishop and Barton also alleged that they suffered tax consequences as a result of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Oklahoma Governor and Attorney General in 2004 challenging State Question 711 (SQ 711), which bans the marriage or recognition of a marriage between a same-sex couple. Plaintiffs also named the United States President and Attorney General in their challenge to DOMA. The district court denied the Governor and State Attorney General's motion to dismiss in 2006. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that the Plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because the recognition of marriages in Oklahoma was within the purview of the judiciary, not the executive branch. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, naming Sally Howe-Smith as the defendant in her official capacity as Court Clerk for Tulsa County.

In 2011, the United States stated that it would not defend DOMA on the merits. Instead, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group intervened to defend the law. At summary judgment, Howe-Smith filed an affidavit stating that she had no power to recognize a marriage license issued in another state regardless of whether the couple were a same-sex or opposite-sex couple.

After U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), was issued, the district court held that Plaintiffs Phillips and Barton lacked standing to challenge DOMA because state law, not federal law resulted in the non-recognition of their marriage; that any challenge to Section 3 of DOMA was moot under Windsor; that Phillips and Barton lacked standing to challenge the non-recognition part of the Oklahoma amendment because Smith was not involved in the recognition of marriages; and that Part A of SQ 711 violated the Equal Protection Clause, permanently enjoining it. The injunction was stayed pending appeal.

Howe-Smith asserted that Bishop and Baldwin lacked standing to bring the suit because they did not challenge a state statute that bars same-sex couples from marrying, thus failing to establish redressability. Howe-Smith relied on White v. U.S., 601 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2010), where a group of plaintiffs challenged the Animal Welfare Act. The plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered economic injury as a result of the Act, but the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because all fifty states and the District of Colombia banned cockfighting, so the plaintiffs' injuries would not have been redressed. Howe-Smith also relied on a number of sign ordinance cases.

The majority held that the cases relied on by Howe-Smith were distinguishable, because the Oklahoma statute banning same-sex marriage was not independently enforceable from SQ 711. SQ 711, the majority held, took the place of the state statute.

Next, Howe-Smith argued that the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), is controlling because lower federal courts may not reject on-point summary dismissals regardless of doctrinal developments. The majority noted, however, that in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), lower federal courts could reject a summary dismissal if doctrinal developments indicated that the decision is no longer controlling.

Howe-Smith then raised the argument that children have an interest in being raised by their biological parents, and that serving this interest is a compelling governmental goal. The majority responded by noting that banning same-sex marriage is not narrowly tailored to meet that goal. The majority noted several Oklahoma statutes that allow children to be raised by people other than their biological parents, including egg and sperm donation laws, human embryo transfer laws, and adoption laws. Furthermore, it noted that Oklahoma allows infertile opposite-sex couples to marry, even though they may raise non-biological children. The majority found that the law was both under-inclusive of couples who will raise children that are not their biological children, and over-inclusive of same-sex couples that have the fundamental right to choose not to raise children.

The majority then addressed a law of the case issue where, in Bishop v. Okla. ex rel. Edmonson, 333 F.App'x 361 (2009) (unpublished) ("Bishop I"), the court found that neither the Barton nor the Bishop couple had standing to bring the lawsuit because they could not prove redressability because the Governor and the Attorney General were not proper defendants. The majority noted that this conclusion did not necessarily become law of the case, because it could have been dicta, it could have dealt only with an older marriage of the Barton couple, or that, as a jurisdictional issue, it was not subject to law of the case. However, the majority found none of these reasons persuasive.

Applying the law of the case doctrine, the court determined that Bishop I did not require standing to sue on the non-recognition claim brought by the plaintiffs. Three exceptions apply to the law of the case - "(1) when new evidence emerges; (2) when intervening law undermines the original decision; and (3) when the prior ruling was clearly erroneous and would, if followed, create a manifest injustice." (Citations omitted.)

The majority stated that the first exception was the most applicable because Howe-Smith did not explain the "manifest injustice" required for the third exception on which she wished to rely. Additionally, the affidavit that she relied on to make her law of the case argument was not given to the court until after Bishop I was decided. The majority explained that the affidavit could properly be considered new evidence. However, the new evidence demonstrated that the Barton couple lacked standing to challenge the non-recognition aspect of the law. The majority considered and rejected a number of counter-arguments to their position.

Plaintiffs then attempted to establish standing by stating that Howe-Smith has "shut the courthouse doors" on them, and that an injunction against the non-recognition aspect of SQ 711 would redress this injury. Plaintiffs' failure to challenge the law on that ground, rather than on equal protection and due process grounds deprived the district court of the opportunity to evaluate standing on that claim. The majority found that the non-recognition challenge was properly dismissed.

Finally, the court addressed Plaintiffs' assertion that the non-recognition claim should be struck down under severability law regardless of standing. The majority concluded that this argument was not properly preserved for appeal, and that no sufficient reason for overlooking that lack of preservation was presented.

Judge Holmes issued a concurring opinion. Although Judge Holmes fully endorsed the reasoning of the majority, he wrote a concurrence to comment on the district court's decision not to rely upon animus doctrine in striking down SQ 711, noting that several district court opinions from other jurisdictions have done so. Judge Holmes reviewed what animus is, how it is found, and what a court must do if it is found. Judge Holmes concluded that applying the animus doctrine was inappropriate because the law was not broadly sweeping, and could not be considered unusual.

Judge Kelly concurred in part and dissented in part. Judge Kelly concurred that the Barton couple lacked standing to challenge the non-recognition provision, but disagreed with the majority on whether the law of the case doctrine applied. Additionally, Judge Kelly dissented that the plaintiffs had standing because they did not challenge the state statutes in addition to the constitutional provisions, and would have dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the case. On the merits, Judge Kelly disagreed with the majority and would have concluded that rational basis review applied and would have upheld Oklahoma's definition of marriage, using the same analysis he used in his dissent in Kitchen.

To read the full opinion, please visit: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5003.pdf

Panel: Kelly, Lucero, Holmes

Date of Issued Opinion: July 18, 2014

Docket Numbers:
14-5003 & 14-5006

Decided: The District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma was affirmed, but a stay was issued pending any potential writ of certiorari.

Counsel:

James A. Campbell, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, Arizona (Byron J. Babione and David Austin R. Nimocks, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, Arizona, and John David Luton, Assistant District Attorney, District Attorney's Office, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Defendant - Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Don G. Holladay, Holladay & Chilton PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (James E.Warner III, Holladay & Chilton PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Joseph T. Thai, Norman, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs Appellees/Cross-Appellants.*

Author: Lucero

Case Alert Author: Ashley L. Funkhouser

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Barbara Bergman

    Posted By: Barbara Bergman @ 08/04/2014 09:25 PM     10th Circuit     Comments (0)  

August 1, 2014
  Hatim v. Barack Obama - D.C. Circuit
Headline: New Guantanamo policies on lawyer meetings are reasonable security precautions

Area of Law: Habeas Corpus; Guantanamo Detainees

Issue(s) Presented: Whether two policies imposing new security measures for detainee meetings with lawyers violate detainees' right to counsel.

Brief Summary: In 2012 and 2013, the government implemented two new policies governing lawyer visits to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. One policy required all lawyer meetings to be held in a nearby camp to which detainees were transported in vans, rather than in the camps where the detainees were housed. The second policy subjected detainees to a "non-invasive search of the genital area" before and after meeting with visitors in conformity with standard military prison procedures. Appellants, a group of detainees, challenged both policies in habeas corpus proceedings, claiming that they had the purpose and effect of discouraging detainees from meeting with their lawyers. Appellants claimed that their poor health made it too difficult to travel by van to the nearby camp and that their religious beliefs prohibited them from submitting to the genital search. They sought an order permitting them to meet with counsel without complying with the new policies. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion in part, finding that the new procedures were an "exaggerated response to overstated security concerns" that were principally aimed at restricting access to counsel.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court first concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim given recent circuit precedent allowing challenges to conditions of confinement in a federal habeas petition. The court ruled that the applicable standard was Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), which held that courts should uphold prison regulations that "impinge on inmates' constitutional rights" as long as those regulations are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Applying the four-factor Turner test, the court found that there was a "valid, rational connection" between the new policies and the "legitimate governmental interest" in prison security put forward to justify them. The court determined that the policies addressed the risks posed to prisoners and guards by hoarded medication and smuggled weapons while leaving detainees with other means to exercise their right to counsel. Finally, the court concluded that the district court had improperly placed the burden of proving that the new policies were reasonable on the military, rather than requiring Appellants to prove that they were not.

For the full text of the opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...e/13-5218-1505518.pdf.

Panel: Garland, Henderson, Griffith

Argument Date: December 9, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: August 1, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5218

Decided: Reversed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: Edward Himmelfarb, Stuart F. Delery, and Matthew M. Collette for appellants. S. William Livingston, Brian E. Foster, David H. Remes, Brent Nelson Rushforth, and David Muraskin for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Griffith

Case Alert Circuit Supervisors: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 08/01/2014 02:07 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 31, 2014
  United States v. Anderson - Eight Circuit
Case Name United States v. Anderson

Headline Eighth Circuit panel affirms denial of motion to dismiss an indictment count concerning distribution of a "morphed image" constituting child pornography

Area of Law First Amendment

Issue(s) Presented Whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the count of the indictment against him concerning distribution of child pornography, where the image in question was a digitally altered image of a child's face onto an adult female's body.

Brief Summary A grand jury charged Defendant with distribution of child pornography, distribution of child pornography to a minor, production of child pornography, and enticement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. The charges resulted from Defendant sending a digitally altered image, also called a "morphed image," to his eleven-year-old half-sister, M.A. The image portrayed an adult female and male having sexual intercourse, but Defendant had digitally superimposed M.A.'s face over the face of the female. The altered image was sent to M.A.'s Facebook account, with a caption stating in substance, "This is what we will do." Defendant later admitted to law enforcement officials that he created and sent the image.

The relevant statutes define child pornography as including any "visual depiction [that] has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct." (Emphasis added.) Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that this definition is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment as applied to the morphed image that he sent. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the morphed image was child pornography that was not protected speech. After entering a conditional guilty plea to the distribution of child pornography charge, Defendant appealed the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss.

A panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. The Court first held that the image was not squarely within the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent holding that morphed images that both implicate the interests of real children and depict an actual crime are categorically unprotected speech, because no children were sexually abused in the production of the image. However, the Court further held that the statute, as applied to Defendant, did satisfy the strict scrutiny test under the First Amendment, which requires that the prohibition must be justified by a compelling interest and narrowly drawn to serve that interest. In this case, safeguarding the physical and psychology well-being of the minor M.A. was a compelling government interest. The Court also held that the statute was narrowly tailored, as there was no less restrictive means for the government to protect M.A. from exploitation and psychological harm resulting from distribution of the morphed image than to prohibit Defendant from distributing it.

The full text of the opinion may be found at http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/14/07/132337P.pdf

Panel Circuit Judges Colloton, Gruender, and Wollman

Date of Issued Opinion July 17, 2014

Decided Affirmed

Docket Number 13-2337

Counsel Michael Norris for the United States and Jennifer Gilg for Defendant

Author Circuit Judge Colloton

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor Joelle Larson, University of Minnesota Law School

Edited: 08/04/2014 at 09:31 AM by Joelle Larson

    Posted By: Joelle Larson @ 07/31/2014 10:22 AM     8th Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 30, 2014
  Sissel v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Headline: Affordable Care Act's "shared responsibility payment" is not a revenue-raising bill within the meaning of the Origination Clause of the Constitution.

Area of Law: Affordable Care Act, Origination Clause

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the Affordable Care Act's penalty for failure to maintain minimum health care coverage is a "Bill for raising Revenue" under the Constitution's Origination Clause that can only be originated by the House of Representatives.

Brief Summary: Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires non-exempt individuals to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage and provides a penalty ("shared responsibility payment") for failure to do so subject to certain exceptions. Plaintiff, an artist and small business owner, challenged the individual mandate and shared responsibility payment of Section 5000A as violative of the Commerce Clause and the Origination Clause. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

The unanimous D.C. Circuit panel held that plaintiff's Commerce Clause argument was clearly foreclosed by National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (NFIB). Turning to the Origination Clause challenge, the court noted that the clause states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." Plaintiff contended that the shared responsibility payment was a "Bill for raising Revenue" that originated in the Senate, not in the House, in violation of the Origination Clause. Rejecting plaintiff's threshold claim, the D.C. Circuit held that the shared responsibility payment was not a "Bill[] for raising Revenue." The court cited consistent Supreme Court precedent holding that revenue bills are those that "levy taxes in the strict sense," not bills that incidentally create revenue, and indicating that the inquiry turned on the statute's "primary purpose." Because NFIB made clear that the purpose of the ACA is to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care, the court concluded that the ACA was not a bill for raising revenue. The court noted that any revenues from the shared responsibility payment are incidental and that success of the ACA actually translates into less revenue from Section 5000A payments, not more. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the fact that Section 5000A may have been enacted solely pursuant to the taxing power brought it within the ambit of the Origination Clause, noting that many exercises of taxing power have a primary purpose other than raising of revenue and thus are not governed by the Origination Clause at all.

To read the full opinion, please visit ">http://www.cadc.uscour...v/i.....504947.pdf.


Panel: Rogers, Pillard, and Wilkins

Argument Date: May 8, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: July 29, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5202

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: Timothy M. Sandefur, Paul J. Beard II, and Daniel A. Himebaugh for appellant. Alisa B. Klein, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen Jr., Beth S. Brinkmann, and Mark B. Stern for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Rogers

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 07/30/2014 10:06 AM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 29, 2014
  American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture
Headline: En Banc D.C. Circuit applies Zauderer beyond context of preventing consumer deception to uphold mandatory labels on meat products.

Area of Law: First Amendment; consumer protection

Issue(s) Presented: Whether Zauderer or Central Hudson governs challenge to compelled country-of-origin labels on meat products, and whether the regulation requiring the labels withstands scrutiny under the appropriate standard.

Brief Summary: A federal statute requires country-of-origin labels on meat products, defining "country of origin" based on where the animal was born, raised, and slaughtered. 7 U.S.C. § 1638a(a)(2). Implementing this requirement, the Secretary of Agriculture issued a 2013 Rule requiring precise information about the location of each step in the production process and eliminating flexibility with respect to commingled animals. The American Meat Institute (AMI) challenged the 2013 Rule on statutory and First Amendment grounds. An initial panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits. The panel believed that Zauderer extends beyond the prevention of consumer deception but, because prior opinions left this conclusion in some doubt, proposed that the case be reheard en banc. The full court voted to do so.

On rehearing en banc, the full court agreed that Zauderer is not limited to preventing consumer deception and that the rationale of the case applied to other government interests. Rejecting rigid application of the Central Hudson test, the court noted that there are "material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech" and that the comparatively lenient Zauderer test governed the former context, where the speaker's interest in opposing forced disclosure of purely factual information is "minimal." The court stopped short of drawing clear lines between the two tests, though, noting that the Zauderer test employed in the case of compulsory factual disclosures can really be seen as a specialized application of Central Hudson, "where several of Central Hudson's elements have already been established." Turning to the government's interests, the court credited as substantial the government's asserted interest in enabling consumers to choose American-made products and providing information to mitigate concern over food-borne illness outbreaks. Finally, the court found that the regulation had a reasonable fit to the asserted interest because a disclosure mandate self-evidently assures that recipients get the mandated information. Because the Rule passed muster under the Zauderer test, the court reinstated the panel decision affirming the district court.

Judge Rogers concurred on the basis that Zauderer applied to disclosure requirements but rejected the suggestion that Zauderer was simply a specialized application of the Central Hudson test. Judge Kavanaugh, concurring in the judgment, noted that the country-of-origin requirements were longstanding and commonplace requirements. Although he agreed with the majority opinion, he analyzed the case under the Central Hudson test.

Judge Henderson and Judge Brown dissented on the basis that Zauderer was intended solely to prevent consumer deception and that broadening its scope created a new standard of review "even more relaxed than rational basis review."

For the full text of opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...e/13-5281-1504951.pdf.

Panel: En banc

Argument Date: May 19, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: July 29, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5281

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: Catherine E. Stetson, Jonathan L. Abram, Judith E. Coleman, Mary Helen Wimberly, and Elizabeth B. Prelogar for appellants. Daniel Tenny, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen Jr., and Mark B. Stern for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Williams

Case Alert Circuit Supervisors: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 07/29/2014 04:23 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Department of Texas, Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Texas Lottery Commission - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Strikes Down Texas Law Prohibiting Charities from Using Bingo Proceeds to Fund Political Advocacy.

Area of Law: Texas Bingo Enabling Act; First Amendment.

Issue Presented: Whether the political advocacy restrictions contained in the Texas Bingo Enabling Act violate the First Amendment.

Brief Summary: The issue presented in this appeal is the constitutionality of political advocacy restrictions contained in the Texas Bingo Enabling Act ("the Bingo Act"). The Bingo Act allows charitable organizations to raise money by holding bingo games on the condition that the money is used only for the organizations' charitable purpose and not for political advocacy. A group of charities filed suit challenging these restrictions in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that the restrictions violated their speech rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the challengers and issued a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the speech restrictions. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, but the panel decision was vacated when the Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc. The en banc Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction.

Extended Summary: In 2010, Plaintiffs-Appellees, who are a host of nonprofit organizations licensed to conduct bingo in Texas ("the Charities"), brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the commissioners and two executive officers of the Texas Lottery Commission, the state agency responsible for bingo licensing and regulation ("the Commission"). The Texas Bingo Enabling Act ("the Bingo Act") allows charitable organizations to raise money by holding bingo games on the condition that the money is used only for the organizations' charitable purpose and not for political advocacy. The Charities alleged that two of the political advocacy restrictions, Sections 2001.456(2) - (3), violated their right to freedom of speech.

Sections 2001.456(2) - (3) state that:
A licensed authorized organization may not use the net proceeds from bingo directly or indirectly to: ... (2) support or oppose a measure submitted to a vote of the people; or (3) influence or attempt to influence legislation.

The First Amendment challenge was twofold: First, the Charities claimed that Sections 2001.456(2) - (3) are facially unconstitutional because they are a direct abridgement of speech with no compelling or substantial justifying interest. Second, they claimed the law unconstitutionally discriminates between the Charities and similarly situated businesses, such as racetracks, which are not prohibited from using their revenue for political purposes.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Charities, permanently enjoining the Commission from enforcing the invalid provisions. The Commission appealed and a unanimous Fifth Circuit panel reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Charities and its permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the challenged statutory provisions. After panel rehearing, a panel majority issued a revised opinion that again reversed the district court's judgment. Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit granted en banc rehearing.

The Fifth Circuit en banc held that (1) the Bingo Act creates a regulatory regime that grants the Charities a benefit - in the form of a license - to conduct bingo games, rather than a government subsidy; (2) the challenged provisions constitute facial restrictions on the Charities' political speech, and therefore strict scrutiny applies; and (3) the political advocacy restrictions in the Bingo Act do not withstand strict scrutiny. The Commission failed to articulate a compelling interest justifying the challenged provisions, but even if the interests raised by the Commission were compelling, the restrictions are not narrowly tailored. Consequently, the provisions at issue are facially invalid under the First Amendment.

Judge Dennis dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court precedent does not permit strict or heightened scrutiny. The charitable bingo program's limitation on the use of bingo proceeds for lobbying and other political speech, which the legislature has decided not to promote, does not "suppress" that speech and therefore should not trigger strict or heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.

Judge Graves's dissent joined Judge Dennis's but also argued that the Bingo Act's restrictions on the use of bingo proceeds for political advocacy are permissible conditions on a government subsidy and do not operate to penalize speech.

For the full opinion, please see:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/op...ub/11/11-50932-CV2.pdf.

Panel: En banc

Argument Date: 1/22/2014

Date of Issued Opinion: 7/28/2014

Docket Number: No. 11-50932

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Kirsty Davis

Counsel: Anatole Robert Barnstone for Plaintiffs-Appellees Department of Texas, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States; Amvets Department of Texas, Incorporated; Amvets Post 52, Incorporated; Amvets Post 52, Auxiliary, Incorporated; The Great Council of Texas, Improved Order of Redmen; Redmen War Eagle Tribe No. 17; Redmen Tribe No. 21 Geronimo; Redmen Ramona Council No. 5; The Institute for Disability Access, Incorporated, Doing Business as Adapt of Texas; Temple Elks Lodge No. 138, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America, Incorporated; Bryan Lodge No. 859, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America, Incorporated; Austin Lodge No. 201, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America, Incorporated; and Anna Fire and Rescue, Incorporated. Arthur Cleveland D'Andrea for Defendants-Appellants Texas Lottery Commission; Gary Grief, Executive Director in his Official Capacity; Sandra K. Joseph, Director of Charitable Bingo in her Official Capacity; Mary Ann Williamson, Commissioner in her Official Capacity; Unknown Commissioner in Official Capacity; and J. Winston Krause, Commissioner in his Official Capacity.

Author of Opinion: Chief Judge Stewart (dissents by Judge Dennis and Judge Graves)

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 07/29/2014 12:20 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 24, 2014
  United States v. Smith - 8th Circuit
Headline Eighth Circuit panel affirms exclusion of defendant's expert testimony and proposed jury instructions concerning laser beam aimed at aircraft

Area of Law Federal Aviation Safety

Issue(s) Presented Whether the district court properly excluded defendant's expert testimony concerning the perceived range of a laser and rejected defendant's proposed jury instructions regarding an "intent to hit" the aircraft.

Brief Summary A jury convicted the Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 39(a), which makes it a criminal offense to "knowingly aim the beam of a laser pointer at an aircraft . . . or at the flight path of such an aircraft." The conviction stemmed from the Defendant pointing a laser beam into the sky and illuminating the cockpit of a police helicopter. At trial, Defendant argued that though he pointed a laser beam at the aircraft, he believed that the laser beam would not actually reach the helicopter and therefore did not "knowingly aim" at it.
In support, Defendant proposed a jury instruction stating that he could not knowingly aim his laser beam at the aircraft if he mistakenly believed that the laser beam could not reach the aircraft. He also attempted to introduce expert testimony regarding the perceived range of a laser to support his mistaken belief. The District Court refused the proposed instruction and excluded the expert testimony based on the Court's interpretation of the statute as simply requiring knowledge that the laser beam was pointed at an aircraft, with no intent to hit the aircraft required.

On appeal of the conviction, a panel of the Eighth Circuit, in its first interpretation of the statute, affirmed the District Court's rulings. The panel concluded that the use of the word "aim" in the statute does not require an "intent to hit" the object at which the laser beam is directed. Rather, the panel held that based on the common usage of the term "aim at" and the wording of the statute as a whole, "knowingly aim" means simply to knowingly point a laser beam at an aircraft, and does not require an offender to intend for the laser beam to strike the aircraft at issue.

The full text of the opinion may be found at http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/14/06/132728P.pdf

Panel Chief Judge Riley and Circuit Judges Beam and Shepherd

Date of Issued Opinion June 27, 2014

Decided Affirmed

Docket Number 13-2728

Counsel Frederick Franklin for the United States and Richard Haile McWilliams for Defendant

Author Chief Judge Riley

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor Joelle Larson, University of Minnesota Law School

Edited: 07/24/2014 at 11:42 AM by Joelle Larson

    Posted By: Joelle Larson @ 07/24/2014 11:30 AM     8th Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 22, 2014
  Halbig v. Burwell
Headline: IRS health insurance tax credits available only to residents of states that established their own health care Exchanges.

Area of Law: Affordable Care Act; Administrative Procedure Act

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the Affordable Care Act permits the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased through federal Exchanges.

Brief Summary: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted in 2010 as a comprehensive effort "to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care." The ACA focuses on helping individuals purchase health insurance through Exchanges, which, among other things, determine what health plans satisfy federal and state standards and operate websites that facilitate enrollment. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have established Exchanges; the remaining states rely on Exchanges operated by the federal government through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted as part of the ACA, qualified individuals who purchase insurance through an Exchange receive a tax credit to offset some of the cost of their insurance. The text of section 36B defines the amount of the credit with reference to "an Exchange established by the State under 1311 of the [ACA]." In May 2012, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated a regulation interpreting section 36B to allow credit for insurance purchased through either a state- or federally-established Exchange.

Appellants, a group of individuals and employers residing in states that did not establish state Exchanges, challenged that regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that it was inconsistent with the language of section 36B and thus "not in accordance with law." The district court held that the ACA's text, structure, purpose, and legislative history make "clear that Congress intended to make premium tax credits available on both state-run and federally-facilitated Exchanges," and that even if the ACA were ambiguous, the regulation would represent a permissible construction entitled to deference under Chevron.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court decision. The court found that the plain language of section 36B required an Exchange to be state-created in order to trigger the subsidies. While the court conceded that section 1321 of the ACA, which directs the HHS Secretary to establish an Exchange when a state is unable or unwilling to do so, created equivalence between state and federal Exchanges in some respects, it held that the equivalence did not go as far as finding "federally-established Exchanges" to be, in fact or legal fiction, "Exchanges established by the State."

The court rejected the government's argument that adopting this interpretation of section 36B would render other sections of the ACA absurd. Warning that an overbroad application of the absurdity doctrine "contradicts the rule-of-law objectives implicit in the Constitution's strict separation of lawmaking from judging," the court determined that the government's contention that giving effect to the literal meaning of the text of 36B would make other sections of the statute superfluous or nonsensical did not cross the "high threshold of unreasonableness" necessary to conclude that the statute did not mean what it said.
Turning to the legislative history of the ACA, the court found that the government failed to present evidence that the literal meaning of the stature was "demonstrably at odds with the intentions of [its]drafters." The court also found the government's argument that section 36B should be read to harmonize with the larger goals of the ACA, which depend on the availability of subsidies, unpersuasive, concluding that the legislative record provided too little indication of intent to supersede the statutory text.

Judge Edwards argued in dissent that section 36B was ambiguous when read in the larger context of the ACA, and that the regulation treating state and federally-created Exchanges the same for purposes of the subsidy was a permissible interpretation of the statute under Chevron.


For the full text of the opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/14-5018-1503850.pdf.

Panel (if known): Griffith, Edwards, and Randolph

Argument Date (if known): March 25, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: July 22, 2014

Docket Number: 14-5018

Decided: Reversed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel (if known): Michael A. Carvin, Yaakov M. Roth, and Jonathan Berry for appellants. Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen, Beth S. Brinkmann, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Griffith

Dissent by: Edwards

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 07/22/2014 05:41 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

  United States v. Holmes and 8th Circuit
Headline Eighth Circuit panel affirms district court discretionary decision to permit U.S. Marshall to testify as expert on the iconography of the Mexican drug underworld

Area of Law Evidence

Issue(s) Presented Whether the district court abused its discretion when it permitted a U.S. Marshall to give expert testimony on the subject of narco-saint iconography

Brief Summary A jury convicted Defendants Holmes and Rendon of "conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846." The district court permitted a U.S. Marshall to testify at trial. The Marshall "linked to drug trafficking several images and shrines in the home of Rendon [and another alleged co-conspirator]." The Marshall focused on the image of Jesus Malverde, a "'narco saint' hailed as a 'Mexican Robin Hood,'" as one indicator of drug activity. The Defendants objected to the testimony, but the Eighth Circuit panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Marshall's opinion.

The Defendants argued that the district court's decision to admit the testimony constituted reversible error on several grounds. They argued first that the Marshall was unqualified as an expert. But the Eighth Circuit panel concluded that the Marshall's study and travel experiences, his self-published materials, and his law-enforcement trainings established sufficient qualifications. The Defendants argued next that the Marshall's opinion was unreliable because of the many non-drug traffickers who have statues of Malverde. But the panel concluded that the reliability rate of the Marshall's "non-scientific" opinion could be based upon the Marshall's own observations and experiences. The Defendants then argued that the Marshall's opinion was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. But the panel cited to other Eighth Circuit opinions accepting "expert testimony on the modus operandi of drug dealers." The Defendants then finally argued that the Marshall's testimony constituted impermissible "drug courier profile evidence." But the panel distinguished between drug-courier profile evidence (which explains the "investigative techniques" law enforcement uses to identify drug couriers) and "modus operandi" evidence (which explains the "paraphernalia of drug trafficking)." As a result, the panel affirmed the district court's ruling and the jury conviction.

Judge Kelly concurred in the ultimate result, but disagreed with the panel majority on the admission of the Marshall's testimony. First, Judge Kelly concluded that the Marshall's opinion was in reality not modus operandi testimony but actually drug-courier profiling. Second, Judge Kelly concluded that the Marshall's opinion, while perhaps based on personal knowledge and experience, was not produced from his law enforcement knowledge and experience but rather from self-study and self-publication activities.

The full text of the opinion may be found at Text

Panel Circuit Judges Gruender, Benton, and Kelly

Date of Issued Opinion May 12, 2014

Decided Affirmed

Docket Number 13-1660

Counsel Alexander D. Morgan, for the United States; James Phillips, for Defendant Holmes; Richard Eugene Holiman, for Defendant Rendon

Author Circuit Judge Benton

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor Bradley G. Clary, Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School

    Posted By: Bradley Clary @ 07/22/2014 11:01 AM     8th Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 21, 2014
  Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Headline: The Defense of Production Act's ban on judicial review of Presidential Orders does not preclude courts from hearing due process challenges.

Area of Law:
Defense of Production Act; Federal Courts; Due Process

Issue Presented
: Whether a foreign-owned company ordered by the President to divest itself of American holdings under Section 721 of the Defense of Production Act may make a procedural due process challenge to that order despite a statutory provision stating that the actions and findings of the President "shall not be subject to judicial review."

Brief Summary: In March 2012, Defendant Ralls Corporation, an American company owned by Chinese nationals, purchased four American companies formed to develop windfarms in Oregon. The Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) reviewed the purchase under Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), which gives it authority to review transactions "which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States." CFIUS decided that the proximity of the planned windfarms to restricted airspace and a military bombing zone threatened national security and issued an order in July 2012 directing Ralls to cease construction and operations at the site. In September, the President completed his review of the transaction and, agreeing with CFIUS, issued a Presidential Order prohibiting the transaction and ordering Ralls to divest itself of the windfarm assets. Although Section 721 of the DPA states that the Presidential Order "shall not be subject to judicial review," Ralls filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the order on numerous grounds, including that the company was not offered the opportunity to review and rebut the evidence on which the decision was based, in violation of the Due Process Clause. The District Court found that Section 721 barred judicial review of many of the claims but rejected Ralls' due process charge for failure to state a claim. Ralls appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. First the Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the due process claim. The court reasoned that a statutory bar on judicial review precludes consideration of constitutional claims only where there is "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress so intended. Examining the text and legislative history of the statute, the court found no evidence that Congress had intended to exclude constitutional challenges to the process. The court distinguished McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of Judicial Conference of the United States, 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001), on the basis that Congress had provided an alternative mechanism for review of process-based challenges in that statute that would have rendered review by an Article III court superfluous.

The court then rejected the government's claim that review of the Order presented a non-justiciable political question. Applying the six disjunctive prongs of Baker v. Carr, the court found that the due process claim did not call for review of either the President's decision that the acquisition of the project companies threatened national security or the President's prohibition of the transaction in order to mitigate the national security threat.

Turning to the merits of the due process claim, the court rejected the district court's conclusion that Ralls's fully-vested state law property interests were "too contingent for constitutional protection" given the likelihood of CFIUS review. The court then concluded that the Constitution required permitting Ralls access to the unclassified evidence on which CFIUS relied and an opportunity to rebut that evidence. Because the process afforded Ralls fell short of this constitutional minimum, the court reversed the dismissal.

For the full text of the opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/13-5315-1502552.pdf.

Panel: Henderson, Brown, and Wilkins

Argument Date: May 5, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: July 15, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-5315

Decided: Reversed and remanded.

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel (if known): Paul D. Clement, Viet D. Dinh, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, and George W. Hicks, Jr. for the appellant. Douglas N. Letter, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen, Jr., and Sonia K. McNeil for the appellees.

Author of Opinion: Henderson

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 07/21/2014 10:55 AM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 16, 2014
  Hoven v. Walgreen Co. - Sixth Circuit
Headline: Sixth Circuit upholds Walgreen's firing of employee who shot at armed gunmen during store robbery, rejecting claim that the termination violated public policy.

Areas of Law: Employment law; the United States Constitution; the Michigan Constitution; and Michigan Compiled Laws.

Issue Presented: Did Walgreen violate Michigan public policy when it fired an at-will employee for shooting at a masked gunman during a store robbery, in self-defense, using a handgun for which the employee had a permit?

Brief Summary: A Walgreen employee sued for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy after he fired his handgun in self-defense during a robbery at his Walgreen store. Walgreen removed the action to the federal court. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Walgreen. The employee appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the employee's termination for exercising his rights of self-defense, defense of others, and carrying a concealed weapon did not violate public policy and thus was not actionable under Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit concluded that Michigan's Self-Defense Act did not confer any general right to engage in self-defense or defense of others.

Extended Summary: Jeremy Hoven, a full-time pharmacist at Walgreen, first experienced an armed robbery in 2007. After the robbery, Hoven asked Walgreen to improve store security. When Walgreen denied his request, Hoven underwent training and got a concealed-weapon permit. He then began carrying a concealed handgun at work.
About three years after the first robbery, Hoven was working the overnight shift when two masked individuals with guns entered the store. Hoven tried to dial 911, but one of the masked gunmen pointed a gun at him. When Hoven saw the masked gunman's finger jerking on the gun's trigger, Hoven drew his own weapon and fired several times. No one was injured in the incident.

After a company investigation, Walgreen officials told Hoven that he had violated the company's nonescalation policy. Walgreen gave Hoven the option to resign or be terminated. He refused to resign, and Walgreen fired him. Hoven sued Walgreen alleging that his termination violated seven public - policy considerations, which the Sixth Circuit addressed.
First, the Court relied on precedent that established three instances when a termination of employment would violate public policy: (1) The employee is discharged in violation of an explicit legislative statement prohibiting discharge of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty; (2) the employee is discharged for the failure or refusal to violate the law in the course of employment; or (3) the employee is discharged for exercising a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment. McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Mich. 2009).

Applying these three factors to the employee's case, the Court found no cause of action under the first two instances, but it did consider whether the employee's claims fit under the third instance: exercising a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment.

To begin, the Sixth Circuit stated that under Michigan law a private actor does not violate public policy when it fires an employee based on a constitutional provision. According to the Sixth Circuit, although the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution limit state interference with an individual's right to bear arms, private actors are not bound by those limitations. Therefore, the Court found that the employee's federal and state constitutional arguments were not valid.

The Sixth Circuit also rejected the employee's reliance on the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions and the Michigan Self-Defense Act. The Court held that the employee's arguments were unpersuasive, as the criminal jury instructions were not a legislative enactment, and there is no general "right" to engage in self-defense. Rather the law conferred a right to receive a rebuttable presumption of self-defense. Therefore, the Court rejected these public-policy claims.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit considered the employee's argument about the state's concealed-weapon permit law, which states that an employer may not prohibit employees from receiving a license to carry a concealed weapon and carrying a concealed weapon. The court noted that a section of that statute expresses that the right to carry a concealed weapon in the course of employment may be limited. Therefore, Walgreen was permitted to limit an employee's use of a concealed weapon on its premises. Accordingly, the Court held that the concealed-weapon permit law did not support the employee's claim.

For all these reasons, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on Walgreen's pleadings.

Panel: Judge Moore, Gibbons, and Sutton

Date of Issued Opinion: June 2, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1011

Decided: Petition for review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of Walgreens

Counsel: ARGUED: Daniel D. Swanson, SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. Adam S. Forman, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel D. Swanson, Jesse L. Young, SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. Adam S. Forman, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

Link to full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...ns.pdf/14a0115p-06.pdf

Case Alert Author: Ogenna Iweajunwa

Author of Opinion: Judge Moore

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Erika Breitfeld

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 07/16/2014 03:23 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

July 15, 2014
  Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States
Headline: Ex Post Facto Clause no bar to conspiracy charge against Guantanamo-based 9/11 conspirator tried under the Military Commission Act of 2006.

Area of Law: Ex Post Facto Clause; Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006; International Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether, consistent with the Military Commission Act of 2006 and the Ex Post Facto Clause, the government can prosecute a 9/11 conspirator detained at Guantanamo for conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes.

Brief Summary: Bahlul, a native of Yemen, joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and worked his way into Osama bin Laden's inner circle. He produced recruitment videos celebrating the suicide bombing attack on the U.S.S. Cole and was intimately involved in the planning and execution of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bahlul was captured in Pakistan in December 2001 and transferred to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, where U.S. forces have detained him ever since as an enemy combatant.

Initial charges against Bahlul were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. After the Hamdan court found that the military commission procedures then in place violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Congress enacted the Military Commission Act of 2006, which attempted to cure those procedural flaws. In 2008, military prosecutors renewed charges against Bahlul for conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes. Bahlul admitted all of the underlying factual allegations but challenged the legitimacy of the military commission. The commission convicted him of all three offenses and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Bahlul appealed. During the pendency of Bahlul's appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, in Hamdan II, that the 2006 MCA did not authorize retroactive prosecution for conduct not already subject to criminal sanction before passage of the act and that providing material support for terrorism was not a pre-existing war crime triable by military commission. Applying Hamdan II, a panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated Bahlul's conviction on all counts. The government successfully petitioned for rehearing en banc. In its appeal, the government conceded that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to trials by military commission pursuant to the MCA.

The en banc majority reversed as to the conspiracy claim and affirmed the vacatur of the material support and solicitation claims. The court began by overruling Hamdan II on the basis that the MCA unambiguously proclaims its retroactive effect, thus precluding application of the constitutional "avoidance canon." Because Bahlul had not raised an Ex Post Facto claim below, however, the majority reviewed only for plain error. The majority assumed, without deciding, that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to military commission proceedings given the government's concession on appeal. The court found no merit to Bahlul's Ex Post Facto challenge to the conspiracy conviction on two alternative grounds. First, the court found that conspiracy was already criminalized under other federal statutes, and, while the elements of conspiracy under the MCA differed from statutory conspiracy, those differences did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the commission's proceedings. Second, the court noted that the Supreme Court had not resolved the question of whether conspiracy to commit war crimes was a law-of-war offense triable by a military commission. Given the Supreme Court's inability to resolve the issue, the majority reasoned, it could not be "plain error" for a military commission to hear the claim. Turning to the other two charges, material support and solicitation, the court agreed with Bahlul that they were not subject to criminal sanction prior to the enactment of the MCA and that the prosecution of these claims was therefore foreclosed by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court rejected the government's claims that prosecutions for material support dated back to the Civil War, finding that the examples cited did not "establish that such conduct was tried by law-of-war military commissions" and that the comparison was "too distinguishable and imprecise." The court further held that solicitation was "plainly not traditionally triable" and thus upheld Bahlul's Ex Post Facto challenge.

The panel majority was joined in its entirety by four of seven judges. Several judges wrote separately, each grappling with the government's concession that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies in the military commission context and taking issue with the majority's decision to review for plain error rather than to definitively resolve the question.

For the full text of the opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/11-1324-1502277.pdf.

Panel (if known): En banc

Argument Date (if known): September 30, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: July 14, 2014

Docket Number: 11-1324

Decided: Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel (if known): Michel Paradis, Mary R. McCormick, and Todd E. Pierce for petitioner. Ian H. Gershengorn, Steven M. Dunne, John F. De Pue, Jeffrey M. Smith, Francis A. Gilligan and Edward S. White for respondent.

Author of Opinion: Henderson

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 07/15/2014 06:34 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Upholds Race-Conscious Admissions Policy at University of Texas.

Area of Law: Constitutional Law: Equal Protection.

Issue Presented: Whether the University of Texas violates the Equal Protection Clause by considering applicants' race as one part of its admissions plan.

Brief Summary: The University of Texas at Austin admits most of its incoming class through the state's Top Ten Percent Plan (which considers applicants' class rank in high school) and the remainder of its class through a more holistic process that includes consideration of race as one component. The university contends that some consideration of race is necessary in order to achieve a critical mass of minority students. In a prior round of litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the admissions program against a constitutional challenge brought by a white student who was denied admission. Last year, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, concluding that the Fifth Circuit had not properly applied the "strict scrutiny" standard that applies to the government's use of racial classifications. In particular, the Supreme Court faulted the Fifth Circuit for showing excessive deference to the university's claim that consideration of race was necessary to achieve the goal of a diverse student body. On reconsideration, the Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed its prior ruling. Having scrutinized the university's plan again, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the university's consideration of race is narrowly tailored to achieving the compelling goal of diversity and that race-neutral alternatives would not suffice. The university's admissions plan is therefore lawful.

For the full opinion, please see: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/op...ub\09/09-50822-CV2.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges King, Higginbotham, and Garza.

Argument Date: 11/13/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 7/15/2014

Docket Number: No. 09-50822

Decided: Affirmed

Counsel: Bert Walter Rein, Wiley Rein, L.L.P., for Plaintiff-Appellant Fisher; Gregory George Garre, Latham & Watkins, L.L.P., for Defendant-Appellee University of Texas at Austin.

Author of Opinion: Judge Higginbotham (Judge Garza dissenting)

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 07/15/2014 04:45 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

June 29, 2014
  Kitchen v. Herbert-- 10th Circuit
Case Name: Kitchen v. Herbert -- 10th Circuit

Headline: Tenth Circuit holds that right of same-sex couples to marry and have marriages recognized by the state is fundamental; state laws banning same-sex marriage violate Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law

Issue Presented:

May a state deny a citizen the benefit and protection of State marital laws based on the gender of person the citizen chooses to marry?

Brief Summary:

The State of Utah passed a series of laws, including Utah Code § 30-1-2(5), which voided marriages between same sex couples, § 30-1-4.1, which provided that Utah will only recognize marriages between a man and a woman, and a constitutional amendment, Amendment 3, which added a provision to the Utah Constitution that defined marriage as a legal union between a man and woman, and stated that only marriages between a man and woman would be recognized. This Amendment was passed by voters, and became article I, section 29 of the Utah Constitution. Collectively, the laws are known as "Amendment 3."

Plaintiffs sued the Governor of Utah, the Attorney General of Utah, and Salt Lake County Clerk in Federal District Court for the District of Utah, alleging that Amendment 3 violated their rights to due process and equal protection under the law. Plaintiffs asked the court for a declaratory judgment that Amendment 3 was unconstitutional and requested an injunction stopping its enforcement. The district court ruled for the plaintiffs on their cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that the laws denied the plaintiffs equal protection, because it classified the plaintiffs on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, but found that the laws violated the plaintiff's substantive due process right, because the right to marry is a fundamental right. After finding that the right to marry was fundamental, the Tenth Circuit held that the State of Utah had provided no compelling reason for the law, and that the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet the strict scrutiny standard necessary to overcome a substantive due process challenge. Additionally, although the issue was not raised by the parties, the court addressed the appellant's standing to challenge the ruling of the district court, because the Salt Lake County Clerk did not appeal the ruling. The majority found that the Governor and Attorney General were proper defendants to the underlying suit and did have standing to challenge the ruling.

Judge Kelly concurred and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority that the appellants did have standing to challenge the decision, but disagreeing that same sex marriage fell into the category of a fundamental right, and stating that the State of Utah had met the rational basis standard for justifying a law facing an equal protection challenge.

Extended Summary:

The State of Utah passed Utah Code Sections 30-1-2(5), 30-1-4.1, and, with the approval of voters, Amendment 3 to the Utah Constitution to ensure that same-sex marriages would not be legally performed or recognized in the State of Utah (collectively known as Amendment 3). The laws included marriages performed in other states. The laws were passed because state legislators and citizens felt threatened by state-court opinions allowing same-sex marriage.

Plaintiffs challenged the laws on the grounds that they were denied several marriage benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples, including the ability to file joint state tax returns, hold marital property, claim benefits under their partners' pension or make medical decisions when their partners become ill. Additionally, plaintiffs state that they were not afforded the "dignity, respect, and esteem" of marriage. Plaintiffs Archer and Call were married in Iowa, but the State of Utah refused to recognize their marriage.

Plaintiffs brought suit in United States District Court for the District of Utah against the Governor and Attorney General of Utah, and the Clerk of Salt Lake County in their official capacities. Plaintiffs stated that the laws violate their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of the fundamental right to choose the person they want to marry and to have that marriage recognized. Additionally, they claimed that Amendment 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs asked the court for a declaratory judgment that Amendment 3 was unconstitutional and an injunction barring its enforcement.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation, had a fundamental right to marry. Additionally, the District Court found that Amendment 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause because the laws classified citizens on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, without a rational basis. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of Amendment 3. The Governor and Attorney General then appealed and moved to stay the district court's decision. Both the Tenth Circuit and the district court denied the stay, but the Supreme Court granted the stay pending a decision by the Tenth Circuit.

The majority first addressed the issue of standing, even though it was not raised by the parties. The court held that at least four of the plaintiffs had standing because they were unable to obtain marriage licenses from the Salt Lake County Clerk and identified harm that flowed from this denial, including financial injury. The plaintiffs proved that the County Clerk caused their injury because the Clerk denied them a marriage license and demonstrated that an injunction barring enforcement of Amendment 3 would cure the injury. Therefore, the plaintiffs demonstrated the necessary "meaningful nexus" between the defendant and the injury.

The majority then considered whether the Governor and the Attorney General had standing to challenge the district court's ruling, because the Salt Lake County Clerk did not appeal the decision. The court noted that it determined in Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 333 F.App'x 361 (10th Cir. 2009), that Oklahoma's Governor and Attorney General were not the proper defendants in a challenge to Oklahoma's prohibition on same-sex marriage. In that opinion, the court based its decision on the fact that marriage licensing in Oklahoma was a judicial power. The district court clerk in Oklahoma was charged with issuing marriage licenses, and as such, the executive branch did not have the authority to issue a marriage license or record a marriage. In contrast, Utah marriage licenses are issued by county clerks. The Governor is charged with supervising executive and ministerial offices, like the county clerk, and as such had standing to challenge the suit. Furthermore, the Attorney General had the duty to supervise or assist county, district, and city attorneys in the discharge of their duties. Because knowingly issuing a marriage license to a same-sex couple is a misdemeanor in Utah, the Attorney General would supervise any charges filed against a county clerk who issued a marriage license to a same-sex couple. This authority, combined with the Governor and Attorney General's "willingness to exercise" their duties related to the enforcement of Amendment 3, made them appropriate defendants in this appeal. Particularly because the Attorney General is empowered to direct the Utah State Tax Commission to recognize Archer and Call's out of state marriage, Archer and Call had standing to sue the Attorney General for their injuries related to Amendment 3's non-recognition provisions. Archer and Call were able to sue the Governor for the same reason - the Governor had the ability to appoint and remove state tax commissioners from office. Therefore, by nature of their supervisory power, the Governor and the Attorney General had the requisite nexus between Amendment 3 and the injuries suffered by plaintiffs. As proper defendants to the underlying lawsuit, they had standing to challenge the district court's decision on appeal, even without the Salt Lake County Clerk.

The majority began its analysis of Amendment 3 by discussing the history of litigation regarding same-sex marriage. The court stated that Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) was decided on a summary dismissal for want of a federal question. In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a ban on same-sex marriage, stating that marriage meant a union between two persons of the opposite sex, and uniquely involved procreation and child rearing. It then stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was not to be used to restructure the institution of marriage, and that there was no irrational discrimination that violated Equal Protection Clause. The majority noted that although summary dismissals are to be treated as a decision on the merits, it agreed with the district court that "doctrinal developments" found in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) had superceded Baker, noting that nearly every federal court since Windsor was decided has determined that Baker is no longer controlling. Because doctrinal developments had occurred since Baker, the majority determined it could make a decision on the merits of the issue. Lawrence held that individuals have the right to make intimate contact with another person, including homosexual persons. Windsor determined that the federal government does not have the right to deny recognition of a marriage license issued by a state to a same-sex couple. Although the court recognized the federalism concerns set forth in Windsor and stressed by the appellants, the majority stated that the federal government has the power to make determinations that affect marital rights, including insurance proceeds, immigration, and Social Security benefits. Furthermore, the court stated that Windsor framed the issue as a question of essential liberty rather than a federalism issue.

Next, the majority explained the standards of review to be used. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and a permanent injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Summary judgment is granted to a moving party only if the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. In order to obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must show "(1) actual success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued will not adversely affect the public interest." The court only reviewed the merits aspect, because the appellants only challenged the merits.

The majority then determined whether the right to marry an individual of the same sex qualified as a fundamental liberty. A fundamental liberty must be deeply rooted in the Nation's history and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed." The majority noted that the right to marry itself is unquestionably a fundamental right.

Appellants argued that the right to marry only applied to opposite-sex marriage, and that same-sex marriage was not deeply rooted in the Nation's tradition because it had only recently been considered by citizens that two same-sex individuals might aspire to marry. The majority responded to this argument by showing that the court had always discussed the right to marry as a broad right, pointing to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that banning interracial marriage was unconstitutional, and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), which held that a state cannot ban individuals in arrearage of child support obligations from marrying. Appellants asserted that Loving and Zablocki were distinguishable because they both discussed opposite-sex couples, and only opposite-sex couples are procreative. Appellants pointed to Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 31 U.S. 678 (1977), for evidence that the Supreme Court had discussed the rights of marriage and procreation together. The majority responded to this by stating that the Supreme Court has discussed the fundamental right to marry and the right to procreate as separate. The majority noted that Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), which appellants relied on heavily, described Loving as a marriage case, where it described Skinner as a procreation case. Furthermore, the majority stated that Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), invalidated the concept that marriage is fundamental because of procreation potential. In Turner, the Supreme Court considered the right of inmates to marry, and invalidated a law barring inmates who had not procreated from marrying. The majority stated that the issue in Turner was framed broadly - not as the right of "inmate marriage," but whether the fact of incarceration made it impossible for inmates to benefit from marriage. Turner stressed that the importance of marriage is based on personal aspects, including emotional support and public commitment. The majority then stated that this holding is consistent with other Supreme Court decisions where the court has discussed the freedom to marry, including the freedom to choose one's spouse, in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) and Carey.

Appellants argued that the personal elements inherent in the institution of marriage, such as the freedom to choose one's spouse, to decide whether to have children, and to publicly proclaim commitment to one another are not the principal interests the State has in regulating marriage. The majority found that these personal elements reinforce the childrearing family structure and support the dignity of each person. It then noted that the dignity factor was emphasized in Windsor.

The majority then noted the similarity of Windsor to the difficulties faced by plaintiffs Archer and Call, who were married in Iowa but could not have their marriage recognized in Utah. It stated that the fundamental right to marry included the right to remain married.

Next, the majority stated that the appellants' assertion that the right to marry is fundamental because of its connection with procreation is undermined by the fact that individuals have a fundamental right to choose not to procreate, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which stated that individuals have the right to choose whether to bear a child regardless of if they are married or single, and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which recognized the right of married couples to use contraception. Furthermore, the court noted that nearly 3,000 children in Utah were being raised by same-sex couples, even though same-sex couples are banned under Utah law from jointly adopting children. The majority pointed to this information as evidence that childrearing is exercised by both opposite-sex and same-sex couples, and even single individuals.

The majority also noted that biological relationships are not determinative of the existence of a family, citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). It noted that Windsor stated that restrictions on same-sex marriage humiliated children of same-sex couples and made it difficult for them to understand the integrity of their own family. The laws, as stated in Windsor, discouraged those children from being considered members of a family.

Appellants stated that the Tenth Circuit would have to define marriage in order to find that there is a right to marriage, and that marriage, by definition, excluded same-sex couples. The majority responded to this by stating that the Supreme Court has described the right to marry in broad terms, and stated that a claimed liberty cannot be framed as being exercised by a specific class of persons. The court noted that before Windsor, many courts had found that that the right to marry could not be exercised by same-sex couples, but the majority stated that it is impermissible to focus on class-membership of the individual exercising a right when determining a liberty interest. The court rejected the appellants' assertion that plaintiffs are excluded from marriage by definition as circular, because many states do permit same-sex marriage, and because appellants' reliance on the definition of marriage is not meaningful. The majority again pointed to Windsor, where the Court invalidated Section 3 of DOMA, which limited the federal definition of marriage to a legal union between a man and woman. The majority then noted that definitions are not immune from constitutional scrutiny.

The majority then noted that Lawrence precluded the narrow definition of the fundamental right sought by appellants. In Lawrence, the Court rejected its previous holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the court framed the liberty right as the right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy. In Lawrence, the Court recognized that there was no history of a right to engage in homosexual sex, but stated that the characterization of the right in Bowers was too narrow. The majority then noted that Lawrence alluded to marriage, stating that individuals in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for the personal decisions related to marriage, just as heterosexual people do.

The majority then stated that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have not changed, but that as knowledge and understanding of what it means to be gay or lesbian changes, the liberty of those who were previously excluded should be recognized.

Having determined that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty, the majority then analyzed whether Amendment 3 was "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." The court considered the four justifications for Amendment 3 - that the laws furthered the state's interest in "(1) 'fostering a child-centric marriage culture that encourages parents to subordinate their own interests to the needs of their children'; (2) children being raised by their biological mothers and fathers - or at least by a married mother and father in a stable home'; (3) 'ensuring adequate reproduction'; and (4) accommodating religious freedom and reducing the potential for civic strife.'"

The majority stated that the first three interests did not meet strict scrutiny. The common thread between the first three claims is the link between marriage and procreation. However, the majority found that the law is under-inclusive, because the recognition of valid marriages does not differentiate between couples that procreate and couples that do not. The elderly, infertile, and those who do not wish to have children or choose to adopt are still free to marry and have out-of-state marriages recognized in Utah. The majority further illustrated its point by demonstrating that marriages between first cousins in Utah are predicated on the inability to have children. The majority also noted that several district courts had rejected similar attempts to ban same-sex marriage. The majority also explained that under-inclusiveness also invalidated the prohibition on marriage by child-support debtors in Zablocki, because the challenged provisions did not limit the incurrence of financial commitments of those debtors other than through marriage. The law in Eisenstadt, which prohibited distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, was also under-inclusive on the grounds that using contraceptives is immoral. The majority also noted that a law basing marriage on a couple's ability and willingness to procreate also raised its own set of concerns. Finally, in response to appellant's statement that banning non-procreative individuals from marrying is impracticable, the majority explained that administrative challenges do not render a system constitutional, and noted that the statute authorizing marriage of non-procreative first cousins was inconsistent with appellant's position.

The majority stated that the State's interest in childbearing and childrearing did not share a causal connection to a ban on same-sex marriage. The majority relied on Windsor that the recognition of same-sex couples will not alter the personal decisions of opposite-sex couples.

Appellants asserted that the same-sex marriage ban is justified by the preference for children to be raised by a man and woman. However, the majority found that law was not narrowly tailored to meet this goal because the state does not restrict the right to marry based on parenting guidelines. The majority relied on Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the Court invalidated a law making the State the custodian of children of unwed parents upon the death of the mother. The Court concluded that not all unmarried fathers are unfit to raise their children, as asserted by the state. Similarly not all opposite-sex couples are preferable over any same-sex couple. The majority was unwilling to accept on faith the argument that children raised by opposite-sex parents are better off than children raised by same-sex parents, because arguments based on speculation cannot survive strict scrutiny. The court again pointed to Windsor, stating that the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage harms the children of those couples.

The majority addressed the final justification of accommodating religious freedom and reducing civic strife by stating that the Supreme Court has held that public opposition cannot form the basis for violating a fundamental right. Furthermore, the decision related only to civil marriage, not to religious ceremonies. Religious institutions, the majority emphasizes, are still free to practice their own traditions as they always have.

The majority then addressed appellants' concerns about the value of democratic decision-making by stating that fundamental rights may not be limited by voters, nor does the experimental value of federalism outweigh an individual's right to due process and equal protection.

Appellants raised a concern that recognizing same-sex marriage began a slippery slope toward recognizing polygamy and incest. However, the majority explained that its basis for finding that the plaintiffs were seeking to exercise a fundamental right was based on Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing a right to engage in same-sex relationships, whereas the Court had not recognized a right to engage in polygamy or incest. Appellants also contended that the decision would lead to the privatization of marriage, but the majority dismissed that because the appellants provided no authority to support that this would render the statutes constitutional.

Finally, the majority stressed that its opinion did not endorse a finding that those who oppose same-sex marriage are intolerant. The court stated that it was not making a judgment on the minds and hearts of those who support Amendment 3.

The court stayed its decision pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Judge Kelly, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority that the Governor and Attorney General were proper defendants, that the appeal was permissible without the Salt Lake County Clerk, and that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge Amendment 3. Judge Kelly disagreed, however, that Baker was not controlling and that there was a fundamental right to marry that could be exercised by the plaintiffs. Judge Kelly performed an analysis of the issue under the equal protection clause, and determined that Amendment 3 was rationally related to the State's interests in "(1) responsible procreation, (2) effective parenting, and (3) the desire to proceed cautiously in this evolving area."

The dissent stated that because the Constitution makes no mention of the regulation of marriage, it is a power that should be exercised by the States. Furthermore, although the Court has determined that marriage is a fundamental right, those decisions have always involved opposite-sex couples. The dissent emphasized the importance of allowing states to be "laboratories of democracy," stating the forcing all States to recognize same-gender marriage "turns the notion of a limited national government on its head."

The dissent stated that Baker must still be controlling because summary dismissals by the Supreme Court are still considered decisions on the merits that are to be followed by lower courts until the Supreme Court makes a contrary decision.

The dissent addressed plaintiffs' argument that excluding same-sex couples from marriage is a gender-based classification. However, the dissent noted that Amendment 3 does not treat men and women differently - same-sex male and same-sex female couples are equally subject to the laws. Because there is no disparate treatment between men and women, there is no basis for a gender discrimination equal protection claim.

Plaintiffs then argued that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation required heightened scrutiny. However, the dissent noted that the Supreme Court had not assigned a level of scrutiny to sexual orientation, and that the Tenth Circuit had already rejected heightened scrutiny in Price-Cornelson v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1113 n.9 (10th Cir. 2008), Walmer v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1995), and Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 1992).

The dissent explains that the fundamental right to marry does not extend to same-sex couples because same-sex marriage is a recent concept. Thus, there is no deeply rooted tradition in the Nation's history required for a fundamental rights classification. Romer, Lawrence and Windsor created protection for "moral and sexual choices" of same-sex couples, but did not create a fundamental right to same-gender marriage, or state that heightened scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on sexual orientation. Furthermore, the dissent noted that the Court in Lawrence specifically did not address the issue of same-sex marriage. Additionally, the dissent notes that Windsor did not limit the ability of a state to outlaw same-sex marriage or create a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but mandated that the federal government defer to States to make decisions regarding marriage.

With respect to rational basis, the dissent noted that extreme deference should be given to the decisions of the State, and that any plausible reason that the classification could advance will satisfy rational basis. Furthermore, the legislature need not have actually been motivated by the reason given, and a law may be over-inclusive or under-inclusive and still meet rational basis. The dissent noted that the procreative capabilities of opposite-gender couples are a permissible consideration by the legislature. Simply because the fundamental right to marriage has been discussed separate from procreation does not mean that legislatures may not consider procreation in regulating marriage.

Finally, the dissent urged that the court should refrain from using the Fourteenth Amendment as a means for imposing its views upon others.


To read the full opinion, please visit: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4178.pdf

Panel: Kelly, Lucero, Holmes

Date of Issued Opinion: June 25, 2014

Docket Number: 13-4178

Decided: Ruling that Amendment 3 is unconstitutional and preliminary injunction was affirmed, but a stay enforcing the injunction was issued until the Supreme Court of the United States had made a decision on any potential writ of certiorari.

Counsel:

Gene C. Schaerr, Special Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, Utah (Brian L. Tarbet, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Parker Douglas, Chief of Staff and General Counsel, Stanford E. Purser, and Philip S. Lott, Assistant Utah Attorneys General, Salt Lake City, Utah, and John J. Bursch, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Monte N. Stewart, Boise, Idaho, with him on the briefs), for Defendants - Appellants

Peggy A. Tomsic, Magleby & Greenwood PC, Salt Lake City, Utah (James E. Magleby and Jennifer Fraser Parrish, Magleby & Greenwood PC, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Kathryn D. Kendell, Shannon P. Minter, David C. Codell, National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, California, with her on the brief), for Plaintiffs - Appellees.*

Author: Lucero

Case Alert Author: Ashley L. Funkhouser

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Barbara Bergman

    Posted By: Barbara Bergman @ 06/29/2014 07:58 PM     10th Circuit     Comments (0)  

June 23, 2014
  Kuretski v. Commissioner of the IRS
Headline: D.C. Circuit holds U.S. Tax Court is part of the Executive Branch, and President's authority to remove Tax Court judges is constitutional.

Area of Law: Constitutional Law, Separation of Powers

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the President's authority to remove Tax Court judges for cause is a violation of constitutional separation of powers.

Brief Summary: Appellants, Peter and Kathleen Kuretski, failed to pay federal income taxes for the 2007 tax year. After assessing penalties and interests, the IRS attempted to collect the unpaid amount through a levy on the couple's home. In July, 2010, after failed attempts to reach a settlement with the IRS, the Kuretskis received notice that their request for a compromise and an abatement of penalties has been rejected. The Kuretskis unsuccessfully appealed that notice. A month later, they filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to vacate in the Tax Court, claiming for the first time that the Tax Court exercised judicial power under Article III of the Constitution, rendering 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f), which enables the President to remove Tax Court judges for cause, a violation of constitutional separation of powers. The Tax Court denied both motions, declining to address the Article III because the Kuretskis had, without explanation, failed to raise it until after the court's initial decision. The Kuretskis appealed, and both parties stipulated that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the proper venue for review.

After determining that the Kuretskis had standing to raise the claim, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision on both constitutional and non-constitutional grounds. Appellants' principal contention on appeal was that, because the Tax Court exercises "judicial power" under Article III of the Constitution, or, alternatively, because it is part of the Legislative Branch, the federal statute authorizing the President to remove Tax Court judges for cause "leaves those judges in an unconstitutional bind" because they "must fear removal from an actor in another branch."

The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument, concluding that the Tax Court is part of the Executive Branch. Applying the "public rights" doctrine, which allows Congress to constitutionally assign cases involving "public rights" to non-Article III tribunals, the court determined that it is "settled" that internal revenue and taxation fall into the "public rights" category. The court concluded that "Congress undisputedly exercised that option when it initially established the Tax Court as an Executive Branch agency rather than an Article III tribunal" and was unpersuaded by the Kuretskis' argument that the 1969 Tax Reform Act converted the Tax Court into an Article III court.

Addressing Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that the Tax Court was a "Court of Law" that "exercises a portion of the judicial power of the United States," the D.C. Circuit emphasized that Freytag dealt with the scope of the Appointments Clause and that the Court had clarified that "the judicial power of the United States is not limited to the judicial power defined under Article III."

Finally, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Kuretskis' alternative argument that the Tax Court functions as part of the Legislative Branch. While the court agreed that the Tax Court could be characterized as an Article I legislative court, it held that the court was not part of the Legislative Branch and its judges did not exercise "legislative powers" under Article I. While, under Freytag, the Tax Court has some measure of independence from the Executive Branch and exercises "something other than executive power," the court concluded that the Tax Court exercised its authority as part of the Executive Power and that its judges remain Executive Branch officers subject to presidential removal.

For the full opinion, please see http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/13-1090-1498618.pdf.

Panel: Srinivasan, Edwards, and Sentelle

Argument Date: November 26, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: June 20, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1090

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: Tuan N. Samahon, Carlton M. Smith, Frank Agostino, and John P.L. Miscione for appellants. Bethany B. Hauser, Teresan E. McLaughlin for appellee.

Author of Opinion: Srinivasan

Case Alert Circuit Supervisors: Elizabeth Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 06/23/2014 10:22 AM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

June 17, 2014
  All Party Parliamentary Group v. Department of Defense -- D.C. Circuit
Headline: D.C. Circuit determines that the term "representatives" of foreign government entities under FOIA's Foreign Government Entity Exception means "agents" of foreign governments.

Area of Law: Freedom of Information Act

Issue Presented: Whether a member of the British House of Commons, an informal British parliamentary caucus, and an American lawyer representing both are "representatives" of a foreign government entity within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act's Foreign Government Entity Exception.

Brief Summary:
Appellants, a member of the British parliament, an informal parliamentary caucus, and the American lawyer representing both, filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with various U.S. government agencies seeking information about the United Kingdom's alleged involvement in extraordinary rendition. Several agencies within the intelligence community declined to release relevant documents, invoking FOIA's Foreign Government Entity Exception, which prohibits intelligence agencies from releasing records to foreign government entities or their "representatives." According to the agencies, requesters, as a member of a foreign government, a "subdivision of a foreign government entity," and their legal representative, were "representatives" of the British government within the meaning of the act. The requesters sued to compel disclosure, arguing that only "agents" of foreign governments qualify as "representatives" under the exemption and that they were not agents of the British government because they lacked authority to file FOIA requests on their government's behalf. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, reasoning that "the term 'representative' is not synonymous with 'agent' for the purposes of [FOIA]" and concluding that all three requesters were British government "representatives" within the meaning of the Act.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, adopting appellants' narrower interpretation of "representative" as "agent." The D.C. Circuit began by noting that a narrow definition would not expose government secrets to terrorists or otherwise compromise national security because of other FOIA exemptions preventing disclosure of classified records. The court found that defining "representative" as "agent" comported with both the traditional and common-sense understandings of the term and reasoned that Congress would have used an alternate word "had it wanted to avoid incorporating agency principles into the Foreign Government Entity Exception." Examining the structure and purpose of the exemption, the court concluded that the "representative" language was intended to prevent foreign governments from evading the exception by having their agents file a FOIA motion, not to create an independent class of disfavored FOIA requesters. Finally, the court rejected the agencies' argument that interpreting "representative" to mean "agent" would impose additional burdens on intelligence agencies by requiring a time-intensive inquiry into whether each individual FOIA requester qualifies as an agent of a foreign government entity. The court found this exercise no more burdensome than any other FOIA analysis. Because appellants lacked authority to file FOIA requests on behalf of the United Kingdom, they were not its agents and fell outside the FOIA exemption.

For the full opinion, please see http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...e/13-5176-1497947.pdf.


Panel: Tatel, Griffith, and Pillard

Argument Date: May 7, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: June 17, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5176

Decided: Reversed and remanded.

Author of Opinion: Tatel

Counsel: Dominic F. Perella, Audrey E. Moog, Jonathan L. Abram, and Mary H. Wimberly for appellants. Charles W. Scarborough, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald Machen, and Matthew Collette for appellees.

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 06/17/2014 03:24 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

June 13, 2014
  United States v. Richards - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Upholds Federal "Crush Video" Law Against Constitutional Challenge.

Area of Law: First Amendment, criminal law.

Issue Presented: Whether the federal statute prohibiting creation and distribution of "crush videos" (18 U.S.C. § 48) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Brief Summary: Federal prosecutors charged the defendants with violating the federal "crush video" law, which prohibits the creation or distribution of certain pornographic films in which animals are killed or seriously harmed. The current version of the law was enacted after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the prior version on First Amendment grounds several years ago. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the revised statute still violates the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion, agreeing that the statute is unconstitutional. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the revised statute is constitutional. The court accordingly reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Significance: The Fifth Circuit upholds the federal "crush video" law, a prior version of which had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Extended Summary: In United States v. Stevens (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal statute prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Congress responded by amending the statute to reach a narrower range of conduct. The revised statute applies to videos that (1) depict conduct in which animals are intentionally killed or seriously injured and (2) are "obscene." 18 U.S.C. § 48.

Federal prosecutors charged Ashley Nicole Richards and Brent Justice with violating the new version of the law. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the revised statute is still unconstitutional on its face. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion, agreeing that the statute violates the First Amendment.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court and concluded that the revised statute is constitutional. The Fifth Circuit observed that the new version is significantly narrower than its predecessor, most importantly in that it reaches only "obscene" depictions of harm to animals. "Obscene" speech, as defined in a long line of precedent, is constitutionally unprotected sexual material. Therefore, by definition, the statute by its terms reaches only unprotected speech. The defendants further contended that even if the statute prohibits only obscenity, the statute unfairly targets only a narrow category of obscenity based on the nature of its content (i.e., only those obscene depictions that involve injury to animals). The court rejected this argument, reasoning that particular categories of obscenity may be targeted based on their socially harmful secondary effects - here, cruelty to animals.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

For the full opinion, please see: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/op...ub\13/13-20265-CR0.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson

Argument Date: 3/11/2014

Date of Issued Opinion: 6/13/2014

Docket Number: No. 13-20265

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Counsel: John Michael Pellettieri, Department of Justice, for Plaintiff-Appellant United States; Joyce A. Raynor for Defendant-Appellee Richards; Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender's Office, for Defendant-Appellee Justice.

Author of Opinion: Judge Higginson

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 06/13/2014 09:32 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Mendoza v. Perez -- D.C. Circuit
Headline: D.C. Circuit permits Americans herders to challenge Labor guidance allowing the hiring of foreign herders.

Area of Law: Administrative Law, Standing

Issue(s) Presented: Whether American herders have standing to challenge an employment guidance issued by the Department of Labor relaxing the requirements for hiring foreign herders, and whether the guidance, promulgated without notice and comment, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Brief Summary:
The Immigration and Nationality Act creates a temporary visa program, the H-2A Visa Program, to facilitate hiring foreign workers when there are not enough qualified and available Americans to fill open jobs. In 2011, the Department of Labor, tasked with administering the program, updated the special procedures establishing minimum wages and working conditions that have to be offered to U.S. herders before employing foreign workers. The Department published two Training and Employment Guidance Letters (TEGLs) without notice and comment procedures. In October 2011, U.S. herders brought an action against the Department, claiming that the conditions established by the TEGLs forced them out of the industry by lowering wages and degrading working conditions. Plaintiffs, U.S. workers with years of experience as herders, alleged that the Department of Labor violated the APA by issuing the special procedures without notice and comment. Two groups representing employers in the herding industries intervened on the side of the government and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they had not suffered a cognizable injury traceable to the disputed regulations and, alternatively, because they were not in the zone of interests protected by the Immigration and Nationality Act and thus lacked prudential standing. The plaintiffs appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court emphasized that the requirements for Article III standing to enforce procedural rights are different from those for enforcing substantive rights; while the plaintiffs must establish the agency action threatens their concrete interest in a personal way, once they have done so, standards are less stringent for demonstrating immediacy and redressability. Specifically, the court found that plaintiffs need not demonstrate that but for the procedural violation, the effect on their personal interests would have been different. Provided plaintiffs can link the agency action and the alleged injury, the court will assume the agency action would have been different had it been consummated in a procedurally valid manner.

Applying the competitor standing doctrine, the court determined that parties suffer an injury in fact when agencies lift restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition. Since the special procedures contained in the TEGLs had the effect of loosening the general H-2A requirements, thus increasing the supply of labor and competition, their promulgation caused injury to the plaintiffs. Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs, American workers, had prudential standing because they fell squarely within the zone of interests protected by the Immigration and Nationality Act.

After finding that plaintiffs had standing, the court opted to rule on the merits given that parties had adequately briefed and argued the question. The court concluded that TEGLs are legislative rules and that promulgating them without following the notice and comment procedure was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. As such, the court found plaintiffs were entitled to an entry of summary judgment in their favor and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

For the full opinion, please see http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i.../13-5118-1497417.pdf.

Panel: Tatel, Brown, and Millett

Argument Date: February 25, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: June 13, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5118

Decided: Reversed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: Julie A. Murray, Michael T. Kirkpatrick, and Edward J. Tuddenham for Appellants. Craig A. Defoe, Stuart F. Delery, and David J. Kline for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Brown

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 06/13/2014 04:10 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

June 5, 2014
  Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers -- Sixth Circuit
Headline: Sixth Circuit denies relief to challengers of mining permit, finding that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' limited-in-scope environmental analysis and approval of a mitigation plan complied with the Clean Water Act and National Environmental Policy Act.

Areas of Law: Environmental Law; Coal Mining; Clean Water Act; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977; National Environmental Policy Act

Issue Presented: Under the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, what level of environmental analysis is required when issuing a permit that relates to a small but necessary part of a mining operation?

Brief Summary: Plaintiff environmental groups sued after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers granted a mining company a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Plaintiffs alleged that the Army Corps violated federal mandates by issuing a permit that would negatively affect water quality, by failing to consider adverse effects on human health and welfare, and by failing to issue an environmental-impact statement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Army Corps, dismissing the lawsuit in its entirety. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Army Corps did not abuse its discretion by (1) limiting the scope of its environmental analysis to only health effects closely related to the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters and (2) approving a mitigation plan that was rationally designed to maintain the water integrity near the mine.

Extended Summary: The Kentucky Division of Mine Permits granted a mining company a permit for a surface coal-mining operation in Kentucky. In 2007, the company applied to the Army Corps for a secondary §404 permit related only to the filling of jurisdictional waters. After the company addressed various concerns and implemented strategies outlined by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps issued an environmental assessment finding "no significant impact" and issued the §404 permit in 2012. Three months later, plaintiff environmental groups sued the Army Corps alleging Clean Water Act and National Environmental Policy Act violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army Corps, finding that it issued the §404 permit in compliance with federal mandates. Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 grants states the exclusive right to regulate surface coal-mining and reclamation operations on nonfederal lands. That right is subject to limited federal oversight to ensure compliance with federal standards. Under the Act, the State of Kentucky, through its Department for Natural Resources' Division of Mine Permits, has exclusive authority to grant surface mining permits within its state. However, because surface mining operations may affect navigable waters of the United States, the federal Clean Water Act requires additional permits to preserve the quality of waters and wetlands. At issue in this case was the §404 permit issued by the Army Corps under the Clean Water Act.

Under §404 of the Clean Water Act, the Army Corps' authority is limited to the narrow issue of the filling of navigable waters within the United States. The Army Corps must review several factors, including the health and welfare of individuals likely to be affected by mining discharge into jurisdictional waters. The Army Corps must also comply with the National Environmental Policy Act by taking a "hard look" at the potential environmental consequences of its actions and by preparing an environmental-impact statement or environmental assessment, depending on the level of its actions.

The Sixth Circuit found that its review of compliance under the National Environmental Policy Act was limited to whether the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious. As such, the Sixth Circuit was limited to review whether the Army Corps had adequately studied the issues surrounding the §404 permit and had taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of its decision. Because the Army Corps' authority is limited to the filling of jurisdictional waters, it did not have authority to review the entire mining operation, as plaintiffs suggested.

Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that the Army Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency had adequately addressed health concerns, even though those concerns were the primary responsibility of the Kentucky Division of Mine Permits. The Sixth Circuit held that the Army Corps performed an environmental assessment reasonably limited in scope to the effects closely related to the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters and approved a mitigation plan that was rationally designed to maintain the water integrity near the mine's location. Therefore, the Army Corps did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in its decision to issue the §404 permit.

Panel: Judges Keith, Siler, and Rogers

Date of Issued Opinion: March 7, 2014

Docket Number: 13-6153

Decided: Petition for Review of a Motion for Summary Judgment granted in favor of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Counsel: ARGUED: Neil Gormley, EARTHJUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. J. David Gunter II, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Federal Appellees. Robert G. McLusky, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee Lecco. ON BRIEF: Neil Gormley, Jennifer C. Chavez, EARTHJUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Joseph M. Lovett, J. Michael Becher, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES, Lewisburg, West Virginia, Mary Cromer, APPALACHIAN CITIZENS LAW CENTER, Whitesburg, Kentucky, for Appellants. J. David Gunter II, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Federal Appellees. Robert G. McLusky, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Kevin M. McGuire, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee Leeco.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0046p-06.pdf

Case Alert Author: Minyon Bolton

Author of Opinion: Judge Rogers

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 06/05/2014 01:46 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Laster v. City of Kalamazoo -- Sixth Circuit
Headline: The Sixth Circuit highlights the distinction between the "materially adverse action" element of a Title VII retaliation claim and the "adverse employment action" element of a Title VII race-discrimination claim.

Area of Law: Constitutional Law, Employment Law; Title VII (Race Discrimination), Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act

Issue Presented: Did the district court improperly dismiss plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim by requiring plaintiff to prove that he suffered an "adverse employment action" as part of his prima facie case?

Brief Summary: The plaintiff claimed that after he had filed two complaints with the EEOC, his employer retaliated against him in discriminatory ways, ultimately forcing him to resign. Plaintiff sued, claiming race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the First Amendment. The Title VII race-discrimination and First Amendment claims were dismissed, but the Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. The court contrasted the application of the McDonnell-Douglas test to retaliation claims with its application to Title VII race-discrimination claims. A retaliation claim requires a less-onerous standard of "materially adverse action" than a race-discrimination claim, which requires proof of an "adverse employment action." Applying this standard, the court found that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation even though he could not succeed in his claim for Title VII race discrimination or in his First Amendment claim.

Significance: Even though a plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation because the elements for these claims are different.

Extended Summary: Plaintiff, an African-American public-safety officer, filed two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaints alleging race discrimination and failure to obtain relief through his employer's internal grievance system. Plaintiff alleged that, following these complaints, he was subjected to retaliatory actions that forced him to resign. Plaintiff sued, claiming Title VII race discrimination and retaliation, and a violation of his First Amendment rights.

The Title VII race-discrimination and First Amendment claims were dismissed in both the district court and the Sixth Circuit. But the Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. Because the plaintiff sought to establish his Title VII retaliation claim through circumstantial evidence, the court applied the Supreme Court's McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis. The court noted that it applies McDonnell-Douglas differently to Title VII race-discrimination claims than to retaliation claims. For a discrimination claim, a plaintiff's prima facie case requires proof of an "adverse employment action," which is defined as a "materially adverse change in the terms or conditions" of employment. For a retaliation claim, however, the plaintiff need only show a "materially adverse action," which means that the employer's action might have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."

In light of this distinction, the court found that plaintiff's claim that he faced heightened scrutiny, received frequent reprimands for breaking selectively enforced policies, and was disciplined more harshly than similarly situated peers might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Thus, the evidence could establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation even though it could not support his claim for Title VII race discrimination or his First Amendment claim.

Panel: Batchelder, Chief Judge; Siler and Clay, Circuit Judges.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...14a0048p-06.pdf


Date of Issued Opinion: March 13, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1640

Decided: Affirmed as to dismissal of Title VII race-discrimination claim; reversed as to dismissal of Title VII retaliation claim and remanded for further proceedings.

Counsel: ON BRIEF: Richard O. Cherry, KALAMAZOO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Kalamazoo, Michigan, for Appellee. Mark Laster, Kalamazoo, Michigan, pro se.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Clay; separate concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Batchelder.

Case Alert Author: Theodora Eisenhut

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 06/05/2014 01:11 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  United States v. Romero-Caspeta - Sixth Circuit
Headline: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), once an alien has been deported from the United States, it is a felony to reenter the United States at any time without express consent of the Attorney General. Even after the five-year prohibition to apply for reentry lapses, the alien still must obtain consent to lawfully enter the United States.

Area of Law: Criminal law; Immigration law

Issue Presented: Is it a defense to the crime of unlawful reentry to claim that a previously removed alien reentered the United States more than five years after his removal and thus no longer needed express consent of the Attorney General before entering the United States?

Brief Summary: The defendant was charged with the crime of unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the requirement that an alien obtain express consent from the Attorney General before reentering the country no longer applies after five years. Considering this issue of first impression, the Sixth Circuit construed 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), which allows a previously removed alien to apply for a visa five years after removal, to have no effect on §1326.

Significance: A previously removed alien must obtain express consent from the Attorney General before reentering the United States, regardless of the length of time that has passed since removal.

Extended Summary: In 1991, the defendant, a Mexican citizen, was removed from the United States after attempting to enter using another person's border pass. The defendant was deported back to Mexico. The order of removal prohibited the defendant from reentering the United States for a period of five years without prior express consent of the Attorney General. Along with the order of removal, the defendant was given a notice statement warning that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, it is a felony for any previously removed alien "to enter, attempt to enter, or be found in the United States without the Attorney General's express consent."

In 2012, the defendant committed a traffic violation in Detroit, Michigan, and was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents. Defendant was charged with unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). This required the government to prove that the defendant: (1) was an alien; (2) had been removed from the United States; (3) and re-entered the United States (4) without the consent of the Attorney General.

Defendant moved for acquittal arguing that, once five years had elapsed since his removal, he was no longer required to obtain the advance consent of the Attorney General before reentering the United States. According to the defendant, §1326(a) should be read in conjunction with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), which permits a removed alien to obtain a visa after five years. Defendant argued that §1182 implicitly modifies §1326 to end the alien's obligation to obtain the Attorney General's express consent to reenter the United States after five years. The district court disagreed and denied defendant's motion of acquittal.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined previous decisions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits addressing the same issue, and found their reasoning persuasive. Those decisions clarified that §1182 does not implicitly modify §1326. Under §1182(a)(9)(A)(i), a previously removed alien is categorically inadmissible for the first five years after removal. Under §1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), the alien may seek readmission during that time with the express consent of the Attorney General. But the Sixth Circuit explained that §1182 does not give the removed alien "carte blanche to reenter the United States at his leisure" without the express consent of the Attorney General after the five-year prohibition period. It held, therefore, that §1182 has no effect on §1326, which "continues to articulate all the elements necessary to prove a violation." This includes the requirement that a previously removed alien must obtain the Attorney General's advance consent before reentry, even after the five-year prohibition period in §1182(a)(9)(A)(i) expires.

The Sixth Circuit determined that, in order to have had a defense to prosecution under §1326(a), the defendant was required to obtain express consent of the Attorney General before entering the United States. Because defendant admitted he had not done so, he had no defense as a matter of law.


Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0042p-06.pdf

Panel: Judges Bathelder, Griffin, Bell

Date of Issued Opinion: February 28, 2014

Docket Number: 12-2690

Decided: Affirmed.

Case Alert Author: Chelsey Morgenstern

Counsel: George B. Washington, SCHEFF, WASHINGTON & DRIVER, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: District Judge Bell

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 06/05/2014 12:57 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

June 4, 2014
  United States v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Affirms Liability for Civil Penalties in Deepwater Horizon Spill.

Area of Law: Clean Water Act.

Issue Presented: Whether the owners of the failed well involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are responsible for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act for "discharg[ing]" pollutants where the pollutants first travelled through another party's structure before entering the environment.

Brief Summary: The United States sought civil penalties under the Clean Water Act against Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and BP Exploration & Production, Inc., the owners of the failed well involved in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The well owners disputed liability on the ground that the oil did not enter the environment directly from the well but rather flowed first through a structure owned by another party, Transocean. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered summary judgment in the government's favor on the issue of liability for discharging pollutants. The U.S. Court of Appeals rejected the well owners' arguments and therefore affirmed.

Extended Summary: Anadarko Petroleum and BP owned the Macondo Well, which had been drilled by the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling vessel owned and operated by Transocean. In April 2010, the cement that sealed the Macondo Well failed, the blowout preventer sitting atop the well also failed, and oil flowed uncontrolled through a riser connecting the well to the Deepwater Horizon vessel. The vessel then caught fire and capsized, and oil spewed through the broken riser into the Gulf of Mexico for months.

The United States brought a civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against various entities involved in the spill. As relevant here, the government sought civil penalties under the Clean Water Act against Anadarko and BP. The Act imposes liability on the owner of any "facility from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged" into navigable waters. The district court granted summary judgment in the government's favor on the issue of liability. Anadarko and BP appealed.

On appeal, the well owners argued that they had not violated the statute because oil entered the environment through the riser, which was part of Transocean's vessel, rather than escaping into the water directly from their well. The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that a "discharge" occurs where controlled confinement of a substance is lost. Here, there was no disputing that such confinement was lost in the well, even though the uncontrolled oil then flowed through Transocean's riser before entering the water. The Fifth Circuit deemed it irrelevant to the question of liability that Transocean might have been culpable as well, though that factor could influence the size of the penalty ultimately imposed. The Fifth Circuit accordingly affirmed.

For the full opinion, please see: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/op...ub/12/12-30883-CV0.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges King, Benavides, and Dennis

Argument Date: 12/4/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 6/4/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-30883

Decided: Affirmed

Counsel: Maggie B. Smith, U.S. Department of Justice, for Plaintiff-Appellee United States; David Bruce Salmons, Bingham McCutchen LLP, for Defendant-Appellant Anadarko Petroleum Corp.; Richard Cartier Godfrey, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, for Defendant-Appellant BP Exploration & Production, Inc.

Author of Opinion: Judge Benavides

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 06/04/2014 09:29 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

May 23, 2014
  Cause of Action v. National Archives and Records Administration
Headline: Legislative branch does not forfeit FOIA exemption by transferring records to the National Archives.

Area of Law: Freedom of Information Act

Issue Presented: Whether a legislative commission's records, exempt from FOIA while the commission produced, retained, and relied upon those documents, became subject to FOIA when the commission turned its records over to the National Archives, an agency within the executive branch.

Brief Summary: Like all other entities within the legislative branch, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a legislative branch agency charged with reporting and investigating the causes of the economic crisis, is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Upon disbanding in 2011, the Commission transferred its records to the National Archives, an agency within the executive branch that is covered by FOIA. Cause of Action submitted a FOIA request to the Archives seeking Commission records. The Archives denied the request on the basis of § 552(a)(4)(B), and Cause of Action filed suit. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the Commission's records were not agency records subject to FOIA and granted the Archives' motion to dismiss. Cause of Action appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court noted that its prior decisions had assumed that transfer of non-covered documents to the Archives did not convert them to records subject to FOIA, and it observed that regulations of the Archives likewise presumed that FOIA covered only executive branch records. The court declined to use its four-factor Burka test to determine whether the Archives had sufficient control over the documents, finding the test "an uncertain guide" with "particularly problematic" application where documents were simply deposited with and catalogued by the Archives. The court noted that in the context of the Archives, application of the four-factor test did not further FOIA's objective of revealing to the public how federal agencies operate. Because the main function of the Archives is merely preservation, and because the Archives does not use the documents in any operational way, the court found itself confident that Congress intended the FOIA exemption to follow the records.

For the full text of the opinion, please see http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...e/13-5127-1494295.pdf.


Panel: Henderson, Kavanaugh, and Randolph.

Argument Date: February 19, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: May 23, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5127

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Albertine Guez

Counsel: Daniel Epstein, Marie A. Connelly, Patrick J. Massari, and Reed D. Rubinstein for Appellant. Christine N. Kohl, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen Jr., Leonard Schaitman, and Edward Himmelfarb for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Randolph

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 05/23/2014 02:36 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

May 14, 2014
  Estate of John R.H. Thouron v. USA - Third Circuit
Headline: Reliance on tax expert may establish reasonable cause for failure to pay

Area of Law: Tax

Issues Presented: Whether the reliance on a tax expert can establish reasonable cause for late payment of taxes.

Brief Summary: The Estate of Thouron failed to pay its taxes on time because of reliance on a tax expert. The Court decided that reliance on a tax expert for matters that are not ministerial tasks may be enough to establish reasonable cause for the late payment. The taxpayer must show that he relied on the advice of the tax expert and then either inability to pay on the date or that undue hardship would result if the taxes were paid on the date.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: This case centers on whether reliance on a tax expert can establish reasonable cause for failure to pay taxes. The Estate of Thouron hired an executor who retained an experienced tax attorney to provide advice for tax matters. On the date the taxes were due the Estate filed for an extension of time and paid some money but less than it would ultimately owe. The balance was not paid because of reliance on the tax expert. When the Estate filed its return it owed a penalty of over $900,000 because the reliance on the tax expert resulted in a failure to elect to defer taxes and thus the penalty. The Court looked to whether the Estate should receive a refund of the penalty because the failure to pay was not willful neglect but resulted from reasonable cause.
Tax penalties apply unless the tax payer can show that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. To show reasonable cause, the tax payer must prove that he exercised ordinary business care and was nevertheless unable to pay the tax or would have suffered undue hardship if it was paid on that date. The Court determined that the District Court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle too strictly. While both this case and Boyle are late- filing cases the Court believes the reasons for the late filing matter. The Court determined that Boyle identified three categories of late filing cases. The first is reliance on an agent for filing or paying. The second is where the tax payer files late but before the time the agent erroneously told him was available. The third is where an attorney or accountant advises the taxpayer on a matter of law.
The Court determined that the issue in this case is the second type while the issue in Boyle was the first. The Supreme Court declined to decide the second and third categories and so it was wrong for the District Court to apply Boyle so strictly. The Court held that a tax payer's reliance on the advice of an expert may be reasonable cause for failure to pay by the deadline. The taxpayer must then show either an inability to pay or undue hardship from paying at the deadline. The Court found that there is dispute of material fact as to whether the reliance occurred here.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131603p.pdf

Panel (if known): Ambro, Hardiman, and Greenaway, Jr., Circuit Judges

Argument Date: January 14, 2014

Argument Location:

Date of Issued Opinion: May 13, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-1603

Decided: Vacated and Remanded

Case Alert Author: Cheri Snook

Counsel: Joel L. Frank, Esq., William H. Lamb. Esq., Scot R. Withers, Esq., for appellant; Zane D. Memeger, Kathryn Keneally, Jonathan S. Cohen, Esq., Jennifer M. Rubin, Esq., William B. Russell, Jr., Esq., for appellee

Author of Opinion: Judge Ambro

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 05/14/2014 12:27 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

May 12, 2014
  In re: Fosamax Products - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit concludes that federal law pre-empts state design defect and strict liability claims

Area of Law: Federal Preemption

Issue(s) Presented: Whether state law claims against Generic Defendants in a products liability case were pre-empted by federal law?

Brief Summary:
This case involves product liability claims by individuals who allegedly suffered bone fractures because they took Fosamax® - a drug used to treat or prevent osteoporosis and Paget's Disease - or the generic equivalent of that drug, alendronate sodium. Plaintiffs sued Merck Sharp & Dohme, Corp. ("Merck"), the manufacturer of Fosamax, as well as several entities that manufacture the generic equivalent (the "Generic Defendants"). The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Generic Defendants because it determined that the state law claims against them were pre-empted by federal law. The district court certified that order as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and a number of the plaintiffs then appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary (if applicable):
This case involves product liability claims by individuals who allegedly suffered bone fractures because they took Fosamax - a drug used to treat or prevent osteoporosis and Paget's Disease - or the generic equivalent of that drug, alendronate sodium. Those plaintiffs sued Merck Sharp & Dohme, Corp. ("Merck"), the manufacturer of Fosamax, as well as several entities that manufacture the generic equivalent (the "Generic Defendants"). The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Generic Defendants because it determined that the state law claims against them were pre-empted by federal law. The district court certified that order as final under and a number of the plaintiffs then appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiffs brought state law product liability claims under theories of design defect, failure-to-warn, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. This action was centralized by the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The Generic Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were pre-empted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court concluded that the claims against the Generic Defendants were pre-empted because, just as those defendants could not lawfully change drug labeling for alendronate sodium, they also could not lawfully change the active ingredient design of the drug either. The district court then dismissed all of the Generic Defendants from the case.

Plaintiffs argued that their negligence-based design-defect claims were grounded on the theory that the Generic Defendants were negligent "because of their failure to properly analyze the drug to discover the product's defects and for negligently continuing to sell the drug after they were, or should have been aware, that it was defectively designed. The Generic Defendants argued that plaintiffs waived this argument by raising it for the first time in their reply brief. The Third Circuit agreed. The Court has consistently held that an argument is waived unless it is raised in the party's opening brief. Thus, plaintiffs' reply brief arguments, which were outside of anything addressed in the opening brief, were waived.

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal law shall be the supreme law of the land. There are three circumstances for when a state law is pre-empted by federal law: (1) when a federal statute includes "an express provision for pre-emption;" (2) "[w]hen Congress intends federal law to 'occupy the field'" in an area of law; or (3) when a state and federal statute are in conflict. Two recent Supreme Court opinions hold that certain state law claims against manufacturers of generic drugs directly conflict with federal law and are pre-empted. The Court explained that ". . . under the FDCA a generic [drug manufacturer] may not unilaterally change its labeling or change its design or formulation, and cannot be required to exit the market or accept state tort liability." Drager, 741 F.3d at 476. Thus, state tort law is pre-empted by the FDCA. Because there was nothing the Generic Defendants could have done to change the labeling or the drug, plaintiffs' strict liability design-defect claims were pre-empted. The Third Circuit, thus, affirmed the district court's decision. A copy of the Court's opinion can be found here: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/122250p.pdf

Panel (if known): Jordan, Vanaskie, and Greenberg, Circuit Judges

Argument (if known): December 18, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: April 30, 2014

Docket Number: 12-2250

Decided: April 30, 2014

Case Alert Author: Alexandra Perry

Counsel (if known):
Brandon L. Bogle, Esq. [ARGUED]
Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor
316 S. Baylen Street, Suite 600
Pensacola, FL 32502

Scott D. Levensten, Esq.
1420 Walnut Street, Suite 801
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellants

Karen A. Confoy, Esq.
Fox Rothschild
997 Lenox Dr.
Princeton Pike Corporate Center, Bldg. 3
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648
Counsel for Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.

John K. Crisham, Esq.
Kirkland & Ellis
655 15th St., N.W., Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20005

Glenn S. Kerner, Esq.
Katherine D. Seib, Esq.
Goodwin Procter
620 Eighth Avenue
The New York Times Bldg.
New York, NY 10018

Jay P. Lefkowitz, Esq. [ARGUED]
Kirkland & Ellis
601 Lexington Ave.
New York, NY 10022

George E. McDavid, Esq.
Reed Smith
136 Main Street, Suite 250
Princeton, NJ 08540
Counsel for Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc., RP,
Barr Laboratories, and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc.

Terry M. Henry, Esq.
Blank Rome
130 N. 18th Street
One Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Watson Laboratory and
Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Kelly E. Jones, Esq.
Steven A. Stadtmauer, Esq.
Harris Beach
One Gateway Center , Suite 2500
Newark, NJ 07102

Harvey L. Kaplan, Esq.
Shook, Bardy, Bacon
2555 Grant Bldg.
Kansas City, MO 64108
Counsel for Mylan Inc. and
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Charles A. Fitzpatrick, III, Esq.
Arthur B. Keppel, Esq.
Rawle & Henderson

1339 Chestnut Street, The Widener Bldg.
One South Penn Square, 16th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Counsel for Apotex Corp.

Jeffrey A. Cohen, Esq.
Flaster Greenberg
1810 Chapel Ave. West
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

Sandra J. Wunderlich, Esq.
Stinson Leonard Street
7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1100
St. Louis, MO 63105
Counsel for Sun Pharma Global and
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Inc.

Terry M. Henry, Esq.
Blank Rome
130 N. 18th St.
One Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Author of Opinion: Jordan, Circuit Judge

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 05/12/2014 01:09 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  U.S. v. Abdur Tai - Third Circuit
Headline: Criminal Conviction Upheld in Fraud Case Involving Fen-Phen Settlement

Area of Law: Criminal Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the district court committed plain error by implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its wilful blindness jury instruction and applying upward adjustments under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines?

Brief Summary: Defendant Tai appealed his conviction and sentence for mail and wire fraud in connection with claims for payment from the Fen-Phen Settlement Trust. Tai argued that the district court committed plain error by implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its "willful blindness" jury instruction and applying upward adjustments under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a position of trust, use of a special skill, and aggravated role. The Third Circuit concluded that the district court's jury instruction and upward adjustments were not erroneous, but remanded the case so the district court could determine whether Tai supervised a criminally culpable subordinate, which is necessary to award an aggravated role enhancement.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary (if applicable):
Defendant Tai appealed his conviction and sentence for mail and wire fraud in connection with claims for payment from the Fen-Phen Settlement Trust. Tai argued that the district court committed plain error by implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its "willful blindness" jury instruction and applying upward adjustments under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a position of trust, use of a special skill, and aggravated role. The Third Circuit concluded that the district court's jury instruction and upward adjustments were not in error, but remanded the case so the district court could determine whether Tai supervised a criminally culpable subordinate, which is necessary to award an aggravated role enhancement.

The Fen-Phen settlement trust was established due to a class-action lawsuit alleging that the diet pill Fen-Phen caused heart disease. To obtain payment from the trust, people affected by this drug had to obtain a signed affidavit from a physician. The trust relied on the integrity of physicians submitting these affidavits on behalf of claimants. In 2002, the district court determined that 100% of claims would be audited. Tai, a board-certified cardiologist, was retained by many attorneys representing claimants to prepare reports. Tai estimated that he was owed over $2 million for his reports - based on the amount of reports he wrote and a bonus fee for each successful claim. Tai admitted to having his assistant review many of the echocardiograms because he did not have time for them all. He also admitted to reporting different findings than those of technicians' reports in about 10% of cases. Tai was charged with wire and mail fraud, and sentenced to 72 months' imprisonment, fines, and three years' supervised release.

None of the issues Tai appealed were preserved for review. Thus, plain error review applied. For reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The Court found that the district court's willful blindness instruction did not exhibit clear error. These instructions told the jury when willful blindness does or does not exist, but did not imply in any way that Tai must present evidence concerning his own beliefs or knowledge. Thus, there was no implicit or explicit shifting of the burden of proof to Tai. The district court also told the jury that it could not find knowledge based on a willful blindness theory unless the Government proved Tai's knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, and in fact the jury was expressly told at the beginning of the instructions that Tai never had to prove anything, and that the burden always remained on the government. This was more than sufficient to inform the jury that Tai bore no burden to prove he was not wilfully blind.

Tai next argued that the district court plainly erred by imposing a two-level increase under U.S.S.G § 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust and use of a special skill. Section 3B1.3 allows an increase of two offense levels "f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense." Again, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for plain error. The Court found that Tai's credentials, and the deference he was accorded as a result of them, placed him in a position that facilitated his criminal conduct. His signature gave claimants the opportunity to receive, collectively, hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation, yielding more than $2 million in potential payments to him. The trust's auditing ability did not limit any doctor's authority, and only looked to whether a reasonable physician could come to such conclusion. Also, Tai's skill and credentials were the means by which he could participate in the claims process. Without them, he would not have been permitted to submit reports to support claims and collect a fee. Thus, the district court did not commit plain error in concluding that Tai abused a position of trust and use of a special skill.

The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated and remanded the judgment of sentence to address the applicability of the role enhancement. More fact-finding was required by the district court to determine whether the alleged participants were criminally liable, which would allow for application of the twofold sentencing enhancement. A copy of the Third Circuit's decision can be found here:
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131998p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes and Schwartz, Circuit Judges; Rosenthal, District Judge

Argument (if known):

Date of Issued Opinion: April 30, 2014

Docket Number: 13-1998

Decided: April 30, 2014

Case Alert Author: Alexandra Perry

Counsel (if known):
Paul G. Shapiro, Esq. [ARGUED]
Office of the United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee

Peter Goldberger, Esq. [ARGUED]
50 Rittenhouse Place
Ardmore, PA 19003
Counsel for Appellant

Author of Opinion: Rendell, Circuit Judge

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 05/12/2014 01:05 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

May 9, 2014
  ACLU v. U.S. Department of Justice
Headline: The D.C. Circuit says privacy interests trump ACLU's interest in obtaining warrantless cell phone tracking data for individuals who were indicted, but not ultimately convicted.

Area of Law: Freedom of Information Act

Issue Presented: Whether individuals' privacy interests in controlling information concerning criminal charges for which they were not convicted outweigh the public interest in disclosure.

Brief Summary: After learning that federal law enforcement agencies were obtaining data from cell phone companies without a warrant and using that information to track the phones' whereabouts, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed FOIA requests with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Executive Office of the United States Attorneys. It sought records related to the case name, docket number, and court of criminal prosecutions of individuals who were tracked using cell phone data obtained without a warrant based on probable cause. In order to compel production of these records, the ACLU filed suit against the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice identified 229 prosecutions responsive to the FOIA request but refused to turn the list of cases over, claiming that it fell within FOIA Exemption 7(C), which allows an agency to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes if the disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In an earlier disposition of the case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the agency to disclose the records of prosecutions where the defendant had been convicted or pled guilty but found that the privacy interests of those not convicted was substantially higher than those convicted and outweighed the public interest in disclosure. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed with regard to the records of those convicted but remanded the case regarding the records of those not convicted, finding the record below unclear as to whether any cases in fact fell within that category.

Following remand, the parties identified six on-point cases, four of which were resolved by dismissal and two of which ended in acquittal. The district court again granted the Department of Justice's motion for summary judgment, and the ACLU again appealed. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The court acknowledged that privacy interests in preventing disclosure were less compelling here, where the individuals had already been indicted and their alleged participation was a matter of public record, than they would be if individuals had merely been subject to investigation. However, the fact of public prosecution made the privacy interests "fade, not disappear altogether." The court relied on both a person's presumption of innocence and a person's right to be left alone in finding that the scales tipped in favor of nondisclosure. The court noted that the special interest in allowing people charged but not convicted with crimes to go on with their lives is reflected in numerous state laws limiting disclosure of nonconviction data. Given its conceptualization of the individual privacy interest, the court had "little hesitation" in determining that it outweighed the public interest in disclosure.
Judge Tatel wrote separately in concurrence with his majority opinion, explaining that the prior release of information related to the 214 cases of convicted individuals substantially reduced the value of the remaining information to the public, further tipping the balance toward withholding the records.
Judge Brown dissented because she believed there was only a minimal privacy interest compromised by the disclosure of information readily available to the public. She found that the public had a strong interest in obtaining information that would allow it to decide for itself whether the government action was proper and that this interest outweighed any privacy interest involved.

For the full text of this opinion, please visit
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C093507F31A9E09485257CD3004EC615/$file/13-5064-1492222.pdf.

Panel: Tatel, Brown, and Kavanaugh

Argument Date: February 20, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: May 9, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5064

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Joseph T. Maher, Jr.

Counsel: Arthur B. Spitzer, Catherine Crump, and David L. Sobel for appellants. John S. Koppel, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen Jr., and Leonard Schaitman for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Tatel

Concurrence: Tatel

Dissent: Brown

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 05/09/2014 04:40 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

May 1, 2014
  Rouse v. Wachovia Mort., FSB
Headline: District court order reversed and remanded for lack of diversity jurisdiction, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1348 a national bank is only a citizen of the state in which its main office is located.

Area of Law: Federal Civil Procedure

Issue Presented: Whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, a national bank is a citizen of both the state in which its principal place of business is located and the state where its main office is located as designated in the bank's articles of association.

Brief Summary: The Rouses filed suit in the Superior Court of California, based on state and federal laws, against Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo removed the case to district court, where the Rouses' complaint was dismissed with leave to amend.

The amended complaint raised only state law claims, and the district court found that because national banks are citizens of the state where (1) their principal place of business is located and (2) their main office is located as designated in their articles of association. Consequently, Wells Fargo was deemed to be a citizen of California, and the district court remanded to state superior court because the Rouses were also citizens of California.

The Ninth Circuit looked to Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, which held that a national bank is not a citizen of every state in which it operates a branch, but is only a citizen of the state in which its main office is located. While Wachovia did not expressly address the issue at hand, the Court in that case stated that the difference between main office and principal place of business was "scant," because they were often in the same state. According to the Ninth Circuit, Wachovia Bank, strongly suggested that a national bank's citizenship was determined only by the location of its main office, not by its principal place of business.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit tracked the history of jurisdictional law for national banks and state-chartered corporations, finding that while jurisdictional parity had been established for state-chartered and national banks, such parity was only established with respect to federal question jurisdiction, and not with respect to diversity jurisdiction.

Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that once Congress amended the diversity citizenship of a state-chartered corporation to include its principal place of business in 1958, the absence of an express linking, as Congress had previously done in 1882, could not justify reading § 1348 to include a national bank's principal place of business as another source of citizenship.

Dissent

The dissent was critical of the majority's (1) liberal interpretation of Wachovia Bank, and (2) the determination that the policy of jurisdictional parity between national banks and state-chartered corporations did not apply with respect to citizenship established by virtue of the location of the principal place of business.

Further, the dissent addressed the policy concern of placing national banks on a superior footing in accessing federal courts - especially where the national bank is broadly identified with the state in which its principal place of business is located, and the principles of federalism are better served by allowing a state court resolve the disputes of their residents with such a national bank.

Extended Summary: The Rouses sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., its Wachovia Mortgage division ("Wells Fargo") and NDeX West LLC in the Superior Court of California. The complaint was based on state and federal law concerning the Rouses' home loan and deed of trust. Wells Fargo removed to district court, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, NDeX West joined, and the district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.

In their first amended complaint, the Rouses raised only state law claims, and after an order to show cause why the Rouses' case should no be remanded to state court for lack of diversity, and the district court held that national banks are citizens of the state where: (1) their principal place of business is located, and (2) their main office is located as designated in their articles of association.

Because Wells Fargo's main office is in South Dakota, and its principal place of business is in California, and the Rouses are citizens of California, the district court remanded the case to California Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit provided that Wells Fargo's citizenship, as a national bank is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1348, and not by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which applies to state-chartered banks and other corporations. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, "[a]ll national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located."

In addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit's focus was on the word "located" in § 1348, and began with the Supreme Court's determination that "located," as used in § 1348, was ambiguous on its face, thus the Ninth Circuit had to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute and the word's ordinary meaning.

While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit looked to the Court's determination under Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, which addressed the issue of whether a federally chartered national bank is a citizen of every state where it operates a branch in addition to the state where its main office is designated. The Court in Wachovia Bank held that a national bank is not a citizen of every state in which it operates a branch, because to hold otherwise would contravene Congress's intent to protect the right of national banks to remove cases to federal courts.

While Wachovia Bank did not address whether a national bank is a citizen of the state in which its principal place of business is located, the Court did note that the omission of any reference to a principal place of business in § 1348 was of "scant" significance because "in almost every case ... the location of a national bank's main office and of its principal place of business coincide."

Wachovia Bank, in it's holding, expressly held that a national bank is a citizen of the state in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located. Because the Court did consider the principal place of business issue, but did not expressly hold that under § 1348 a national bank's citizenship included its principal place of business, the Ninth Circuit provided that Wachovia Bank strongly suggested that a national bank's citizenship was not determined by its principal place of business.

The Eighth Circuit, in resolving this issue, held that a national bank's citizenship is limited to the state designated in its articles of association as its main office. Section 1348 embodied Congress's intent to put national and state banks of the same jurisdictional footing, however, Congress then amended § 1332 to include principal place of business, and the Eighth Circuit reasoned that if Congress intended for § 1348 to include principal place of business it would have expressly amended § 1348 to do the same.

The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the history of the jurisdictional statutes. In 1875, Congress provided for removal of national bank cases to federal court, based on the belief that suits involving national banks arose under the federal laws. However, by 1882, Congress established the principal of jurisdictional parity between state-chartered banks and national banks - ending federal question jurisdiction for national banks.

In 1887, the law provided that "[a]ll national banking associations established under the laws of the United States shall ... be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located; and in such cases the circuit and district courts shall not have jurisdiction other than such as they would have in cases between individual citizens of the same state." Thus, under the 1887 amendment, jurisdictional parity was established between a national bank and individual citizens.

In 1888, Congress revised the 1887 act, by providing the federal question jurisdiction for suits involving national banks was limited to (1) suits by the United States and (2) winding up bank affairs. The 1888 revision did not provide a reference to parity between national banks and individual citizens or state-chartered banks.

In 1911, Congress provided that "all national banking associations established under the laws of the United States shall, for the purposes of all other actions against them ... be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." The Court in Herrmann v. Edwards provided that the 1991 act maintained limits on federal jurisdiction established in 1887 - (1) federal question was only available for (i) suits by the United States or (ii) for winding up a national bank's affairs, and (2) diversity jurisdiction for all other suits, in which national banks were "deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located." The Ninth Circuit determined that to the extent that the 1911 established any principal of jurisdictional parity, it referred only to federal question and not diversity jurisdiction.

Finally, in the 1948 act, Congress provided that "[a]ll national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." Again, the Ninth Circuit found no mention of jurisdictional parity in between national and state banks in the 1948 act.

In 1958, Congress revised the law of diversity citizenship for state-chartered corporations - a new provision was adopted, under which a state chartered corporation is a citizen of both (1) the state of incorporation and (2) the state of its principal place of business. The Ninth Circuit provided that even if Congress intended to link state and national banks for purposes of diversity citizenship, in 1948, state-chartered corporations were citizens of only the state in which they were incorporated, thus Congress would not have contemplated that a national bank would also be a citizen of the state in which its principal place of business was located.

Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that if Congress wanted to assure a link to state-chartered banks, it would have done so as it did in the 1882 act. In the absence of such a link, after the 1958 revision of citizenship for state-chartered corporations, Congressional intent did not tend to show that the citizenship of a national bank was based on its principal place of business, in addition to the state in which its main office is located.

As such, Wells Fargo is only a citizen of South Dakota, and complete diversity existed as against the Rouses, who are citizens of California.

Dissent

The dissent disagreed with the application of Wachovia Bank. Wachovia Bank held that a national bank is not a citizen of every state where it has any branch operations, and did provide that a national bank is only a citizen of the state designated as its main office.

The decision "places national banks on superior footing in their access to federal courts as compared to state-chartered corporations." The dissent agreed with the dissenting opinion in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. WMR e-PIN, LLC, which promoted construing Wachovia Bank in favor of reading § 1348 in light of jurisdictional parity between national banks and state corporations.

Finally, the dissent raised the policy implication of the majority's decision. Under these facts, Wells Fargo, a bank identified with California and having its principal place of business in California for more than a century, can ensure federal court diversity actions. The majority's decision precludes state courts from resolving their residents' disputes, contravenes principles of federalism.

Panel: Judges Bybee, Gould, McKeown

Date of Issued Opinion: March 27, 2014

Docket Number: 5:11-cv-00928-DMG-DTB

Decided: Reversed and Remanded

Case Alert Author: Joseph Chaparo

Author of Opinion: Judge McKeown

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Ryan T. Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 05/01/2014 01:37 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 25, 2014
  United States v. Cannon - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Rejects Constitutional Challenge to Federal Hate Crimes Law.

Area of Law: Thirteenth Amendment; criminal law.

Issue Presented: Whether the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), is a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Brief Summary: Defendants Cannon, Kerstetter, and McLaughlin were convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas of committing a race-motivated hate crime under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 ("Shepard-Byrd Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). Congress passed the relevant portion of the Shepard-Byrd Act pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Shepard-Byrd Act is unconstitutional. They also argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that they attacked their victim because of his race. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed their convictions because the Supreme Court's Thirteenth Amendment precedent allows Congress to define and regulate the "badges" and "incidents" of slavery so long as their definition is rational, and the Shepard-Byrd Act survives rational basis review, and because there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants caused bodily injury to their victim because of his race.

Extended Summary: Defendants Cannon, Kerstetter, and McLaughlin were convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas of committing a race-motivated hate crime under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 ("Shepard-Byrd Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), for a 2011 assault in Harris County, Texas. Section 249(a)(1) makes it a federal crime to "willfully cause[] bodily injury to any person . . . because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person." Congress passed this section of the Shepard-Byrd Act pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude. Defendants appealed, arguing that the relevant portion of the Shepard-Byrd Act is unconstitutional. They also argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that they attacked their victim because of his race.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions because the Supreme Court's Thirteenth Amendment precedent, namely Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968), allows Congress to define and regulate the "badges" and "incidents" of slavery so long as their definition is rational. Section 249(a)(1) of the Shepard-Byrd Act survives rational basis review because Congress could rationally determine that racially motivated violence is a badge or incident of slavery. Racially motivated violence was essential to the enslavement of African-Americans and was widely employed after the Civil War in an attempt to return African-Americans to a position of de facto enslavement. In light of these facts, it cannot be said that Congress was irrational in determining that racially motivated violence is a badge or incident of slavery. The court noted that other portions of the Shepard-Byrd Act, which apply to other protected categories and derive from other congressional powers, were not at issue in this case.

The Fifth Circuit also held there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants caused bodily injury to their victim because of his race. Accordingly, the convictions were affirmed.

Circuit Judge Elrod, the author of the majority opinion, also filed a special concurrence. The opinion expressed concern that there is a growing tension between the Supreme Court's older precedents regarding the scope of Congress's powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's more recent decisions regarding the other Reconstruction Amendments and the Commerce Clause.

For the full opinion, please see:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/o...ub/12/12-20514-CR0.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges Reavley, Elrod, and Graves.

Argument Date: 8/5/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 4/24/2013

Docket Number: No. 12-20514

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Kirsty Davis

Counsel: Thomas Evans Chandler, U.S. Dept. of Justice, for Plaintiff-Appellee United States; Thomas S. Berg, for Defendant-Appellant Cannon; Mervyn M. Mosbacker, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant Kerstetter; and Richard B. Kuniansky, Kuniansky & Associates, for Defendant-Appellant McLaughlin.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Elrod (majority opinion and special concurrence)

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 04/25/2014 10:44 AM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 24, 2014
  European Community v. RJR Nabisco
Case Name: European Community v. RJR Nabisco

Headline: Second Circuit Holds That Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute Can Apply Extraterritorially, Reinstating European Community's Claims Against RJR Nabisco

Area of Law: International Criminal Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the claims brought against RJR Nabisco by the European Community and 26 of its member states under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute are impermissibly extraterritorial, and whether the European Community qualifies as an organ of a foreign state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

Brief Summary: The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco ("RJR") under RICO, alleging that RJR had facilitated a worldwide money-laundering scheme in connection with organized crime groups, laundered money through New York financial institutions, and committed common law torts in violation of New York law. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the RICO statute has no extraterritorial application, and also dismissed the state law claims on the grounds that the European Community did not qualify as an organ of a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1603, which "deprived the court of jurisdiction over the state law claims." The Second Circuit disagreed, vacating the judgment below and remanding the case to go forward. In regard to the RICO issue, the Second Circuit held that Congress had clearly manifested an intent for RICO to apply extraterritorially in the type of circumstances alleged here. The Second Circuit further held that the European Community qualified as a "foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), and "its suit against 'citizens of a State or of different States' comes within the diversity jurisdiction." To read the full opinion, please visit http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...5f17e650ebd/1/hilite/

Extended Summary: The plaintiffs alleged that RJR directed and controlled a money-laundering scheme that involved a multi-step process. According to the complaint, Colombian and Russian organized criminal entities smuggled illegal narcotics into Europe. They then sold the drugs, making a profit in euros, which they laundered through money brokers who changed the euros into the "domestic currency of the criminal organizations' home countries." The money brokers then sold the euros money to cigarette importers at a discounted rate. Next, the cigarette importers would use these euros to purchase RJR's cigarettes from wholesalers, who obtained their cigarette supply from RJR. The plaintiffs contended that RJR directed and controlled this money-laundering scheme, thereby committing racketeering acts that violated the RICO statute "including mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations." They also alleged that RJR violated New York state law by committing fraud, unjust enrichment, public nuisance, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and money had and received.

The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that RICO did not apply to activity outside the territory of the United States and could not apply to a foreign enterprise. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the remaining state law claims because the European Community did not qualify as a "foreign state" under federal law, and therefore there was not complete diversity between the parties.

On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected both conclusions. First, as to the RICO claim, the court held that
when a RICO claim depends on violations of a predicate statute that itself manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially, RICO will apply to that conduct as well. Conversely, when a RICO claim depends on violations of a predicate statute that does not clearly apply to extraterritorial conduct, RICO will not apply extraterritorially either. "In all cases, what constitutes sufficient domestic conduct to trigger liability is the same as between RICO and the predicate that forms the basis for RICO liability," the court held. The court further held that the money laundering and material support of terrorism statutes both applied extraterritorially in circumstances such as those alleged in the complaint. The court added that although the wire fraud, money fraud, and Travel Act statutes did not apply extraterritorially, the plaintiffs' RICO claims based on those predicates also applied here because the plaintiffs had alleged that the elements of those statutes were violated in the United States. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claims could go forward.

Second, the Second Circuit held that the European Community (which, after the lawsuit was filed, was incorporated into the European Union) qualified as a "foreign state." Specifically, the court deemed the European Community an "organ of a foreign state," and "thus an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under the relevant statutory provisions. The Second Circuit used the five factors set forth in Filler v. Hanvitt Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) to determine whether or not the Plaintiff is considered an "organ". These five factors are: (1) whether the foreign state create the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law. It concluded that the European Community satisfied most, if not all, of these factors.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...5f17e650ebd/1/hilite/

Panel: Judges Leval, Sack, and Hall.

Argument: 02/24/2012

Date of Issued Opinion: 04/23/2014

Docket Number: 11-2475-cv

Decided: Vacated and remanded.

Case Alert Author: Amy Stein

Counsel: John J. Halloran, Jr., Speiser, Krause, Nolan & Granito, for the Plaintiff-Appellants. Gregory G. Katsas, Jones Day, for the Defendants - Appellees.

Author of Opinion: Judge Leval

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Emily Gold Waldman

    Posted By: Emily Waldman @ 04/24/2014 02:20 PM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 22, 2014
  The New York Times Company v. United States - Second Circuit
Headline: Second Circuit Reverses District Court in Part, Requiring Limited Disclosure of Classified Government Documents Pertaining to Legal Justification for Use of Drones for Targeted Killings of United States Citizens in Response to New York Times and ACLU FOIA Requests

Area of Law: Freedom of Information Act

Issue(s) Presented: Whether United States agency responses to FOIA requests, seeking documents related to the United Stated government's justification for a 2011 targeted drone strike killing three United States citizens in Yemen, one of whom the government claimed was a member of Al Qaeda, which refused to disclose responsive documents on grounds that they were classified, privileged, or met other FOIA exemptions and, in some cases, refused to admit or deny the existence of potentially responsive documents, were lawful?

Brief Summary: Plaintiffs, The New York Times, two of its reporters, and the American Civil Liberties Union, brought suit against the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency for failing to adequately respond to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for documents pertaining to the justification for the government's use of drone attacks that killed three American citizens in 2011. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the government's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the challenge to the FOIA responses, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case, holding that the government should be required to disclose a classified memorandum prepared by the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel setting out the legal justification for the drone killings and to submit certain indices of relevant documents to the district court for review of their privilege and exclusion claims.

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...006f148ca16/1/hilite/

Extended Summary: Plaintiffs-Appellants, The New York Times Company, two New York Times reporters, Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, and The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), the United States Department of Defense (DOD), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (collectively, "the Government") seeking information concerning the legal justification for targeted drone strikes that killed three United States citizens, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, along with Anwar al-Awaki's teenage son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, in Yemen in 2011. The DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) denied some of the FOIA requests on the grounds that the requested documents were exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exclusions for documents properly classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy (exemption 1), records specifically exempted by statute - here, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 or National Security Act of 1947 (exemption 3) - or otherwise exempt as agency memoranda "not available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency" (exemption 5). The OLC also neither admitted nor denied the existence of other requested documents, asserting the existence or nonexistence of such documents was itself classified. Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging the denials of the requests and the suits were later consolidated. The parties made cross motions for summary judgment and the district court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. After the district court entered judgment for Defendants, certain government documents were leaked and then subsequently released by the government, affirming the existence of a classified DOD-OLG memorandum and other documents that were responsive to Plaintiffs' requests.

The Second Circuit began by noting that the FOIA calls for broad disclosure of government records, but also sets out several exemptions to the required disclosure. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the search undertaken for responsive documents was sufficient and agreed that the Government was not required to provide to the ACLU certain requested legal memoranda which were very brief, informal and pre-decisional, and constituted personal opinions of the writer. The Second Circuit reversed the district court in part, however, determining that the government should be required to disclose, in redacted form, a classified memorandum - the "OLC-DOD Memorandum" - that set out the OLC's confidential legal advice to the Attorney General relating to the use of drones for targeted killings, and to submit certain indices of relevant documents to the district court for review of their privilege and exclusion claims.

Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the government waived its right to withhold the "OLC-DOD Memorandum" under exemptions 1 and 5 as protected by the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges and as information about military operations, intelligence methods, and foreign relations activities by disclosing portions of the contents of the Memorandum in public statements and in its release of a classified "White Paper" to the public, following a leak of this document, in a public relations effort to convince the public of the lawfulness of the killing of al-Awlaki. The Second Circuit rejected the Government's contention that disclosure of the OLC-DOD Memorandum would inhibit agencies from seeking OLC's legal advice, reasoning that upholding that rationale would effectively mean a waiver of privileges protecting legal advice could never occur. The Second Circuit also rejected the Government's contention that the LOC-DOD Memorandum contents could not be understood without reference to other classified documents and found that, under the FOIA, a redacted version of the document should be provided after deletion of portions exempt under the statute.

The Second Circuit also ordered the Government to disclose indices listing certain documents, the existence of which the Government previously declined to confirm or deny and required the Government to submit other indices to the district court for in camera review on remand for review of claims of exemption and privilege.

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...006f148ca16/1/hilite/

Panel:
Circuit Judges Newman, Cabranes, and Pooler

Argument Date:
10/1/2013

Date of Issued Opinion:
4/21/2014

Docket Number
: Nos. 13-422(L), 13-445(Con).

Decided: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Case Alert Author: Gillian Kirsch

Counsel: David E. McCraw, The New York Times Company, New York, N.Y. (Stephen N. Gikow, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants The New York Times Company, Charlie Savage, and Scott Shane. Jameel Jaffer, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, N.Y. (Hina Shamsi, Brett Max Kaufman, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, N.Y., Joshua Colangelo-Bryan, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York, N.Y., Eric Ruzicka, Colin Wicker, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN., on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

Sharon Swingle, U.S. Appellate Staff Atty., Washington, D.C. (Preet Bharara, U.S. Atty., Sarah S. Normand, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York, N.Y., Stuart F. Delery, Acting Asst. U.S. Atty. General, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

(Bruce D. Brown, Mark Caramanica, Aaron Mackey, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, Arlington, V.A., for amicus curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.) (Marc Rotenberg, Alan Butler, Ginger McCall, David Brody, Julia Horwitz, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center, in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.)

Author of Opinion: Judge Jon O. Newman

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elyse Diamond Moskowitz

    Posted By: Elyse Moskowitz @ 04/22/2014 08:43 AM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 21, 2014
  Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA
Headline: D.C. Circuit upholds EPA emission standards for cement manufacturing but strikes down EPA's affirmative defense for violations due to unavoidable malfunction because creation of such a defense is for courts, not the agency.

Area of Law: Administrative Law, Clean Air Act

Issue Presented: Whether certain aspects of the EPA's emission standards for the cement industry contravene the Clean Air Act and whether the EPA has statutory authority to create an affirmative defense in civil suits for violations of the standards due to unavoidable malfunction.

Brief Summary: In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated particulate emissions standards for kilns used in the manufacture of portland cement. The 2010 Rule also created an affirmative defense, available to manufacturers in private civil suits, when violations of the standards occurred because of "unavoidable" malfunctions. The affirmative defense replaced a previous EPA policy creating an exemption from emissions limitations during malfunction events. That rule was struck down the following year, after the D.C. Circuit determined that EPA had erroneously included information in its dataset that resulted in an arbitrarily low emission standard. In 2013, the EPA corrected the data errors and promulgated a new rule raising the limit of particulate residue from .04 lb/ton to .07 lb/ton. The 2013 rule also included the affirmative defense provision, which EPA believed was necessary to resolve a "tension" between the Clean Air Act's requirement that emission standards apply at all times and the fact that emission limits may sometimes be exceeded for reasons beyond the control of the source.

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental groups challenged the revised rule, arguing that it violated part of the Clean Air Act, which states that no standard can diminish or replace a more stringent existing standard, created pursuant to other authority. Because the 2010 rule had required more stringent standards, the NRDC claimed the 2013 rule diminished that standard. The NRDC also challenged the affirmative defense provision on the grounds that it exceeded EPA's statutory authority because it is the role of the courts to create an affirmative defense, not the EPA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the 2013 rule but vacated the affirmative defense provision. Applying Chevron deference, the court found the Clean Air Act sufficiently ambiguous on the meaning of other authority and held the EPA's interpretation to be reasonable. The court also found reasonable EPA's interpretation that it may consider cost-effectiveness in determining the maximum reduction in emissions. Turning to the rule's affirmative defense provision, the court found the rule inconsistent with the statutory language granting courts the jurisdiction to award appropriate civil penalties. The EPA has authority over administrative claims and may intervene in civil cases, but it is the role of the courts to determine the appropriate remedies. The court found the EPA's arguments insufficient to justify encroaching on the judiciary but indicated that the EPA could make its substantive points in favor of moderating the penalty to the court when this issue arises in that venue.

For the full text of this opinion, please visit
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i.../10-1371-1488926.pdf.

Panel: Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, and Edwards

Argument Date: October 24, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: April 18, 2014

Docket Number: 10-1317

Decided: Affirmed in part, vacated in part

Case Alert Author: Joseph T. Maher, Jr.

Counsel (if known): James S. Pew, Seth L. Johnson, John Walke, Meleah Geertsma, and Avinash Kar for petitioners. Matthew R. Oakes, Robert G. Dreher, and Steven E. Silverman for respondents.

Author of Opinion: Kavanaugh

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 04/21/2014 11:59 AM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 17, 2014
  Huffman v. The Hilltop Companies, LLC - Sixth Circuit
Headline: The presumption in favor of arbitration applies even after a contract expires, even if the contract's survival clause did not mention the arbitration clause.

Area of Law: Contract Law; Arbitration

Issue Presented: Does the strong federal presumption in favor of arbitration apply after a contract expires when the arbitration clause is not specifically listed in the survival clause?

Brief Summary: The plaintiffs each signed an employment agreement with the defendant. The agreement contained an arbitration clause, but the arbitration clause was not listed in the survival clause. After the plaintiffs' employment ended, they sued for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. The defendant argued that the claim had to be submitted to arbitration. The Sixth Circuit held that the arbitration clause did not expire with the contract, even though it was not listed in the survival clause.

Significance: Despite the doctrine of expressio unius, arbitration clauses can survive after a contract expires even if they are not listed in the contract's survival clause.

Extended Summary: Defendant hired the plaintiffs in 2011 to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank. The plaintiffs each signed an employment agreement that contained an arbitration clause. The clause stated that all claims "arising out of or related to" the agreement would be settled by arbitration. The agreements also contained a survival clause, which listed provisions of the agreement that would remain in effect after its expiration. The survival clause did not mention the arbitration clause.

After their employment agreements with the defendant expired, the plaintiffs sued, alleging that the defendant had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration clause applied after the agreement's expiration even though the survival clause did not list it. The district court found for the plaintiffs. It relied on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which states that when a contract contains a detailed list of particulars, courts should presume that items not included in that list were intentionally omitted. The district court reasoned that if certain provisions were included in the survival clause, the provisions not included were not meant to apply post-expiration. The defendant appealed.

The Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of expressio unius, by itself, was not enough to rebut the strong presumption in favor of arbitration. It reasoned that the list of provisions in the survival clause was not meant to be exhaustive because it did not contain other clauses that would necessarily survive expiration, including a 12-month noncompetition clause and integration and severability clauses. Reading the employment agreement as a whole, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the arbitration clause was meant to survive the agreement, even though it was not mentioned in the survival clause. Thus, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have dismissed the case and compelled arbitration.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0056p-06.pdf

Panel: Gilman, Cook, McKeague

Argument: March 19, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: March 27, 2014

Docket Number: 13-3938

Decided: March 27, 2014

Counsel: ARGUED: Matthew C. Blickensderfer, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Adam W. Hansen, NICHOLS KASTER, LLP, San Francisco, California, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Matthew C. Blickensderfer, Eugene Droder III, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Adam W. Hansen, NICHOLS KASTER, LLP, San Francisco, California, Rachhana T. Srey, NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Appellees.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge McKeague

Case Alert Author: Sarah Fuhrman

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Barbara Kalinowski

Edited: 04/17/2014 at 04:00 PM by Mark Cooney

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 04/17/2014 03:51 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 16, 2014
  United States of America v. Sergio Velazquez - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Finds Government's Five-Year Delay in Making Serious Search to Find Defendant Violates Right to Speedy Trial

Area of Law: Constitutional Law - Sixth Amendment

Issue Presented: Whether the right to a speedy trial guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment is violated when, after an initial effort to apprehend the defendant, the government's effort for nearly five years consist only of running the defendant' name a handful of times through the National Crime Information Center, despite other available leads?

Brief Summary: The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") began investigating Sergio Velazquez ("Appellant") in June 2005. Appellant traveled from California to Philadelphia to meet co-defendant Pedro Curiel and informant to discuss the sale of cocaine. Appellant went back to California after discussions. A sale of cocaine between Curiel, another co-defendant and informant subsequently occurred. They were then arrested and indicted. In August 2005, a complaint and arrest warrant were issued for Appellant. A DEA special agent went to an address associated with Appellant in California, but he was not at that address. The case was assigned to the Marshals Service in Philadelphia. Deputy Marshal Degan was assigned to the case; he entered the warrant into National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database and prepared a collateral request, which is a request for investigative assistance from a Marshals Service office in another jurisdiction. The Los Angeles Marshal Service received the collateral request. The Los Angeles Marshal Service did not take any steps to work on the collateral request. From November 2005 until November 2010 authorities checked the NCIC eight times for Appellant, but nothing came up and no further steps to apprehend Appellant were taken. A new collateral request was issued in June 2011, when Deputy Marshal Ilagan was assigned to the case. The LA Marshal Service took some steps to apprehend Appellant, but they were unsuccessful. In December 2011, Appellant was apprehended on an unrelated narcotics charge. He was then extradited to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In March 2012, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a speedy trial violation. The District Court denied his motion, finding that the government was reasonably diligent in pursuing Appellant. Thus, Appellant had to show specific prejudice to his defense from the delay between indictment and arrest, and the District Court held that he did not make this showing. The Third Circuit found that the length of delay in bringing Appellant to trial was extraordinary and that the government was not reasonably diligent in pursuing the Appellant. Thus, the delay in apprehending the Appellant was due to the government's conduct. The Appellant timely asserted his speedy-trial rights, four months, after he found out about his indictment. Due to the delay of apprehending the Appellant, there is a presumption of general prejudice that applies with considerable force in case of such delay. Thus, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court's conviction of Appellant and directed that the case be dismissed. There was a dissenting opinion by Judge Jordan.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary:
The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") began investigating Sergio Velazquez ("Appellant") in June 2005. Appellant traveled from California to Philadelphia to meet co-defendant Pedro Curiel and informant to discuss the sale of cocaine. After the meeting, police stopped Appellant and Curiel to identify the men. Appellant was not arrested and returned to California. In July 2005, after a sale between Curiel, another co-defendant and informant, Curiel and the co-defendant were arrested. The co-defendants were indicted on August 2, 2005. A complaint and arrest warrant were issued for Appellant the next day. David Pedrini, a DEA special agent in Philadelphia had a fellow agent from Los Angeles, Steve Pascoe, go to Appellant's California address, but he was unable to locate him.

The DEA declared Appellant a fugitive and turned over the search to William Degan, a deputy marshall in the United States Marshals Service office in Philadelphia. Degan entered Appellant's name into the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database, and into a Marshals Service information system. Entering Appellant into the NCIC database would allow any law enforcement agent that took Appellant into custody on unrelated charges to know that Appellant was wanted in another jurisdiction. Degan, in October 2005, then prepared a collateral request, which is a request for investigative assistance from a Marshals Service in another jurisdiction. The request was received by the Los Angeles office. Seven weeks later Degan left his position in the Philadelphia Marshall's Service and ended his involvement with Appellant's case.

In November 2005, an assistant U.S. attorney in Philadelphia sent a copy of the complaint and warrant to Appellant's counsel in California, Jerome Kaplan. Three weeks later, a superseding indictment was filed, charging Appellant. The indictment was not sent to Kaplan. From November 2005 until November 2010, authorities checked the NCIC eight times to see if any law enforcement agents had encountered Appellant. At some point during that time, Pedrini put Appellant on the "Most Wanted" section of the website for the DEA's office in Philadelphia. There were no further steps taken to find Appellant in this five-year period.
In November 2010, Deputy Marshal Ilagan of the Philadelphia office began working on Appellant's case. Ilagan ran a NCIC check along with a Lexis-Nexis search and found a new address for Appellant and a possible new job location. Ilagan continued to check databases. In June 2011, he came up with a new address for Appellant and submitted a new collateral request on June 22, 2011 to the Los Angeles Marshal Service taskforce. Deputy David Dominguez was assigned. He sat surveillance at Appellant's old address as well as at the post office where Appellant had his mail delivered. Although the employees at the Post Office recognized Appellant and noted that he came to retrieve his mail frequently, Appellant did not show up during the half-day that Dominguez waited outside. Appellant was finally apprehended on December 9, 2011 on an unrelated narcotics charge. Appellant was then served with the arrest warrant and extradited to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On March 28, 2012, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a speedy trial violation. The district denied the motion, finding that the government was reasonably diligent in pursuing Appellant. Thus Appellant had to show specific prejudice to his defense from the long delay between indictment and arrest, and the District Court held that he did not make this showing.
The Supreme Court case of Barker v. Wingo established a four-factor test for evaluating whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The inquiry focuses on: (1) the length of the delay before trial; (2) the reason for the delay and, specifically, whether the government or the defendant is more to blame; (3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant.

The District Court found here that the delay between the November 2005 superseding indictment for Appellant and the July 2012 trial date crossed the threshold of prejudicial delay to justify analysis of the remaining Barker factors.
The District Court found that the government performed reasonable diligence in trying to find the Appellant. The District Court made this determination for two reasons: (1) the unfruitful trip to the Woodward Avenue address in 2005 and the investigate efforts in 2011 showed that the government inaction in the intervening years was a reasonable choice to conserve resources and thus comports with the requirements of reasonable diligence; and (2) that Appellant had an elusive lifestyle and thus bears responsibility for the delay. The Third Circuit, however, found that the Marshal Service and the DEA efforts to find Appellant were limited to periodic checks of the NCIC Persons database. They also found there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that investigators made an actual "choice" not to pursue Appellant. The Third Circuit also found that Appellant consistently listed the same PO Box as his address and that there was no evidence that he either knew he was under indictment or that he was attempting to elude arrest. Thus, the Third Circuit found that the Appellant was not the cause of the delay in prosecution and that the government was not reasonably diligent in its pursuit of Appellant.

The Third Circuit found that knowledge of the indictment as the appropriate measure for the timely assertion of the speedy trial right. Neither Appellant nor his attorney were told of the indictment, thus, Appellant learned of the indictment at the time of his arrest. Thus, Appellant brought his speedy-trial motion in time. The Third Circuit held that the presumption of general prejudice, triggered by the government's extraordinary delay in bringing Appellant to trial, favors the Appellant. Thus, the Barker factors support the Appellant's claim of a violation of his speedy trial right. Therefore, the Third Circuit reverses the district court's judgment of conviction and remanded the case for dismissal.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/123992p.pdf

Panel (if known): Rendell, Jordan and Lipez, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: October 17, 2013

Argument Location: Philadelphia, PA

Date of Issued Opinion: April 14, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-3992

Decided: judgment vacated and case dismissed

Case Alert Author: Tam T. Tran

Counsel: Jerome Kaplan, Esq., for Appellant; Zane David Memeger, Esq. and Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq., Bernadette McKeon, Esq., Joseph T. Labrum, III, Esq., for Appellees

Author of Opinion: Judge Lipez

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mark Anderson

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 04/16/2014 01:36 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  United States of America v. Joseph Vincent White - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Finds that Police Cannot Arrest Suspect Outside of His Home and Then Conduct Warrantless Search of His Home

Area of Law: Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment

Issues Presented: Whether it is correct to apply the analysis of Maryland v. Buie's "prong 1" related to a search incident to an arrest outside of the home?

Brief Summary: Joseph Vincent White ("Appellant") was arrested outside of his home after a domestic disturbance call. After police officers arrived on the scene they asked his daughter, the victim of the domestic disturbance, if there was anyone else in the home. Even though she said there was not, one of the officers, Trooper Hoban, decided he would check for himself. When he went into the home, he saw two guns lying on the floor, just inside the threshold; he seized the weapons. Weeks later, after obtaining a search warrant based in part on the two firearms Trooper Hoban found, police discovered an additional 91 firearms in the home. A grand jury subsequently indicted Appellant for unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. Appellant then moved to exclude from evidence the firearms found in his home on the grounds that they were the result of an illegal search. The District Court denied the suppression motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Buie. In Buie the Supreme Court found that a search of a house without a warrant issued on probable cause is generally unreasonable. However, there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement. In Buie, the Supreme Court articulated two of them: (1) warrantless search of a home incident to an arrest occurring in the home, provided that the search is limited to those places immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched, and; (2) a warrantless search of a home based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that the areas being searched may harbor an individual who poses a danger to those present at the scene of the arrest. The District Court found that Trooper Hoban's warrantless search of Appellant's home was a limited permissible search incident to arrest under the first prong of Buie, and therefore did not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Third Circuit, however, found that because Appellant was arrested outside of his home, the District Court's analysis under the first prong of Buie was inapplicable. The Court noted that its ruling was consistent with prior Third Circuit precedent and with holdings of other federal courts of appeals. The Third Circuit then vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for consideration as to whether the second prong of Buie or the "exigent circumstances" doctrine could justify the warrantless search at issue.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: Joseph Vincent White ("Appellant") was arrested outside of his home after a domestic disturbance call. On April 12, 2012 police were called to Appellant's residence. Appellant's daughter's boyfriend called the police stating that Appellant was waving a loaded firearm around and dragging his daughter from room to room. When police officers arrived at the Appellant's home the troopers ordered the two people they saw out of the home, a trailer home with a mudroom attached. Appellant and his daughter walked out, and the officers arrested Appellant. One of the officers, Trooper Hoban, then asked Samantha White, Appellant's daughter, if there was anyone else in the home; she indicated there was not. Trooper Hoban decided to check himself. As he walked into the mudroom, he saw two guns, a revolver and shotgun, lying on the floor just inside the threshold. He took the guns and put them in his trunk. Weeks later, on May 4, 2012, after obtaining a search warrant based in part on the two firearms, police seized 91 additional firearms from the home.

On August 8, 2012 a grand jury indicted the Appellant with unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. Appellant moved to suppress the two firearms plus the additional guns seized during the execution of the warrant. He argued that Trooper Hoban's warrantless search of his home was unreasonable and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. After testimony from Trooper Hoban and Trooper Hill, the District Court ruled from the bench and denied Appellant's motion. Relying on Maryland v. Buie the District Court held that Trooper Hoban's search was a lawful search incident to the arrest, which did not require reasonable suspicion to be lawful. On January 7, 2013, Appellant pled guilty to the felon in possession of a firearm charge, expressly reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression of motion.

The Supreme Court in Buie held that a search of a house without a warrant issued on probable cause is generally unreasonable. However, in Buie the Supreme Court articulated two exceptions: (1) a warrantless search of a home incident to an arrest occurring in the home, provided that the search is limited to those places immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched; and (2) a warrantless search of a home based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that the areas being searched may harbor an individual who poses a danger to those present at the scene of the arrest. A warrantless search of a home is also permitted when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court limited its analysis to the first prong of Buie, finding that the warrantless search of Appellant's home was a limited and permissible search incident to arrest, not requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

The Third Circuit, however, found that because the Appellant was arrested approximately 20 feet outside of the entrance to his home, the first prong of Buie was not applicable and the search must be evaluated pursuant to the other exceptions to the warrant requirement.

The Court also noted that its holding was consistent with the prior Third Circuit precedent in Sharrar v. Felsing as well as with cases from other federal courts of appeal. The Court then vacated the decision of the District Court and remanded the case for a determination as to whether the search was justified under the second prong of Buie or by the "exigent circumstances" doctrine.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132130p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes and Fisher, Circuit Judges and Stark, District Judge

Argument Date: January 22, 2014

Argument Location: Philadelphia, PA

Date of Issued Opinion: April 14, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-2130

Decided: Vacate and remand for further consideration

Case Alert Author: Tam T. Tran

Counsel: Zane David Memeger, Esq., Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq., Robert J. Livermore, Esq., and Paul G. Shapiro, Esq., for Appellee; Leigh M. Skipper, Esq., Brett G. Sweitzer, Esq., Sarah S. Gannett, Esq., and Keith M. Donoghue, Esq., for Appellent

Author of Opinion: Judge Stark

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Mark Anderson

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 04/16/2014 11:23 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 15, 2014
  Common Cause v. Biden
Headline: D.C. Circuit finds Common Cause had no standing to sue Senate officials over the constitutionality of the filibuster rule.

Area of Law: Standing, Speech and Debate Clause

Issue Presented:
Whether beneficiaries of a bill that passed the House of Representatives but were filibustered in the Senate have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Senate's cloture rule.

Brief Summary: In the 110th Congress, two bills, the DREAM bill and the DISCLOSE bill, passed the House of Representatives. Although both bills garnered the support of a majority of Senators, neither measure achieved the sixty votes necessary to cut off debate and bring them to a vote. Common Cause and other supporters of the bills brought suit against the Vice President, in his capacity as President of the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate, the Parliamentarian of the Senate, and the Sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, claiming that the cloture rule, which requires a super-majority to force a vote in a bill, blocks legislation that has the support of a majority of both houses of Congress, violating the Constitutional principle of majority rule. They asked the court to strike the sixty vote requirement from the cloture rule and replace it with a majority-rule requirement. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It held that, because there was no guarantee the bills would have passed in the Senate, even if a vote had occurred, none of the plaintiffs had suffered a cognizable injury from the failure of the bills. The court also found that the suit presented a nonjusticiable political question.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed but on different grounds than the district court, focusing instead on "whom Common Cause chose to sue - or, more to the point, not to sue." Common Cause was barred from suing Senators and their staff by the Speech and Debate Clause, which confers immunity for any act that falls "within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Appellants relied on Powell v. McCormack, for the proposition that they could sue Senate officers for implementing the cloture rule even if they could not sue the Senators who created it. However, the D.C. Circuit distinguished Powell, concluding that the causal connection between Powell's alleged injuries and the actions of officers of the House of Representatives, who had refused to pay his salary and threatened to bar him from the building, was "obvious" but finding no such connection here. Determining that Appellants' injury was "caused not by any of the defendants, but by an 'absent third party' - the Senate itself," the court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the case.

For the full text of this opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/12-5412-1488364.pdf

Panel: Henderson, Williams, and Randolph

Argument Date: January 21, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: April 15, 2014

Docket Number: 12-5412

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Joseph T. Maher, Jr.

Counsel (if known): Emmet J. Bondurant II and Stephen Spaulding for appellants. Thomas E. Caballero, Morgan J. Frankel, Patricia Mack Bryan, and Grant R. Vinik for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Randolph

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 04/15/2014 02:28 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 11, 2014
  United States of America v. Cellco Partnership
Headline: Parting company with the Fourth Circuit, D.C. Circuit holds that the False Claims Act's first-to-file rule barring subsequent related suits applies even when the first action is no longer pending.

Area of Law: False Claims Act

Issue Presented: Whether the first-to-file rule of the False Claims Act bars subsequent related claims even after the first action is no longer pending.

Brief Summary: Stephen M. Shea, a former telecommunications consultant, filed a qui tam complaint on behalf of the United States government against Verizon in 2007 (Verizon I) alleging that Verizon had charged the government certain taxes and surcharges contrary to federal regulations. The United States intervened, and the case settled in 2011. Shea filed a second qui tam action in 2009 and a second amended complaint in 2012 (Verizon II). The second action, closely related to the first, encompassed more contracts and more governmental agencies. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Shea's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The court held that under the False Claim Act's (FCA) first-to-file bar, it did not have jurisdiction to hear a subsequent complaint. The first-to-file bar provides that "[w]hen a person brings an action under [the FCA], no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action." The district court found that the government was already equipped to investigate the fraudulent scheme based on the complaint in Verizon I and dismissed Verizon II with prejudice.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) the complaint is "related" within the meaning of the FCA to the earlier action, (2) that the first-to-file bar applies to Shea even though he brought the first action, and (3) that the bar remains effective even after the first action is no longer pending. Although Verizon II alleged more fraudulent allegations than Verizon I, the court found that it essentially argued the same fraudulent scheme, and the original complaint served its purpose to put the government on notice to investigate all the allegations in Verizon II. Shea argued that the first-to-file bar only applies to litigants other than the relator who filed the original action. Not persuaded, the court found that the plain language stating "no person other than the Government" may intervene or bring a related claim includes the original relator. This provision of the FCA has two purposes, to encourage whistleblowers to file suit and to remove that incentive when the government is capable of pursuing suit itself.

Finally, Shea argued that the first-to-file bar is a temporal limit on related suits. He argued that by using the language "pending action," Congress intended to permit the second action so long as the first action is no longer pending. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the word "pending" merely identified the earlier action, as distinguished from the subsequent action, and did not literally require that the earlier action remain pending. The court used plain text, the absence of any temporal constraint in the statute, and policies undergirding the FCA in reaching this conclusion. The court recognized that three other circuits have suggested that "pending" means the opposite, but it determined that two of those decisions were dicta and the other, from the Fourth Circuit, did not directly compare the two conflicting constructions of the term. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that its decision created a split with the Fourth Circuit but concluded that "pending" does not literally mean that the original action must be pending.

Circuit Judge Srinivasan concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Verizon II was related to the prior action and that the first-to-file bar encompasses situations where the same relator files the second action but dissenting from the court's holding regarding the meaning of "pending."

For the full text of this opinion, please visit
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i.../12-7133-1487936.pdf.

Panel: Srinivasan, Edwards, and Sentelle.

Argument Date: November 16, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: April 11, 2014

Docket Number: 12-7133

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Joseph T. Maher, Jr.

Counsel: Christopher Mead and Mark London for appellant. Seth P. Waxman, Randolph D. Moss, and Brian M. Boynton for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Sentelle

Concurring in part, Dissenting in part by: Srinivasan

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 04/11/2014 04:35 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

  SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Thomas Perez
Headline: D.C. Circuit upholds fines imposed on SeaWorld in wake of trainer's death in killer whale attack

Area of Law: Occupational Safety and Health Act

Issue(s) Presented: Whether SeaWorld violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Health and Safety Act by exposing trainers who worked with killer whales to recognized hazards and whether procedures to abate those hazards were feasible.

Brief Summary: On February 24, 2010 SeaWorld trainer Dawn Brancheau was killed when a killer whale dragged her off a platform during a performance before a live audience at Sea World in Orlando, Florida. Brancheau suffered traumatic injuries and drowned.

The Secretary of Labor issued three citations to SeaWorld following an investigation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), including a citation for two instances of a "willful" violation of the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act for exposing trainers to the recognized hazards of drowning or injury during performances, and proposed a penalty of $70,000. An ALJ affirmed the citations after an evidentiary hearing, finding [1] that Brancheau was performing at the time she was killed; [2] that close contact with killer whales was a hazard likely to cause death or serious injury; [3] that there was "abundant" evidence, including the deaths of three trainers while working with killer whales at facilities around the world, that SeaWorld was aware of the hazard; and [4] that there were steps that Sea World could have taken, and in fact did take subsequent to Brancheau's death, to abate the hazard. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission denied SeaWorld's petition for discretionary review, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

Extended Summary (if applicable): SeaWorld contested the ALJ's findings that the risks of working closely with killer whales constituted a recognized hazard and that there were feasible methods of minimizing those risks. SeaWorld also argued that the General Duty Clause was unconstitutionally vague as applied because it lacked fair notice of the necessity of abatement measures imposed by the Secretary.

Applying arbitrary and capricious review, the D.C. Circuit rejected SeaWorld's argument that working with killer whales was not a recognized hazard because its extensive training and safety programs adequately controlled the risk. The court determined that these programs, and the fact that managers repeatedly urged caution when working with the whales, evidenced a recognition that interacting closely with killer whales was dangerous and unpredictable. The court also rejected SeaWorld's argument that the trainers accepted and controlled their own exposure to the hazards of close contact with the whales, finding that the duty to provide a safe workplace rests with the employer and is not qualified by common law doctrines like assumption of risk.

The court determined that imposition of the safety measures did not alter the essential nature of SeaWorld's business, as it would not stop trainers performing with, or caring for the whales. In support of that finding, the court considered that SeaWorld had already voluntarily imposed some of the recommended measures, including increasing the required distances between whales and trainers and prohibiting trainers from being in the water with certain whales, without harming its business.

Finally, the court rejected SeaWorld's as-applied vagueness challenge to the General Duty Clause. The court reasoned that the risks of working with killer whales were well known and that SeaWorld could have anticipated the necessity for abatement measures it imposed after the accident.

Judge Kavanaugh dissented, arguing that the Department of Labor had exceeded its authority in attempting to proscribe risks that are "normal activities" intrinsic to the industry.

For the full text of the decision, please see http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/12-1375-1487925.pdf


Panel (if known): Garland, Rogers, Kavanaugh

Argument Date (if known): 11/12/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 04/11/2014

Docket Number: 12-1375

Decided:
Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Ripple Weistling

Counsel (if known): Eugene Scalia, Baruch A. Fellner, and Daniel P. Rathbun for Petitioner. Amy S. Tryon, Joseph M. Woodward, Charles F. James, and Kristen M. Lindberg for Respondent.

Author of Opinion: Rogers; dissent by Kavanaugh

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 04/11/2014 02:59 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 9, 2014
  Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt. - Sixth Circuit
Headline: One witness interview about employee's suspected workplace dishonesty is insufficient investigation to support employer's "honest belief" defense to discrimination claim.

Area of Law: Title VII Employment Discrimination

Issue Presented: Was summary judgment of plaintiff's Title VII employment-discrimination claims proper where plaintiff presented evidence that her supervisors had exchanged emails describing her in unflattering terms and that she was replaced by a person outside her protected racial class, but where there was also evidence that she had lied to her supervisors before she was fired?

Brief Summary: Plaintiff, a female African-American executive of a regional transit authority, claimed she was fired in violation of federal law and brought a Title VII employment-discrimination claim. Plaintiff based her claim on emails between her former supervisors calling her a "prima donna" and a "helluva bitch," and the fact that she was replaced by a person outside her protected racial class. Defendants countered that plaintiff had been fired for the legitimate reason that she had twice lied to her supervisors. The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff's proofs rebutted defendants' evidence. And because defendants did not conduct a "reasonably informed and considered" investigation before firing plaintiff, they could not establish an "honest belief" in the proffered reason for plaintiff's firing.

Significance: Although a defendant can defeat a prima facie discrimination claim under the honest-belief doctrine if the employer made a "reasonably informed and considered decision" before taking the complained-of action, the investigation supporting the honest belief cannot be cursory. Here, an investigation into the plaintiff's truthfulness that included a single conversation with one person was not enough to show an honest belief in the proffered reason for plaintiff's firing.

Extended Summary: Plaintiff was fired from her assigned position as CEO of a transit authority and brought a Title VII claim for race and sex discrimination. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, contending that she presented both direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination on the basis of her sex and race.

Although the Sixth Circuit identified complex issues of fact and law under plaintiff's direct-evidence theory of employment discrimination, it found no need to rule on these because plaintiff's circumstantial-evidence theory provided a sufficient basis to overturn the summary judgment. The circumstantial-evidence theory requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing four elements: (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was discharged, (3) she was qualified for the position held, and (4) she was replaced by someone outside of her protected class. The parties agreed that the first three elements were met but disagreed on the fourth. Defendant argued that the relevant question was whether similarly situated, nonprotected individuals were treated any better, but the court disagreed. Since plaintiff was African American and her replacement was Hispanic, it was clear that someone outside plaintiff's protected class had replaced her. Accordingly, the prima facie case of race discrimination was established.

Addressing the sex-discrimination claim, plaintiff presented evidence of emails between her former supervisors in which they referred to her as a "prima donna" and a "helluva bitch." The Sixth Circuit agreed that the emails revealed sexist animus toward plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff met the prima facie burden for discrimination on the basis of both sex and race.

Defendants then offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's firing: that plaintiff had twice lied about issues related to the unionization of the transit authority's drivers and maintenance technicians. The court found, however, that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the truthfulness of plaintiff's assertions, which precluded summary judgment.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted that an employer's "honest belief" in the proffered basis for the firing can overcome a finding of pretext. The key inquiry in assessing whether an employer had an honest belief is whether the employer made a "reasonably informed and considered decision" before taking the complained-of action. In this case, defendants' investigation into plaintiff's purported lies consisted of a single conversation between plaintiff's supervisor and another person. This evidence did not establish defendants' reasonable reliance on particularized facts concerning plaintiff's truthfulness. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, finding sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0034p-06.pdf

Panel: Cole and Clay, Circuit Judges; Bertelsman, District Judge

Argument: December 4, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 19, 2014

Docket Number: 13-3253

Decided: February 19, 2014

Case Alert Author: Iris Timm

Counsel: ARGUED: Laura Welles Wilson, BLANK ROME LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Susan R. Bell, CORS & BASSETT LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Laura Welles Wilson, Nathaniel R. Jones, Michael L. Cioffi, Lori G. Nuckolls, BLANK ROME LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Susan R. Bell, Robert J. Hollingsworth, Alexis L. McDaniel, CORS & BASSETT LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees.
Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Clay

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 04/09/2014 12:32 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Schoenefeld v. State of New York, et al. - Second Circuit
Headline: Second Circuit Suggests that New York Law Requiring Nonresident Attorneys to Maintain an Office in New York to Practice in New York Courts Could Violate Privileges and Immunities Clause of U.S. Constitution and Certifies Question to New York Court of Appeals for Resolution of Determinative Issue

Area of Law: Constitutional

Issue(s) Presented: Whether a New York State law requiring attorneys who are admitted to practice in New York but reside out of state to maintain an office for the transaction of law business in New York violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution

Brief Summary: Plaintiff-appellee, Ekaterina Schoenefeld, is a lawyer admitted to practice law in both New York and New Jersey and maintains her residence and law office in New Jersey. Schoenefeld brought an action suing the State of New York, among others, challenging the constitutionality of New York Judiciary Law § 470 ("Section 470"). Section 470 requires nonresident attorneys to maintain an "office for the transaction of law business" in New York in order to practice law in New York courts. Schoenefeld argued that this law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution by infringing upon her fundamental right to practice law. The defendants argued that the office requirement in Section 470 might be satisfied with something less than maintenance of a physical office in New York and therefore does not treat New York and out-of-state attorneys differently and, in the alternative, even if it does, it imposes "an incidental burden" that is substantially related to adequate state interests. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the office requirement appears to implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, however, certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of "what minimum requirements are necessary to satisfy th[e] mandate" in Section 470 that nonresident attorneys keep an "office for the transaction of law business."

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...2b08e637b2d/2/hilite/

Extended Summary: Plaintiff-appellee, Ekaterina Schoenefeld is a solo practitioner licensed to practice law in New Jersey and maintains her residence and law office in Princeton, New Jersey. She is also licensed to practice law in the State of New York and claims that on occasion prospective clients have requested that she represent them in New York state courts. Schoenefeld, however, has refused these occasional requests because she believes that her representation of clients in New York state courts would violate New York Judiciary Law § 470 ("Section 470").

New York Judiciary Law § 470 ("Section 470") provides that "[a] person, regularly admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor, in the courts of record of this state, whose office for the transaction of law business is within the state, may practice as such attorney or counselor, although he resides in an adjoining state." In other words, Section 470 appears to prohibit attorneys that do not reside in New York from practicing law in New York state courts unless they also have an "office for the transaction of law business within the state," which Schoenefeld did not have. Schoenefeld brought an action in the Southern District of New York, arguing that Section 470 was unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause. The case was subsequently transferred to the Northern District of New York, which held that Section 470 violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause and granted Schoenefeld's cross-motion for summary judgment.

The Second Circuit began by discussing the protection afforded under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Under the clause, citizens in each state are entitled to "all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." According to the Second Circuit, the right to practice law is one such privilege protected under the Clause and, therefore, plaintiff could prevail if she could demonstrate that New York has, in fact, discriminated against nonresident attorneys with regard to this privilege that it accords its own citizens. To then defeat this showing, New York has to demonstrate: "a substantial reason for the discrimination, and [] a reasonable relationship between the degree of discrimination exacted and the danger sought to be averted by enactment of the discriminatory statute." In its analysis, the Second Circuit suggested that the Section 470 "office for transacting business within the state" requirement implicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause because there is no New York law requiring in-state attorneys to maintain an office in New York.

The defendants argued that Section 470 can be read in a manner that does not implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. According the defendants, the only requirement imposed by Section 470's language "an office for the transaction of law business" is an address for accepting personal service and simply designating an agent for the service of legal papers could satisfy this requirement." The Second Circuit noted, though, that the New York Supreme Court and its Appellate Division courts have never interpreted the Section 470 "office for the transaction of business" requirement to be satisfied by something less than the maintenance of physical office space in New York. Moreover, because the New York Court of Appeals has never before interpreted the Section 470 office requirement, the Second Circuit found it could not predict how the Court of Appeals would resolve the issue. Concluding that this issue is important to the state, would require value judgments and public policy choices, and is determinative of the plaintiff's claim, the Second Circuit chose to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The specific question certified is as follows: "Under New York Judiciary Law § 470, which mandates that a nonresident attorney maintain an "office for the transaction of law business" within the state of New York, what are the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy that mandate?"

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...2b08e637b2d/2/hilite/


Panel: Circuit Judges Raggi, Hall and Carney

Argument Date: 10/3/2012

Date of Issued Opinion: 4/8/2014

Docket Number: No. 11-4283-cv

Decided: Certified Question to New York Court of Appeals

Case Alert Author(s): Christopher Roma

Counsel: Ekaterina Schoenefeld, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Laura Etlinger, Assistant Solicitor General, for Defendants-Appellants

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Hall

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elyse Diamond Moskowitz

    Posted By: Elyse Moskowitz @ 04/09/2014 07:55 AM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 4, 2014
  Parra-Rojas v. Attorney General USA - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Reverses Immigration Case Regarding Transportation of Illegal Aliens

Area of Law: Immigration Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether Petitioner is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) for transporting illegal aliens once they had already entered the country, and there was no evidence that Petitioner was involved in the border crossing?

Brief Summary: Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, but a permanent resident of the United States, was charged with Bringing In and Harboring Aliens for Financial Gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In Immigration Court, the government argued that Petitioner's conviction under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), which provides that, "an alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible." The Immigration Judge ordered that Petitioner be deported to Colombia. On appeal the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision, noting that it is not necessary that an individual be physically present at the border crossing to be held inadmissible. The BIA concluded that "bringing or attempting to bring an alien to the United States corresponds with assisting, abetting or aiding an alien entering or trying to enter the United States." The Third Circuit reversed, holding that there is no evidence that Petitioner aided the aliens' entry into the United States, and that because he only transported the aliens once they had already entered the United States, § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) does not apply to Petitioner's case.

Extended Summary: Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia, but was admitted to the United States at age 20 as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. On November 16, 2009, he was stopped at the High Peaks checkpoint near North Hudson, New York. Upon questioning, Petitioner admitted that he had picked up two illegal aliens in the Saint Regis Mohawk Reservation, on the U.S. side of the Canadian border, and that he was to be paid $1,000 to drive the men to locations in Queens, New York. Petitioner also admitted that he had performed the same work on two prior occasions, and was generally paid around $500 per illegal alien, plus expenses.

Petitioner was charged with Bringing In and Harboring Aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Petitioner was also charged with Transporting Illegal Aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i) (transporting offense). Petitioner pled guilty to the first charge, and the second charge was dismissed on motion by the Government. Petitioner was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

On August 22, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) filed a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court, charging Petitioner with removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable. On September 13, 2011, Petitioner appeared before the Immigration Judge and admitted the fact of his conviction and removability, but informed the Immigration Judge that he planned to apply for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which provides that adjustment may be granted in the discretion of the Attorney General to aliens who are eligible to receive an immigrant visa and are "admissible to the United States for permanent residence."

The Government conceded that an aggravated felony conviction does not, by itself, render an alien ineligible for adjustment of status, but that Petitioner's conviction under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), which provides that, "an alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible."

On February 23, 2012, the Immigration Judge issued an interlocutory order denying Petitioner's application for adjustment of status. The Immigration Judge reasoned that Petitioner's conduct, though limited to transporting aliens within the United States, rather than across the border, was "integral to the overall scheme of alien smuggling," and therefore Petitioner was inadmissible due to his conviction. The Immigration Judge issued a final decision ordering that Petitioner be deported to Colombia on November 27, 2012. On appeal the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision, noting that it is not necessary that an individual be physically present at the border crossing to be held inadmissible. The BIA concluded that "bringing or attempting to bring an alien to the United States corresponds with assisting, abetting or aiding an alien entering or trying to enter the United States."

The Petitioner also argued that his conviction required that the individual charged have acted either knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior authorization to enter the United States, and that he did not have the requisite mens rea for the conviction. The BIA examined Petitioner's pre-sentencing report, which stated that Petitioner had admitted to knowing that the aliens he transported lacked authorization to enter the United States. Therefore, the BIA held that the Petitioner had not established that he did not act with the requisite mens rea.

On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court reversed, holding that Petitioner did not satisfy the "encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided" requirement of § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). To support its holding, the court looked at Petitioner's individual actions regarding the transportation of the illegal aliens. The court found that there was no evidence that Petitioner himself performed any act encouraging, facilitating, or otherwise relating to the aliens' entry into the United States. The court noted that the record contains no indication that Petitioner knew or had contact with any of the aliens prior to transporting them after they had already been dropped off inside the United States, as well as no evidence that Petitioner provided any financial or other assistance to the aliens he transported prior to their entry into the country. Petitioner's conduct was strictly limited to picking up the aliens once they had already crossed the border and transporting them from one area in the United States to another area. Therefore the court held that § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) does not apply to Petitioner's conduct.

The Government relied heavily on the 5th Circuit's holding in Soriano v. Gonzales, which held that an individual was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) because he had made contact with three other aliens in a restaurant in El Paso, Texas, and then drove them to a gas station. However, the Third Circuit reasoned that the Soriano opinion does not indicate whether Soriano had known the aliens prior to their entry to the United States or whether he had personal involvement with their entry into the country. The court held that in the present case, however, the record is clear that Petitioner had no involvement with the aliens prior to their entry to the United States and did not commit any other "affirmative" act that "encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided" the aliens' entry, as required by § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). Because the court held that Petitioner's conduct does not satisfy the requirements of § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), they did not address Petitioner's mens rea argument.

The full opinion can be found at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131828p.pdf

Panel: Circuit Judges Rendell, Roth, and Barry

Argument Date: 1/16/2014

Argument Location: Philadelphia

Date of Issued Opinion: 3/26/2014

Docket Number: No. 13-1828

Decided: Reversed

Case Alert Author: Larissa Staszkiw

Counsel: Thomas E. Moseley, Esquire, Counsel for Petitioner; Eric H. Holder, Jr.
Attorney General of the United States, Stuart F. Delery, Esquire, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Francis W. Fraser, Esquire & Dawn S. Conrad, Esquire, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Counsel for Respondent

Author of Opinion: Judge Rendell

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 04/04/2014 03:54 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Nazareth Hospital v. Secretary United States Department of Health and Human Services - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Finds that Secretary of Department of Health Had Rational Basis for Medicare Regulation

Area of Law: Medicare/Medicaid, Administrative Law, APA

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the Secretary had a rational basis for her Medicare regulation?

Brief Summary:
Because Medicare payments are fixed and not cost-based, hospitals that see larger numbers of low-income patients can sometimes get more funding through disproportionate share hospital (DSH) calculations. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services made a determination that state general assistance patients are not includable in disproportionate share hospital calculations, yet waiver patients are. The District Court held that the Secretary provided no rational basis for making this distinction, and found that the rule violated the APA and equal protection clause. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary had statutory authority to make the distinction, and provided several rational bases for doing so.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary (if applicable):
The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") appealed the District Court's judgment holding the Secretary's Medicare regulation to be arbitrary and capricious, as well as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The dispute centers around certain Medicare reimbursement adjustments to appellees, two Pennsylvania hospitals. The District Court found there was no rational basis to exclude from such reimbursements patients covered by Pennsylvania's General Assistance ("GA") plan, while at the same time including patients covered under a federal statutory waiver program. The Third Circuit reversed.
Medicare reimbursements to hospitals are based on prevailing rates for given services, rather than on the hospital's actual costs. Some hospitals that serve high numbers of low-income patients are eligible for a Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) adjustment. Eligibility depends on the number of days the hospital treats low-income patients who are eligible for Medicaid. DSH also takes into account the days the hospital has treated patients ineligible for Medicaid but who receive benefits pursuant to a Medicaid demonstration project ("waiver projects"). DSH calculations do not, however, include state general assistance patients. The Secretary has discretion to choose which Medicaid requirements will be waived, how long the waiver lasts, and whether the costs of the project will be considered Medicaid-covered expenditures.
Nazareth Hospital and St. Agnes Medical Center, two Pennsylvania hospitals, included "protest" Pennsylvania general assistance patient days in their 2002 Medicare cost reports. The Intermediary then excluded these protest general assistance inclusions from the hospital's Medicare DSH calculations. The Intermediary's decision was affirmed by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Administrator. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that there was no rational distinction between the state general assistance program and the waiver projects in terms of eligibility requirements and services covered, and concluded that the Secretary's disparate treatment could not stand under the APA and the Equal protection Clause.
The scope of the Third Circuit's review of an agency determination is rational basis. Thus, the Court considered whether the Secretary set forth a rational explanation for her actions, and found that the Secretary set forth multiple rational bases upon which to distinguish patient days covered under the general assistance program from those covered under a waiver project. The Secretary has the statutory authority to treat the two categories of patient days differently, and given the different purposes of the programs, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious to do so. The Third Circuit recognized that a court is no substitute for the judgment of the agency, and should uphold an agency decision if the court can reasonably understand the agency's reasoning. Thus, because the Secretary set forth multiple rational bases justifying her inclusion of waiver program patient days in Medicare DSH calculations, but excluding days covered under Pennsylvania's general assistance plan, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court.
The full opinion is available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132627p.pdf

Panel (if known): Rendell, Roth, and Barry, Circuit Judges

Argument (if known): January 16, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: April 2, 2014

Docket Number: 13-2627

Decided: April 2, 2014

Case Alert Author: Alexandra Perry

Counsel (if known):
Veronica J. Finkelstein, Esquire
Joel M. Sweet, Esquire
Office of the United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Stuart F. Delery, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
Zane David Memeger, Esquire
United States Attorney
Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Esquire
Joshua Waldman, Esquire (Argued)
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Room 7232
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Counsel for Appellant
Mark H. Gallant, Esquire (Argued)
Gregory M. Fliszar, Esquire
Katie Beran, Esquire
Robert A. Chu, Esquire
Cozen O'Connor
1900 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellees

Author of Opinion: Rendell, Circuit Judge

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 04/04/2014 03:44 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Arcia, et al., v. Florida Secretary of State
Headline: Eleventh Circuit holds the National Voter Registration Act prohibits the State of Florida's attempt to systematically remove names from voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election.


Area of Law: Voting, Elections

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the State of Florida violated the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act by conducting a program to systematically remove names from voter rolls.

Brief Summary: Numerous plaintiffs sued Florida Secretary of State Kenneth W. Detzner ("Secretary Detzner") for systematically removing names from the voter rolls within 90 days of the 2012 Florida primary and general elections. The District Court found no violation of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and denied plaintiffs' motions for an injunction and summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded finding Secretary Detzner's removal of the names constituted a violation of the 90 Day Provision of the NVRA.

Extended Summary: The 90 Day Provision of the NVRA requires states to complete any systematic removal of ineligible voters 90 days before federal primary and general elections. In 2012, Secretary Detzner implemented two programs to remove non-citizens from Florida voter registries. The first program utilized DMV records to generate a list of registered voters who previously presented identification suggesting non-citizenship. Although this program was suspended at the end of April 2012, suspected non-citizens continued to be removed from the voter rolls within 90 days of Florida's primary election. The second program relied on the Department of Homeland Security's Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database. This program also continued to operate within the 90 day period before Florida's general election. The Eleventh Circuit found both programs violated the 90 Day Provision of the NVRA because the methods chosen were "systematic" efforts to remove ineligible voters, and they took place within 90 days of a federal election. Accordingly, the district court's grant of judgment for the Appellee was reversed. Circuit Judge Jordan issued a concurring opinion and Circuit Judge Suhrheinrich dissented.

Panel: Martin, Jordan and Suhrheinrich (United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation).

Argument: October 10, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: April 1, 2014

Docket Number: 12-15738

Decided: Reversed and Remanded

Case Alert Author: Henry Alvarez, Michelle Gonzalez, Kathryn Lecusay, Maxine Meltzer, Colette Peterson, Jesse Peterson, Raphael Sanchez

Counsel: Marc A. Goldman, counsel for Appellants
Michael Anthony, counsel for Appellee

Author of Opinion: Martin

    Posted By: Gary Kravitz @ 04/04/2014 02:15 PM     11th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri v. Robert Moser - 10th Circuit
Case Name: Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri v. Robert Moser

Headline: The Tenth Circuit holds that private parties have no cause of action under the Supremacy Clause against state agencies that refuse to provide these private parties with federal funds under statutes passed under the Spending Clause.

Area(s) of Law: Public Health Law, Constitutional Law, Statutory Interpretation

Issue(s) Presented:

1. Does the Supremacy Clause provide a cause of action to private entities claiming that an act of state law is preempted by a federal statute passed under the Spending Clause?

2. Does the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine of the First Amendment prohibit adverse discretionary legislative action against a private entity based on the content of that entity's speech and/or association?

Brief Summary:

Section 107(l) of a Kansas appropriations bill imposed facially neutral conditions interfering with Planned Parenthood's ability to receive federal funding under Title X of the Public Health Service Act. Planned Parenthood sought an injunction, arguing that Section 107(l) contravened the broad legislative purposes of Title X and was preempted under the Supremacy Clause, and that it violated Planned Parenthood's rights to speech and association under the First Amendment. The district court granted the injunction.

The Tenth Circuit reversed. Although the issue had been explicitly waived by the defendant in briefing, the majority exercised its discretion to address issues sua sponte and held that the Supremacy Clause provided no cause of action to private entities claiming that an act of state law is preempted by federal legislation rooted in the Spending Clause. The majority also held that while the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine prohibited adverse discretionary executive action against private entities based on the content of their speech or association, there was no equivalent prohibition (under Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit caselaw) on adverse discretionary legislative action - even in the face of strong evidence that such discretionary legislative action had been taken in retaliation for a private entity's exercise of its rights of speech and association.

In a strong dissent, Judge Lucero criticized the majority for exercising its sua sponte discretion to effectively overrule prior Tenth Circuit holdings regarding the Supremacy Clause question.

Extended Summary:

Family-planning services for low-income individuals are subsidized through Title X of the Public Health Service Act ("Title X"). In May of 2011, Governor Sam Brownback of Kansas signed into law an appropriations bill containing a provision - Section 107(l) - that restricted Title X funds to public entities, hospitals, and federally qualified comprehensive health centers. Section 107(l) effectively denied Title X funding to two family-planning clinics operated by Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri ("Planned Parenthood"). Planned Parenthood sued Robert Moser, Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and the Environment, arguing that Section 107(l) 1) violated Title X and therefore the Supremacy Clause, and 2) violated Planned Parenthood's First Amendment rights.

The district court found that Planned Parenthood had established a likelihood of success on the merits on its first two claims, and granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Moser from implementing Section 107(l). Moser appealed the injunction. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's findings with regard to Planned Parenthood's Supremacy Clause claim and First Amendment claim.

In reviewing Planned Parenthood's Supremacy Clause claim, the Tenth Circuit began by acknowledging that Planned Parenthood was eligible to receive funds under Title X, and had in fact received Title X funds for over 25 years prior to the passage of the Section 107(l) in May of 2011. Similarly, the court noted the agreement of the parties that Planned Parenthood was not eligible for Title X funding under Section 107(l).

Setting aside a number of arguments by the plaintiffs and defendants, the court began its analysis by asking a simple question: does Planned Parenthood, as a private entity, have a cause of action to assert a claim for injunctive relief? Eschewing the opportunity to claim a cause of action under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the language of Title X, Planned Parenthood restricted itself to the claim that the Supremacy Clause itself gives private parties the right to seek injunctions against state or local laws inconsistent with federal law.

The majority agreed with Planned Parenthood that the Supremacy Clause "declares that when state or local law conflicts with federal law, federal law prevails." However, the majority disagreed with Planned Parenthood that the availability of an injunctive remedy to private parties under Title X was clearly established by "federal law." Simply put, the Tenth Circuit held that "whether to recognize a private cause of action for injunctive relief is a matter of statutory interpretation," and that proper statutory interpretation did not indicate the availability of a private injunctive remedy under Title X.

The majority began its analysis by noting that any potential conflict between Title X and Section 107(l) could be resolved by the initiation of a public action by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) - the agency responsible for initial federal grants of Title X funds to states. The majority added that permitting private parties to seek injunctive relief for alleged Title X violations "would substantially interfere with the administration of the program by HHS" by opening the door to the possibility of different courts imposing different rules under the same statute. The majority also stated that the Supremacy Clause creates no individual federal rights and therefore provides no individual remedy to be enforced by private parties. The statutory language of Title X clearly contemplates that the distribution of Title X funds be administered and supervised by HHS.

Throughout its opinion, the majority relied heavily on the idea that Spending Clause legislation (like Title X) rarely required the provision of a private injunctive remedy due to the fact that "the federal government's power of the purse gives it a very effective means for ensuring that federal law is honored." The majority also suggested that the potential availability of a remedy under the Administrative Procedures Act indicated that a private injunctive remedy under the Supremacy Clause was potentially unnecessary.

The majority went on to address a large number of cases offered by Planned Parenthood as precedential support for the notion that Moser's implementation of Section 107(l) could be privately enjoined under the Supremacy Clause. The majority rather summarily distinguished each of these cases by noting that none of the opinions addressed the particular root of private injunctive remedies in the Supremacy Clause itself.

The majority then addressed Planned Parenthood's primary reliance on Tenth Circuit holdings in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010), and Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2004). In these two cases, the Tenth Circuit held that "party may bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a local enactment is preempted even if the federal law at issue does not create a private right of action." After a brief discussion of the dangers of an overly formalistic approach to questions of precedent and stare decisis, the majority disregarded the holdings in Edmondson and Qwest due to the fact that neither dealt with a situation where the allegedly preempting statue (cf. Title X) was Spending Clause legislation and the injunction was not to halt enforcement action.

The majority then turned to an analysis of the likelihood of Planned Parenthood's success on the merits of its First Amendment claim. Planned Parenthood's claim was that Section 107(l) violated the "unconstitutional-conditions doctrine" by imposing conditions on Planned Parenthood because of the particular content of the organization's speech and/or association. Under Supreme Court caselaw, violations of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine occur in two contexts: where a condition imposed by statute or regulation prospectively limits or denies a government benefit to organization due to the content of the organization's speech and/or association, or where a condition imposed by discretionary executive action retrospectively terminates a government benefit to an organization due to the content of the organization's speech and/or association.

The majority agreed with Moser that Section 107(l) "neither conditions eligibility for a Title X sub-grant on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, nor punishes entities for exercising such rights." Section 107(l) did not prevent sub-grantees from providing abortion services, from advocating for abortion rights, or from associating with abortion providers; at most, it required that organizations like Planned Parenthood to provide addition health services if they wished to continue providing their family planning services. As such, the legislation did not prospectively deny benefits to Planned Parenthood on the basis of its speech and/or association.

Planned Parenthood argued that Section 107(l) violated the second prong of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. In support of this contention, Planned Parenthood introduced evidence showing that Kansas legislators designed Section 107(l) for the specific purpose of defunding Planned Parenthood.

The majority quickly noted that Planned Parenthood cited "no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority" for expanding the second prong of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine to include adverse discretionary legislative actions in addition to adverse discretionary executive actions. To the contrary, the majority reminded Planned Parenthood that under United States v. O'Brien, federal courts "will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." Although the majority acknowledged the propriety of examining legislative motives in the context of Establishment Clause claims, Equal Protection claims, and in the context of statutory interpretation, the majority listed a number of policy reasons for not examining legislative motives in the context of statutory creation. Having distinguished Planned Parenthood's First Amendment claim from a claim of adverse discretionary executive action under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, the majority found that claim unsupported by law and lacking merit. As such, the majority reversed the decision of the district court and remanded with instructions.

Judge Lucero offered a detailed dissent, focusing in large part on the majority's departure from what he viewed to be clear precedent established in Edmondson and Qwest. As a starting point, Judge Lucero noted that under the law set forth in those cases, both Moser and Planned Parenthood agreed in their respective briefs that the Planned Parenthood "possesse[d] a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause." (The majority opinion addressed this issue summarily, noting that even if Moser had waived his right to contest the matter, the court had discretion to address it sua sponte). Judge Lucero heavily criticized the majority for exercising that discretion in this case, to the effect (in his opinion) of "overruling the decisions of prior [Tenth Circuit] panels" in an improper manner.

After arguing that Planned Parenthood's cause of action under the Supremacy Clause was clearly established by Tenth Circuit caselaw, Judge Lucero went on to address the merits of Planned Parenthood's claim (which the majority opinion never reached). Finding that the loss of funding under Section 107(l) wrought sufficient injury to Planned Parenthood to justify Article III and prudential standing, and that Title X's contemplation of a broad eligibility standard for grantees was thwarted by Section 107(l)'s restrictions, Judge Lucero argued that Planned Parenthood was likely to succeed on the merits of its Supremacy Clause claim and that the preliminary injunction of the district court should be affirmed.

Finally, Judge Lucero took the majority to task for its heavy reliance on the Spending Clause characterization to distinguish Title X from the legislation at issue in Edmondson and Qwest. "Four circuits have considered the argument that Spending Clause legislation is fundamentally different than other legislation for Supremacy Clause purposes," he wrote: "None found any merit in the argument." Judge Lucero stated that the majority's reliance on the availability of an alternative remedy in the Administrative Procedures Act was "an invented claim that finds no support in precedent or practice," and noted that the same availability did not stop the Tenth Circuit from holding as it held in Qwest.

In summarizing his dismay at the majority's exercise of its sua sponte discretion, and concluding his argument that the majority opinion damaged the principle of stare decisis, Judge Lucero made the following statement: "When a panel of this court writes 'a party may bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a local enactment is preempted even if the federal law at issue does not create a private right of action'... it should not be necessary to look past that statement and decide whether that issue was sufficiently 'disputed' to make that statement by this court binding law."

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-3235.pdf

Panel: Lucero, Hartz, O'Brien

Date of Issued Opinion: March 25, 2014

Docket Number: 11-3235, 12-3178, 13-3175

Decided: Preliminary injunction of the district court vacated, reversed, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Counsel:

James M. Armstrong, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant -
Appellant.

Elissa Joy Preheim, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C. (Lee Thompson and
Erin C. Thompson, Thompson Law Firm, LLC, Wichita, Kansas; Roger K. Evans
and Helene T. Krasnoff, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, New York,
New York and Washington, D.C., with her on the briefs), for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.

Author: Hartz

Case Alert Author: Levi A. Monagle

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Barbara Bergman

    Posted By: Barbara Bergman @ 04/04/2014 01:18 PM     10th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Bronx Household v. Board of Education
Case Name: Bronx Household v. Board of Education

Headline: Second Circuit Reinstates New York City Board of Education's Restriction on the Use of School Facilities for Religious Worship

Area of Law: Constitutional

Issue(s) Presented: Whether a New York City Board of Education regulation that makes school facilities available outside of school hours for use by outside groups, but prohibits such facilities' use for religious worship services, violates the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.

Brief Summary: The New York City Board of Education has been involved in longstanding litigation over its policy of making school facilities available for after-hours and weekend use by outside entities, while limiting such usage for religious purposes. The current version of its policy provides that no permits shall be granted to outside entities seeking to use school facilities for "the purpose of holding religious worship purposes." The Bronx Household of Faith, which had previously unsuccessfully challenged this policy on Free Speech grounds, sought a preliminary injunction on grounds that the policy violated the Free Exercise Clause. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the requested injunction, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding - in its sixth ruling on this controversy - that the policy violated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...8367b/2/hilite/


Extended Summary: Regulations promulgated by the New York City Board of Education allow outside groups to use school facilities outside of school hours, without requiring them to pay rent. The regulations specify, however, that "No permit shall be granted for the purpose of holding religious worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of worship."

The Bronx Household of Faith, which has long sought to hold worship services in New York City public school facilities, challenged its exclusion in 2007 (after previously challenging earlier versions of this rule). It was successful in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled that the regulation violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Second Circuit, however, reversed this ruling and held that the regulation did not violate Bronx Household's free speech rights.

On remand to the district court after the Second Circuit vacated its previous victory, Bronx Household again moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the regulation prohibiting worship services. Bronx Household argued that the prior ruling had only focused on its Free Speech argument, and had not passed on its separate Free Exercise argument. The district court ruled in its favor, holding that the exclusion of religious worship services violated both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The district court thus enjoined the regulation once again.

The Second Circuit, however, again reversed the district court's ruling, thus lifting the injunction and permitting the regulation to be enforced. The Second Circuit held that (1) "the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle Bronx Household to a grant from the Board of a subsidized place to hold religious worship services;" and (2) the district court erred in concluding that the regulation had violated the Establishment Clause by "compel[ling] the Board to become excessively entangled with religion by deciding what are religious worship services." As to the Free Exercise claim, the court explained that the regulation was treating all religions equally and that the Board's only motivation had been to "protect itself against reasonable Establishment Clause challenges" by declining to provide rent-free premises for religious worship services. As to the Establishment Clause issue, the Second Circuit reasoned that the Board was not violating the Establishment Clause merely by assessing whether a specific group was conducting religious worship services; rather, this Clause "at times compels government officials to undertake such inspection in order to draw constitutionally necessary distinctions," and in any case, the Board's policy "is to rely on the applicant's own characterization as to whether the applicant will conduct religious worship services."

Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the injunction imposed by the District Court of the Southern District of New York, allowing the Board's regulation to remain in effect. Judge Walker dissented, as he had done in the prior Second Circuit opinion, reiterating his conclusion that the policy violated the Free Speech Clause, and also arguing that it violated the Free Exercise Clause. Judge Walker concluded that both the Free Speech and the Free Exercise issues were "ripe for Supreme Court review."

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...8367b/2/hilite/



Panel: Judges Walker, Leval, and Calabresi

Argument (if known): 11/19/2012

Date of Issued Opinion: 04/03/2014

Docket Number: 12-2730-cv

Decided: Reversed.

Case Alert Author: Sophia Sofferman

Counsel: Jordan W. Lorence, (Joseph P. Infranco, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC; David A. Cortman, Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, GA; David J. Hacker, Heather Gebelin Hacker, Alliance Defending Freedom, Folsom, CA, on the brief), Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington D.C., for Appellees - Plaintiffs.

Jane L. Gordon (Edward F.X. Hart, Jon Pines, Lisa Grumet, Janice Casey Silverberg, Charles Carey, on the brief), of counsel, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellants - Defendants.

Author of Opinion: Judge Leval (majority); Judge Walker (dissent).

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Emily Gold Waldman

    Posted By: Emily Waldman @ 04/04/2014 10:21 AM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 3, 2014
  Snider International Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, et al. - Fourth Circuit
Headline: Fourth Circuit Speeds Through Speed Camera Case

Area of Law: Due Process, Traffic Regulation

Issues Presented: Whether the use of first-class mail to notify drivers of speeding citations violates the Due Process Clause. Whether citations signed electronically may serve as sworn testimony.

Brief Summary:
After accumulating fifty-five speed camera violations, Eastover Auto Supply (officially "Snider International Corporation") filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to challenge Maryland's speed camera policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the towns, and Eastover Auto Supply appealed. Eastover Auto Supply contended that sending a speeding citation through the mail failed to satisfy the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that first class mail was reasonably calculated to reach Eastover Auto Supply, so the notice requirement was fulfilled. Turning to the evidentiary question, the Fourth Circuit ruled that because the claim had not been raised in state court, it would be improper to address the issue for the first time in federal court.

Panel: Judges King, Gregory, and Agee

Argument Date: 10/29/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 01/07/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-2490

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Steven Roy

Counsel: James S. Liskow, DECARO, DORAN, SICILIANO, GALLAGHER & DEBLASIS, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants. Kevin Bock Karpinski, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, 2 for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen H. Ring, Gaithersburg, Maryland; Christopher R. Dunn, DECARO, DORAN, SICILIANO, GALLAGHER & DEBLASIS, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants. Sandra D. Lee, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Author of Opinion: Judge Gregory

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Renée M. Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 04/03/2014 04:54 PM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Companies and Industrial Contractors, Inc. - Fourth Circuit
Headline: Just Because It's on the Internet Does Not Mean It's Legally Significant

Area of Law: Labor and Employment/Civil Procedure

Issues Presented: Whether the posting of a study on a government website provides a company with adequate notice of potential threats to employees' health. Whether, for the purpose of removal to federal court, the company's nerve center should be found at the location that a company calls its headquarters or at the location where the majority of major decisions are made.

Brief Summary: After removing bird droppings from an Appalachian Power Companies (APCO) facility, Roger Hoschar was diagnosed with the lung disease histoplasmosis. At the time this happened, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) webpage noted that histoplasmosis could be caused by coming into contact with bird droppings. Hoschar sued APCO in state court alleging that APCO should have protected him from the disease. The case was removed to federal court because of diversity jurisdiction. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the case was properly removed to federal court - Hoschar was from West Virginia and APCO's headquarters were in Ohio, even though the company's website said their headquarters were in West Virginia. Moreover, the court held that APCO did not owe a duty to Hoschar to protect him from histoplasmosis because APCO, despite the OSHA webpage, did not have actual or constructive knowledge that histoplasmosis could be caused by contact with bird droppings.

Extended Summary: Roger Hoschar was diagnosed with the lung disease histoplasmosis after cleaning a significant amount of bird droppings off of equipment at an Appalachian Power Companies' (APCO) power plant. The droppings had to be removed so that the ducts could be fixed. Hoschar wore a respirator over his face while removing debris and welding. While Hoschar was working, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration's webpage referenced a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health study that stated that histoplasma capsulatum, a fungus, can infect accumulations of bird droppings and cause histoplasmosis if the spores are inhaled. The district court denied Horschar's motion to remand the action to state court and granted APCO's motion for summary judgment, holding that APCO did not owe a duty to Horschar.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that (1) APCO did not have actual knowledge that the fungus was associated with bird droppings and (2) although the study was disseminated via various means and generally available, APCO had no reason to be aware of the study and could not be charged with constructive knowledge. Without actual or constructive knowledge, under West Virginia law, no duty was owed to Hoschar.

The case was removed to federal court as a matter of diversity jurisdiction. Hoschar was a resident of West Virginia. Consequently, diversity jurisdiction would only be appropriate if APCO was something other than a West Virginia company. In deciding the issue, the Fourth Circuit articulated the Supreme Court's sentiment in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, where it said a corporation's nerve center "should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters -- provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination." 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). The Horschar court, concluded that although APCO's website identified Charleston, West Virginia as APCO's headquarters, Ohio was in fact APCO's nerve center. The majority of APCO's board was located in Ohio and the bulk of business decisions were made there. Therefore, the case was properly removed from West Virginia to federal court.

Panel: Judges Gregory, Davis, and Thacker

Argument Date: 11/062013

Argument Location: University of Maryland Carey School of Law, Baltimore, MD

Date of Issued Opinion: 01/07/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-2482

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Phillip Chalker

Counsel: ARGUED: Alexander Deane McLaughlin, THE CALWELL PRACTICE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Daniel Rhys Michelmore, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John Skaggs, THE CALWELL PRACTICE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Brian R. Swiger, Michael P. Leahey, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Judge Thacker

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Renée Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 04/03/2014 04:24 PM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V. - Fourth Circuit
Headline: Expensive? Yes. Excessive? No: $24 Million Fine Levied Against Foreign Subcontractor for Over 4,000 Counts of Fraud Against the Government

Area of Law: Civil Law

Issue Presented: Whether a fine under the Federal Claims Act for conspiring to defraud the government of over $1.5 million was excessive and thus in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.

Brief Summary: The Appellee, Gosselin Worldwide Moving, N.V. ("Gosselin"), was a German subcontractor that worked with foreign vendors to transport goods in Germany. After being contracted by the United States Department of Defense to provide transportation services, Gosselin and other companies in the same industry collectively agreed to charge a non-negotiable minimum price for their services. Over the next two years, Gosselin threatened to withdraw materials necessary for transport if companies undercut the agreed upon fixed prices with lower bids. Gosselin's threats resulted in two vendors cancelling their bids. Gosselin was subsequently convicted of federal criminal offenses for its involvement in the scheme.
After a criminal trial, the relator, Bunk, brought a civil action against Gosselin, under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), for participating in price-fixing and a monopoly of access to defraud the government. Finding that Bunk (on behalf of the government) had proven 4,341 instances of false claims, the district court entered judgment for Bunk in the amount of $5,500, in total. Even though Bunk was entitled to as much as $50 million, the district court reasoned that any penalty in excess of $1.5 million would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first found that relators seeking solely civil penalties enjoy standing to sue. Turning to the amount of the judgment, the court affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of Bunk but reversed the trial court's award of only $5,500, and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to amend the judgment to award $24 million. The Fourth Circuit noted that $24 million did not constitute an excessive fine as it appropriately reflected the gravity of Gosselin's offenses and provided the necessary and appropriate deterrent effect.

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Op...ublished/121259.P.pdf

Significance: The Fourth Circuit interpreted the FCA's penalty provision.

Panel: Judges King, Shedd, and Thacker

Argument Date: 05/14/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 12/19/2013

Docket Number: 12-1369

Decided: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions

Case Alert Author: Emmanuel Fishelman

Counsel: ARGUED: Louis Martin Bograd, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael David Shumsky, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Terrence J. Donahue, Jr., MCGLYNN GLISSON & MOUTON, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for Appellant. Joseph P. Thomas, Linda E. Maichl, Jeffrey Peck, ULMER & BERNE, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio; Jay P. Lefkowitz, John K. Crisham, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Judge King

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Renée Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 04/03/2014 01:16 PM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 2, 2014
  Mitchell v. JCG Industries - Seventh Circuit
Headline: Poultry plant workers not paid for lunch time spent changing out of and into sanitary gear

Area of Law: Employment

Issue(s) Presented: Whether time spent changing clothing before and after a half-hour lunch break is worktime and must be compensated.

Brief Summary:

The plaintiffs are line worker employees at a Chicago poultry processing plant owned by the defendant. Sanitation regulations require that the plaintiffs wear a significant amount of sanitary gear. The plaintiffs alleged that the time spent removing and reapplying sanitary gear is worktime and must be compensated under both federal and state law. The plaintiffs argued that 10 to 15 minutes of their 30-minute lunch break is spent removing and reapplying sanitary gear, while the defendant argued the process requires only 2 to 3 minutes. In the majority opinion, authored by Judge Posner, the court held that time spent "donning and doffing" a few items of clothes or washing is non-compensable under existing case law. Judge Posner also wrote that some of the judges conducted an experiment after ordering the sanitary gear to confirm "the common sense intuition that donning and doffing a few simple pieces of clothing do not eat up half the lunch break."

Extended Summary:

The plaintiffs stand next to a conveyor belt and perform a variety of tasks related to poultry processing, including deboning, evisceration, and cleaning of poultry carcasses. Sanitation regulations require that the plaintiffs wear a sterilized jacket, plastic apron, cut-resistant gloves, plastic sleeves, earplugs, and hairnets while working on the line. The plaintiffs are required to remove the sanitary gear at the start of their half-hour lunch break and put it back on before returning to work. This time is taken out of their lunch break, rather than from the four-hour shifts that precede and follow it. The plaintiffs argued that they spend 10 to 15 minutes of their break time removing and reapplying sanitary gear, while the defendant argued the process requires only 2 to 3 minutes. The plaintiffs alleged that the time spent removing and reapplying sanitary gear is worktime and must be compensated both under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), states that in "the hour for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday..." Judge Posner, writing for the majority, explained that the term "workday" must also encompass workers who work night shifts and he quoted Webster's Dictionary to define "workday" as "the period of time in a day during which work is performed." Judge Posner characterized the plaintiffs' eight-hour worktime as two four-hour workdays in an eight-and-a-half-hour period. Therefore, the plaintiffs' changing time before and after lunch breaks falls under § 203(o) and is non-compensable worktime. To find otherwise, argued Judge Posner, would mean that the standard eight-hour workday is actually an eight-hour workday plus some additional minutes for which the employer must pay overtime.

Judge Posner pointed out that the relevant collective bargaining agreement does not require compensation for time spent removing and reapplying sanitary gear. Judge Posner surmised that the union negotiated for compensation in exchange for this concession and that the current system is attractive to both parties because it avoids having to calculate how much time each employee takes changing. Judge Posner characterized the plaintiffs in this case as "trying to upend the deal struck by their own union."

One of the judges identified the supplier of the sanitary gear and purchased a set to conduct an experiment to determine the time required to remove and reapply the sanitary gear. Judge Posner explained that three members of the court staff "donned/doffed it as they would do if they were workers at the plant," and that they videotaped the ordeal to verify the time spent. The "actors" required an average of 95 seconds to put on the sanitary gear and an average of 15 seconds to remove it, or less than two minutes in total. Judge Posner stated that the intention of the experiment was to satisfy curiosity and did not create actual evidence in the case, though it confirmed his hunch that "donning and doffing a few simple pieces of clothing and equipment do not eat up half the lunch break." As alternative grounds to support the majority's decision, Judge Posner also cited the familiar legal doctrine de minimis non curat lex - the law does not care about trifles.

In her dissent, Chief Judge Wood argued that the characterization of the plaintiffs' workday as two four-hour workdays is incompatible with a plain reading of § 203(o). Rather than break the workday into two four-hour "days," or perhaps even smaller units, Chief Judge Wood argued that the most straightforward reading of the statute shows that the plaintiffs remove and reapply their sanitary gear in the middle of one continuous workday. Chief Judge Wood agreed with the majority that a union could bargain about compensation relating to removing and reapplying sanitary gear at the beginning or end of a full workday, but she argued that the plain language of § 203(o) does not apply to mid-day breaks. Therefore, Chief Judge Wood stated that the plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to compensation for their time spent during their lunch breaks removing and reapplying sanitary gear.

Chief Judge Wood expressed shock that judges of an appellate court would conduct an experiment like the one Judge Posner detailed in his opinion as a means to resolve a dispute. Even if the experiment is not considered actual evidence, Chief Judge Wood indicated that relying on an experiment of this kind to resolve a dispute in the slightest way is impermissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Chief Judge Wood also pointed out that the plaintiffs must remove and reapply the sanitary gear in an isolated room to prevent contaminating the raw poultry and that going to and from this area adds time beyond simply changing clothes. Similarly, the plaintiffs stated they must wash and stow tools in addition to removing and reapplying sanitation gear.

Chief Judge Wood also argued that disputes about the time consumed and the effort required for the plaintiffs to change and wash up are material issues that should have prevented the district court from ruling in the defendant's favor on a pretrial summary judgment motion. Whereas the district court and the majority's opinion discredited the claim that 10 to 15 minutes are required to change and clean up, Chief Judge Wood viewed the claim as believable and cited studies, standards, and news reports about what can go awry when sanitation standards are not rigidly followed. "It is essential for the health of the worker, her fellow workers, and the consumers who will consume the poultry products that a person who has been steeped in raw poultry viscera for hours wash herself off before eating," stated Chief Judge Wood. By not crediting the plaintiffs' allegations, argued Chief Judge Wood, the majority opinion erred, particularly if it was influenced by an in-chambers experiment with court staff.

Panel: Chief Judge Wood, Judge Posner, Judge Kanne

Argument Date: January 7, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: March 18, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-2115

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Bryan Bach

Author of Opinion: Judge Posner (majority), Chief Judge Wood (dissenting).

    Posted By: Bryan Bach @ 04/02/2014 04:48 PM     7th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  In re Walter Leroy Moody, Jr.
Headline: Eleventh Circuit holds recusal is not required in a case arising out of the 1989 murder of an Eleventh Circuit judge.

Area of Law: Criminal, Recusals

Issue Presented: Whether the recusal of all the judges in the Eleventh Circuit is required in a case arising from the 1989 murder of a Eleventh Circuit judge.

Brief Summary: Mr. Moody was convicted in state court of murdering Eleventh Circuit Judge Robert S. Vance in 1989. Ultimately, Mr. Moody filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. Mr. Moody also petitioned to the Eleventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus to transfer the matter outside the Eleventh Circuit and moved for the recusal of all judges on the appellate court. The Eleventh Circuit denied his motion for recusal and mandamus petition.

Extended Summary: In 1989, Walter Moody mailed a series of packages containing bombs, one of which killed Judge Robert S. Vance. Mr. Moody was convicted of the murder in state court. After filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Moody petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the recusal of the assigned district judge. Mr. Moody also filed a motion for recusal of all judges sitting on the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit denied the relief, noting that none of the panel members had a close personal or professional relationship with Judge Vance or his family and none were members of the federal judiciary at the time of the murder. The court also determined that none of the appellate judges had an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of Mr. Moody's case. In its reasoning, the court considered the remoteness of the interest and its extent or degree. The court also denied the request to recuse the district judge, noting that he had no close connection to Judge Vance or his relatives, was not in the federal judiciary at the time of crime, and was not part of the original investigation and prosecution.

To view opinion: http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/o...ops/201312657.op2.pdf

Panel: Wilson, Martin and Jordan

Date of Issued Opinion: March 12, 2014

Docket Number: 13-12657

Decided: Motion for Recusal of Panel Denied; Mandamus Petition Denied.

Case Alert Author: Henry Alvarez, Michelle Gonzalez, Colette Petrerson, Kathryn Lecusay, Maxine Meltzer, Jesse Peterson, Raphael Sanchez

Author of Opinion: Per Curiam

    Posted By: Gary Kravitz @ 04/02/2014 10:54 AM     11th Circuit     Comments (0)  

April 1, 2014
  Baumann v. Chase Investment Services Corp - Ninth Circuit
Headline: Ninth Circuit reverses the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand civil action brought in California Superior court under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) and holds the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Area of Law: Fourteenth Amendment; Federal Civil Procedure

Issue Presented: Whether the district court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the removed PAGA action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).

Brief Summary: On behalf of himself and other employees, plaintiff-employee filed a civil action against defendant-employer in California state court under PAGA. After defendant removed to the United States District Court invoking diversity jurisdiction under §1332(a) and CAFA, plaintiff filed a motion to remand. In denying plaintiff's motion to remand the district court held that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on §1332(a) diversity of citizenship because the potential claims against defendant could be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy. The district court declined to address CAFA jurisdiction which allows aggregation of claims where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion and held that PAGA actions are not sufficiently similar to Rule 23 class actions to confer CAFA jurisdiction because (1) PAGA suits lack essential "hallmarks of Rule 23 actions" and (2) the nature of a PAGA action is to enforce California labor laws rather than to provide restitution for wrongs done to class members.

Extended Summary: Plaintiff, an employee of defendant-Chase Investment Services ("Chase"), sued Chase under PAGA in California superior court alleging that Chase failed to provide him and other employees with overtime pay, meal breaks, rest periods and timely expense reimbursements. Chase filed a notice of removal invoking diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction under CAFA. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand but the district court denied the motion holding that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on diversity of citizenship because the penalties sought by plaintiff and other employees could be aggregated to meet the minimum amount in controversy under CAFA.

Applying Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., the Ninth Court panel determined that PAGA penalties against an employer may not be aggregated to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). To determine whether the cause of action could still be heard in federal court the panel considered whether the PAGA suit (which authorizes aggrieved employees to act as "private attorneys general" and to "recover civil penalties from their employers for violations of the Labor Code") constitutes a class action under CAFA (which defines a "class action" as "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure").

In applying the rule that a state rule is similar to Rule 23 "if it closely resembles Rule 23 or is like [it] in substance or in essentials," the panel held that PAGA actions are fundamentally different from Rule 23 actions because (1) the nature of the suits are essentially law enforcement actions since aggrieved employees only receive 25% of penalties collected and (2) the suits lack essential "hallmarks of Rule 23" such as a notice requirement for unnamed employees, ability to opt out of the action, and inquiry by the court of the adequacy of representation.

Panel: Judges Hawkins, Thomas, and Hurwitz

Date of Issued Opinion: March 13, 2014

Docket Number: 2:11-cv-06667-GHK-FMO

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Monique Midose

Author of Opinion: Judge Hurwitz

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Glenn Koppel

    Posted By: Glenn Koppel @ 04/01/2014 06:32 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Garcia v. Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC - Ninth Circuit
Headline: Ninth Circuit Reverses Denial of Request for Preliminary Injunction Requiring the Removal of an Anti-Islamic Film from YouTube.Com.

Area of Law: Civil Law, First Amendment

Issues Presented: Whether the district court's denial of the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, requiring the removal of an Anti-Islamic film which used plaintiff's performance intended for a different film, was an abuse of discretion.

Brief Summary: Appellant, Cindy Lee Garcia, appealed the denial of her application for a temporary restraining order seeking removal of an Anti-Islamic film from YouTube. Appellant claimed that the posting of the video infringed her copyright in her performance.

The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, finding that the appellant established a likelihood of success on the merits and showed irreparable harm would result if the injunction was not issued, that the balances of equities favored the appellant, and that the public interest weighed in favor of injunctive relief.

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da.../12-57302_opinion.pdf

Extended Summary: Appellant, Cindy Lee Garcia, agreed to act in a film with the working title "Desert Warrior." The film's writer and producer, Mark Basseley Youssef, cast appellant in a minor role. Appellant was paid $500 for three and a half days of filming of what appellant believed was an Arabian adventure movie. Although the film never materialized, appellant's scene in the film was used in an anti-Islamic film titled, "Innocence of Muslims." "Innocence of Muslims" was uploaded onto YouTube and appellant discovered that her performance in "Desert Warrior" had been partially dubbed over so that appellant appeared to ask, "Is your Mohammed a child molester?" The film's appearance on Egyptian television sparked protests, generating worldwide news coverage. An Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa, calling for the killing of everyone involved in the "Innocence of Muslims" film. Appellant soon began receiving death threats.

Appellant filed eight takedown notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 512. However, Google refused to act. Appellant then applied for a temporary restraining order against Google and YouTube, seeking removal of the film from YouTube, on the grounds that the posting of the film infringed her copyright in her performance. The district court treated the application as a motion for preliminary injunction and denied it. The district court held that appellant delayed in bringing the action, failed to demonstrate that preliminary relief would prevent any alleged harm, and that appellant was unlikely to succeed on the merits.

The panel reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. In granting a preliminary injunction, four factors must be considered: plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not issued, the balances of equities and the public interest.

First, the panel considered appellant's copyright interest and the likelihood of success on the merits. Appellant claimed that her performance in the film was independently copyrightable and that she retained an interest in that copyright. The panel noted that appellant must prove that she had an independent interest in her performance, Youssef did not own any such interest as a work for hire, and Youssef did not have an implied license to use her performance. The panel held that, although appellant was not a "joint author" of the film, nothing in the Copyright Act suggested that a copyright interest in a creative contribution disappears because a contributor was not considered a "joint author." As such, appellant may assert a copyright interest in the portion of "Innocence of Muslims" that represents her individual creativity. Furthermore, the under the work for hire doctrine, appellant's rights in her performance vested in Youssef if appellant was Youssef's employee and acted in her employment capacity. However, the panel held that appellant did not qualify as a traditional employee and nothing in the record suggest Youssef was in the "regular business" of making films. Additionally, the panel found that, although appellant granted Youssef an implied license for her contribution to the film, Youssef exceeded the bounds of the implied license, as the film differed radically from anything appellant could have imagined.

Next, the panel considered whether appellant would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not issued. The district court found that appellant failed to make this requiring showing because she delayed in bringing her claim for several months. However, panel found that she took action as soon as she began receiving death threats, when a need for speedy action was required. The panel therefore held that harm was real and immediate. Furthermore, there was a causal relationship between the infringement of appellant's copyright and the harm. As such, appellant demonstrated that, absent an injunction, she would continue to suffer concrete harms.

Lastly, the panel considered the balance of equities and the public interest. Here, the panel noted that Youssef lied to appellant about the project she participated in. Appellant's performance was used in a way that subjected her to threats of harm and death. Despite appellant's viable copyright claim and the harms, Google refused to remove the film from YouTube. The panel held that it was difficult to see how Google could defend its refusal on equitable grounds and that "it doesn't really try [arguing instead] that an injunction would be inequitable because of the overwhelming public interest in the continued hosting of "Innocence of Muslims" on YouTube. Furthermore, Google's public interest argument that the proposed injunction was unconstitutional as prior restraint of speech was not successful. The panel held that the First Amendment does not protect copyright infringement. Therefore, the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of injunctive relief.

Because all four factors were met, the Ninth Circuit panel held that the district court abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief, and reversed and remanded.

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da.../12-57302_opinion.pdf

Panel: Judges Kozinksi, Gould and Smith

Date of Issued Opinion: 2/26/2014

Docket Number: 12-57302

Decided: Reversed and Remanded.

Case Alert Author: Kimberly Whang

Counsel: M. Cris Armenta, The Armenta Law firm APC, Los Angeles, California and Credence Sol, Chauvigng, France, for the Plaintiff; Timothy L. Alger and Sunita Bali, Perkins Coie LLP, Palo Alto, California for the Defendants.

Author of Opinion: Chief Judge Kozinski

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor Headline: Ninth Circuit Reverses Denial of Request for Preliminary Injunction Requiring the Removal of an Anti-Islamic Film from YouTube.Com.

Area of Law: Civil Law, First Amendment

Issues Presented: Whether the district court's denial of the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, requiring the removal of an Anti-Islamic film which used plaintiff's performance intended for a different film, was an abuse of discretion.

Brief Summary: Appellant, Cindy Lee Garcia, appealed the denial of her application for a temporary restraining order seeking removal of an Anti-Islamic film from YouTube. Appellant claimed that the posting of the video infringed her copyright in her performance.

The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, finding that the appellant established a likelihood of success on the merits and showed irreparable harm would result if the injunction was not issued, that the balances of equities favored the appellant, and that the public interest weighed in favor of injunctive relief.

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da.../12-57302_opinion.pdf

Extended Summary: Appellant, Cindy Lee Garcia, agreed to act in a film with the working title "Desert Warrior." The film's writer and producer, Mark Basseley Youssef, cast appellant in a minor role. Appellant was paid $500 for three and a half days of filming of what appellant believed was an Arabian adventure movie. Although the film never materialized, appellant's scene in the film was used in an anti-Islamic film titled, "Innocence of Muslims." "Innocence of Muslims" was uploaded onto YouTube and appellant discovered that her performance in "Desert Warrior" had been partially dubbed over so that appellant appeared to ask, "Is your Mohammed a child molester?" The film's appearance on Egyptian television sparked protests, generating worldwide news coverage. An Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa, calling for the killing of everyone involved in the "Innocence of Muslims" film. Appellant soon began receiving death threats.

Appellant filed eight takedown notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 512. However, Google refused to act. Appellant then applied for a temporary restraining order against Google and YouTube, seeking removal of the film from YouTube, on the grounds that the posting of the film infringed her copyright in her performance. The district court treated the application as a motion for preliminary injunction and denied it. The district court held that appellant delayed in bringing the action, failed to demonstrate that preliminary relief would prevent any alleged harm, and that appellant was unlikely to succeed on the merits.

The panel reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. In granting a preliminary injunction, four factors must be considered: plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not issued, the balances of equities and the public interest.

First, the panel considered appellant's copyright interest and the likelihood of success on the merits. Appellant claimed that her performance in the film was independently copyrightable and that she retained an interest in that copyright. The panel noted that appellant must prove that she had an independent interest in her performance, Youssef did not own any such interest as a work for hire, and Youssef did not have an implied license to use her performance. The panel held that, although appellant was not a "joint author" of the film, nothing in the Copyright Act suggested that a copyright interest in a creative contribution disappears because a contributor was not considered a "joint author." As such, appellant may assert a copyright interest in the portion of "Innocence of Muslims" that represents her individual creativity. Furthermore, the under the work for hire doctrine, appellant's rights in her performance vested in Youssef if appellant was Youssef's employee and acted in her employment capacity. However, the panel held that appellant did not qualify as a traditional employee and nothing in the record suggest Youssef was in the "regular business" of making films. Additionally, the panel found that, although appellant granted Youssef an implied license for her contribution to the film, Youssef exceeded the bounds of the implied license, as the film differed radically from anything appellant could have imagined.

Next, the panel considered whether appellant would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not issued. The district court found that appellant failed to make this requiring showing because she delayed in bringing her claim for several months. However, panel found that she took action as soon as she began receiving death threats, when a need for speedy action was required. The panel therefore held that harm was real and immediate. Furthermore, there was a causal relationship between the infringement of appellant's copyright and the harm. As such, appellant demonstrated that, absent an injunction, she would continue to suffer concrete harms.

Lastly, the panel considered the balance of equities and the public interest. Here, the panel noted that Youssef lied to appellant about the project she participated in. Appellant's performance was used in a way that subjected her to threats of harm and death. Despite appellant's viable copyright claim and the harms, Google refused to remove the film from YouTube. The panel held that it was difficult to see how Google could defend its refusal on equitable grounds and that "it doesn't really try [arguing instead] that an injunction would be inequitable because of the overwhelming public interest in the continued hosting of "Innocence of Muslims" on YouTube. Furthermore, Google's public interest argument that the proposed injunction was unconstitutional as prior restraint of speech was not successful. The panel held that the First Amendment does not protect copyright infringement. Therefore, the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of injunctive relief.

Because all four factors were met, the Ninth Circuit panel held that the district court abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief, and reversed and remanded.

To read the full opinion, please visit: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da.../12-57302_opinion.pdf

Panel: Judges Kozinksi, Gould and Smith

Date of Issued Opinion: 2/26/2014

Docket Number: 12-57302

Decided: Reversed and Remanded.

Case Alert Author: Kimberly Whang

Counsel: M. Cris Armenta, The Armenta Law firm APC, Los Angeles, California and Credence Sol, Chauvigng, France, for the Plaintiff; Timothy L. Alger and Sunita Bali, Perkins Coie LLP, Palo Alto, California for the Defendants.

Author of Opinion: Chief Judge Kozinski

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Glenn Koppel

    Posted By: Glenn Koppel @ 04/01/2014 06:14 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Rivera v County of Los Angeles - Ninth Circuit
Headline: Ninth Circuit affirms dismissal of constitutional and state law violations arising from a mistaken arrest and month long detention of the plaintiff

Area of Law: Civil rights

Issue Presented: Whether county agencies are liable under the Fourth amendment, Fourteenth amendment or state law claims of false imprisonment and the Bane Act for the plaintiff's mistaken arrest and month long detention based on a warrant for a suspect with the same name, date of birth, and similar physical description when the plaintiff had previously been issued a judicial clearance form.

Brief Summary: In 2009, the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for a suspect with the same first and last name, despite the fact that the plaintiff had been previously arrested on the same warrant nearly 20 years earlier. The 2009 arrest resulted in the plaintiff being jailed for approximately one month prior to being released based on fingerprint analysis. The plaintiff sued two counties and two sheriff's departments for constitutional and state law violations based on his mistaken arrest and month-long detention, but all claims were dismissed by the trial court.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissals, holding that (1) the warrant was sufficiently particular since it contained the suspect's name and physical description, (2) the sheriff's deputies were reasonable in believing the plaintiff was the subject of the warrant since he had the same name and was physically similar to the description of the warrant, (3) the plaintiff's detention did not violate the Due Process Clause since he had access to the courts and circumstances did not indicate further investigation was needed, and (4) the state law claims were properly dismissed based on state law statutory immunities.

Extended Summary: In 1989, the plaintiff, Santiago Rivera, was arrested on a warrant for a suspect with the same name. After fingerprint analysis confirmed that the plaintiff was not the suspect sought by the warrant, Rivera was released and given a judicial clearance form. The warrant was then reissued with a physical description of the correct suspect and a date of birth that matched Rivera's, but did not specify that Rivera had been cleared. In 2009, a car in which Rivera was riding was stopped for a vehicle violation in San Bernardino. In response to questions about the 1989 warrant, Rivera claimed that he was not the warrant's subject but was unable to produce the judicial clearance form. Believing that Rivera was the subject of the warrant, the deputies arrested him.

The next morning, Rivera appeared in a Los Angeles Superior Court but failed to tell the judge that he was not the subject of the warrant. At his next court appearance, almost two weeks later, Rivera claimed he was not the subject of the warrant. However, because the Los Angeles archives experienced problems obtaining the documents with the true subject's fingerprints, the court was unable to verify Rivera's claims for approximately two more weeks. After verification was made, Rivera was released. The court also issued Rivera a new judicial release form, added Rivera's photograph and fingerprints to the case file, and reissued the warrant with the true subject's middle name.
In 2010 Rivera sued Los Angeles County, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, San Bernardino County, and the San Bernardino County's Sheriff's Department for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments, violation of the Bane Act, and common law false imprisonment. The district court granted the Counties' motions for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's claims. Rivera then timely appealed.

Rivera claimed that Los Angeles County violated the Fourth amendment by issuing the 1989 warrant without sufficient particularity. The panel observed that prior decisions held that warrants lacking the suspect's name but containing a physical description, or warrants containing only the suspect's name, satisfied the particularity requirement. Since the warrant here contained both the suspect's name and a physical description, the panel ruled that the 1989 warrant satisfied the particularity requirement.

Furthermore, the panel held that even were the warrant lacking the particularity requirement, the municipalities would only be liable if Rivera proved that they had a policy or custom of failing to include more detailed information in their warrants. While Los Angeles County did have a policy of including an entry that identified anyone mistakenly arrested on the warrant, the panel ruled that a single failure to follow this policy was insufficient for liability.

Rivera also claimed that the San Bernardino Sheriff's deputies violated the Fourth amendment in arresting him. However, the panel ruled that the deputies had probable cause to arrest him based on a good faith, reasonable belief that Rivera was the subject of the warrant. Not only did the name and date of birth in the warrant match Rivera's exactly, but his physical appearance also closely resembled that described in the warrant. The panel also held that the officers were reasonable in being wary of Rivera's bald claim of judicial clearance.

To support his Due Process claim, challenging his detainment after arrest, Rivera relied on a prior Ninth Circuit decision. However, the panel distinguished the facts of the current case from the case cited by Rivera which involved repeated claims of innocence, a different name in the warrant, substantial differences in weight between the warrant and the plaintiff, and no appearances before a judge. Instead, the Court explained that Due Process cases fit into at least one of two categories: either the circumstances indicated to the State that further investigation was warranted or the State denied the plaintiff access to the courts for an extended period of time.

However, all of the "further investigation" cases involved significant differences between the arrestee and the true suspect; something that was plainly lacking in under the present facts. Furthermore, the same facts that made Rivera's arrest reasonable also support the conclusion that the Counties had no reason to believe that further investigation was required. Similarly, the "denied access" cases involved significant periods of deprivation; whereas here Rivera was in court the day after his arrest. The Court also explained that once Rivera's first court appearance took place that Rivera was then being "'held in custody pursuant to a court order'" and case law holds that, once this occurs, county officials are not required by the Due Process Clause to investigate whether the court order is proper.

As for Rivera's common law claim of false imprisonment and his California claim of a Bane Act violation, the Court examined two types of immunity. The first provides that an officer is not liable for arrests made if the officer acts without malice and in the reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one referred to in the warrant. The second is that an officer is not liable for false arrest if the officer had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. Citing Lopez v. City of Oxnard, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4 (Ct.App. 1989), a case where the plaintiff repeatedly brought his judicial innocence sheet to the arresting officer's attention, the court held that the arresting officer was nevertheless immune from liability because "there is no factual question whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Lopez was the person named in the warrant." Relying on Lopez, the Ninth Circuit panel held that the individual employees would be able to invoke statutory immunity to avoid liability and that as such the Counties could do so as well; therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment based on statutory immunities was correct.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Rivera's claims.


Dissent
Judge Paez concurred in part and dissented in part. Concurring that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed, along with the state law claims, Judge Paez disagreed with the majority's analysis of the Due Process claim. Judge Paez believed that Rivera raised a genuine issue of material fact whether Los Angeles County deprived Rivera of liberty without due process of law by its failure to investigate his claims of innocence, stating that "[t]he touchstone is simply whether the jailer should have known, despite the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, that a detainee was entitled to be released. This is inherently a fact-intensive, circumstance-specific inquiry."

Panel: Judges O'Scannlain, Paez, and Ikuta

Date of Issued Opinion: March 12, 2014

Docket Number: 2:10-cv-01861-PSG-DTB

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Seth DuMouchel

Author of Opinion: Judge O'Scannlain

Author of Dissent: Judge Paez

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: P

    Posted By: Glenn Koppel @ 04/01/2014 05:28 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 28, 2014
  Kerr v. Hickenlooper - 10th Circuit
Case Name: Kerr v. Hickenlooper

Headline: Tenth Circuit holds that Colorado state legislators have standing to bring Guarantee Clause claims against Colorado governor, and that Guarantee Clause claims are not barred by the political question doctrine.

Area(s) of Law: Constitutional Law

Issue(s) Presented:

1. Do Colorado state legislators have standing to bring Guarantee Clause claims against the Governor of Colorado, seeking enjoinder of provisions of the Colorado Taxpayers' Bill of Rights?

2. Are Guarantee Clause claims barred by the political question doctrine?

Brief Summary:

Colorado state legislators sought to invalidate key provisions of the Colorado Taxpayers' Bill of Rights (TABOR), claiming that those provisions interfered with their constitutional voting abilities and thus violated the Guarantee Clause of the federal constitution. Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, the named party tasked with defending TABOR, argued that the legislators' claims ought to be dismissed for lack of standing, and as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.

The Tenth Circuit found that TABOR had caused actionable injury to the legislative plaintiffs by depriving them of their unique ability to affect Colorado tax policy by their votes, and (upon quick findings of causation and redressability) held that those plaintiffs possessed both Article III and prudential standing. The court held that a case-by-case approach to the political question doctrine was required by Baker v. Carr, and that the legislative plaintiffs' Guarantee Clause claims were not barred as nonjusticiable by any of the six factors detailed in that case.

Extended Summary:

The Colorado Taxpayers' Bill of Rights (TABOR) was enshrined in the Colorado state constitution by voter initiative in 1992. TABOR requires that all new taxes be directly approved by voters, and that all new spending (with narrow exception) be directly approved by voters. In Kerr v. Hickenlooper, the Tenth Circuit held that the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution served as a valid basis for a challenge by Colorado state legislators and educators to these key provisions of TABOR.

In response to the plaintiffs' Guarantee Clause claim, the named defendant (Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper) argued that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and prudential standing, and that plaintiffs' Guarantee Clause claims were barred by the political question doctrine. The district court found that plaintiffs possessed Article III standing and prudential standing, and that the political question doctrine did not bar plaintiffs' Guarantee Clause claims. The defendant sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal; permission was granted, and the Tenth Circuit addressed each of defendant's arguments in sequence.

With regard to Article III standing, the court recited the standard elements from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, and devoted the bulk of its analysis to the "concrete and particular injury" prong. In assessing whether or not TABOR caused injury to the plaintiffs, the court examined two federal Supreme Court cases dealing with the standing of legislators: Coleman v. Miller and Raines v. Byrd. Under Coleman, legislators suffer actionable injury where their votes are "completely nullified" by some intervening cause. In contrast, under Raines, legislators facing "the abstract dilution of legislative power" - for instance, by an executive's utilization of a line-item veto - do not suffer actionable injury.

The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "neither Coleman nor Raines maps perfectly onto the alleged injury in this case," but found that the allegations of the plaintiff legislators "[fell] closer to the theory of vote nullification espoused in Coleman than to the abstract dilution theory rejected in Raines." What TABOR effectuated, the court wrote, was function nullification - the complete inability of legislators to use their votes to bring about a tax or spending increase. The court found that under the line of precedent extending from Coleman, the deprivation of a legislator's opportunity to vote was an injury in fact. Finding in short order that this injury was both clearly traceable to TABOR and easily remedied by its invalidation, the court found that the legislative plaintiffs had Article III standing and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The court then turned to a quick prudential standing analysis. In response to the defendant's argument that the legislative plaintiffs' injury constituted a "generalized grievance," the court reiterated that TABOR did not simply amount to a decrease in the amount of tax revenue collected by the state - it amounted to the targeted deprivation of legislative powers unique to members of the Colorado General Assembly. As such, these plaintiffs were not asserting a "generalized grievance," and dismissal on the grounds of prudential standing was not warranted.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the defendant's argument that plaintiffs' Guarantee Clause claim was barred by the political question doctrine. First, the court discussed whether or not Guarantee Clause claims against state constitutional amendments were categorically prohibited by the political question doctrine. The court found some support for a categorical bar in the language of Luther v. Borden and Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon. In Luther - where the Supreme Court was asked to decide "which of two putative governments legitimately controlled Rhode Island" - the Court held that Guarantee Clause claims were political questions more properly directed to Congress than the judiciary. In Pacific States, a case where a corporation claimed that a recently implemented popular referendum system violated its rights under the Guarantee Clause, the Court found Guarantee Clause claims to be "political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of powers conferred by Congress."

"Had those been the Supreme Court's final words on the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause," the Tenth Circuit wrote, "a categorical approach might be proper." Of course, the court noted, this was not the case. Baker v. Carr made perfectly clear "the need for case-by-case inquiry" whenever the political question doctrine was raised, and "the Baker Court explicitly rejected a categorical Guarantee Clause bar." Since the Baker Court was able to conclude that the decision in Luther rested on four of six of its newly articulated political question factors, there was a (somewhat fictional) absence of contradiction between the two cases. After reiterating subsequent recharacterizations of Luther's holding, the Tenth Circuit decided that Baker continued to hold the field, and that case-by-case inquiry remained the proper approach to Guarantee Clause claims.

Second, the court applied the six-factor "political question" test articulated in Baker v. Carr. With regard to the first factor, the court wrote that "the omission of any mention of Congress from the Guarantee Clause, despite Congress' prominence elsewhere in Article IV" - in addition to the simple fact of the Guarantee Clause's inclusion in Article IV, rather than Article I - "indicate[d] there is no 'textually demonstrable commitment [of the Clause to a coordinate branch of government]... barring our review."

With regard to the second Baker factor - a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards - the court noted that "there is sparse judicial precedent interpreting the Guarantee Clause to aid our analysis," before adding (somewhat defiantly) that it was "unwilling to allow dicta suggesting that the Guarantee Clause is per se nonjusticiable to become a self-fulfilling prophecy." In order to develop judicially manageable standards, the panel stated, analysis of the Guarantee Clause "must be permitted to reach the stage of ligation [beyond summary dismissal] where such standards are developed."

With regard to the third Baker factor, prohibiting the making of a "policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion," the court reiterated its interpretive responsibility under Marbury v. Madison before noting that "we 'cannot avoid [that] responsibility merely because the issues have political implications.'" The court allowed this obvious tension to hang in the air, and added (without apparent authority) that "deciding whether a state's form of government meets a constitutionally mandated threshold does not require any sort of 'policy determination' as courts applying the Baker tests have understood that phrase."

The remaining three Baker factors were summarily dismissed. The court affirmed the standing and political question rulings of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. Interestingly, the court added in the concluding lines of its opinion that anti-TABOR claims by the legislative plaintiffs under the Colorado Enabling Act were "independently justiciable for reasons that do not apply to the Guarantee Clause claim," quoting the D.C. Circuit to the effect that "the Supreme Court has never applied the political question doctrine in a case involving alleged statutory violations."

To read the full opinion, please visit: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1445.pdf

Panel: Briscoe, Seymour, Lucero

Date of Issued Opinion: March 7, 2014

Docket Number: 12-1445

Decided: District court rulings as to standing and the political question doctrine affirmed; remanded for further proceedings.

Counsel: Daniel D. Domenico, Solicitor General (John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Frederick R. Yarger, Assistant Solicitor General, Bernie Buescher, Deputy Attorney General, Megan Paris Rundlet, Assistant Attorney General, with him on the briefs), Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for the Defendant-Appellant.

David E. Skaggs (Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov, Herbert Lawrence Fenster, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP; Michael F. Feeley, John A. Herrick, Geoffrey M. Williamson, and
Carrie E. Johnson, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP, with him on the briefs),
Denver, Colorado for the Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Richard A. Westfall, Hale Westfall, LLP, Denver, Colorado and Karen R. Harned and
Luke A. Wake, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Washington, DC, filed an amicus
curiae brief for National Federal of Independent Business, Tabor Foundation, Oklahoma Council for Public Affairs, Howard Jarvies Taxpayers Foundation, Freedom Center of Missouri, 1851 Center for Constitutional Law, Freedom Foundation, and Goldwater Institute on behalf of Defendant-Appellant.

David B. Kopel, Independence Institute, Denver, Colorado, and Ilya Shapiro, Cato
Institute, Washington, DC, filed an amicus curiae brief for Independence Institute and Cato Institute on behalf of Defendant-Appellant.

James M. Manley, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado, filed an
amicus curiae brief for Sen. Kevin Lundberg, Rep. Jerry Sonnenberg, Rep. Justin Everett, Rep. Spencer Swalm, Rep. Janak Joshi, Rep. Perry Buck, Sen. Ted Harvey, Sen. Kent Lambert, Sen. Mark Scheffel, Sen. Kevin Grantham, Sen. Vicki Marble, Sen. Randy Baumgardner, Rep. Dan Nordberg, Rep. Frank McNulty, Rep. Jared Wright, Rep. Chris Holbert, Rep. Kevin Priola, Sen. Scott Renfroe, Sen. Bill Cadman, and Colorado Union of Taxpayers Foundation on behalf of Defendant-Appellant.

D'Arcy W. Straub, Littleton, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for D'arcy W. Straub, on behalf of Defendant-Appellant.

Andrew M. Low, Emily L. Droll, and John M. Bowlin, Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP,
Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Colorado Association of School
Boards and Colorado Association of School Executives on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Melissa Hart, University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado, filed an amicus
curiae brief for Erwin Chemerinsky, Hans Linde, William Marshall, Gene Nichol, and
William Wiecek on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Joseph R. Guerra and Kathleen Mueller, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, filed an
amicus curiae brief for The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Stephen G. Masciocchi, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado, and Maureen Reidy Witt,
Holland & Hart, Greenwood Village, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for The
Colorado General Assembly on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Matthew J. Douglas, Holly E. Sterrett, Paul W. Rodney, and Nathaniel J. Hake, Arnold & Porter LLP, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for the Bell Policy Center and the Colorado Fiscal Institute on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Catherine C. Engberg, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP, San Franscisco, California,
filed an amicus curiae brief for Colorado Parent Teacher Association on behalf of
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Harold A. Haddon and Laura G. Kastetter, Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C., Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Colorado Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics and Colorado Nonprofit Association on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Author: Lucero

Case Alert Author: Levi A. Monagle

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Barbara Bergman

    Posted By: Barbara Bergman @ 03/28/2014 06:02 PM     10th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  American Meat Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture
Headline: D.C. Circuit rejects First Amendment challenge to Department of Agriculture rule compelling disclosure of the countries of origin of meat, applying Zauderer standard beyond the context of avoiding consumer deception.

Area of Law: First Amendment, Administrative Law
Issue Presented: Whether requiring meat packaging to label the country where the animal was born, raised, and slaughtered violates the First Amendment or exceeds statutory authority.

Brief Summary: The American Meat Institute (AMI), a group of trade associations representing livestock producers, feedlot operators, and meat packers, brought suit against the Department of Agriculture challenging a rule requiring meat labels to disclose where the animal was born, raised, and slaughtered. They sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that the rule exceeded the scope of its statutory authority under the country-of-origin labelling statute (COOL) and that the compelled disclosures violated their First Amendment rights. The District Court for the District of Columbia denied the injunction, finding that AMI was unlikely to succeed on the merits.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding both that the agency's interpretation of the COOL statute is reasonable and that the rule does not violate AMI's First Amendment rights. The court concluded first that the agency was within the bounds of reasonableness to interpret COOL to require labeling at each step of the production process, finding that this did not conflict with the statute's seemingly permissive language allowing the retailers to choose the country of origin for animals spending time in multiple countries. Turning to the First Amendment claim, the court applied the framework of Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), which applies to requirements that a company disclose factual and non-controversial information, rather than that of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), the general test for commercial speech. Zauderer minimized companies' First Amendment interests in not providing purely factual information. Although Zauderer said that informational mandates are consistent with the First Amendment as long as the "disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers," the D.C. Circuit held that the state's interest was not limited to deception and is also applicable to disclosures required for other purposes. Finding that the government's interests were sufficient to justify the minimal intrusion on AMI's First Amendment interests, the court found AMI unlikely to succeed on the merits and affirmed the decision of the district court.
For the full text of this opinion, please visit
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i.../13-5281-1485877.pdf.

Panel (if known): Garland, Srinivasan, and Williams

Argument Date (if known): January 9, 2014

Date of Issued Opinion: March 28, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5281

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Joseph T. Maher, Jr.

Counsel (if known): Catherine E. Stetson, Jonathan L. Abram, Judith E. Coleman, Mary Helen Wimberly, and Elizabeth B. Prelogar for appellants. Daniel Tenny, Stuart F. Delery, Ronald C. Machen Jr., and Mark B. Stern for appellees.

Author of Opinion: Williams

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elizabeth Earle Beske, Ripple Weistling

    Posted By: Ripple Weistling @ 03/28/2014 03:43 PM     DC Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Upholds Texas Abortion Regulations.

Area of Law: Abortion.

Issue Presented: Whether requiring physicians performing or inducing an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion. And, whether mandating that the administration of abortion - inducing drugs comply with the protocol authorized by the Food and Drug Administration amounts to a ban on pre-viability abortion in some circumstances.

Brief Summary: Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services and other abortion facilities and three physicians (collectively Planned Parenthood) sued the Attorney General of Texas and other individuals (collectively the State), seeking to enjoin two provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2) pertaining to the regulation of surgical abortions and abortion - inducing drugs. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas held that parts of both provisions were unconstitutional and granted injunctive relief. A motions panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal, and the United States Supreme Court upheld the stay. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that both of the challenged provisions are constitutional and therefore reversed and rendered judgment, with one exception, for the State.

Extended Summary: Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services and other abortion facilities and three physicians (collectively Planned Parenthood) sued the Attorney General of Texas and other individuals (collectively the State), seeking to enjoin two provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2). The first provision requires that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges on the date of the abortion at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and the second provision mandates that the administration of abortion - inducing drugs comply with the protocol authorized by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas permanently enjoined the admitting - privileges provision and partially enjoined the medication abortion regulation. The State noted its appeal and moved for an emergency stay. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal, which the United States Supreme Court upheld.

Admitting Privileges Requirement: Planned Parenthood argued that the admitting - privileges requirement lacked a rational basis and imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion.

To show that the admitting - privileges requirement lacked a rational basis, Planned Parenthood produced evidence that there is an extremely low risk of a complication from or after an abortion, that ER doctors are qualified to treat most of these complications, and that the provision has the effect of restricting the availability of abortion within the state because the requirement will close one-third of the state's abortion facilities. The State argued that there are four main benefits supporting the requirement: (a) it provides a more thorough evaluation mechanism of physician competency which better protects patient safety; (b) it acknowledges and enables the importance of continuity of care; (c) it enhances inter - physician communication and optimizes patient information transfer and complication management; and (d) it supports the ethical duty of care for the operating physician to prevent patient abandonment.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the State acted within its prerogative to regulate the medical profession by heeding these patient - centered concerns and requiring abortion practitioners to obtain admitting privileges at a nearby hospital, and that the State is not required under rational basis review to choose the least restrictive means to achieve a legitimate goal.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that even though the State articulated rational bases for this law, and even though its purpose was not impugned, Planned Parenthood could succeed if the effect of the law substantially burdened women's access to abortions in Texas. However, the Fifth Circuit held that an increase of travel of less than 150 miles for some women is not an undue burden. Second, the assertion that "there will be abortion clinics that will close" is too vague. Although some clinics may be required to shut their doors, there is no showing that any woman will lack reasonable access to a clinic within Texas. And, third, the record does not show that abortion practitioners will likely be unable to comply with the privileges requirement.

Planned Parenthood further contended that H.B. 2 does not offer abortion providers a long enough "grace period" to comply with the admitting-privileges provision. H.B. 2 gives abortion providers approximately 100 days to apply for admitting privileges, which, on its face, is a sufficient grace period. However, under Texas law, hospitals can take up to 170 days from the date of application to respond. It is unreasonable to expect that all abortion providers will be able to comply with the admitting-privileges provision within 100 days when receiving a response from a hospital processing an application for admitting privileges can take 170 days. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that pursuant to H.B. 2's severability provision, § 10(b), the admitting - privileges requirement may not be enforced against abortion providers who applied for admitting privileges within the grace period allowed under H.B. 2, but are awaiting a response from a hospital.

Medication Abortions Provision: H.B. 2 mandates that medication abortions satisfy the protocol approved for such abortions by the FDA and outlined in the final printed label (FPL) for the abortifacient drug mifepristone. Since the FDA authorized the protocol for medication abortions, doctors have developed an off - label protocol that differs from the FDA - approved version. In particular, although the FPL limits the administration of a medication abortion to forty - nine days following a woman's last menstrual period (LMP), doctors regularly administer medication abortions up to sixty - three days LMP, and sometimes as late as seventy days LMP.

Planned Parenthood argued that for women who suffer from certain medical conditions that make surgical abortion significantly more risky, H.B. 2 acts as a ban to pre-viability abortion after forty - nine days LMP. The Fifth Circuit held that H.B. 2's regulations on medication abortion do not facially require a court - imposed exception for the life and health of the woman. First, the conditions that supposedly require an off-label protocol have not been clearly defined. Second, Planned Parenthood has not pointed to any evidence of scientific studies or research in the record showing this to be true. Third, H.B. 2 does not ban an entire abortion method. Rather, it merely shortens the window during which a woman may elect to have a medication abortion.

The Fifth Circuit also noted that Planned Parenthood's facial attack on the Act should not have been entertained because the proper means to consider exceptions is by as - applied challenge.

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and rendered judgment for the State of Texas, except that the admitting privileges requirement, § 10(b), may not be enforced against abortion providers who timely applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a response from the hospital.

For the full opinion, please see:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/o...ub/13/13-51008-CV1.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges Jones, Elrod, and Haynes

Argument Date: 1/6/2014

Date of Issued Opinion: 3/27/2014

Docket Number: No. 13-51008

Decided: Reversed and rendered

Case Alert Author: Kirsty Davis

Counsel: Helene T. Krasnoff, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services, Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Planned Parenthood Sexual Healthcare Services, each on behalf of itself, its patients and physicians; and Planned Parenthood Women's Health Center. Janet Crepps, Center for Reproductive Rights, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Whole Woman's Health, Austin Women's Health Center, Killeen Women's Health Center, Southwestern Women's Surgery Center, West Side Clinic, Inc., each on behalf of itself, its patients and physicians; Alan Braid, M.D., Lamar Robinson, M.D., and Pamela J. Richter, D.O., each on behalf of themselves and their patients. Rebecca L. Robertson, ACLU Texas, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Routh Street Women's Clinic and Houston Women's Clinic, each on behalf of itself, its patients and physicians. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Office of the Solicitor General for the State of Texas for Defendants-Appellants Attorney General Gregory Abbott, David Lakey, M.D., and Mari Robinson, Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Jones

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 03/28/2014 02:39 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 27, 2014
  Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco
Headline: Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment and remanded in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state law, alleging the police officers violated a plaintiff's rights when they entered her residence without a warrant and shot her after she threatened them with a knife. The panel held, inter alia, that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to arrests and on the facts presented in this case, there was a triable issue whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability when they forced their way back into her room without taking her mental illness into account or employing generally accepted police practices for peaceably resolving a confrontation with a person with mental illness.

Area of Law: Fourth Amendment; Americans with Disabilities Act; California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act

Issues Presented: (1) Whether the warrantless entries violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) Whether the officers had qualified immunity against liability under a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim; (3) Whether San Francisco was liable under a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim based on a theory of failure to train or ratification; (4) Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act applied to arrests; and (5) Whether the officers were immune from liability for violation of state law claims under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5278.

Brief Summary: Teresa Sheehan suffered from mental illness, and she threatened her social worker, the police were called to transport her to a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When the officers first entered Sheehan's room, they were confronted with a knife and threats and immediately retreated. After calling for back up however, the officers entered Sheehan's room a second time, and again were confronted with a knife and threats, resulting in Sheehan being pepper sprayed and shot five to six times.

The district court granted the defendants summary judgment against all of Sheehan's claims.

The panel held that the officers were justified in entering plaintiff's home initially, without a warrant, under the emergency aid exception because they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that plaintiff was in need of emergency medical assistance and they conducted the search or seizure in a reasonable manner up to that point. However, the panel also held that a jury could find that the officers acted unreasonably in forcing a second entry into plaintiff's residence and provoking a near-fatal confrontation, and that the plaintiff presented a triable issue of the unreasonable use of deadly force under a provocation theory.

Having determined that a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation, the panel also held that the officers were not entitled, as a matter of law, to qualified immunity as against the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and, therefore, the granting of summary judgment was premature. Although the panel held that there were triable issues of fact whether the shooting was unreasonable on a provocation theory, the panel also held that the officer who shot Sheehan once she was already on the ground was entitled to qualified immunity because, despite having been shot, Sheehan continued to hold the knife and threaten officers and the other officer was in close proximity to Sheehan.

The panel further held that summary judgment was proper as to Sheehan's Monell claims, because the police department had provided its officers appropriate training, and mere acquiescence to the officers' conduct and failure to discipline, did not amount to ratification by San Francisco of the officers' conduct.

The Ninth Circuit addressed an issue of first impression addressed by other circuits - whether the Americans with Disabilities Act applied to arrests, and held that the Act did apply to arrests. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit adopted the approach of the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, in which the focus is the reasonableness of the requested ADA modification where there are exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity. Because the reasonableness of modification was a question of fact, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants, and the Ninth Circuit remanded that issue as well.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment with respect to whether the defendants were immune under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5278, because the claims alleged by Sheehan were not within the scope of the immunity granted under § 5278. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing Sheehan's state claims, and remanded.

The dissent contended that summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim with respect to the second entry should have been affirmed, as the amount of force used in the second entry was not excessive force, but instead objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Extended Summary: A social worker contacted police for transportation of Teresa Sheehan, a woman suffering from mental illness, to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment for evaluation and treatment pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 5150. The social worker's concern arose from the woman's refusal to take her medication and the danger she posed to others, based on the threat made by the woman to "knife" the social worker. The social worker did not give the officers reason to believe Sheehan was likely to injure herself.

Police arrived and were informed that no other residents were in the group home building and that the only way out of Sheehan's room, aside from the door, was a second story window. The officers entered Sheehan's room, without a warrant, to confirm the social worker's assessment and take custody of the woman. Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill the officers, forcing the officers to leave the room. The officers called for back-up and then proceeded once again to attempt to enter Sheehan's room with their weapons drawn.

While the officers testified that Sheehan emerged from the room brandishing the knife, was unaffected by pepper spray, and was shot only after Sheehan continued to approach the officers, Sheehan testified that she opened the door, brandished the knife, and fell to the ground upon being pepper sprayed and was shot once she was on the ground.

Sheehan continued to hold the knife once shot and conceded that she intended to use the knife to defend herself against officers in an attempt to avoid being involuntarily committed.

Sheehan filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the officers and the San Francisco, asserting violations of her rights under the (1) Fourth Amendment, (2) Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as (3) tort and statutory claims under state law. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Sheehan appealed.

Fourth Amendment

The panel considered Sheehan's contention that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment right when they entered her home without a warrant.

Initial Entry

As to the initial entry, the panel considered the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirement for a warrant. Under the emergency aid exception there must be an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves [officers] from harm, and the search's scope and manner must have been reasonable to meet the need. The exigency exception requires that the government show that the officer had probable cause to search or arrest and the exigent circumstances justified the warrantless intrusion. Further, the panel noted that, regardless of which exception is employed, the search or seizure may be invalid if carried out in an unreasonable manner.

To determine whether the intrusions by the officers were unreasonable, the panel applied the Supreme Court's excessive force standard, balancing the nature and the quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the government interests at stake. The reasonableness of force used is determined from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.

Applying the excessive force standard to the initial entry, the panel held it was lawful under the emergency aid exception, and did not violate Sheehan's Fourth Amendment rights, because (1) the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to determine that there was an urgent need to protect Sheehan from serious harm, pursuant to the information provided to the officers by the social worker, and (2) the officers entered in a reasonable manner - the officers knocked, announced they were officers, and used a key to enter.

Second Entry

The panel nonetheless held that summary judgment as to the second entry was inappropriate, as there were triable issues of fact with respect to whether that entry violated the Fourth Amendment. While the officers may have had justification that relieved them of the warrant requirement, because (1) there was still an ongoing emergency, (2) the two entries were a part of a "continuous search or seizure" and thus the second entry did not require a separate justification, and debatably (3) the officers may have been relieved by the exigent circumstances exception, the officers did not carry out the second entry in a reasonable manner.

Because the officers forced a second entry without taking Sheehan's mental illness into account, and appeared to depart from police officer training, the panel determined that the second entry could not be characterized as reasonable as a matter of law. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could have found that the second entry was objectively unreasonable.

Qualified Immunity

The panel stated that a government official would be denied qualified immunity if (1) the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or proved show a violation of a constitutional right and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.

In determining whether qualified immunity exists, the panel balanced the amount of force applied against the need for that force. Construing the facts most favorably to Sheehan, the panel determined that there was no pressing need to enter a second time because backup was on its way, Sheehan was not a threat to herself, and reasonable officers would have reason to expect that their subsequent entry may result in harm or death. Since the facts were disputed, the panel ruled that it was premature to hold that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Turning to the question of deadly force, the panel noted that where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon such as a knife or gun, the officer is justified in using deadly force. The use of deadly force, "viewed from the standpoint of the moment of the shooting," was reasonable as matter of law because the officers could reasonably believe they were in danger due to Sheehan's brandishing of the knife.

However, the panel also considered "whether the shooting was reasonable when the events leading up to the shooting are taken into account." Where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, the officer may be held liable for this otherwise defensive use of force. The panel held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the shooting was unreasonable on a provocation theory.

As to one of the officer's final shot, the Court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity as Sheehan was not necessarily subdued while on the ground, since she continued to hold the knife and make threats, and was in such close proximity to the other officer as to signal a continued danger.

Monell Claims

Sheehan asserted § 1983 claims under Monell against the San Francisco, based on (1) failure to train, and (2) ratification.

Failure to train or inadequate training may serve as a basis for a § 1983 claim only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come in contact. However, Sheehan failed to point to any facts in the record that show that the officer's training was responsible for the disregard of Sheehan's mental illness. In fact, Sheehan conceded that the police department had employed appropriate training.

To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that the authorized policy makers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it. Sheehan argued that the city ratified the conduct by not disciplining the officers, but the panel ruled that more than mere acquiescence is required for ratification.

Americans with Disabilities Claim

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act protects against discrimination of individuals who are deemed disabled under the Act. Discrimination includes a failure to reasonably accommodate a person's disability.

The question whether the Act applies to arrests was one of first impression for the Ninth Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit has held that Title II does not apply to an officer's "on-the-street-responses," the Eleventh Circuit focuses on the reasonableness of the requested ADA modification where there are exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity. The Tenth Circuit held that excluding arrests from the scope of Title II "is not the law," and the Fourth Circuit applied a similar approach to the Eleventh Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit panel held that Title II applies to arrests and adopted the Eleventh Circuit's reasonableness of the ADA modification approach. Two types of Title II claims applicable to arrests have been recognized : (1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a disability based on a misperception that the effects of a disability amount to criminal activity, and (2) where there is a proper police investigation and arrest of a disabled individual for a crime unrelated to the disability, but there is a failure to reasonably accommodate the person's disability in the course of the investigation or arrest, resulting in the person suffering a greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.

Sheehan raised the second type of claim. To state a Title 2 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is a disabled individual (2) otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of a public entity's services, programs or activities, (3) was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of her disability.

The Ninth Circuit determined that reasonableness of an accommodation is a question of fact, and subsequently, the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on Sheehan's Americans with Disabilities Act claim.

State Law Claims

Finally, the district court ruled that the officers had immunity under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5278, in response to Sheehan's claims for negligence, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of California Civil Code § 52.1.

The Ninth Circuit outlined the scope of the immunity afforded under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, limiting immunity to (1) police officers' decision to detain, (2) the fact of detention, and (3) circumstances inherent in the involuntary detention. However, the officers were not immune if they were negligent in carrying out the detention; any injury that Sheehan suffered from the officers' failure to exercise ordinary care in taking Sheehan into custody would not be an "inherent" circumstance in the detention. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants with respect to immunity under § 5278, and vacated the dismissal of the state law claims and remanded.

Dissenting Opinion

Addressing the excessive force claim, the dissent argued that summary judgment in favor of qualified immunity for the defendants should have been affirmed. The dissent contended that the officers could have reasonably concluded that their second entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition on the use of excessive force, and that a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment merely based on an expert report that stated that the officers' conduct was inappropriate.

The dissent further noted that, after the officers witnessed Sheehan's dangerous disposition and retreated to the hallway, it was reasonable to believe that Sheehan still a danger to herself or others because behind the closed door Sheehan may have had access to other weapons. The dissent observed that the determination of what conduct may be deemed reasonable should take into account the need to make split-second decisions.

Panel: Judges Noonan, Graber, Fisher

Date of Issued Opinion: February 21, 2014

Docket Number: 3:09-cv-03889-CRB

Decided: Affirmed in part, reversed in part

Case Alert Author: Joseph Chaparo

Author of Opinion: Judge Fisher; partial concurrence and partial dissent by Judge Graber

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Glenn Koppel

    Posted By: Glenn Koppel @ 03/27/2014 02:45 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 26, 2014
  United States v. Gupta -- Second Circuit
Headline: Second Circuit Affirms Rajat Gupta's Securities and Conspiracy Convictions

Area of Law: Securities Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the district court erred in admitting statements of defendant's coconspirator and excluding evidence offered by the defense.

Brief Summary: Rajat Gupta, formerly a member of the Goldman Sachs Board of Directors, was charged with providing inside information to Raj Rajaratnam knowing that the information would be used to buy and sell securities. A jury in the Southern District of New York convicted Gupta of four of the six counts against him, including conspiracy to commit securities fraud and three substantive counts of fraud. On appeal to the Second Circuit, Gupta contended that the trial court erred by admitting wiretapped conversations to which Gupta was not a party, and by excluding evidence offered by the defense. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the conviction. To read the whole opinion, please visit http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...9783e2d8b6f/3/hilite/

Extended Summary: Rajat Gupta, a former member of the Board of Directors of Goldman Sachs, was involved in several financial ventures with Raj Rajaratnam, founder of the Galleon Group, which was the subject of a government investigation of insider trading. This investigation uncovered evidence that Gupta was supplying Rajaratnam with inside information about Goldman Sachs. As a result, Gupta was charged with six counts of securities law violations, on grounds that Gupta, Rajaratnam, and others conspired to commit securities fraud; that Gupta disclosed inside information to Rajaratnam knowing that he would use the information to buy and sell securities.
Gupta was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud based on insider trading. The majority of the evidence that supported this conviction was circumstantial, consisting of testimony, wiretapped phone calls, and records of phone calls. In his defense, Gupta called witnesses to testify as to his character and introduced evidence suggesting that it was a different Goldman Sachs insider who supplied Rajaratnam with the confidential information.
After being convicted, Gupta was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment, to be followed by a one year term of supervised release, and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $6,218,223.59. On appeal, Gupta argued that Rajaratnam's wiretapped conversations were inadmissible hearsay; that the trial court erred in curtailing evidence proffered by Gupta in his defense; and that the errors, either singly or in combination, entitle him to a new trial. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the District Court's conviction.
Gupta first contended that the wiretap authorizations were obtained in violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The Second Circuit, however, rejected these arguments. Secondly, Gupta challenged the admission of the wiretapped conversations between Rajaratnam and other individuals on the grounds that the tapes are hearsay. The Second Circuit found that the lower court had not abused its discretion in finding that the tapes were admissible both as nonhearsay statements in furtherance of the Rajaratnam-Gupta conspiracy and under the exception for statements against penal interest.
Gupta further contended that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the district court unduly limited evidence proffered by the defense to show that any communication by Gupta of inside information to Rajaratnam was improbable. The Second Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting this evidence; rather. the district court made a proper Rule 403 assessment that the evidence, if admitted, would have been unduly prejudicial and confusing to the jury. The court also concluded that if the limitation on the testimony was error, the error was harmless.
Gupta also challenged the lower court's refusal to admit documents that may have shown that another Goldman Sachs employee was responsible for providing Rajaratnam with the inside information, arguing that "the accused may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that another person may have committed the crime with which the defendant is charged." The lower court had found that the proffered evidence was replete with inadmissible hearsay, suffered from a lack of foundation, and that in the absence of explanatory testimony by a witness the jury would be unable to understand the documents without representations by counsel or speculation, either of which would be improper. The Second Circuit agreed, concluding that the district court did not err in refusing to admit the evidence, especially in light of Gupta's intention to rely solely on the documents themselves, rather than call a witness to lay a foundation for these documents.
The Second Circuit also agreed with the district court's finding that evidence of Gupta's intention to give money to charity was inadmissible hearsay, would be unduly confusing and prejudicial, and its admission unjustified under Rule 106. Moreover, the Second Circuit did not find that the lower court abused its discretion in prohibiting Gupta from questioning witnesses about his "integrity." Lastly, the Second Circuit, again agreeing with the district court, reiterated that it is settled law in the Second Circuit that an instruction that character testimony may by itself raise a reasonable doubt is not required and declined to reconsider that rule.

Panel (if known): Newman, Kearse, and Pooler.

Argument Date: May 21, 2013

Argument Location: New York, NY

Date of Issued Opinion: March 25, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-4448

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Gillian Kirsch

Counsel: Richard C. Tarlowe, Assistant United States Attorney, New York, New York, for Appellee. Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, Washington, D.C., for the Defendant-Appellant.

Author of Opinion: Kearse

Circuit: 2nd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Emily Gold Waldman

    Posted By: Emily Waldman @ 03/26/2014 08:19 AM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 20, 2014
  Delaware County v. Federal Housing Finance Agency - Third Circuit
Headline: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA Tax Exempt

Area of Law: Constitutional Law/Congress's Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce

Issues Presented: Did Congress act unconstitutionally when it statutorily created a tax exemption for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA from all state and local taxation except taxes on real property, and are real estate transfer taxes are also exempt from taxation under the statute.

Brief Summary: Counties in Pennsylvania and New Jersey sought to collect taxes on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and its conservator FHFA for the transfer of property. Congress enacted a statute that exempts these entities from all local and state taxes except taxes on real property. Plaintiff counties claimed that the entities were subject to taxes for real estate transfers because they are based on the value of the property. Plaintiffs also claimed that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause and usurped state powers when it enacted the statute. The Court rejected these arguments and determined that the statutory language exempted defendants from all taxes including those for the transfer of property.

Extended Summary: This case centers on the statute enacted by Congress that exempts the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) from paying all state and local taxes except taxes on real property. Counties in Pennsylvania and New Jersey filed suit alleging that the "all taxes" language in the statute meant only direct taxes and, therefore, defendants were subject to real estate transfer taxes.
The Third Circuit disagreed with plaintiffs' argument that "all taxation" means something less than all taxes. It explained that when interpreting a statute the words must be given their ordinary meaning. The Court determined that a transfer tax is not a tax on property itself and is exempt under the statute. The Court held that the proper interpretation of the phrase "all taxation" is exactly what it says and that defendants were exempt from paying state and local real estate transfer taxes.
The Court also rejected the argument that transfer taxes fall within the exception for taxes on real property. It agreed with precedent that transfer taxes are an excise tax because they are not taxes on the property itself but on a transaction relating to the property. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that transfer taxes amount to a direct real property tax because they are calculated by reference to the value of the property, the Court relied on the Supreme Court's rejection of a similar argument holding that a "privilege tax is not converted to a property tax because it is measured by the value of the property."
The Court also rejected the constitutional arguments raise by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued that the exemption exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Court rejected that argument and reasoned that the state cannot use its power to tax to defeat Congress's power to regulate commerce. While respecting the state's power to tax, Congress can supersede that power as part of an interstate regulatory regime and can preempt it when Congress makes it explicit that is what it intends to do. The actions of the defendants here fall squarely within Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Congress only needed a rational basis for determining that the regulated activity, in the aggregate, would substantially affect interstate commerce. Congress had reason to believe that by making defendants tax exempt, it would decrease the transaction costs and increase the amount of buying defendants could do.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132163p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes, Fisher, and Stark, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: January 22, 2014

Argument Location:

Date of Issued Opinion: March 18, 2014

Docket Number: Nos. 13-2163/13-2501/13-3175

Decided: March 18, 2014

Case Alert Author: Cheri Snook

Counsel: Jeremy J. Brandon, Esq., for appellants Delaware County, Chester County of Pennsylvania, Cape May County, Rita Marie Fulginiti and Lackawanna County Recorder of Deeds, Nicholas E. Chimicles, Esq., Alison F. Gushue, Esq., Benjamin F. Johns, Esq., Joseph G. Sauder, Esq., for appellants Delaware County and Chester County of Pennsylvania, Lewis B. April, Esq., Jeffrey Ryan Lindsay, Esq., Bryan L. Clobes, Esq., for appellants Cape May County and Rita Marie Fulginiti, Jennifer E. Agnew, Esq., Warren T. Burns, Esq., Katherine L.I. Hacker, Esq., Terrell W. Oxford, Esq., Carol H. Lahman, Esq., Larry D. Lahman, Esq., Todd J. O'Malley, Esq., Ira N. Richards, Esq., Elaine A. Ryan, Esq., Patricia N. Syverson, Esq., Howard J. Sedran, Esq., Joseph Siprut, Esq., Stewart M. Weltman, Esq., for Lackawana County Recorder of Deeds, Scott J. Etish, Esq., Michael A. Johnson, Esq., Dirk Phillips, Esq., for appellees Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal National Mortgage Association, RP, AKA Fannie Mae and Federal Home Mortgage Corp, AKA Freddie Mac, Howard N. Cayne, Esq., Michael A Johnson, Esq., Dirk Phillips, Esq., Asim Varma, Esq., Jared P. Duvoisin, Esq., for appellee Federal Housing Finance Agency, Michael D. Leffel, Esq., for appellee Federal National Mortgage Association, RP, AKA Fannie Mae, Michael J. Ciatti, Esq., Nicholas Deenis, Esq., Joseph T. Kelleher, Esq., Jill L. Nicholson, Esq., Ann Marie Uetz, Esq., William T. Mandia, Esq., for appellee Federal National Mortgage Association, RP, AKA Fannie Mae, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp, AKA Freddie Mac, Patrick J. Urda, Esq., for intervenor-appellee

Author of Opinion: Judge Fisher

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 03/20/2014 01:38 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 18, 2014
  Price Trucking Corp. v. Norampac Industries, Inc. - Second Circuit
Headline: Second Circuit Reverses, Holding CERCLA Does Not Give Subcontractor Right to Sue Landowner Directly For Unpaid Fees Owed to Subcontractor by General Contractor

Issue(s) Presented: Does CERCLA create direct liability between a land owner and a subcontractor for cleanup performed by the subcontractor on a CERCLA remediation site when the owner has paid the general contractor in full for the subcontractor's work?

Brief Summary: The defendant landowner, Norampac Industries, appealed a grant of a summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York to plaintiff, Price Trucking. Price Trucking was a subcontractor to the general contractor, AAA Environmental Inc., in a Brownfield remediation cleanup of Norampac's Erie County property. Norampac paid AAA Environmental in full for work, but AAA failed to pay monies owed to subcontractor Price Trucking for the work performed. Price Trucking brought this action asserting liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's ("CERCLA") liability provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607.

The Second Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment motion and remanded the case. The court held that to make the landowner owner essentially a surety for contractors, subcontractors, employees, or suppliers is beyond the scope of Congress's intent in enacting CERCLA. The court found that CERCLA's purpose is to ensure that landowners accept responsibility and pay for these actions, and Norampac had done so upon completing the cleanup and ensuring that the contracted party was paid. The Second Circuit also reasoned that Congress did not intend to upend state law by providing a separate remedy to the normal method in which subcontractors and contractors seek to be paid.

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...c470529bbb1/1/hilite/

Extended Summary: Norampac Industries, Inc. ("Norampac") owned land in Erie County, New York which contained levels of lead and other contaminants exceeding the maximums set by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"). The company entered into a Brownfield Site Cleanup agreement with the DEC and contracted with AAA Environmental, Inc. to perform the remedial work. AAA Environmental subsequently subcontracted with Price Trucking, the plaintiff, to transport and dispose of the contaminated soil from the site.

Initially, AAA Environmental paid Price Trucking for all services rendered, but on October 6, 2008 the payments stopped. AAA Environmental refused to pay any outstanding invoices, and Price Trucking in turn refused to keep working unless Norampac paid them directly. Norampac agreed to this agreement and Price Trucking continued working until completion. After work was completed, Price Trucking was unable to recover the payments due from AAA Environmental. Price Trucking instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York against Norampac for its unpaid bills premised on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's ("CERCLA") liability provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607.

In March 2010, Price Trucking moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, and District Court adopted the findings of the Magistrate Judge and found in favor of Price Trucking. There were several concurrent state court cases which affected the damages in this case, but the appeal in front of the Second Circuit dealt solely with the issue of liability.

The Second Circuit initially outlined the primary purposes of CERCLA as "encourage[ing] the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites; and [placing] the cost of that cleanup on those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous condition." The parties stipulated that the defendant met the elements required to impose strict liability under CERCLA and, thus, the court concluded that the issue in the case was whether the landowner had discharged his liability under CERCLA by making payments to the general contractor which included the amounts due for work done by the subcontractor. Norampac argued that its CERCLA liability was satisfied when the response was complete and once it had made all payments pursuant to the applicable contracts entered into to effect the cleanup. Price Trucking argued that liability remained until all parties who contributed to cleanup were made whole for all costs of their work.

The Second Circuit disagreed with the District Court and held that CERCLA does not require the landowner to ensure that all subcontractors are made whole for the work they perform. The court first notes that nothing under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), CERCLA's liability provision, on its face provides assistance in determining the extent of a party's liability. The court instead looked to the purpose of CERCLA's liability provision in making its determination, stating that it was enacted "with the expansive, remedial purpose of ensuring that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions" and accomplishes these purposes by imposing a "strict liability regime . . . without regard to fault or negligence." The court continued by stating that "CERCLA's purposes are served when landowners and others who profit from hazardous activities are made to bear the costs of accidents on their land."

In this case, the Second Circuit reasoned that through Norampac's actions and payments, it had accepted responsibility and paid for its actions, and Price Trucking's attempt to treat Norampac "as though it were a surety to its subcontract with AAA Environmental . . . pushes the terms of CERCLA beyond their intended assignment of responsibilities." The Second Circuit ultimately held that "CERCLA is not designed to hold the responsible party perpetually liable as a surety in any dispute relating to the clean up between or among contractors, subcontractors, employees, or suppliers."

The Second Circuit went on to address the role of state law in providing resolution for disputes such as this. Common law in New York addresses a subcontractor's right to remedy for nonpayment by a general contractor by providing that subcontractor's cannot assert a cause of action against one who they are not in privity with, and cannot place a mechanic's lien on property unless the owner has not yet paid a general contractor for the work done. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend for CERCLA to upend these longstanding principles. Furthermore, the court stated that neither CERCLA's terms or legislative history suggest that "the statute is meant to provide a substitution for the usual manner in which contractors and subcontractors are paid." The Second Circuit offered a disclaimer, noting that its holding does not suggest that private contractors and subcontractors cannot bring recovery actions, but rather reminds that this can only be done under certain circumstances that did not exist in this case.

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...c470529bbb1/1/hilite/

Panel: Chief Circuit Judge Katzmann, Circuit Judges Straub and Sack

Argument: 9/24/2012

Date of Issued Opinion: 3/18/2014

Docket Number: 11-2917-cv

Decided: Reversed and Remanded

Case Alert Author: David Restrepo

Counsel: John Gilbert Horn (Craig A. Slater, of counsel), Harter Secrest & Emery LLP, Buffalo, N.Y., for Appellant. Kevin M. Hogan, Phillips Lytle LLP (Patricia A. Manabelli, of counsel), Buffalo, N.Y., for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Sack

Case Alert Supervisor: Elyse Diamond Moskowitz

    Posted By: Elyse Moskowitz @ 03/18/2014 03:13 PM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  T.S. v. Doe - Sixth Circuit
Headline: A juvenile-detention center may implement a generally applicable, suspicionless strip-search policy.

Area of Law: Constitutional Law; Fourth Amendment

Issue Presented: May government officials invoking qualified immunity benefit from a post-arrest Supreme Court decision that validated the government's complained-of procedure?

Brief Summary: After being arrested for underage drinking, two juveniles were brought to a detention center where they were strip-searched. The juveniles sued, arguing that strip searches for minor offenses are not allowed unless reasonable suspicion is present. The district court denied the defendants qualified immunity under both federal and Kentucky law.

The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that, at the time the strip search occurred, a reasonable official would have known that a suspicionless strip search of a juvenile during intake violated the Fourth Amendment. But the court agreed with the district court that the officials who strip-searched the juveniles were conducting "ministerial" acts and thus were not protected by qualified official immunity under Kentucky law.

Significance: For the purpose of establishing that an official has acted in objective good faith, the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the issue is relevant, even if it was decided after the disputed acts occurred.

Extended Summary: Plaintiffs, two juveniles, were arrested for underage drinking and were transferred to a juvenile-detention center. During intake, plaintiffs were strip-searched, and their bodies were inspected for general condition and markings.

Plaintiffs, through their parents, sued the officials who strip-searched them, the officials' supervisors, and the detention-center administrators. They claimed that the search violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. Plaintiffs argued that the strip searches were unreasonable because they had been arrested for a minor offense that did not warrant such a search.

Defendants argued that their actions were protected under the qualified-immunity doctrine. The district court held that both adults and juveniles have the right to be free from unreasonable strip searches, and it denied immunity to defendants under both federal and Kentucky law.

The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. Once defendants raised a qualified-immunity defense, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to prove that (1) the officials' conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) that this right was so clearly established at the time of the offense that the officials understood that their actions were violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs relied on Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1989), which prohibited suspicionless strip searches of adult detainees who committed a minor offense. The Sixth Circuit noted, however, that Masters conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), which held that officials may conduct suspicionless strip searches of pretrial detainees, regardless of the severity of their offense, during their initial entry into the general population of a prison. The Sixth Circuit held, therefore, that Masters was abrogated.

Plaintiffs argued that Florence was not controlling because it was decided three years after their arrests. But the Sixth Circuit observed that when the arrest occurred, there was already an extensive body of caselaw supporting a reasonable official's good-faith belief that strip searches for minor offenses were not prohibited. Thus, the court reversed the district court's decision and held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity against plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims.

The court also briefly noted that other circuits' decisions had uniformly affirmed the reasonableness of suspicionless strip searches of juveniles, observing that the state's status in loco parentis over juveniles created an enhanced responsibility to protect detained juveniles from weapons and other contraband.

But the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that defendants were not entitled to qualified official immunity under Kentucky law. The court noted that this immunity is available for discretionary, but not ministerial, acts. Because the officials acted under the orders of their supervisors, their acts were ministerial and thus not protected under qualified official immunity.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...ns.pdf/14a0026p-06.pdf

Panel: Boggs and Donald, Circuit Court Judges; and Stamp, District Judge, sitting by designation.

Argument: June 12, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 5, 2014

Docket Number: 12-5724

Decided: Reversed in part, affirmed in part.

Case Alert Author: Meri Kligman

Counsel: Roger G. Wright, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Joe F. Childers, JOE F. CHILDERS & ASSOCIATES, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Roger G. Wright, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Joe F. Childers, JOE F. CHILDERS & ASSOCIATES, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees. Marsha Levick, JUVENILE LAW CENTER, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amici Curiae.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Court Judge Boggs

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Kalinowski

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 03/18/2014 02:58 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 16, 2014
  THI v. Patton - 10th Circuit
Case Name: THI of New Mexico v. Lillie Mae Patton

Headline: Tenth Circuit holds that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts unconscionability determinations rooted in state-level hostility to arbitration.

Area(s) of Law: Arbitration, Contracts, Constitutional Law

Issue(s) Presented: Does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt a state law determination that an arbitration clause is unconscionable because it applies primarily to claims that only one party to the contract is likely to bring?

Brief Summary:

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) articulates a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. In interpreting the Act, various courts have held that that the FAA preempts both state statutes and state common law predicated on the view that arbitration is inferior to litigation as a means of vindicating rights.

In THI v. Patton, the Tenth Circuit held that the FAA preempted a determination of the unconscionability of an arbitration clause under the common law of New Mexico, insofar as that determination was rooted in an assumption by the New Mexico Court of Appeals that arbitration was inferior to litigation as a means of vindicating rights. The Tenth Circuit added that a court's reasons for finding an arbitration clause unconscionable must be carefully examined to ensure that they are not rooted in this statutorily prohibited assumption.

Extended Summary:

The FAA was passed in 1925, with the objective of overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements and leveling the playing field between arbitration and litigation as methods of dispute resolution. Since the passage of the FAA, arbitration has assumed a prominent role in federal dispute resolution, and numerous opinions in recent years have reinforced the federal courts' "strong endorsement" of arbitration.
In acknowledgment of the purpose of the Act, federal courts have held that the FAA preempts both state statutes and state common law predicated on the view that arbitration is inferior to litigation as a means of vindicating rights. While acknowledging that state common law may still indicate that an arbitration clause is invalid - because it is unconscionable, for instance - the courts have repeatedly emphasized that the invalidity of an arbitration clause may not hinge on the simple fact that the clause mandates arbitration.

In THI v. Patton, a nursing home resident entered into an agreement requiring arbitration for all claims except guardianship proceedings, collection/eviction actions, and claims under $2,500. When the resident died, his estate sued THI (the nursing home operator) for negligence and misrepresentation. Pursuant to its agreement with the resident, THI sought to compel arbitration.

The district court initially ordered arbitration in keeping with the agreement. However, in the relatively simultaneous case of Figueroa v. THI, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held an identical arbitration agreement to be unconscionable, and the district court subsequently reversed its prior decision under Rule 60(b)(6). Included in the district court's reversal was a holding that the FAA did not preempt the holding of Figueroa because the holding of Figueroa hinged on the generally applicable common law rule that grossly one-sided contracts were unconscionable and thus unenforceable. THI appealed to the Tenth Circuit on the federal preemption question.

The Tenth Circuit began (and essentially ended) its analysis by noting that the New Mexico Court of Appeals found the arbitration agreement in Figueroa to be unconscionable because it "reserved" litigation for THI's most likely claims while "subjecting" residents to arbitration for their most likely claims. Finding such an arrangement unconscionable, the panel stated, depended entirely on "assuming the inferiority of arbitration to litigation" - the exact assumption prohibited by the FAA.
Stated differently, an agreement requiring litigation for THI claims and arbitration for resident claims could only be unfair to residents if arbitration was inferior to litigation in some way. Under the FAA, this could not be the case. Thus, the agreement could not be unfair to residents (much less "unconscionable"). Because the agreement could not be unconscionable, THI was entitled to compel arbitration of the claim at issue.

The Tenth Circuit noted that "the view of the New Mexico courts appears to be that so long as they are applying general unconscionability doctrine, the FAA does not limit their reasons for ruling an arbitration agreement unconscionable." This, the court declared, could not be the case: the reasons for a court's finding of unconscionability must be examined to ensure that those reasons are not "based on a policy hostile to arbitration."

Importantly, the panel concluded its opinion by distinguishing the arbitration clause at issue from a clause "that required consumers to arbitrate all their claims but allowed [a corporation] to choose between arbitration and litigation for its claims." See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 168 - 71 (2004). The Tenth Circuit allowed the possibility that such a clause might not be preempted by the FAA - that is, might be legitimately unconscionable - because it allowed a choice of remedies for one party without allowing choice for the other. As such, a clause of this nature might be found unconscionable without assuming that arbitration was in some way inferior to litigation - the only necessary assumption being that lack of choice was in some way inferior to choice.

To read the full opinion, please visit: https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2012.pdf

Panel: Circuit Judges Hartz and Tymkovich, and District Judge Jackson

Date of Issued Opinion: January 28, 2014

Docket Number: 13-2012

Decided: New Mexico district court's grant of Rule 60(b)(6) relief is REVERSED; case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to reinstate its original order compelling arbitration.

Counsel: Lori D. Proctor, Proctor & Associates, P.C., Houston, Texas, for Plaintiffs - Appellants. Jennifer J. Foote (Dusti D. Harvey, with her on the brief), Harvey Law Firm, LLC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant - Appellee.

Author: Hartz

Case Alert Author: Levi A. Monagle

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Barbara Bergman

    Posted By: Barbara Bergman @ 03/16/2014 04:15 PM     10th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 14, 2014
  Shuler v. Garrett - Sixth Circuit
Headline: A medical injection is a "procedure" that can support a medical-battery claim if unauthorized.

Area of Law: Tort Law; Medical Battery

Issue Presented: Is an unauthorized medical injection a "procedure" leading to medical-battery liability or a component part of treatment leading only to medical-malpractice liability?

Brief Summary: A hospital patient died because of allegedly unauthorized injections. The district court found that the injections were not "procedures" and dismissed the case because the hospital did not need the patient's consent. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that medical injections are "procedures" and that the hospital needed the patient's authorization.

Significance: The Sixth Circuit rejected a narrow interpretation of the term "procedure" for a medical-battery theory.

Extended Summary:

A patient died in a Memphis hospital. The patient's heirs sued the doctors, the hospital, and the clinic where the patient received treatment, alleging negligence and medical battery. The complaint alleged that despite being aware of the patient's heparin allergy, the medical staff injected the patient with heparin over her objections, causing her death. The district court dismissed the case, finding that there was no claim for medical battery under Tennessee law.

The Sixth Circuit reversed, explaining that medical battery is an intentional tort and that performing an unauthorized procedure is a medical battery. This is different from medical malpractice, the court noted, which is rooted in negligence.

Tennessee law provides a two-prong test to decide if a medical-battery claim exists. The court must determine (1) whether the patient was aware that the doctor was going to perform the procedure, and (2) whether the patient authorized the procedure. The Sixth Circuit explained that this case turned solely on the second question: what qualifies as a "procedure" and what constitutes authorization. Since the Tennessee Supreme Court has never defined the word "procedure," the Sixth Circuit used the common dictionary definition: "a surgical or (later) other therapeutic or diagnostic operation or technique." It concluded that an injection qualified as a procedure and noted that other states have reached the same conclusion. Next, the court found that the patient did not authorize the injections - in fact, she expressly refused them.

Finding that the patient did not authorize the procedure, the court concluded that the complaint made a case for nonconsensual contact (the injection) that violated the patient's right to bodily integrity. The court reversed the district court's order dismissing the medical-battery claim.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0033p-06.pdf

Panel: Cook and Stranch, Circuit Judges; Carr, District Judge

Argument: December 4, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 14, 2014

Docket Number: 12-6279

Decided: February 14, 2014

Case Alert Author: Jessica Michels

Counsel: ARGUED: Rachael E. Putnam, PUTNAM FIRM PLC, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. Buckner Wellford, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Rachael E. Putnam, Austin T. Rainey, PUTNAM FIRM PLC, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. Buckner Wellford, Shannon Wiley, Memphis, Tennessee, William H. Haltom, Jr., Claire M. Cissell, Memphis, Tennessee, William W. Dunlap, Jr., Tabitha F. McNabb, Laura S. Martin, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Stranch

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 03/14/2014 02:48 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 12, 2014
  Hizam v. Kerry - Second Circuit
Headline: The Second Circuit Reverses Order Mandating that the State Department Return Documentation of Citizenship Erroneously Granted to Plaintiff by State as a Child, Despite Plaintiff Having Spent Years Building a Life in the United States in Reliance on the Erroneous Documentation of his United States Citizenship

Area of Law: Immigration; Nationality and Naturalization

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the State Department improperly revoked plaintiff's documentary proof of citizenship, a Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) and passport, that were issued to him as a child erroneously due to a State Department error and upon which he relied in establishing a life in the United States and in forgoing other paths to citizenship?

Brief Summary: The Secretary of State and United States Department of State appealed from a July 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, granting Plaintiff Abdo Hizam's motion for summary judgment in his action for declaratory relief affirming his United States citizenship and ordering State to return his passport and documentation of citizenship. The Second Circuit reversed holding that, because Hizam's documentation of citizenship was issued due to a State Department error, and he is not and never was a United States citizen, "while the equities . . . weigh heavily in Hizam's favor, well-settled law does not allow the courts to provide the relief that Hizam seeks."

To read the full opinion, please visit:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...630c4f09c13/5/hilite/

Extended Summary: The Plaintiff, Abdo Hizam, was born in Yemen. When Hizam was 2 years old, his father, a naturalized United States citizen, applied on his behalf, for an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad ("CRBA"). All of the information contained in his father's application was truthful and accurate. Hizam was issued a CRBA, which was valid proof of his citizenship, and at age 9 he moved to the United States to live with his grandparents. In the several years that followed, Hizam lived in Michigan with his grandparents, attended elementary, middle, and high school, became fluent in English, and attended and graduated from college while working two jobs. Twice during this time period, Hizam applied for and was granted renewal of his United States passport without incident. At the time of this action Hizam was working at his family deli in New York, taking care of his younger brother, and pursuing a grauate degree at Mercy College. In 2011, the State Department discovered, and notified Hizam, that his passport and CRBA had been improperly issued due to its own error in processing the original CRBA application in 1980, and revoked his passport and CRBA.

At the time the Hizam's birth, a child born outside of the United States could obtain citizenship if the child's parent was "present in the United States for at least 10 years at the time of the child's birth." When Hizam's father applied for the CRBA on his behalf when Hizam was two years old, the law had changed and required that the parent of the child be present within the United States for only five years. At the time he applied, Hizam's father had been in the United States 7 years, which he truthfully stated on the CRBA application. The consular officer that granted the CRBA apparently erroneously applied the law at the time of application, rather than the law at the time of the Hizam's birth.

Hizam commenced an action on October 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking an declaration of his status as a national of the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). In support of his request for a declaration by the court, he alleged that: 1) the State Department wrongfully denied him his rights and privileges as a national by revoking his CRBA and passport; 2) the State Department lacked the authority to cancel his CRBA because the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1504, which authorizes the cancellation of a CRBA under certain circumstances, does not authorize cancellation due to agency error, and, in any event, did not apply retroactively to Hizam's CRBA, granted before that section was enacted; and 3) the State Department was equitably estopped from revoking his CRBA and passport because he had "rightfully relied on his United States citizenship for more than twenty years."

The District Court found that the State Department lacked authority to cancel Hizam's CRBA, and held that doing so would impermissibly apply § 1504 retroactively. The District Court rejected the Defendant's argument that "the power to issue citizenship documents implied the power to revoke those documents," reasoning that allowing that power would render the provision authorizing the cancellation of CRBAs superfluous.

The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court exceeded its authority under § 1503(a) by ordering the Defendant to return Hizam's CRBA. The Second Circuit also disagreed with the District Court's finding that the Defendant's application of § 1504 - which authorizes the State Department to cancel a CRBA under certain circumstances - impermissibly applied the law retroactively, explaining that "the enactment of Section 1504 neither changed the citizenship rights provided by statute, nor attached new legal consequences to a prior acquisition of citizenship," and thus was not impermissibly retroactive." The court reasoned that, although the consular officer erroneously erred by granting the CRBA, and Hizam, through admittedly no fault of his own, relied on the CRBA, Hizam is not a United States citizen because his father did not meet the necessary requirements that were stated in the statute at the time of the Plaintiff's birth. Section 1504, therefore, did not change the Hizam's status, because he was not a citizen or national to begin with. "A finding of retroactive effect in this case would allow a non-citizen to keep documents that serve as conclusive proof of American citizenship when he is not a U.S. citizen."

The Second Circuit also found that, although "[t]he equities in this case overwhelmingly favor" Hizam, who was plainly prejudiced by the State Department error and delay in correcting its error, which delay foreclosed several other avenues to citizenship that Hizam could have pursued at an earlier time, courts cannot grant citizenship through their equitable powers. The court ordered that the District Court's order to return his passport and CRBA be reversed, but called upon the State Department to "support other lawful means to provide relief to Hizam, including a private bill in Congress should one be introduced."

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/de...630c4f09c13/5/hilite/

Panel: Judges Newman, Pooler, and Livingston.

Argument: 09/30/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 03/12/2014

Docket Number: 12-3810

Decided: Reversed and Remand with directions to dismiss the complaint.

Case Alert Author: Amy Stein

Counsel: Ropes & Gray, LLP and Morawetz, Washington Square Legal Services, for the Plaintiff-Appellee; Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, for the Defendants - Appellants.

Author of Opinion: Judge Pooler

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Elyse Diamond Moskowitz

    Posted By: Elyse Moskowitz @ 03/12/2014 07:34 PM     2nd Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 6, 2014
  Smith v. Swarthout
Headline: Ninth Circuit affirms the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition alleging juror bias, misconduct, and related error in connection with a conviction of corporal injury to a spouse and making criminal threats.

Area of Law: Sixth & Fourteenth Amendments; Criminal Procedure

Issues Presented: (1) Whether the trial court's refusal to dismiss Juror No. 6, for cause, violated the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury. (2) Whether any alleged juror misconduct during deliberations and/or irregularities in the trial court's acceptance of final verdicts resulted in constitutional violations.

Brief Summary: During voir dire, Juror No. 6 was not asked specific questions with respect to his knowledge of the defendant, however he knew of the defendant, had heard rumors of previous criminal charges, had not read any coverage of the incident underlying the present charges, but the court ultimately determined he could be a fair and impartial juror.

Smith, the criminal defendant, charged with four counts, was found guilty two counts upon which the jury reached a verdict before Juror No. 6 performed his own research and discussed it with the jury. The court declared a mistrial as to the other two counts. . The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed, the California Supreme Court summarily denied review, and the defendant then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for federal habeas corpus, which was denied.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendant's habeas corpus petition, reviewing the California Court of Appeal's decision and determining that the decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings with respect to the defendants claims that: (1) his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the state court refused to discharge Juror No. 6, based on the juror's untruthfulness in voir dire, (2) his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Juror No. 6 conducted his own research and presented it to the jury, (3) his state and federal constitutional rights to a unanimous jury were violated when the court refused to resume deliberations when Juror No. 1 mistakenly believed the court was asking about the sentence enhancement, and answered "no" when asked if he had found the defendant guilty of Counts III and IV, and (4) that his due process rights were violated when the trial court told the jury that if there was not a unanimous verdict with respect to Count III, an alternate juror would replace Juror No. 6 and deliberations would start from the beginning.

Extended Summary: Smith, a criminal defendant, was charged with four counts in California state court, as well as a sentencing enhancement.

A retired lieutenant was chosen as a Juror No. 6, and the next day the court learned that, while Juror No. 6 did not know the defendant personally, the defendant was Juror No. 6's daughter's neighbor. The court further questioned Juror No. 6 and he stated he had not read the local newspaper about the case at hand, and though he had heard rumors about the defendant's past charges, he would remain impartial. The court denied the defense counsel's motion to disqualify Juror No. 6.

Juror No. 6 conducted his own research by reading labels on medicine bottles and looking on the internet, then later claimed he had only stated he "could" look online. The jury reached a verdict with respect to Counts III and IV before Juror No. 6 discussed this information so the court accepted the verdict on Counts III and IV and declared a mistrial with respect to Counts I and II. When Juror No. 1 was polled as to his verdicts for Counts III and IV, he stated "No," however the court clarified asking if the jury's indications on the forms, that the defendant was guilty of Count III and IV, omitting the sentence enhancement for Count III, he stated "yes." The court entered verdicts of guilty for Counts III and IV, and dismissed the sentence enhancement.

The Defendant appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. The defendant, acting pro se, then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus, and the federal district court denied his petition and declined the defendant's request to issue a certificate of appealability.

The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the district court's denial of the defendant's federal habeas corpus petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), habeas relief can be granted if the state court proceedings adjudicating the claim on the merits "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings." The Ninth Circuit then proceeded by reviewing the California Court of Appeal's decision with respect to the defendant's four claims.

First, the defendant argued that the trial court should have discharged Juror No. 6 because he willfully withheld and concealed material information, which violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for actual bias based on a juror's untruthfulness on voir dire. However, the standard for a new trial based on a juror's failure to disclose requires a juror's failure to honestly answer a material question. The Ninth Circuit noted that here, no specific questions were asked of Juror No. 6 with respect to his knowledge of the defendant. Further, Juror No. 6 explained his failure to answer if he had read about the case in the newspaper, and the trial court found his answers credible and that he could be a fair and impartial juror. Because nothing in the record suggested that this conclusion was unreasonable, habeas relief was not available under this first contention.

Second, the defendant argued that Juror No. 6 violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by conducting his own research, lying about his Internet research, and discussing it with the jury. When extraneous information is considered by a jury, not produced at trial, relief will be afforded to the defendant only if the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The Ninth Circuit, provided that the Brecht factors determine whether the introduction of extrinsic evidence is harmless, however focused on the fact that the jury had already reached a verdict on Counts III and IV when Juror No. 6 discussed his research with the jury, and the trial court had properly declared a mistrial with respect to Counts I and II.

Third, the defendant contended that his right to a unanimous jury under California Penal Code § 1163 and the federal Constitution were violated when the trial court did not order the jury to resume deliberations when Juror No. 1 stated that he did not vote to find the defendant guilty of Counts III and IV. Again, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the California appellate court determination that the jury verdict for Counts III and IV was unanimous was not based on unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the proceedings. The California Court of Appeal determined that in responding to the trial court's question, Juror No. 1 did not understand that unlike the previous inquiries, the court was not asking about the sentence enhancement, but Juror No. 1's confusion was clarified when the trial court asked if he had voted guilty of the crimes under Counts III and IV, as Juror No. 1 then stated he had voted guilty.

Fourth, the defendant maintained that the trial court coerced the jury in violation of federal due process when the judge stated that in the absence of a unanimous verdict with respect to Count III, the court would discharge Juror No. 6, provide an alternate juror, and deliberation would begin anew. The defendant relied on Jenkins v. US for the proposition that a judgment in a criminal trial could be reversed when a trial judge stated to the jury during deliberation that the jury had to reach a decision. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the United Stated Supreme Court instructed that its decision in Jenkins was based on the Court's supervisory power over federal courts, and not on constitutional grounds. Thus, because Jenkins did not establish precedent for a violation of a due process claim, the Ninth Circuit could not reach the issue on federal habeas corpus review.

Panel: Judges Alarcón, Tallman, Ikuta

Date of Issued Opinion: February 10, 2014

Docket Number: 2:10-cv-00730-FCD-CHS

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Joseph Chaparo

Author of Opinion: Judge Alarcón

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Ryan T. Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 03/06/2014 01:26 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Rea, et al. v. Michaels Stores, Inc.
Headline: Ninth Circuit Declines to Allow Defeat of CAFA Jurisdiction Based on Post-Filing Developments and Damages Waivers.

Areas of Law: Class Action Fairness Act; Federal Jurisdiction; Civil Procedure

Issue(s) Presented: Whether consideration of post-filing developments is appropriate in assessing CAFA's jurisdictional requirements. Whether a damages waiver defeats CAFA's amount-in-controversy jurisdictional requirement.

Brief Summary: The Ninth Circuit here examined the ever-evolving requirements for class action suits under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Notably, the court asked whether review of a CAFA jurisdictional remand is moot based on post-filing developments that make jurisdiction unlikely. The court recalled that CAFA jurisdiction assessments consider the facts as presented at the time of filing, not following post-filing decisions. Thus, review of the merits is appropriate here because the facts as of filing indicate the possibility of CAFA jurisdiction.

In reviewing the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that defendants sought timely removal. Although removal must be sought within 30 days of receipt of the complaint or within 30 days of some filing that renders the case removable, this rule is not exclusive. If, as here, the complaint and subsequent filings do not facially reveal that the case is removable, the 30-day period never begins. Thus, when the case did become apparently removable based on a Supreme Court decision, defendants request for such removal was timely, as it was done within 30 days.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's finding that there was insufficient evidence of satisfaction of the amount in controversy requirement. Given that the appropriate standard for a lower court's review of the amount in controversy issue was in flux at the time the lower court visited the issue, this court noted it was unclear which standard was applied. It held however, that if the wrong standard was applied, remand would be appropriate in order to gain proper review. Or if the correct standard was applied, the lower court clearly erred in its application, and as such remand for review would be appropriate.

For the full opinion: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da...18/14-55008.pdf


Extended Summary: Plaintiffs filed suit in state court against Michael's Stores alleging improper classification as exempt employees for purposes of overtime pay. Defendant sought removal to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded the case to state court on the grounds that the amount in controversy requirement was not met because plaintiffs disclaimed any award of damages greater than $4,999,999.99.

Following a Supreme Court decision, that held such damages waivers inapplicable to the consideration of CAFA jurisdiction, defendants sought removal again. Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S.Ct. 1345 (2013). The district court again remanded the case to state court, this time holding that the 30-day time limit for removal had run. The Ninth Circuit granted review upon defendant's request.

The Ninth Circuit examined whether the case was moot, given post-remand developments in the state court - first, the class was certified in state court prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Fire; and second, that the certified class was now significantly smaller, such that recovery would surely be less than $5,000,000. The court held that for purposes of CAFA jurisdiction, the amount in controversy requirement is examined at the time of filing, not at any later time based on post-filing developments. Thus, the case was not moot.

In examining the timeliness issue, the court cited to the general rule for removal - removal must be sought within 30 days of receiving a complaint or within 30 days of a filing that demonstrates the case has become removable. It then noted that this rule is not exclusive, such that if the case never appears removable, the 30-day period never begins to run. As applied here, because the damages waiver was controlling at the time of filing, the case did not appear removable based on the insufficiency of the amount in controversy and the 30-day removal period was never triggered.

The court also examined the timeliness issue through the lens of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which prohibits review of successive bad-faith attempts to remove. It dismissed the applicability of § 1447 because CAFA expressly allows review of removal orders "notwithstanding section 1447(d)."

Last, the court took up the amount in controversy question. It noted that the record is unclear as to which standard the lower court applied in reviewing the amount in controversy - legal certainty or preponderance of the evidence. At the time of the lower court's review, legal certainty was the controlling standard. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007). However, during pendency of the instant case, the Ninth Circuit determined preponderance of the evidence to be the appropriate standard. Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Services, 728 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2013).

Thus, if the lower court applied the legal certainty standard, reversal would be necessary based on application of the wrong standard. And an examination under the preponderance of the evidence standard revealed that the lower court clearly erred in finding insufficient evidence that the amount in controversy could meet or exceed the $5,000,000 requirement.

Because the issue was not moot, defendant timely filed for removal, and there was sufficient evidence that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court and remanded the case.

Panel: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Barry G. Silverman, and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Date of Issued Opinion: February 18, 2014

Docket Number: 8:13-cv-00455-GW-AGR

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Kathleen M. McHale

Counsel: Jesse A. Cripps, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant. David J. Gallo, Law Offices of David J. Gallo, Del Mar, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Author of Opinion:
Per curiam

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Ryan T. Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 03/06/2014 01:17 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Peruta v. County of San Diego
Headline: Ninth Circuit holds that the Second Amendment protects a law-abiding citizen's right to bear arms outside of the home for purposes of self-defense.

Area of Law: Second Amendment; Federal Civil Procedure

Issue Presented: Whether San Diego County's concealed-carry license procedures violate a law-abiding citizen's right to carry a firearm for self-defense under the Second Amendment in light of the County's "good cause" permitting requirement and California's overall restrictions on carrying a concealed or open handgun in public locations.

Brief Summary: Plaintiff, a San Diego resident whose application for a concealed-carry license was denied, sued the County of San Diego claiming that the County's refusal to recognize one's concern for personal safety as a qualifying demonstration of "good cause" to obtain a concealed firearm violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and held that the County's policy, requiring a demonstration of circumstances distinguishing an applicant from the mainstream in terms of being in harm's way, was unconstitutional because (1) the right to carry a gun outside of the home for self-defense falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and (2) the County's "good cause" permitting requirement infringes on that right since typical citizens fearing for their own personal safety cannot distinguish themselves from the mainstream and therefore cannot bear arms for self-defense in light of California's ban on open carry.

Full Opinion: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da...19/10-56971%20web.pdf

Extended Summary: Plaintiff applied for a license to carry a concealed firearm but the San Diego County sheriff denied his application. To obtain a concealed-carry permit, San Diego County required applicants to demonstrate "good cause" by providing documentation that shows that circumstances distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and cause him/her to be in harm's way. Plaintiff sued San Diego County arguing that its exclusion of a general desire to carry a concealed firearm for self-defense from its definition of "good cause" unconstitutionally burdens citizens' Second Amendment right to bear arms.

Both plaintiff and the County filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court denied plaintiff's motion and granted summary judgment to the County, holding that California had a substantial interest in public safety and that the use of the County's policy as a means of reducing the risk to the public "posed by concealed handguns" outweighed applicants' Second Amendment interests.

The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part inquiry of District of Columbia v. Heller and determined whether having an operable handgun outside of the home for self-defense purposes amounted to "keeping and bearing arms" within the meaning of the Second Amendment and, if so, whether San Diego's "good cause" permitting requirement infringed on that right. In finding that Heller supported the proposition that the ability to carry a gun outside of the home for self-defense fell within the scope of the Second Amendment right, the Ninth Circuit analyzed (1) the historical context of the Second Amendment text, (2) nineteenth and eighteenth century precedent and (3) the plain meaning of the term "bear."

The Court rejected the County's argument that under Heller its concealed-carry restrictions were "presumptively lawful" and held that the San Diego policy "in light of California's licensing scheme as a whole violated the Second Amendment" because it did not permit a typical citizen to have "some form of carry" for self-defense outside of the home since the concealed-carry permit was the only type of permit available in the state. Notwithstanding the exemptions for certain groups, places and situations, the Court found that the San Diego policy destroyed the Second Amendment right to bear arms and was therefore invalid under any level of constitutional scrutiny. The dissent found that the majority's opinion exceeded the scope of the issue presented and concluded that the narrow issue before the court was whether the Second Amendment protected the concealed carrying of handguns in public. According to the dissent, the act of carrying concealed weapons in public does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment and the San Diego policy was presumptively lawful under Heller. Alternatively, even if conceal carry implicated the Second Amendment, the dissent found that the policy was constitutional under intermediate scrutiny because the County had a substantial interest in public safety and its policy was narrowly tailored to promoting public safety by reducing the number of guns in public circulation.

Panel: Judges O'Scannlain, Thomas, and Callahan

Date of Issued Opinion: February 13, 2014

Docket Number: 3:09-cv-02371-IEG-BGS

Decided: Reversed

Case Alert Author: Monique Midose

Author of Opinion: Judge O'Scannlain

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor:
Professor Ryan T. Williams

Edited: 03/13/2014 at 11:58 AM by Ryan Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 03/06/2014 01:14 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 5, 2014
  Ernesto Galarza v. Mark Szalczyk - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Holds that Detainers Issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement Do Not Require State and Local Agencies to Detain Suspects But Act Only As Requests that They Do So

Area of Law: Immigration

Issues Presented: Whether immigration detainers issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement impose mandatory obligations on state and local law enforcement agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to removal?

Brief Summary: After posting bail, Ernesto Galarza, a U.S. citizen arrested for a drug offense, was held in custody by Lehigh County under an immigration detainer issued by federal immigration officials. Three days after posting bail, immigration officials found out he was a U.S. citizen, the detainer was withdrawn, and he was released. Galarza filed a § 1983 action against Lehigh County arguing that it had detained him without probable cause and without notice of the reason for his detention or an ability to contest it. The District Court dismissed Galarza's complaint, finding that Lehigh County could not be held responsible for the detention because it was compelled to follow an immigration detainer. On appeal, Galarza argued that the relevant federal regulation was permissive and not mandatory. He further contended that holding otherwise would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. The Third Circuit found that the relevant regulation used the words "request" and "advise" to describe its purpose; thus a plain reading would render the regulation a request, not a command. Even if the regulation were considered ambiguous, the Court noted that no other federal appellate court had ever described an immigration detainer as mandatory, that the controlling statute did not use mandatory language, and that no agency of the federal government had ever taken the position that immigration detainers were mandatory. Finally, the Third Circuit held that if a detainer were deemed mandatory it would violate the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the Court reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Judge Barry dissented.

Extended Summary: This case concerns the detention of Ernesto Galarza by Lehigh County Prison after federal immigration officials issued an immigration detainer. On November 20, 2008, Galarza and three other men were arrested at a construction site for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza was born in New Jersey and is a citizen of the United States. The other men arrested were not U.S. citizens. At the time of the arrest, Galarza had a wallet which contained his Pennsylvania driver's license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The arresting police officer contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and provided immigration officials with Galarza's information, in accordance with a policy that ICE be contacted whenever persons arrested are suspected of being "aliens subject to deportation." Galarza was transported to Lehigh County Prison and his bail was set. On Friday, November 21, ICE agent Mark Szalczyk filed an immigration detainer with Lehigh County Prison, describing Galarza as a suspected "alien" and asking that he be detained for a period not exceeding 48 hours to provide time for ICE to assume custody (although the language of the detainer did say that "[f]ederal regulations require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours"). Galarza posted bail that day and was told he would not be released because he was the subject of a detainer. On Monday, November 24, Galarza was first told by a Lehigh County counselor that the detainer holding him was an immigration detainer filed by ICE. Galarza urged the counselor to check his license and Social Security Card, but the counselor refused. Thereafter, Galarza was questioned by two ICE officials, and eventually the officials informed him his detainer was being lifted. Galarza was released by Lehigh County Prison at about 8:30 pm on Monday, November 24. At his subsequent trial, Galarza was acquitted on the charge of conspiracy to deliver cocaine.
Galarza filed complaints against Lehigh County, the City of Allentown, various federal and municipal defendants for violations of his constitutional rights, and against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The District Court dismissed his Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims against Lehigh County on the grounds that the policies employed were not unconstitutional because they were consistent with federal statutes and regulations. The District Court found that detainers issued pursuant to this regulation imposed mandatory obligations on state or local law enforcement agencies to follow such a detainer once it was received. Further, the District Court concluded Lehigh County complied with the federal regulation because it did not hold him for more than 48 hours, not including weekends. Following the District Court's opinion, Galarza reached settlement with the remaining defendants. Galarza only appealed the dismissal of his complaint against Lehigh County.
On appeal, Galarza argued that his detention resulted from Lehigh County's policy of enforcing all immigration detainers from ICE, regardless of whether ICE had probable cause to detain the suspected immigration violator. Regarding his due process claim, Galarza contended that he was held for three days without any notice of the basis for his detention or a meaningful opportunity to explain that he was a U.S. citizen, despite repeated requests. During oral argument, Lehigh County conceded that the policies as alleged would be unconstitutional and its sole basis for seeking dismissal was the allegedly mandatory nature of ICE detainers. Thus, the question on appeal was whether immigration detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 imposed mandatory obligations on state and local law enforcement agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.
In reviewing the relevant regulations, the Third Circuit emphasized the following key phrases: "[a] detainer serves to advise," "[t]he detainer is a request," "[t]emporary detention at Department request," and "such agency shall maintain custody." While Lehigh County argued that the phrase "shall maintain custody" meant that all detainers were mandatory because this language overshadowed the other phrases, Galarza countered that the word "shall" only served to inform an agency that chose to comply with the ICE detainer that it should hold the person. The Third Circuit agreed with Galarza, finding it difficult to read the use of the word "shall" in the timing section to change the nature of the entire regulation. The Court added that, even if it agreed that the word "shall" created ambiguity, that ambiguity was clarified on numerous fronts. The Third Circuit found the following: (1) no U.S. Court of Appeals has ever described ICE detainers as anything but requests, (2) no provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorized federal officials to command state or local officials to detain suspected aliens, and (3) all federal agencies and departments with an interest in the matter have consistently described detainers as requests.
Finally, the Third Circuit stated that, even if there were any doubts about whether immigration detainers were requests, settled constitutional law established that they must be deemed requests. The Court cited two cases where the Supreme Court struck down portions of federal laws that compelled states or local state agencies on anti-commandeering grounds. In light of this, the Third Circuit found that a detainer commanding a local law enforcement agency to detain an individual on behalf of the federal government would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. The Court found Lehigh County was free to disregard the non-mandatory detainer, thus eliminating the defense that the county's own policy did not cause the deprivation Galarza's constitutional rights. Accordingly, the District Court's judgment dismissing Galarza's complaint against Lehigh County was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Judge Barry dissented, on the grounds that the federal government was not a party to the case and, therefore, was not able to argue the merits of treating immigration detainers as mandatory orders to state and local detention facilities.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/123991p.pdf

Panel (if known): Fuentes, Cowen, and Barry, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: October 10, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: March 4, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-3991

Decided: Vacated and reversed

Case Alert Author: Shannon Zabel

Counsel: Mary Catherine Roper, Esq., Molly M. Tack-Hooper, Esq., Omar C. Jadwat, Esq., Esha Bhandari, Esq., Jonathon H. Feinberg, Esq., Cecilia Wang, Esq., Katherine Desormeau, Esq., Seth Kreimer, Esq. for the Appellant Ernesto Galarza; and Thomas M. Caffrey, Esq. for Appellee Lehigh County' and Christopher N. Lasch, Esq., Rebecca A. Sharpless, Esq. for Amicus Appellant Law Professors and Scholars who Teach, Research, and Practice in the Area of Immigration and Nationality Law and Criminal Law; and Andrew C. Nichols, Esq. for Amicus Appellant National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild

Author of Opinion: Judge Fuentes

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Mark Anderson

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 03/05/2014 02:26 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 4, 2014
  Mik v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage -- Sixth Circuit
Headline: No private right of action exists under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA). But violations of the Act can be used to establish the elements of a state-law claim.

Area of Law: Property Law, Landlord-Tenant Law

Issue Presented: Did the district court err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint because it arose solely under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, and that Act did not create a federal cause of action?

Brief Summary: Plaintiffs sued the Federal Home Loan Corporation (Freddie Mac), arguing that they were unlawfully evicted from their rental home after their landlord defaulted on her mortgage and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The district court granted Freddie Mac's motion to dismiss the complaint because the PTFA did not create a private cause of action. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their three claims didn't arise under the PTFA but, instead, arose under Kentucky law. The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs stated a claim for wrongful eviction but failed to state claims for denial of due process and outrageous infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Significance: The PTFA preempts state laws that are less protective of tenants.

Extended Summary: In 2010, plaintiffs rented a home. The lease included an option to purchase. The owner defaulted on her mortgage, and her lender foreclosed. Plaintiffs were not named as parties. The lender was the successful bidder at the April 2011 foreclosure sale and assigned its bid to Freddie Mac. Plaintiffs stopped paying rent after April 2011 because they did not know to whom rent should be paid.

In June 2011, plaintiffs informed Freddie Mac of their lease and their desire to stay in the home. They were told that they could avoid eviction if they participated in a program called "Cash for Keys," where they would be paid $1,500 to vacate the property. Plaintiffs signed the agreement but were never paid and never moved out.

In June 2011, Freddie Mac obtained a writ of possession, which evicted the owner from the property but did not mention the plaintiffs. In July, plaintiffs were informed that they could buy the home for $190,000 and avoid being evicted if they could demonstrate that they qualified for a loan by 5 p.m. on Friday, July 29, 2011.

Plaintiffs applied for a loan but were told it would take two weeks to have the home appraised. On July 31, 2011, Freddie Mac told plaintiffs that they would be evicted the following day.

On August 8, 2011, plaintiffs posted a copy of the lease on the door with a note stating: "We are asserting our rights under the lease agreement and object to entry by anyone." That day, sheriff deputies removed plaintiffs' personal property from the home and placed it outside. As a result, more than $38,000 of property was damaged or destroyed by rain. In November 2011, plaintiffs obtained a loan and purchased the home from Freddie Mac.

In May 2012, plaintiffs sued Freddie Mac, arguing that (1) Freddie Mac disregarded the PTFA, (2) they were wrongfully evicted from their home, and (3) Freddie Mac's actions were outrageous and inflicted severe emotional distress.

The district court granted Freddie Mac's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It interpreted plaintiffs' complaint as asserting claims under the PTFA, which protects tenants by imposing certain requirements on successors-in-interest to foreclosed properties. The district court held that the PTFA does not provide a private right of action.

On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims did not arise under the PTFA and that their complaint asserted claims under Kentucky law for wrongful eviction, denial of due process, and outrageous infliction of emotional distress.

The Sixth Circuit agreed that the PTFA does not provide a private right of action. But it noted that the PTFA requires successors-in-interest to foreclosed properties to provide bona fide tenants with 90 days' notice to vacate and to allow them to occupy the premises until the end of their lease term unless certain conditions are met. Freddie Mac violated this provision.

While Freddie Mac's actions were tolerable under Kentucky law, they were not under the PTFA. The PTFA's requirements preempt state laws that provide less protection to tenants. While no federal cause of action for violations of PTFA exists, tenants may use PTFA violations to establish the elements of state-law claims. Here, Freddie Mac did not meet the conditions laid out by the PTFA, and plaintiffs could use this fact to support their state-law claims.

The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs stated a claim for wrongful eviction but failed to state claims for denial of due process and outrageous infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0030p-06.pdf

Panel: Gibbons, Stranch, Hood*
*District Judge, sitting by designation

Argument: June 19, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 7, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-6051

Decided: Reversed in part, affirmed in part.

Case Alert Author: Jenna Adamson

Counsel: ARGUED: Alan W. Roles, COLEMAN, ROLES & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellants. Rick D. DeBlasis, LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alan W. Roles, Theodore J. Palmer, COLEMAN, ROLES & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellants. Rick D. DeBlasis, LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. Kent Qian, NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, San Francisco, California, C. Matthew Hill, PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici Curiae.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Gibbons

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

Edited: 03/14/2014 at 01:24 PM by Mark Cooney

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 03/04/2014 02:51 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 3, 2014
  Slyusar v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. - Sixth Circuit
Headline: Sixth Circuit denies relief to asylum-seeker, finding that the REAL ID Act has the practical effect of foreclosing stays of removal to asylum-seekers who have received adverse credibility determinations.

Areas of Law: Immigration; Asylum; REAL ID Act of 2005

Issue Presented: Whether the REAL ID Act of 2005 permits adjudication of petitions for asylum, withholding of removal, and other relief from removal after an adverse credibility determination.

Brief Summary: After receiving notices to appear from the Department of Homeland Security in 2005, Petitioner and her minor children requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In 2011, an immigration judge denied all relief based on an adverse credibility determination and other secondary adverse findings. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review and motion for a stay of removal, holding that (1) inconsistencies in Petitioner's testimony were a sufficient basis for a determination of adverse credibility and (2) under the REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility determination is dispositive, foreclosing applications for asylum, the withholding of removal, or other relief from removal.

Extended Summary: In 2003, Petitioner entered the United States under an alias with a Russian passport. After marrying a United States citizen, she and her two minor children applied for adjustment of status. In 2005, their applications for adjustment of status were denied, and Petitioner filed applications for asylum.

While awaiting disposition of the applications, the Department of Homeland Security issued notices to appear that requested removal and alleged that Petitioner and her children had entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner then requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In 2011, an immigration judge denied all of Petitioner's relief because of her inconsistent testimony. The judge found that Petitioner failed to timely apply for asylum and failed to show extraordinary circumstances warranting the delay. But the judge found that even if Petitioner's application had been timely, it would have been denied because her testimony was not credible. Further, the judge found that Petitioner failed to prove her eligibility for asylum and for withholding of removal and that the adverse credibility determination barred relief under the Convention Against Torture. In 2012, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal, finding no error and agreeing that Petitioner's testimony was inconsistent and not credible. Petitioner then sought relief in the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit explained that the REAL ID Act of 2005 applies to applications for asylum, withholding of removal, or other relief from removal filed on or after May 11, 2005. Before the REAL ID Act, immigration judges assessing an applicant's credibility were allowed to consider only inconsistencies that went to the heart of an applicant's claim. But under the REAL ID Act, judges are allowed to consider any inconsistencies or falsehoods in an applicant's statements - and any other relevant factor - without regard to its relationship to the heart of an applicant's claim.

Applying the REAL ID Act, the Sixth Circuit found that Petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence to reverse the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination. The court found that adverse credibility determinations are conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion. But the fact that the court could conceivably make a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify reversal of the immigration judge's decision. The immigration judge's findings of numerous inconsistencies between Petitioner's testimony and the information provided to the Department of Homeland Security were enough, under the Act, to foreclose relief.

The Sixth Circuit found that, although Petitioner had not been given the opportunity to demonstrate the strength of her case on its merits, the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination under the Act was dispositive. As applied, the Act forecloses stays of removal to asylum-seekers who have received adverse credibility determinations by constructively preventing them from proving eligibility for that relief. Yet the Sixth Circuit, quoting a Ninth Circuit opinion, was careful to caution that "[a]lthough the REAL ID Act expands the bases on which an [immigration judge] may rest an adverse credibility determination, it does not give a blank check to the [judge] enabling him or her to insulate an adverse credibility determination from our review of the reasonableness of that determination."

Panel: Judges Keith, Guy, and Gibbons

Date of Issued Opinion: January 30, 2014

Docket Number: 13-3071

Decided: Petition for Review of an Order from the Board of Immigration Appeals

Counsel: ARGUED: Troy A. Murphy, MURPHY LAW OFFICES, Avon, Ohio, for Petitioners. Claire L. Workman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. On BRIEF: Troy A. Murphy, MURPHY LAW OFFICES, Avon, Ohio, for Petitioners. Kathryn M. McKinney, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/14a0021p-06.pdf

Case Alert Author: Minyon Bolton

Author of Opinion: Judge Keith

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Barbara Kalinowski

Edited: 03/14/2014 at 01:30 PM by Mark Cooney

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 03/03/2014 03:25 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

March 1, 2014
  USA v. Antoine Cortez-Dutrieville - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Holds There is No Fourth Amendment Standing to File a Motion to Suppress Where Defendant was on Premises in violation of a Protection From Abuse Order

Area of Law: Motion to Suppress

Issue(s) Presented: Whether a defendant has Fourth Amendment standing to file a motion to suppress when defendant was barred from the premises by a Protection From Abuse Order?

Brief Summary: Antoine Cortez-Dutrieville was charged with one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming that there was no probable cause. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that Dutrieville did not have Fourth Amendment standing to bring the challenge because a Protection From Abuse Order barred him from the home of the mother of his child, where the heroin was found. Therefore, he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the home and his overnight bag. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that even though the mother of his child consented to Dutrieville's presence in the home, her consent could not override the Protection Order and therefore Dutrieville had no legitimate expectation of privacy in a home where he was unlawfully present.

Extended Summary: Antoine Cortez-Dutrieville appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from the home of the mother of his child. In June 2012, law enforcement agents intercepted a UPS package containing heroin that was to be delivered to the home, and repackaged the box with a beeper that would indicate when the package was opened. Based on this information, the agents obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the residence of Portia Newell, the mother of Dutrieville's child. The warrant covered the contents of the package and a list of materials commonly associated with drug trafficking. An undercover agent delivered the package, and two minutes later the beeper activated. Agents approached the home and announced their presence. When they received no response, they entered the home, took Dutrieville into custody, and searched the home.

The agents found the heroin underneath a blanket in the rear bedroom. In the master bedroom they found the empty package, the beeper, Dutrieville's cell phone, and his overnight bag, which contained 45 unused stamp bags, commonly used to package heroin. The agents also found digital scales and other drug paraphernalia in the living room.

Dutrieville was the subject of a Protection From Abuse Order, which provided that: (1) Dutrieville was not to contact Newell except to make child custody arrangements; (2) Dutrieville was "completely evicted and excluded from" Newell's residence; (3) Dutrieville had "no right or privilege to enter or be present on the premises of [Newell]"; (4) the protection order would remain in effect until October 7, 2013; (5) Newell's consent could not override the express terms of the order; and (6) Dutrieville could be arrested without a warrant for violating the terms of the order. App. 194-96. However, he had been staying at the home with Newell's consent for three days.

Dutrieville was charged with one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming that there was no probable cause. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that Dutrieville did not have Fourth Amendment standing to bring the challenge because the Protection Order barred him from the home. Therefore, he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the home and his overnight bag.
Dutrieville entered a conditional guilty plea, which allowed him to file an appeal on the motion to suppress. On appeal, Dutrieville argued that he has Fourth Amendment standing and that the Court should remand the case to the District Court for consideration of the probable cause argument.

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding that Dutrieville does not have Fourth Amendment standing to bring the probable cause argument. In United States v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that an individual's expectation of privacy is legitimate if: (1) the individual demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of the search and (2) this expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable. In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the subjective prong requires a court to determine whether the defendant, "by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy," and in United States v. Correa, the Third Circuit held that the objective prong requires a court to determine whether the defendant's "expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."

Dutrieville argued that he had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the home since he was an overnight guest, staying at Newell's home with her consent. Although the Supreme Court held in Minnesota v. Olson that a person's "status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable," Dutrieville was prohibited from entering the home and from having any contact with Newell due to the Protection Order. Even though Newell consented, her consent could not override the terms of the Protection Order. The Court reasoned that like a trespasser or squatter, who occupy a piece of property unlawfully, Dutrieville's presence in the home was unlawful and therefore he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy.

The Court also rejected Dutrieville's argument that even if he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home, he had an expectation of privacy in his overnight bag. The Court held that because Dutrieville's presence in the home was unlawful, it followed that he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag that he brought with him. The Court cited the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. Wellons that a person legally prohibited from entering a particular place cannot reasonably expect to use that place as a "private repository or his personal effects." Therefore, Dutrieville lacked standing to challenge the search of the home and his overnight bag.

The full opinion can be found at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132266p.pdf

Panel: Circuit Judges Chagares, Shwartz, and Aldisert

Argument Date: 02/11/2014

Argument Location: Philadelphia

Date of Issued Opinion: 02/26/2014

Docket Number: No. 13-2266

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Larissa Staszkiw

Counsel: Lisa B. Freeland, Esq.
& Renee Pietropaolo, Esq., Office of the Federal Public Defender, Counsel for Appellant; David J. Hickton, Esq., Michael Leo Ivory, Esq., & Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq., United States Attorney's Office, Counsel for Appellee

Author of Opinion: Judge Shwartz

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 03/01/2014 10:48 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 26, 2014
  In re Deepwater Horizon - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Rules that State Claims Arising from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Are Blocked by Federal Law.

Area of Law: Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; Federal Water Pollution Control Act; Oil Pollution Act.

Issues Presented: Whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Oil Pollution Act preempt state-law claims arising on the Outer Continental Shelf.

Brief Summary: Eleven Louisiana coastal parishes (Parishes) filed lawsuits, some of which were filed in state court, against BP and other defendants involved in the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The suits were to recover penalties under the Louisiana Wildlife Protection Statute (Wildlife Statute) for the pollution-related loss of aquatic life and wildlife. The suits that were originally filed in state court were removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court denied the Parishes' motions to remand and then dismissed all of the Parishes' claims as preempted by federal law. Both decisions were challenged in the Parishes' appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the state-law claims were removable pursuant to the jurisdictional provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), and it also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims as preempted by federal law.

Extended Summary: Eleven Louisiana coastal parishes (Parishes) filed lawsuits, some of which were filed in state court, against BP and other defendants involved in the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The suits were to recover penalties under the Louisiana Wildlife Protection Statute (Wildlife Statute) for the pollution-related loss of aquatic life and wildlife. The suits that were originally filed in state court were removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which denied the Parishes' motions to remand and then dismissed all of the Parishes' claims as preempted by federal law. Both decisions were challenged in the Parishes' appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit held that § 23(b)(1) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over cases "in connection with . . . any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, or which involves rights to such minerals." The fact that the oil spill occurred because of the defendants' "operations" in exploring for and producing oil on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) cannot be contested. OCSLA § 23(b)(1) requires only a "but-for" connection. It is undeniable that the oil and other contaminants would not have entered into the State of Louisiana's territorial waters "but for" the defendants' drilling and exploration operation. The district court therefore had original federal jurisdiction, and therefore also removal jurisdiction, under OCSLA.

The Fifth Circuit also held that under International Paper Co. v. Ouellette the correct law to apply is that of the location of the point source. In this case, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (aka Clean Water Act, CWA) and its implementing regulations comprehensively govern oil exploration and development on the OCS. Further, the Court concluded that Congress did not reject that interpretation explicitly or by negative implication when it passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). Congress intended that the OPA would build upon the CWA to create a single federal law providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil pollution. In sum, federal law, which is the law of the point source in this case, exclusively applies to the claims generated by the oil spill in any affected state or locality.

Lastly, the Fifth Circuit held that the savings clauses contained in the CWA and OPA do not save a state's laws where the discharge did not occur "within" the state, and hence they have no effect on this case.

For the full opinion, please see:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/o...ub/12/12-30012-CV0.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges Jones, Barksdale, and Southwick

Argument Date: 3/5/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 2/24/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-30012

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Kirsty Davis

Counsel: Stephen B. Murray, Jr., Murray Law Firm, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Plaquemines Parish and Orleans Parish; Peter J. Butler, Jr., Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, L.L.P., for Plaintiff-Appellant St. Bernard Parish; Walter J. Leger, Jr., Leger & Shaw, for Plaintiff-Appellant Lafourche Parish; C. Berwick Duval, II, Duval, Funderburk, Sundbery, Lovell & Watkins, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Terrebonne Parish and Jefferson Parish; Victor L. Marcello, Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello, for Plaintiffs-Appellants St. Charles Parish, St. Mary Parish, and St. Tammany Parish; Philip Francis Cossich, Jr., Cossich, Sumich, Parsiola & Taylor, L.L.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant Cameron Parish; Richard Cartier Godfrey, Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P., for Defendants-Appellees BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP Products North America, Inc., BP America, Inc., and British Petroleum, P.L.C.; Donald Everett Godwin, Godwin Lewis, P.C., for Defendant-Appellee Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.; Steven Lynn Roberts, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, L.L.P., for Defendants-Appellees Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, L.L.C., Transocean Deepwater, Inc., Transocean Holdings, L.L.C., and Triton Asset Leasing GMBH; Russell S. Post, Beck Redden, L.L.P., for Defendant-Appellee Cameron International Corp.; Allyson Newton Ho, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., for Defendant-Appellee M-I, L.L.C.; Glenn G. Goodier, Jones Walker LLP, for Defendant-Appellee Weatherford US, L.P.; David Bruce Salmons, Bingham McCutchen, L.L.P., for Defendants-Appellees Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and Anadarko E&P Co., L.P.; John F. Pritchard, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, L.L.P., for Defendants-Appellees Moex Offshore 2007, L.L.C. and Moex USE Corp.

Author of Opinion: Judge Jones

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 02/26/2014 01:09 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 25, 2014
  Phillips v. U.S. - Sixth Circuit
Headline: To invoke an equitable exception to the statute of limitations for filing a motion to vacate, a defendant must identify a binding intervening change of law.

Area of Law: Criminal Procedure - "Actual Innocence" Exception

Issue Presented: Can a defendant use an intervening decision from another circuit - or an intervening Supreme Court decision addressing the elements of a different criminal statute - to support an equitable-exception argument for actual innocence?

Brief Summary: Gregory Phillips was convicted of engaging in illicit sexual acts with a male minor in a foreign place. After the statute of limitations had run, Phillips filed a motion to vacate judgment, arguing that he was actually innocent because his travel ended when he moved to Thailand, which occurred two years before the statute was enacted. The Sixth Circuit held that Phillips failed to identify any binding intervening precedent that demonstrated a change in the law that would establish "that he now stands convicted of a crime that the law does not deem criminal." Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the district court's decision denying Phillips's motion to vacate judgment.

Significance: This case demonstrates the Sixth Circuit's unwillingness to extend the actual-innocence exception unless there is a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."

Extended Summary: In 2001, after serving 36 months' probation for "taking indecent liberties with a child," Gregory Phillips moved to Thailand because he was prohibited from seeking employment as a teacher in the United States. While in Thailand, Phillips engaged in sexual conduct with a minor male. In 2003, Title 18 U.S.C. § 2423 was enacted to protect children; this section makes it illegal to travel to a foreign place and engage in illicit sexual conduct.

In 2005, Phillips pleaded guilty to "engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places" and was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. In 2008, just days before serving a second prison term for violating his supervised release, Phillips filed a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction, arguing that § 2423(c) applied only to individuals who both traveled in foreign commerce and engaged in illicit sexual acts after the statute was enacted.

Although Phillips filed his motion after the statute of limitations had expired, he argued that he was entitled to relief because he did not discover grounds for his motion until the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Jackson, 480 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007). Because the Jackson court held that the "travel" element of § 2423 must occur after the statute was enacted, Phillips argued that he was actually innocent because his "travel" ended when he moved to Thailand, which occurred two years before the statute was enacted. While serving his second prison term, Phillips filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of his 2008 motion to vacate, which had not yet been ruled on by the district court. In his supplemental memorandum, Phillips argued that Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010) indicated an additional change in the law, which further established his "actual innocence."

The district court declined to address the timeliness of Phillips's motion and, instead, denied Phillips's motion to vacate on statutory-interpretation grounds; Phillips appealed. The Sixth Circuit found that the timeliness issue was dispositive of Phillips's claims and affirmed the district court on this alternate basis.

The Sixth Circuit explained that the heart of Phillips's argument was "that an equitable exception should be applied to 'bypass the statutory bar' . . . because an intervening change in the law rendered him actually innocent." The Sixth Circuit refused to accept his argument because Phillips failed to show any binding precedent that demonstrated that he "now stands convicted of a crime that the law does not deem criminal." The Sixth Circuit also found that Phillips's reliance on Carr was misplaced because Carr interpreted the substantive elements of a different criminal statute. Without binding precedent interpreting the scope of "travels," Phillips failed to meet the requirements of the actual-innocence exception to his untimely petition. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision denying Phillips's motion to vacate judgment because Phillips's petition remained untimely.

Link to Full Opinion: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/op...s.pdf/13a0321p-06.pdf

Panel: Rogers and Kethledge, Circuit Judges; and Borman, District Judge (sitting by designation)

Argument: June 21, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: November 4, 2013

Docket Number: 11-6249

Decided: November 4, 2013

Case Alert Author: Theodora Eisenhut

Counsel: ARGUED: Hallie H. McFadden, Signal Mountain, Tennessee, for Appellant. Debra A. Breneman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Hallie H. McFadden, Signal Mountain, Tennessee, for Appellant. Debra A. Breneman, Charles E. Atchley, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: District Judge Borman

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Tammy Asher

    Posted By: Mark Cooney @ 02/25/2014 03:28 PM     6th Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 22, 2014
  M.R.; J.R., Parents of Minor Child E.R. v. Ridley School District - Third Circuit
Headline: School District required to reimburse private school costs under "stay put" rule even through parents' unsuccessful appeal of order denying their claim that the District failed to provide an in-district FAPE for their child

Area of Law: Individual with Disabilities Act ("IDEA") - "Stay-Put Rule"
Issues Presented: (1) Whether parents are eligible for reimbursement for private school costs if they do not file a claim seeking payment until after a court has ruled in favor of the school district, and (2) whether the right to interim funding extends through the time of a judicial appeal.

Brief Summary: The "stay-put" provision of IDEA states that a disabled child shall remain in his or her current educational setting during the pendency of proceedings to resolve a dispute over the child's placement. M.R. and J.R., parents of E.R. ("parents") claimed that Ridley violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") by failing to provide an Individualized Education Program ("IEP"), thereby denying E.R. a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE"). Once the parents determined that Ridley was not meeting their disabled daughter's needs, they placed her in a private school and filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education. An administrative hearing officer found that Ridley had not committed a violation during E.R.'s kindergarten year, but was denied a FAPE for part of first and all of second grade. In February 2011, the district court reversed the hearing officer's decision and the Third Circuit affirmed on May 17, 2012. In March 2011, after filing their appeal from the district court's judgment appellee sent a letter to the school district requesting payment for E.R.'s private school costs from April 2009 through spring 2011 - pursuant to the IDEA's stay-put provision. Ridley asserted that the demand for interim tuition was untimely. It also relied on three other theories: res judicata, the compulsory counterclaim requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, and the statute of limitations. Ridley also stated that the parents were not entitled to relief because by the time the second IDEA lawsuit was submitted the district court had already determined that the local public school was the appropriate placement for E.R.. The district court rejected all of Ridley's claims. Ridley appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit determined that a child shall remain in the current educational placement until all proceedings have been completed, this includes at least the district court's decision and thus Ridley's obligation to pay for schooling remained intact. The Third Circuit further determined that the "protective purposes" of the stay-put provision is to remain in effect through the final resolution of the dispute. Thus, in this case, the stay-put provision and obligation for reimbursement remained in place until the Third Circuit's decision in 2012.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: This case addresses a school district's obligation to pay for private school education during the interim period under the "stay-put" provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The stay-put provision states that a disabled child shall remain in her or her current education setting during the pendency of proceedings to resolve a dispute over the child's placement.
E.R.'s parents claimed that Ridley failed to provide E.R. with a suitable Individualized Education Program (IEP), thereby denying her the "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE"), thus the parents enrolled E.R. in private school. In 2009 an administrative hearing officer determined that Ridley had committed no violation during E.R.'s kindergarten year, but that E.R. was denied a FAPE for part of her first and second year education and awarded the E.R. compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year. Two years later, in February 2011, a federal district court reversed the hearing officer's placement assessment. The parents appealed and the Third Circuit affirmed.

In March 2011, after the parents filed their appeal from the district court's judgment, they sent a letter to the school district requesting payment for E.R.'s private school costs from the date of the hearing officer's decision through spring 2011 - pursuant to IDEA's stay-put provision. Ridley denied its obligation to pay for the private school costs on both procedural and substantive grounds. Ridley argued that the demand for interim tuition was untimely. This argument relied on three theories: res judicata, the compulsory counterclaim requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13, and the statute of limitations. Ridley also claimed that because the district court had ruled that E.R.'s proper placement was in the local public school, the IDEA did not provide for recovery of costs.

The premise of the IDEA is that parents and schools should work together to design an IEP that will satisfy the statute's goal of a FAPE for every child. However, if there is a disagreement, the Act allows either party to request an impartial due process hearing before a state or local administrative officer. The parties also have the right to seek state or a federal court review of the administrative decision and the child has the right to remain in his or her current educational placement during the pendency of the dispute resolution proceedings. To determine the placement the Court looks at the current IEP when the stay put is invoked. Where the parent seek a change in placement, however, the stay-put rule does not immediately come into play, and the parents will be responsible for the costs of the child's new placement initially. The new placement can be protected by the stay-put rule if the parents and the State or local education agency agree on the placement. A favorable decision in an administrative review process is treated as an agreement between the two parties. Thus, the child is entitled to "stay put" at the private school for the duration of the dispute resolution proceeding and the school district is obligated for the expense of the private school. Ridley argued that because the district court found that private schooling was unnecessary, the parents' request for payment after the decision dissolved Ridley's financial responsibility. Further, Ridley argued that any obligation for interim funding should not include the period of appeal to the Third Circuit.

Ridley argued that because the parents failed to assert a claim for reimbursement in the earlier IDEA lawsuit between the same parties they may not do so now under the principles of res judicata and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). The Court dismissed these two arguments stating that the previous suit was about the substance of an appropriate education while the current case is a payment dispute over expenses. Ridley also argued that the parents' claim was barred by the statute of limitations because of the IDEA provision requiring any party aggrieved by a hearing officer's decision to file suit within ninety days. The Court found that the statutory limitation period did not apply to a stay-put reimbursement claim.

Ridley contended that under IDEA, a parent has no entitlement to the stay-put provision until a court rules that it is appropriate. The Court rejected this argument stating that when the hearing officer found for E.R.'s private school placement, the pendency placement was the private school. There is no separate requirement of a court finding of appropriateness. Ridley also contended that any reimbursement entitlement the parents may have had dissolved when the district court reversed the hearing officer's decision and their request for reimbursement after the decision made them ineligible. The Court held that nothing in the statute or the Circuit's law provides a basis for changing E.R.'s stay-put placement back to the public school during the pendency of the dispute process. Thus, the school district's obligation to pay for E.R.'s schooling remained intact until at least the conclusion of the district court's proceedings.

Ridley's final argument was that its obligation terminated when the district court ruled in favor of the school district. The Court rejected this argument and held that the stay-put placement is to remain in effect through the final resolution of the dispute. The Court found that the statute's text is broad and includes the pendency of any proceedings, including an appeal to a circuit court. Thus, Ridley is obligated to reimburse the private school costs of E.R. and the district court's order is affirmed.

To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/124137p.pdf.

Panel (if known): Rendell, Jordan and Lipez, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: October 17, 2013

Argument Location: Philadelphia, PA

Date of Issued Opinion: February 20, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-4137

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Tam Tran

Counsel: John Francis X. Reilly, Esq., for the Appellant; Alan L. Yatvin, Esq., for Appellees.

Author of Opinion: Judge Lipez

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/22/2014 10:50 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Heffner v. Murphy - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Upholds Various Provisions of the Funeral Directors Law as Constitutional

Area of Law: Constitutional Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether certain provisions of the Funeral Directors Law are unconstitutional?

Brief Summary:
Pennsylvania Board of Funeral Directors ("Board") appealed the grant of summary judgment by the District Court based on its conclusion that several provisions of the Funeral Directors Law (FDL) are unconstitutional. The suit was originally brought by people involved in Pennsylvania's "death care industry," e.g. owners and operators of funeral homes, alleging that certain provisions of the FDL were unconstitutional. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's determination that certain provisions of the FDL were unconstitutional, because it believed the District Court based its decision on the determination that the provisions were antiquated.

Significance (if any): The FDL, which regulates the funeral home industry, is constitutional and will remain in effect.

Extended Summary (if applicable):
Pennsylvania Board of Funeral Directors ("Board") appealed the grant of summary judgment by the District Court based on its conclusion that several provisions of the Funeral Director Law (FDL) are unconstitutional. The suit was originally brought by people involved in Pennsylvania's "death care industry," e.g. owners and operators of funeral homes, alleging that certain provisions of the FDL were unconstitutional. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's determination that certain provisions of the FDL were unconstitutional, because it believes the District Court based its decision on the determination that the provisions were antiquated.

The FDL was enacted in 1952 to provide for better protection of life and health of the citizens of Pennsylvania by requiring regulation, licensure, and registration of persons and corporations engaging in care, preparation, and disposition of deceased persons. The Board enforces the FDL. In May 2008, the Plaintiffs initiated this suit against the Board, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 for alleged violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution (specifically, the Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). The District Court largely agreed that the provisions were unconstitutional, and struck down provisions that: (1) permit warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the Board; (2) limit the number of establishments in which a funeral director may possess an ownership interest; (3) restrict the capacity of unlicensed individuals and certain entities to hold ownership interests in a funeral establishment; (4) restrict the number of funeral establishments in which a funeral director may practice his/her profession; (5) require every funeral establishment to have a licensed full-time supervisor; (6) require funeral establishments to have a "preparation room;" (7) prohibit the service of food in a funeral establishment; (8) prohibit the use of trade names by funeral homes; (9) govern the trusting of monies advanced pursuant to pre-need contracts for merchandise; and (10) prohibit the payment of commissions to agents or employees.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's determination that these provisions violated the Constitution, concluding that the District Court wrongly granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs. In determining that the FDL did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court considered the Board's reliance on the "well recognized exception" to the warrant requirement that applies to highly regulated industries. The Court relied on the fact that death is not restricted to normal business hours or workdays, which gives compelling reasoning for this industry to be so regulated. Furthermore, the Court determined that the FDL adequately limited government official's actions with respect to these warrantless searches, and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Next, the Court undertook its Commerce Clause analysis, and stated that the potential for consumer abuse and fraud in any scheme that allows merchants to accept payment for goods and services that will not be tendered until some future date is painfully obvious. Thus, the Court easily departed with the District Court's conclusion that the trust requirement of the FDL results in a constitutional deprivation. Finally, the Court considered the Plaintiffs' contention that the Board's interpretation of the FDL's trust provisions violates the Constitution's Contract Clause by impairing pre-need contracts between the Plaintiffs and their customers. The Court found that the Plaintiffs' Contract Clause arguments fail as a matter of law for two obvious reasons. First, the Plaintiffs have not even shown that there was a change in state law. Second, even if the Plaintiffs could show that the Board's proposed regulation had the force of law, the Board's reinterpretation of the FDL would not implicate the Contract Clause. Thus, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's determination that various provisions of the FLD were unconstitutional.
The full opinion is available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/123591p.pdf

Panel (if known): McKee, Chief Judge, Ambro and Greenberg, Circuit Judges

Argument (if known): June 11, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 19, 2014

Docket Number: 12-3591

Decided: February 19, 2014

Case Alert Author: Alexandra Perry

Counsel (if known):
James K. Kutz (argued)
Jason G. Benion
Post & Schell, P.C.
17 North Second Street, 12th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Appellees

Kathleen G. Kane, Attorney General
John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General (argued)
Maryanne M. Lewis, Senior Deputy Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
15th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120

Counsel for Appellants

Author of Opinion: McKee, Chief Judge

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/22/2014 10:24 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Steven R. Graboff v. Colleran Firm - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit holds that publication of factually correct statements that convey a false impression can be actionable as defamation or as false light invasion of privacy

Area of Law: Defamation

Issues Presented: Whether a jury verdict that defendant's published statements were not false, but did cast the plaintiff in a false light, supported a finding of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, or both?

Brief Summary: The Third Circuit addressed a defamation and false light invasion of privacy case between an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Graboff, and his professional organization, the AAOS (the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons and the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons). Following a grievance proceeding filed by another organization member, the AAOS found that Dr. Graboff violated its professional standards and suspended his membership for two years. Pursuant to its bylaws, the AAOS then published an article detailing the grievance proceeding, but excluded both Dr. Graboff's exculpatory statements and the full context surrounding the grievance. Dr. Graboff sued the AAOS, alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy. A jury found that the AAOS did not publish any false statements, but did cast Dr. Graboff in a false light. The District Court read these responses as verdicts for the AAOS on the defamation claim but against them on the false light claim. The AAOS appealed. The Third Circuit found, applying Pennsylvania law, that publication of a factually correct statement that conveys a false impression can be actionable as both defamation (if the statements had a grievous effect on one's reputation)or actionable as false light invasion of privacy (if the statements would be highly offensive to a reasonable person). Accordingly, the Third Circuit found that District Court erred in applying the jury's responses. However, that error was harmless because the jury assessed damages for defamation and false light invasion of privacy together. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order denying the AAOS's judgment as a matter of law and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Extended Summary: This case is an extension of an AAOS (the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons and the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons) grievance proceeding. The AAOC is a voluntary professional organization for orthopaedic surgeons, which includes professional standards that allow for member grievance procedures. An AAOS member, Dr. Menachem Meller, initiated such a proceeding against another member, Dr. Steven R. Graboff. Dr. Meller claimed that Dr. Graboff wrote an inaccurate expert medical report based on incomplete information that was used against Dr. Meller in a medical malpractice suit. Dr. Graboff's report clearly stated it was a draft only and that Dr. Meller departed from reasonable and acceptable standards of medical care. The law firm representing plaintiff in the medical malpractice case, unbeknownst to Dr. Graboff, whited out the draft report designation and used the report to obtain a settlement from Dr. Meller. Dr. Meller subsequently filed an AAOS grievance against Dr. Graboff, alleging that he had provided false testimony in violation of AAOS professional standards. The AAOS Board heard two hearings, wherein Dr. Meller showed Dr. Graboff x-rays from the plaintiff in that case that he had not seen when he prepared his expert report. Dr. Graboff admitted that his report was flawed as a result, and Dr. Meller had satisfied the appropriate standards of care. He also told the Board that his report was only preliminary and he did not expect it to be used in litigation. The AAOS determined that Dr. Graboff had violated its professional standards and suspended him from membership for two years. Pursuant to its bylaws, the AAOS published a summary of the proceedings against Dr. Graboff in AAOS Now, a publication available to members and the public. The article described the malpractice case and the AAOS proceedings but did not mention Dr. Graboff's exculpatory testimony that he considered the draft preliminary, that it had been altered, and that it was improperly used to settle the case. The article was available online and appeared in online searches of Dr. Graboff's name.
Dr. Graboff subsequently filed suit against AAOS alleging that the article was both defamatory and a false light invasion of privacy. Dr. Graboff testified at trial about the article and its exclusion of certain facts, as well as the negative professional impact the article had on his career. A jury concluded that the AAOS had not made false statements in the article, but had made statements that portrayed Dr. Graboff in a false light. The District Court treated these findings as returning a verdict in favor of Dr. Graboff on the false light invasion of privacy claim and in favor of the AAOS on the defamation claim. The AAOS moved for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the verdict, which the District Court denied.
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the question of whether the jury's findings that the article did not contain false statements precluded the District Court from treating the jury's answers to the jury instructions to support the entry of judgment in favor of Dr. Graboff on his false light invasion of privacy claim. The AAOS argued that the jury's finding that the article contained no false statements about Graboff was incompatible with its finding that the same article portrayed Graboff in a false light. In effect, the AAOS argued that since the jury found it did not make false statements about Graboff, it could not have made statements portraying him a false light. The Third Circuit dismissed this argument, and further, found that the District Court erred in its treatment of the jury's answers because the answers supported findings that the AAOS was liable for both defamation and false light invasion of privacy.
The Court applied Pennsylvania law to define defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The Third Circuit noted that it was not aware of any Pennsylvania Supreme Court case on the point, but inferior courts have concluded that defamation may be established where a statement, viewed in context, creates a false implication. The Court further commented that it had no knowledge of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressing the contours of falsity in the false light invasion of privacy context. However, the Superior Court has defined falsity broadly in that context, and a plaintiff can establish falsity by showing that a defendant selectively printed true statements in a manner which created a false impression. The Third Circuit noted that the Superior Court drew this broad definition of falsity from defamation law, and therefore, falsity regarding a defendant's statements carried the same meaning in defamation and false light invasion of privacy contexts. Thus, publication of factually correct statements that convey a false impression could be actionable as defamation if the statements had a grievous effect on one's reputation, or actionable as false light invasion of privacy if the statements would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The Third Circuit next addressed the AAOS incompatible jury verdict argument. The Court stated that it should read the verdict to reconcile the inconsistencies, which the District Court failed to do. The jury's responses supported a finding of liability for both defamation and false light invasion of privacy, since it was not necessary for the jury to find a statement was untrue for there to be recovery on a defamation claim. When viewed this way, the verdict was not inconsistent. The District Court erred in treating the answers as finding for the AAOS on defamation claim. However, the Third Circuit held the error was harmless because the jury assessed damages for both claims as a single unit. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order, denying AAOS's motion for judgment as a matter of law and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132229p.pdf

Panel (if known): Jordan, Vanaskie, Greenberg, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: December 20, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 20, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-2229

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Shannon Zabel

Counsel: Clifford E. Haines, Esq., Lauren A. Warner, Esq. for Appellee; Daniel E. Rhynhart, Esq., Christopher M. Guth, Esq. for Appellants.

Author of Opinion: Judge Greenberg

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/22/2014 10:12 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 21, 2014
  Glenn v. Wynder, District Attorney of Allegheny County - Third Circuit
Headline: Not Granting a Mistrial for Impeached Testimony is Not a Violation of Rights under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment

Area of Law: Criminal Procedure

Issues Presented: Whether not granting a mistrial for contradictory testimony given by a witness is a violation of the defendant's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether the defendant's counsel was ineffective for not moving to strike other evidence that referred to this witness's identification.

Brief Summary: Glenn was convicted of murder. At trial a witness repeatedly contradicted herself and, instead of a mistrial, the testimony was stricken from the record and the jury was given instructions that her testimony should not be used for any purpose in deliberation. The Third Circuit affirmed holding that this did not violate the defendant's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the instructions were enough to purge the record of the taint of the testimony especially because the witness had already been heavily discredited on cross-examination and there was ample other evidence of guilt. The trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to strike other references to the witness's identification of the shooter because objectively the evidence was arguably admissible. The evidence could be used to explain the police's course of conduct in the investigation and the jury was not likely to give much weight to any of the witness's statements after being successfully impeached by defense counsel. There was ample other evidence to convict so the lingering references to the witness' identification were unlikely to have a material effect on the finding of guilt.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary: This appeal centers on the testimony given by Georgianna Cotton at trial. She testified that she saw the defendant shoot William Griffin. Her testimony was riddled with contradictions and she was impeached by the defense on cross-examination. After an in camera with the attorneys and trial judge she again testified but this time said that she did not see the defendant shoot Griffin but only heard shots and saw men fleeing. Again on cross-examination she contradicted herself and was impeached. The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial but the entire testimony of Cotton was stricken from the record and the jury was given instruction to disregard her testimony and not rely on any of it. Other incriminating evidence was presented and Glenn was convicted.
Glenn filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and was denied but an appeal was granted on two issues. The first issue was whether the trial court violated the defendant's due process rights when it refused to grant a mistrial and instead struck the testimony from the record. The second issue was whether, after the testimony was stricken, trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to strike other evidence that referred to Cotton's identification that the defendant was the shooter.
The Court begins the first analysis by determining if Glenn was deprived of a fundamental element of fairness in his trial. It need not have been perfect, only fair. The Court rejects Glenn's claim that the judge's instructions could not purge the record of the taint of the testimony and his wishes to set aside the presumption that jurors follow the instructions given by the Court. It distinguishes Glenn's case from three others where it found that the curative instructions were not enough. The first case involved evidence that was not disclosed to the defense, had the credibility of properly admitted evidence, and clearly contradicted the defendant's argument so that the jury could not possibly ignore it whereas here the testimony had already been cast into doubt by cross-examination. The second case involved a statement by a co-defendant which was not revealed until closing arguments and violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights whereas here the testimony was subject to cross-examination and discredited. The third case involved the prosecutor asking the jury to decide the case based on emotion rather than evidence whereas here there was ample evidence and no plea to emotion.
The Court also dismisses Glenn's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to strike all lingering references to Cotton's identification of the shooter making the trial court's striking of the testimony meaningless. The Court first determines that five of the six pieces of evidence that Glenn wanted to have stricken were procedurally defaulted because he failed to identify the claims in his Post Conviction Relief Act petition and the claims are not substantial so they are not excused from default. Next the Court, using the two-part Strickland test, analyzes the final piece of evidence, a photo array in which Cotton identified Glenn. The Court finds that the trial counsel's performance did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness because it was arguably admissible to explain the course of the police investigation. It was also not prejudicial because of the successful attack on Cotton's credibility and the strength of the other evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/124333p.pdf

Panel (if known): Ambro, Smith, Chagares, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: November 21, 2013

Argument Location: Philadelphia

Date of Issued Opinion: February 20, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-4333

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Cheri Snook

Counsel: Rusheen Pettit, Rebecca D. Spangler for appellee; Adam B. Cogan for appellant

Author of Opinion: Judge Smith

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/21/2014 12:13 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Affirms Crime-Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege in Ongoing Grand Jury Investigation

Area of Law: Attorney-Client Privilege

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the district court properly conducted an in camera examination of client's attorney?

Brief Summary: A corporation and client are the targets of an ongoing grand jury investigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The grand jury served the client's attorney with a subpoena to testify under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The district court conducted an in camera examination of the attorney and found that the crime-fraud exception applied. The corporation and client appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the in camera examination, holding that the crime-fraud exception applied, and refusing to release the testimony or a summary of the attorney's examination.

Extended Summary: A corporation and client (together, "intervenors") are the targets of an ongoing grand jury investigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania into alleged violations of the FCPA. The corporation is a Pennsylvania consulting firm, and the client is the corporation's president and managing director. The grand jury investigation involves the intervenors' business transaction with a bank headquartered in the United Kingdom and owned by a number of foreign countries. Between 2007 and 2009, the corporation was retained as a financial advisor by five countries to provide assistance in obtaining financing from the bank for oil and gas projects. The corporation received nearly $8 million in success fees for the work. For all five projects, one banker at the bank was the operation leader responsible for overseeing the financing process. In 2008 and 2009, the corporation made more than $3.5 million in payments to the banker's sister, and the payments occurred within months of the success-fee payments to the corporation. There was no evidence that the banker's sister worked on any of the projects.

The attorney for the corporation worked out of the corporation's office but practiced law independently, and in exchange for rent-free office space, periodically consulted the corporation on legal matters. In April 2008, the client approached the attorney to discuss issues with the project during which the client explained that he was planning to pay the banker in order to ensure that the project progressed swiftly, as the banker was threatening to slow down the approval process. The attorney completed preliminary research but could not determine whether the planned action was legal or would violate the FCPA, and he advised the client not to make the payment. The client insisted that the payment would not violate the FCPA, and that he would go ahead with the payment. The attorney gave the client a copy of the FCPA, and after this communication, the attorney and client ended the relationship.

In February 2010, the bank began an internal investigation into the transactions between the intervenors and the banker's sister. The Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit in the U.K. was informed, and the Unit also informed the FBI. The Unit arrested the banker and the banker's sister in the U.K.

The grand jury served the attorney with a subpoena, and on June 18, 2012, the government moved to enforce the subpoena. On September 4, 2012, the corporation and client moved to intervene, and the district court granted the request. The district court held an in camera examination of the attorney in order to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the communications between the attorney and client. On January 18, 2012, the district court issued a memorandum and order granting the Government's motion to enforce the subpoena and directing the attorney to testify before the grand jury. The district court reviewed both the Government's ex parte affidavit and the attorney's in camera testimony in finding that the intervenors intended to commit a crime when the client consulted the attorney, and that he could have used the information gleaned from the consultation in furtherance of the crime. The district court also declined to release a transcript of the testimony.

On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the order of the district court enforcing the grand jury subpoena. First, the court explained that the attorney-client privilege may be circumvented under the crime-fraud exception by making a prima facie showing that (1) the client committed or intended to commit a fraud or crime, and (2) the attorney-client communications were in furtherance of that alleged crime or fraud. The Third Circuit held that that the district court applied the proper standard and did not abuse its discretion. The Third Circuit reasoned that the standard for in camera review of tapes and documents in United States v. Zolin, which requires a "showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies," also apply to in camera examination of a witness. The Court explained that because the witness is under oath and in front of a judge, the in camera review will mitigate against the risk of inaccuracies in recounting the communications with the client. The Third Circuit also held that the district court properly applied the Zolin standard in its reliance on the Government's ex parte affidavit because the affidavit contained details from the FBI investigation as well as the attorney's statement to the FBI that the attorney was consulted about a financing project.
The Third Circuit then held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to release a transcript or summary of the testimony. Although the intervenors were aware of some information due to the ongoing investigation of the bank in the U.K., there was a significant amount of information before the grand jury that was not known to the intervenors.

Finally, the intervenors argued that the crime-fraud exception did not apply to their communications with the attorney. For the crime-fraud exception to apply, the client must be committing a crime or fraud or intending to commit a crime or fraud at the time she consults with the attorney. In this case, the Court held that the client intended to commit a crime at the time he consulted with the attorney, as even after the attorney advised him not to make the payment, he still determined it was in his best interest to do so.

The full opinion can be found at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131237p.pdf

Panel: Circuit Judges Ambro, Fisher, and Hardiman

Argument Date: September 25, 2013

Argument Location: Philadelphia

Date of Issued Opinion: February 12, 2014

Docket Number: No. 13-1237

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Larissa Staszkiw

Counsel: Ian M. Comisky & Matthew D. Lee, Blank Rome, and Stephen R. LaCheen, LaCheen Wittels & Greenberg, counsel for appellant John Doe; Michelle Morgan & Peter F. Schenck,
Office of United States Attorney, Counsel for Appellee United States.

Author of Opinion: Judge Fisher

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/21/2014 11:49 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  R Ball for R Ball III by Appt v. Commissioner of IRS - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Affirms tax court Decision on Tax Implications of Qsub Designation

Area of Law: Internal Revenue Code

Issue(s) Presented: Whether Qsub designation qualifies as an item of income under the Internal Revenue Code?

Brief Summary: Ten Trusts for the benefit of the Ball family sold their interests in a corporation to a third party and claimed a loss on their 2003 tax returns. The IRS determined that the sale resulted in a capital gain, as the Trusts had increased the basis of their stock in the company by electing to treat its subsidiary as a "qualified subchapter S subsidiary" (Qsub) under the Internal Revenue Code. The IRS found that the Qsub election did not give rise to an item of income under I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A) and sent deficiency notices to the Trusts. The Trusts filed petitions with the United States tax court seeking a redetermination, which held that the Qsub does not create an item of income. The Trusts appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the decision in the tax court.

Extended Summary: This appeal arose out of nine consolidated cases before the United States tax court regarding the tax implications of an S Corporation's election to treat its subsidiary as a "qualified subchapter S subsidiary" (Qsub) under Internal Revenue Code § 1361. An S corporation ("S Corp.") is a small business corporation that is permitted to have its corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits attributed to its shareholders.

In June 1997, ten Trusts for the benefit of the Ball family acquired direct ownership of all shares of American Insurance Service, Inc. (AIS) with an aggregate basis in AIS stock totaling $5,612,555. In 1999, the Trusts created Wind River Investment Corporation (Wind River), and the Trusts contributed their shares in AIS in exchange for all shares of Wind River so that Wind River owned all of the shares of AIS. Wind River then designated itself an S Corp. and treated AIS as a Qsub under § 1361(b)(3). Before the Qsub election, the Trusts' aggregate adjusted basis in the Wind River stock was $15,246,099. Following the Qsub election, the Trusts increased their basis to $242,481,544.

In 2003, the Trust sold their interests in Wind River to a third party, Fox Paine. The sale yielded $230,111,857 in cash and securities in exchange for all of the Wind River stock. Despite this amount, the Trusts claimed a loss of $12,247,229, calculated as the difference between the amount received for the sale and the new basis in the Wind River stock. The Trusts 2003 tax returns were filed citing this capital loss.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the Wind River stock should not have been increased to $242,481,544 following the Qsub election. The IRS instead determined that the sale to Fox Paine resulted in a $214 million capital gain, and therefore there was a tax deficiency of $33,747,858. The Trusts received deficiency notices which stated that the Qsub election did not give rise to an item of income under I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A) and therefore the Trusts could not increase the basis of their Wind River stock under I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A).

The Trusts filed petitions with the United States Tax Court seeking a redetermination and the cases were consolidated and submitted for decision on stipulated facts. The parties disagreed as to whether the Qsub election and subsequent sale of the S Corp. parent creates an "item of income" for the parent company under § 1366(a)(1)(A) and therefore requires the parties who hold stock in the parent S Corp to adjust their bases in stock under § 1367(a)(1)(A). The Trusts argued that the election resulted in a gain derived from dealings in property and therefore created an item of income under § 61(a). The tax court found the increase in stock basis and declared loss to be improper. The tax court reasoned that a gain from a Qsub election is "realized" and calculated under § 1001, but is not "recognized." Under §1366, when a gain is unrecognized it "does not rise to the level of income" and is not an "item of income for tax purposes."

On appeal to the Third Circuit, the Court affirmed the order of the tax court. First, the Court determined the definition of an "item of income," as the term is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code. The Court held that while an "item of income" is not defined, "gross income" has been defined as "gains derived from dealings in property." The Supreme Court has also defined "gross income" as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Because the Qsub election did not add wealth, just changed the tax treatment of the income flowing from the Qsub, there was no "accession to wealth" for the corporation and therefore could not create "income" for the Trusts.

Next, the court considered the Trusts' argument that the tax court erred in its determination that "unrecognized gain does not rise to the level of income." The Trusts argued that an "item of income" may be defined as gross income under one provision of the Internal Revenue Code, but not recognized under another provision and still remain an "item of income." The Trusts relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Gitlitz v. Commissioner and the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Farley to support their arguments. In Gitlitz, the Supreme Court held that § 1366 is worded broadly enough to include any item of income, even tax-deferred income, which could affect the tax liability of any shareholder. The Third Circuit came to a similar decision in Farley. However, the Court reasoned that the crucial difference in Gitlitz was that the case addressed payments that explicitly were included in gross income under §61(a). After Gitlitz, Congress also made changes to the statute. The Third Circuit explained that the regulations demonstrate that the gain is not recognized and is not income, and, therefore, the S Corp. shareholders could not increase their bases under § 1367.

The full opinion can be found at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/132247p.pdf

Panel: Circuit Judges Jordan, Vanaskie, and Van Antwerpen

Argument Date: 12/17/2013

Argument Location: Philadelphia

Date of Issued Opinion: 02/12/2014

Docket Number: No. 13-2247

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Larissa Staszkiw

Counsel: Nancy Winkelman, Esq. & Timothy K. Lewis, Esq., Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Attorneys for Appellants; Francesca Ugolini, Esq., Richard Farber, Esq.
& Kathryn Keneally, Esq., United States Department of Justice, Attorneys for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Judge Van Antwerpen

Circuit: 3rd Circuit

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/21/2014 11:46 AM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 20, 2014
  SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories
Headline: Ninth Circuit holds that classifications based on sexual orientation must be reviewed under heightened scrutiny for purposes of equal protection analysis, and equal protection prohibits preemptory strikes based on sexual orientation in jury selection.

Area of Law: Constitutional Law; Equal Protection

Issues Presented: (1) Whether equal protection prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in jury selection. (2) Whether classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to a standard higher than rational basis review.

Brief Summary: Abbott appealed a jury verdict on a contract claim and SmithKline cross-appealed, contending that a new trial was warranted because Abbott violated equal protection by using a preemptory strike in excluding a juror because of his sexual orientation.

The Ninth Circuit began by performing the threshold three-prong analysis under Batson v. Kentucky to determine whether there was discrimination. After finding discrimination, the Ninth Circuit determined what level of scrutiny was required in a question of equal protection when sexual orientation is at issue.

Under Witt v. Department of Air Force analysis, the Ninth Circuit determined the Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny, rather than mere rational basis review under the Court's equal protection analysis in US v. Windsor. Consequently, because equal protection analysis of classification based on sexual orientation required heightened scrutiny, and because of the history of exclusion and discrimination against gays and lesbians, the Ninth Circuit determined that a Batson violation occurs when there is a preemptory strike of a juror based on sexual orientation.

The Ninth Circuit reversed, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the Batson violation tainted jury findings.

Extended Summary: In a suit arising containing antitrust, contract, and unfair trade practice claims, relating to a licensing agreement and pricing of HIV medication, defendant Abbott used its first preemptory strike against the only self-identified gay member of the venire. Plaintiff SmithKlinechallenged the strike under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing that it was impermissibly made on the basis of sexual orientation. The district judge stated his reasons for rejecting the Batson challenge and allowing the strike, and provided Abbott with the opportunity to rely on the Court's reasoning or explain exactly why Abbott struck the juror, Abbott merely relied on the Court's reasoning.

There is a three-part test under Batson: (1) the party challenging the preemptory strike must establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, (2) the striking party must give a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike, and (3) the court must determine on the basis of the record, whether the party raising the challenge has shown purposeful discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination the challenging party must produce evidence that (1) the prospective juror is a member of a cognizable group, (2) counsel used a preemptory strike against the individual, and (3) the totality of the circumstances raises an inference that the strike was motived by the characteristic in question. The Ninth Circuit panel's opinion found that SmithKline established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination because the juror was the only juror who identified himself as gay, and there was reason to believe Abbott struck the juror for fear of his being influenced by Abbott's increasing the price of HIV medication.

The Ninth Circuit panel determined that Abbott's contention that it did not know the juror was gay was inconsistent with the record (i.e. the juror referred to his male partner on several occasions). Further, Abbott's questions to the juror failed to address the juror's ability to be impartial, and voire dire revealed that Abbott's strike was based on a discriminatory assumption that the juror could not impartially evaluate the case because he was gay.

Despite Abbott's attempts to provide neutral reasons, the Court stated that only the reason provided at the time of strike was important, and Abbott did not offer a nondiscriminatory reason at the time of the strike.

The Ninth Circuit then turned to the question of whether Batson prohibits strikes based on sexual orientation, noting that the Supreme Court allows for preemptory challenges to remove a class of individuals subject to rational basis review. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was required to determine what level of scrutiny applies to sexual orientation under equal protection.

In Witt v. Department of the Air Force, the Ninth Circuit determined that heightened scrutiny applied to sexual orientation under substantive due process based on Lawrence v. Texas, even though Lawrence did not expressly state that heightened scrutiny applied in such cases. Under Witt, when the Supreme Court has not identified the level of scrutiny used, the Ninth Circuit looks at what the Supreme Court actually did.

The Witt test for determining that a higher level of scrutiny applies includes a consideration of (1) a failure to consider "some conceivable rational" government purpose, and instead focusing on the actual government purpose, (2) the requirement of a "legitimate state interest" to "justify" the harm inflicted by the government's action, and (3) the level of scrutiny used by cases relied upon.

The Ninth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision in US v. Windsor to determine what level of scrutiny applied to classification with respect to sexual orientation under equal protection, and applied the Witt test.

First, Windsor considered Congress's actual purposes with respect to DOMA, instead of conceiving of hypothetical justifications for the law.

Second, the Windsor Court required Congress to "justify disparate treatment of the group," a standard that is contrary to the application of rational basis review, because rational basis is not "ordinarily" concerned with the resulting inequality. Further, rational basis review provides the legislature with the power to balance advantages and disadvantages of a law, and in Windsor, the Court, instead of the legislature, balanced the government interest against the harm or injury to gays and lesbians. Even in the absence of express language, the framework of Windsor analysis does not suggest the Court's use of rational basis review.

Third, in what the Ninth Circuit called the "least important factor," Windsor cited to one case applying rational basis, and two cases applying a heightened scrutiny.

The Ninth Circuit stated that Windsor "requires that when state action discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, we must examine its actual purposes and carefully consider the resulting inequity to ensure that our most fundamental institutions neither send nor reinforce messages of stigma or second-class status."

Next, the Ninth Circuit considered whether there was a Batson violation. While Batson concerned racial classification, the Ninth Circuit noted that J.E.B. v. Alabama, in applying Batson to gender classification, focused on was the actual experience of the group in question - women. The Ninth Circuit, focusing on the actual experience of gays and lesbians, discussed the ways in which individuals were discriminated against and excluded because of their sexual orientation. Because of this history, and a wariness of allowing preemptory strikes based on sexual orientation, which could send the message that gays and lesbians could not be trusted to fairly decide legal issues on a jury, the Ninth Circuit held that Batson applied. Thus, equal protection forbids striking a juror on the basis of sexual orientation.

Finally, Abbott unsuccessfully argued that the Batson violation was harmless because none of SmithKline's should have been submitted to the jury the the basis of insufficient evidence. However, the Ninth Circuit stated that there is no harmless error analysis where a Batson claim is involved; the harm of a Batson violation "is far greater than simply the effect on the verdict." The Ninth Circuit opinion then pointed to jury findings in the case that had been tainted by the Batson violation and, consequently remanded the case for a new trial.

Panel: Judges Berzon, Reinhardt, Schroeder

Date of Issued Opinion: January 21, 2014

Docket Number: 4:07-cv-05702-CW

Decided: Reversed.

Case Alert Author: Joseph Chaparo

Author of Opinion: Judge Reinhardt

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Glenn Koppel

    Posted By: Glenn Koppel @ 02/20/2014 05:58 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  USA v. Ricardo Marrero - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Affirms District Court Classification of Criminal as "Career Offender"

Area of Law: Sentencing Guidelines, Classification as a Career Offender, Criminal Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether Marrero's classification as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines was proper?

Brief Summary:
Ricardo Marrero appeals his judgment of sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of bank robbery, claiming that the District Court erred in classifying him as a "career offender" under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, agreeing that Because Marrero's convictions for simple assault and third-degree murder qualify as "crimes of violence."

Significance (if any): Murder and simple assault were considered violent crimes under the Sentencing Guidelines in order to qualify a criminal as a "career offender."

Extended Summary (if applicable):
Ricardo Marrero appeals his judgment of sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of bank robbery, claiming that the District Court erred in classifying him as a "career offender" under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, agreeing that Because Marrero's convictions for simple assault and third-degree murder qualify as "crimes of violence."
In December 2010, Marrero pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery. Thereafter, his probation officer recommended that he be sentenced as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines because he had been convicted of three violent crimes including third degree murder, simple assault, and the bank robberies. This career offender status resulted in a sentencing guideline of 151 to 188 months imprisonment. Marrero objected to his career offender classification, arguing that neither third degree murder nor simple assault qualifies as a crime of violence because a conviction for mere recklessness cannot constitute violence. The District Court disagreed and found Marrero to be a career offender. In determining that simple assault was a crime of violence, the District Court relied on: 1) United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), which established that intentional or knowing simple assault under Pennsylvania law is a crime of violence; and (2) the transcript of Marrero's guilty plea colloquy, which that he pled guilty to an intentional and knowing violation of the simple assault statute. The District Court found that the third degree murder crime constituted a crime of violence because "murder" is expressly enumerated as such in Application Note 1 to USSG § 4B1.2.
Marrero has timely appealed and raised one issue, which is the issue of his classification as a career offender. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals had already affirmed this classification, and Marrero appealed again, this time getting certiorari granted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the Third Circuit for further consideration in light of the decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Since assault is not enumerated as a violent crime in the Sentencing Guidelines, the Third Circuit determined whether it fell under the residual clause. The Court uses the "modified categorical approach," which applies to assault under Descamps because it is a divisible statute which provides three states of mind for conviction: 1) intent, 2) knowledge, or 3) recklessness. The Court we concluded that the District Court properly concluded Marrero's simple assault plea colloquy was for intentional simple assault.
The Court next considered whether Marrero's third-degree murder conviction was a violent crime. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has specified that third-degree murder is "an unlawful killing with malice but without specific intent to kill." Marrero argued that malice only implies recklessness. Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. in the Sentencing Guidelines expressly states that the term "'[c]rime of violence' includes murder." Thus, the Court concluded that this places murder as an enumerated "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court then went on to perform the Taylor analysis, in which it compared the elements of the crime of conviction to the generic form of the offense. So long as the statutory definition of the prior conviction "substantially corresponds" to the generic definition of the offense, the defendant's prior offense qualifies as a crime of violence. The Court found that the definition of murder in Pennsylvania "substantially corresponds" to the generic definition.
The Court affirmed the District Court's determination that Marrero's third-degree murder and simple assault convictions both qualified as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, and he was properly designated a career offender. Thus, Marrero's Guidelines range was properly calculated and that the District Court did not err.
The full opinion is available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/112351p1.pdf

Panel (if known): Ambro, Chagares, and Hardiman, Circuit Judges

Argument (if known): January 26, 2012

Date of Issued Opinion: February 19, 2014

Docket Number: 11-2351

Decided: February 19, 2014

Case Alert Author: Alexandra Perry

Counsel (if known):
Rebecca R. Haywood
Michael L. Ivory
Office of the United States Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lisa B. Freeland
Karen S. Gerlach
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 Liberty Avenue
1500 Liberty Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-0000
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

Author of Opinion: Hardiman, Circuit Judge

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Prof. Susan L. DeJarnatt

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/20/2014 03:20 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Swatch v. Beehive - Fourth Circuit
Headline: Fourth Circuit Reminds District Courts to "Watch" Standard of Review

Area of Law: Trademark

Issue Presented: Whether a District Court reviews an appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") with a "de novo" or hybrid standard of review.

Brief Summary: Beehive registered "Swap" with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") for use with its interchangeable watch line. Swatch objected to Beehive's application to register the mark, alleging likelihood of confusion, mere descriptiveness, and trademark dilution. After the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejected Swatch's claims, Swatch filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia, re-alleging the PTO claims and alleging related infringement and unfair competition claims. The District Court affirmed the TTAB's decision and dismissed Swatch's claims by using a "hybrid" standard of review." Under this hybrid standard, the District Court acted as an appellate court in reviewing the TTAB's findings and acted as a trial court in examining the new claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Swap did not infringe Swatch's trademark. However, the court rejected the District Court's standard of review. The court noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b), which allowed Swatch to file in federal court, required the District Court to review both the TTAB record and any new evidence submitted by the parties de novo and to act as finder of fact. The court found that although the District Court erred in using a deferential standard in reviewing the TTAB record, the District Court, in essence, had to engage in a de novo review in order to affirm the TTAB's decision. For this reason, the court affirmed the decision.

For the full text of this opinion, please click here

Panel: Judges NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN

Date of Issued Opinion: 01/07/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-2126

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Whitney C. Levandusky

Counsel: Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum, COLLEN IP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, PC, Ossining, New York, for Appellant. William Jerome Utermohlen, OLIFF & BERRIDGE, PLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee

Author of Opinion: Duncan, J.

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Renée Hutchins

Edited: 02/20/2014 at 01:49 PM by Renee Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 02/20/2014 01:38 PM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Martinez v. Holder - Fourth Circuit
Headline: Trying to Fight Deportation? Leave your Gang First!

Area of Law: Immigration Law

Issue Presented: Whether being a former gang member constitutes an "immutable characteristic" for purposes of a "particular social group," one possible method to stop removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B).

Brief Summary: Julio Martinez, an undocumented immigrant and former MS-13 gang member, was caught driving with marijuana. Thereafter, removal proceedings were brought against him, but ultimately languished. When Martinez was pulled over again for a traffic offense, the Department of Homeland Security reopened the removal proceedings and charged Martinez with possessing a controlled substance. Martinez sought but was denied relief from removal in the immigration court as well as before the Board of Immigration Appeals. He then sought review in the Fourth Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted as well as denied in part the petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings. Per 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B), an alien may not be removed if, among other reasons, they hold "membership in a particular social group." The Fourth Circuit held that Martinez's status as a former gang member constituted the sort of "immutable characteristic" necessary for purposes of membership in a "particular social group."

Extended Summary: Julio Martinez was a citizen of El Salvador. At age 12, he joined a group of friends, some of whom were in Mara Salvatrucha, ("MS-13,") a transnational criminal gang. Martinez's group was then "incorporated" into the larger MS-13 gang structure. Martinez agreed to MS-13 initiation, and was initiated. At age 16, however, Martinez attempted to leave MS-13. This attempt was met with MS-13's violent backlash. MS-13 members tried to kill Martinez three times. At age 20, Martinez unlawfully moved to the United States. In March 2006, Martinez was stopped while driving his friend's car and the police subsequently found marijuana in the dashboard. Martinez pled to the possession and received probation before judgment. The Department of Homeland Security then started removal proceedings but canceled them because Martinez agreed to be a confidential informant. In May 2011, Martinez was stopped for a second traffic offense. The Department of Homeland Security then reopened the removal proceedings.

During removal proceedings, Martinez argued that based on his fear of bodily harm at the hands of MS-13 members, he should be eligible for relief under U.S. law (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)) for being a former gang member. Specifically, Martinez argued that his status as a former gang member qualified him as a member of a "particular social group" who was entitled to relief from removal. Martinez also asked for relief in the form of temporary protected status, the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") protection, and voluntary deportation. The immigration judge ("IJ") found Martinez credible but denied all forms of relief except voluntary deportation. On review, the Board of Immigration Appeals, ("BIA") determined that Martinez' former gang membership did not entitle him to relief as a member of a "particular social group." The BIA believed Martinez's former membership did not qualify as a "common immutable characteristic," an element required for a "particular social group" finding. In the BIA's view because the "characteristic resulted from the voluntary association with a criminal gang" it did not qualify. The BIA also determined that Martinez failed to show that the Salvadoran government would acquiesce in his torture and therefore found he was not eligible for CAT protection.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted as well as denied in part the petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court first noted that Martinez' former MS-13 membership met the element of "immutable characteristic," for determining whether he fell within a "particular social group." Regarding deportation, according to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B), an alien may not be removed "f the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in part because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."

To qualify for membership in a particular social group, one must meet three requirements: (1) its members share common immutable characteristics; (2) the common characteristics give its members social visibility; and (3) the group is defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership. With regard to "immutable characteristics," the court noted that such characteristics must be ones which members cannot change or should not be required to change because they are fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. The court also noted the four exceptions to the entire removal statute.

The Fourth Circuit first detailed that being a former gang member was an immutable characteristic in much the same way as being a former military leader, being a former member of a violent political group and being a former child soldier. The Fourth Circuit then noted that it would be undesirable to interpret the Immigration & Nationality Act ("INA") statute in a way that would force individuals to rejoin gangs to avoid persecution. Moreover, although Martinez' behavior was anti-social, Congress explicitly stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B) the four types of anti-social behavior that will result in removal. The court then noted the distinction between current and former gang membership. Martinez, was not a current member; he had repudiated his membership. Moreover, because the gang was marked by violence and criminality, this repudiation was a critical aspect of Martinez' conscience that he should not be forced to change. The court was careful to note, however, that current gang membership is not an immutable characteristic.

The Sixth Circuit has agreed with the Fourth Circuit regarding status as a former gang member being an "immutable characteristic." The First Circuit, in contrast, has disagreed.

Regarding social visibility, the second element, the court "explicitly declined to determine whether the social visibility criterion is a reasonable interpretation of the INA." Moreover, the court detailed that even if this element was valid, the BIA did not consider the issue at all, and the BIA did not offer a supporting explanation for why Martinez social group did not meet this element.

Finally, for the third element, "particularity," the court remanded this issue but still noted that the Seventh Circuit has distinguished between the particularity of inactive and former gang members. Regarding CAT protection, the court reasoned that Martinez failed to show that the government would acquiesce. Moreover, Martinez never made a report to the government, and the government has made attempts to reduce/control gang activity. The court determined that the BIA's decision to deny relief under CAT protection was correct.

For the full text of his opinion, please visit http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Op...ublished/122424.P.pdf

Panel: Judges Niemeyer and Wynn; and District Judge Flanagan, sitting by designation.

Date of Issued Opinion: 01/23/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-2424

Case Alert Author: Aaron D. Parker

Counsel: Maureen A. Sweeney, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Petitioner. Oluremi da Rocha-Afodu, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Benjamin Richard Casper, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA SCHOOL OF LAW, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Amicus Supporting Petitioner. On Brief: Alison D. Yoder, Student Attorney, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Blair T. O'Connor, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Andres C. Benach, BENACH RAGLAND L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Katherine Evans, CASPER & EVANS, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; Samuel Johnson, Student Attorney, Holden Turner, Student Attorney, Interprofessional Center For Counseling & Legal Services, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Amicus Supporting Petitioner.

Author of Opinion: Niemeyer, J.

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Renée Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 02/20/2014 12:31 PM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Feaz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Headline: Eleventh Circuit holds flood insurance covenant in FHA mortgage contracts imposes the minimum coverage amount.

Area of Law: Banking, Mortgages

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the flood insurance covenant in FHA mortgage contracts imposes the minimum or maximum coverage amount.

Brief Summary: Faire Feaz ("Ms. Feaz") appealed the dismissal of her breach of contract claim against her lender. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed based on its interpretation of the flood insurance covenant in FHA mortgage contracts, concluding that the standard form language imposes a minimum coverage amount a borrower must have.

Significance (if any):

Extended Summary (if applicable): Ms. Feaz obtained $63,000 of flood insurance coverage on her home for an FHA issued mortgage from her initial lender. In 2003, Wells Fargo acquired the mortgage and Ms. Feaz renewed her flood insurance. In 2007, Wells Fargo required Ms. Feaz to increase her flood-insurance coverage to $250,000 or the home's replacement value, whichever was less. After she failed to do so, Wells Fargo force-placed the insurance and passed the premium cost to her.

The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss, rejecting Ms. Feaz's claim that the force-placed insurance was a breach of contract. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding the covenant requiring the borrower to insure "to the extent required by the Secretary" of HUD, unambiguously makes the federally mandated flood insurance amount the minimum, not the maximum requirement for coverage. The Eleventh Circuit, noting a split on the issue, agreed with the courts that declared the amount to be a minimum. The court relied upon the unique nature of a government-drafted contract, in which the intent of the contracting parties' is not determinative. Additionally, the court noted the language of the mortgage contract and the federal regulations in support of its conclusion.

To view opinion: http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/o...ons/ops/201310230.pdf


Panel (if known): Carnes, Chief Judge; Dubina, Circuit Judge, and Rosenthal (United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation)

Argument (if known): November 20, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 10, 2014

Docket Number: 13-10230

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Henry Alvarez, Michelle Gonzalez, Colette Largo, Kathryn Lecusay, Maxine Meltzer, Jesse Peterson, Raphael Sanchez

Counsel (if known): Mark R. Freeman, Amicus Curiae United States of America
Stanley P. Baudin, Appellant Faire Feaz
Jan T. Chilton, Appellees Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.

Author of Opinion: Judge Rosenthal

    Posted By: Gary Kravitz @ 02/20/2014 09:52 AM     11th Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 18, 2014
  Patel v. City of Los Angeles
Headline: Ninth Circuit Declares Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.49 Facially Invalid Insofar as the Statute Authorizes Records Inspections Without Affording Prior Judicial Review.

Area of Law: Civil Rights; Fourth Amendment; Administrative Searches

Issue(s) Presented: Whether, on its face, Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.49 violates the Fourth Amendment where it authorizes inspection of hotel guest records without providing an opportunity for hoteliers to obtain prior judicial review.

Brief Summary: § 41.49 requires hotel and motel operators to gather certain information from each guest. The challenged portion of § 41.49 provides law enforcement the authority to conduct non-consensual searches of these guest records. Plaintiffs are hotel owners and challenge the statute on the grounds that it is facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit upheld the challenge.

The court noted that the type of inspection authorized by § 41.49 constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes as it involves "both a physical intrusion upon a hotel's papers and an invasion of the hotel's protected privacy interest in those papers." It found this type of search unreasonable because although a search warrant is not required for such inspection, at the very least, the hoteliers should be afforded an opportunity for judicial review prior to complying with the search.

The court rests its analysis upon two assumptions. First, that the type of search authorized by § 41.49 is an administrative search, as opposed to a search for evidence of a crime. And second, that the intended search will take place in the public area of the hotel.

With these two assumptions in mind, the court found the absence of a judicial review safeguard renders § 41.49 facially invalid. It held the government must allow hoteliers an opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the search in court prior to infliction of non-compliance penalties. With that, the court reversed and remanded.

Judge Tallman dissented on the basis that the court should not issue advisory opinions. He opined that the it is improper for the court to declare a statute invalid absent a specific factual scenario wherein a hotelier's Fourth Amendment rights have been potentially violated. Judge Tallman would entertain a challenge of the statute if plaintiffs asserted an as-applied challenge.

Judge Clifton dissented because the majority, in his opinion, failed to adequately address the facial challenge to § 41.49. He noted the extremely high burden required for a successful facial challenge to a statute, and opined the majority failed to meet such burden.

For the full opinion: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da...13/12/24/08-56567.pdf

Extended Summary: Plaintiffs are hotel operators who have been and will be compelled to submit to warrantless records inspections pursuant to § 41.49 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Plaintiffs challenged the portion of the statute which provides hotel guest records "shall be made available to any member of the Los Angeles Police Department for inspection," simply upon request by an officer. Defendant, the city of Los Angeles, conceded that the provision authorizes records inspection without a warrant and without consent. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to preclude continued use of § 41.49, on the grounds that the provision violated the Fourth Amendment.

In examining the district court's holding that § 41.49 was not facially invalid, the Ninth Circuit first asked whether the inspection of hotel records constituted a search. A search occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is violated, or where the government physically intrudes on a protected area. The court held that, under § 41.49, there is both a violation of a privacy interest and a property interest.

Finding that a Fourth Amendment search does occur under § 41.49, the court turned to whether such searches are reasonable. To this end, the court stated two assumptions upon which it would rely - 1) the type of search in question is an administrative search and 2) the challenged search authorizes inspection in public areas of the hotel, such as the guest lobby.

Administrative searches are appropriate when they are "limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance is not unreasonably burdensome." Additionally, the party subjected to the search must have an opportunity for judicial review prior to compelled compliance. The court agreed that § 41.49 passes muster as to scope, purpose and specificity, but held that the lack of judicial review renders the statute unconstitutional.

In holding § 41.49 facially invalid, the court held that the lack of judicial review constitutes a lack of an essential procedural safeguard such that there is no circumstance under which the statute could be constitutionally applied.

Judge Tallman's dissent disagrees with the majority's review of the case. In his opinion, Fourth Amendment challenges are only appropriate when based on an actual factual basis. Because plaintiffs here dropped their factual challenge in favor of a facial challenge, Judge Tallman thinks it inappropriate for the court to offer what he characterizes as an advisory opinion. He asserted that because § 41.49 does not abrogate LAPD's duty to adhere to the Fourth Amendment, the only way to determine if the statute is violating the same is to examine a factual scenario.

Judge Clifton dissented on the grounds that although facial challenges are appropriate in some cases, plaintiffs did not met that very high burden here. He notes that a facial challenge requires there be no circumstances under which the statute could be constitutionally applied. Judge Clifton recognized the majority pointed to some instances where § 41.49 would be unconstitutionally applied, but failed to examine all instances.

Panel: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Raymond C. Fisher, Marsha S. Berzon, Richard C. Tallman, Richard R. Clifton, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr., Mary H. Murguia, Morgan Christen and Paul J. Waterford, Circuit Judges.

Date of Issued Opinion: December 24, 2013

Docket Number: 2:05-cv-01571-DSF-AJW

Decided: Reversed and remanded

Case Alert Author: Kathleen M. McHale

Counsel: Frank A. Weiser (argued), Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants; Todd T. Leung (argued), Deputy City Attorney; Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney; Laurie Rittenberg, Assistant City Attorney, Office of the City Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Opinion by Judge Watford; Dissent by Judge Tallman; Dissent by Judge Clifton.

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Ryan Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 02/18/2014 01:22 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Kalitta Air, L.L.C. v. Central Texas Airborne System
Headline: Ninth Circuit Affirms In Part and Reverses in Part District Court's Award of Costs Following Jury's Unanimous Verdict For Defendant Central Texas Airborne System.

Area of Law: Civil Law; Fees and Costs

Issues Presented: Whether the prevailing party in a civil suit may be awarded costs for pro hac vice admission fees, deposition costs, costs creation of visual aids created by graphic consultant firms, deposition video production and trial presentation support, and transcript synchronization under 28 U.S.C § 1920, which defines the term "costs" as used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.

Brief Summary: Plaintiff-Appellant Kalitta Air (Kalitta) appealed District Court's award of costs to defendant-appellee Central Texas Airborne System (CTAS) following a unanimous jury verdict in favor of CTAS in the amount of $622,036.38. Costs awarded included pro hac vice admission fees, graphic consultant fees, transcript synchronization fees, and costs for preparation of deposition video clips.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's award of costs finding that pro hac vice admission fees and deposition editing fees were not allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.


To read the full opinion, please visit: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da...13/12/19/13-15015.pdf

Extended Summary: In 1996 Kalitta filed a lawsuit against numerous defendants and CTAS alleging various causes of action stemming from the modification of two of Kalitta's aircrafts from passenger to cargo planes, which was followed by the Federal Aviation Administration's issuance of an Airworthiness Directive that rounded those planes. The District Court granted summary to CTAS on Kalitta's negligence claim. After a jury trial in 2001, the court entered judgment in favor of CTAS on Kalitta's negligent representation claim. In June 2002, the district court awarded CTAS $355,370. In December of 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and reversed and remanded in part the judgment. Subsequently, the District Court held a second trial that resulted in a mistrial. After a third trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of CTAS. CTAS then filed a bill of costs for $724,021.37. Kalitta objected and the clerk of the court awarded CTAS $691,591.73 in costs.

Kalitta then moved the court to review the clerk's costs award arguing that pro hac vice admission fees were not taxable, CTAS sought impermissible costs for visual aids and deposition video production, as well as transcript synchronization, and many deposition costs taxed in the 2002 award were beyond the scope of Northern District of California Civil Local Rule 54-3. The District Court affirmed the clerk's award of $1,310 to CTAS for pro hac vice admission fees and found that costs for preparation of deposition video clips and costs for transcript synchronization were allowed. However, the District Court did reduce the award to $622,036.38, but concluded there was no reason to revisit the 2002 costs award.

The Ninth Circuit first addressed Kalitta's contention that the District Court erred in awarding CTAS $1,310 in costs for pro hac vice admission fees. The Court noted that 28 U.S.C § 1920(1) authorizes the district court to tax as costs "fees of the clerk" and looked to the plain language of the statute. The Court then concluded that the § 1920(1)'s reference to "fees of the clerk" drew its meaning from 28 U.S.C. § 1914, which authorizes the district court to collect a filing fee and additional fees only as prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Court held that the Judicial Conference does not specifically provide for pro hac vice admission fees and thus § 1920(1) does not allow for an award of such fees as taxable costs.

Next, Kalitta argued that the District Court erred by awarding CTAS costs associated with editing deposition video clips to be played at trial and costs for synchronizing the deposition videotapes. The Ninth Circuit looked to § 1920(4), which permits the district court to tax as costs "fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." The Court then concluded that there was no specific provision for the editing of deposition video clips to be played at trial in lieu of live witness testimony. The Court held that this was a service in excess of making copies, as allowed under § 1920(4) and reversed the District Court's award of costs associated with the editing of deposition video clips. Furthermore, synchronizing deposition videotapes with transcripts was also not an act of copying or exemplification, and thus was not truly necessary for trial.

Lastly, Kalitta contended that the District Court erred in awarding CTAS costs for retainers and fees for graphic consultants by refusing to reconsider the 2002 costs award following the first trial. The Ninth Circuit held that these arguments were either waived or lacked merit and, therefore, affirmed the costs.


To read the full opinion, please visit: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/da...13/12/19/13-15015.pdf

Panel: Judges Farris, Black and Ikuta

Date of Issued Opinion: 12/19/13

Docket Number: 13-15015

Decided: Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Case Alert Author: Kimberly Whang

Counsel: Mark L. McAlpine and Don W. Blevins, McAlpine PC, Auburn Hills, Michigan, for Plaintiff-Appellant. E. Joshua Rosenkranz and Robert M. Yablon, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, New York for Defendant-Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Per Curiam Opinion

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Ryan Williams

    Posted By: Ryan Williams @ 02/18/2014 01:18 PM     9th Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 14, 2014
  SEC v. ALFRED TEO - Third Circuit
Headline: Third Circuit Addresses Analytical Framework for Determining Remedy in SEC Disgorgement Motion

Area of Law: Securities

Issues Presented: Whether direct causation between illegal profit and wrongdoing is necessary in determining a disgorgement remedy?

Brief Summary: An investor, Alfred Teo, and his trust failed to disclose their holdings and future plans in a corporation under the Securities Exchange Act. The effect of this was to insulate Teo from the corporation and its poison pill. During this time, as their holdings grew, Teo attempted to privatize the corporation and be placed on its Board of Directors. When Best Buy Co. announced a tender offer and acquired the corporation's shares, Teo sold his shares at great profit. The SEC subsequently filed a civil law enforcement suit against Teo for violations of the Securities Exchange Act. A jury found him liable and the District Court ordered Teo and the Trust to disgorge $17 million, plus prejudgment interest amounting to over $14 million. Teo and the Trust appealed, arguing chiefly that the District Court erred in allowing the disgorgement when the SEC had not proven that the violations were a direct cause of the share profits. The Third Circuit, citing a DC Circuit opinion, policy goals underlying SEC enforcement actions, and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, found that the SEC need only show but-for causation. The Third Circuit further held that the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the disgorgement figure is not a reasonable approximation. The Court found that Teo and the Trust failed to prove that the figure was not reasonable because they only offered a plausible alternate explanation for their profit, instead of specific evidence.

Extended Summary: This case centers around the actions of Alfred Teo, a businessman and investor, and his trust, MAAA Trust. In 1997, Teo's brokerage accounts held approximately 5.25 percent of stock in Musicland, a retailer of music, video, books, computer software and video games. Importantly, Musicland's "shareholder rights plan," also known as a poison pill, could be activated when individual ownership reached 17.5 percent ownership of the company's stock. The poison pill allowed shareholders to purchase stock at a lower price to dilute a hostile buyer's holdings to a lower percentage. Up until 1998, Teo properly disclosed his Musicland holdings to the SEC and they were always below the poison pill threshold. The SEC requires disclosure of an individual's holdings, specifically any plans or proposals to change the Board of Directors or to cause an extraordinary corporate transaction. From 1998 to 2000, Teo and his Trust filed numerous false SEC Schedule 13D disclosure statements, failing to report holdings in Musicland even though their holdings continued to exceed the reporting threshold. The District Court found that Teo and the Trust controlled 17.79 percent of Musicland shares in 1998 and 35.97 percent in 2000. During this time, Teo repeatedly tried to get himself or associates placed on Musicland's Board of Directors. Teo also made plans several times to privatize Musicland. Teo's admitted intent was to create an opportunity for him to cash out his holdings. He never filed a Schedule 13D on any of the above activities. In December 2000, Best Buy Co. announced a tender offer of all Musicland shares and acquired them in January 2001, causing stock prices to rise. Teo sold all of his shares (some publicly and some to Best Buy). The District Court found that Teo's profit from the Musicland stock, beginning at the first SEC violation, was $21 million.

In April 2004, the SEC filed a civil law enforcement action against Teo asserting violations of the Securities Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 10(b) and numerous SEC rules and regulations. A jury found Teo and his trust, MAAA Trust, liable for violating the above sections of the Securities Exchange Act. The District Court denied Defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. It ordered Defendants to disgorge over $17 million, plus prejudgment interest amounting to $14 million. Defendants appealed, alleging errors arising from admission of certain evidence and the use of a general verdict form, and challenging the court's disgorgement and prejudgment interest award.

The Third Circuit first addressed the admission of Teo's 2006 allocution when he pleaded guilty to five counts of insider trading. The Third Circuit found that the allocution was probative of Teo's willfulness and knowledge in evading SEC regulations as they applied to Musicland holdings, and its prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value, especially since his convictions were a part of the record. Further, the Third Circuit dismissed Defendants' argument that the limiting instruction was inadequate.

The Third Circuit also addressed the challenge by the Defendants to the District Court's order to disgorge $17 million in profit from transactions tainted by the SEC violations. They did not appeal the calculation, but rather the fact that the District Court had granted the SEC's motion for this remedy. The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting the differences between private and SEC civil enforcement actions. Private enforcement actions often draw analogies to cases at common law, like civil fraud claims. There, courts will often require proximate cause to establish injury. The Third Circuit stated that common law torts, in contrast, are not part of the jurisprudence or the statutory developments relating to SEC enforcement actions. SEC suits are described as "promoting economic and social policies" and are not "collection agenc[ies] for defrauded investors" as private civil enforcement litigation often is.

The Court found that it needed to separately analyze what type of causation standard should apply to SEC motions for disgorgement. The Third Circuit first addressed the importance of the policies driving SEC-initiated civil enforcement suits. The main policy goals are constructed around two objectives: (1) to deprive a wrongdoer of unjust enrichment, and (2) to deter others from violating securities law. The Court held that in light of this, the analytical framework for determining the remedy differs from that of a private enforcement action. Citing SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the Court explained a burden-shifting approach to causation. Under this approach, the SEC is required to produce evidence supporting a reasonable approximation of "actual profits on the tainted transactions" (essentially satisfying but-for causation). This creates a presumption of illegal profits, which the defendant can rebut by demonstrating that the "disgorgement figure is not a reasonable approximation." According to First City, the risk of uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer who created the uncertainty. The Third Circuit drew two points from this case: (1) that intervening causation is not an element of the SEC's evidentiary burden in setting out an amount to be disgorged, and (2) if the issue of intervening cause is going to be raised, it will normally be the defendant's burden to do so. The Court also observed that First City appeared to be based on the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, which acknowledges that the court has broad discretion in deciding the amount disgorged. The Restatement affirms that the court may apply tests of causation as reason and fairness dictate and cautions the court not to give inordinate weight to the attenuation between wrongdoing and money damages. The Court then dismissed Defendants' argument that the SEC needed to prove more than but-for causation. The Third Circuit held that the policies underlying disgorgement - deterrence and prevention of unjust enrichment - must weigh heavily in the court's consideration of whether the profits are legally attributable to the wrongdoing.

Applying the above framework, the Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that the SEC introduced evidence that demonstrated a reasonable approximation of profits from transactions tainted by SEC violations. The Court stated that Defendants needed to adduce specific evidence and not just put forth a plausible alternate explanation for the profit. The Third Circuit further explained how Teo's misreporting and fraud insulated him from the poison pill and Musicland awareness, which enabled him to acquire and hold a large amount of stock that netted huge profits when sold to Best Buy. For all of the above reasons, the Court found the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining the disgorgement amount.
To read the full opinion, please visit http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/121168p.pdf

Panel (if known): Sloviter, Jordan, and Nygaard, Circuit Judges

Argument Date: April 23, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 10, 2014

Docket Number: No. 12-1168

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Shannon Zabel

Counsel: Eric O. Corngold, Esq., Mary E. Mulligan, Esq., Cheryl A. Krause, Esq. for Defendants Alfred S. Teo, Sr. and MAAA Trust; David Lisitza, Esq. for Appellee, Securities & Exchange Commission

Author of Opinion: Judge Nygaard

Circuit: Third Circuit

Case Alert Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/14/2014 01:53 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Louisiana Forestry Association v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor - Third Circuit
Area of Law: Administrative Law

Issue(s) Presented: Whether the Department of Labor has the authority to promulgate a rule under the H-2B visa program, which was administered by the Department of Homeland Security?

Brief Summary: In September 2011, the Department of Labor ("DOL") promulgated a rule mandating minimum wages for foreign workers working in the U.S. under the H-2B program. The H-2B program allows non-agricultural employers to employ foreign workers in unskilled jobs that U.S. citizens would not take. Appellants challenged this rule on two grounds: 1) that the DOL did not have the authority to promulgate this rule, and 2) even if it did have the authority, the DOL did not follow the procedures of the APA. The District Court granted summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit found that the DOL had implied authority to promulgate the rule, and that it did comply with the APA formal rulemaking requirements.

Significance (if any): The Department of Labor has implied authority to promulgate minimum wage rules under the H-2B program.

Extended Summary (if applicable):
On September 7, 2011 Appellants (a group of associations representing non-agricultural employers) initiated this action claiming that the Department of Labor (DOL) exceeded its authority by enacting a 2011 regulation that governs the minimum wage a U.S. employer must offer to foreign workers under the H-2B visa program. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL and its Co-Defendants, and the Third Circuit affirms.
The H-2B visa program permits U.S. employers to recruit temporary foreign workers to fill unskilled non-agricultural positions that no U.S. worker will accept. The authority to administer the H-2B system is in the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). However, the DHS can look to the DOL for advice in determining whether to grant an H-2B regulation or not. The DOL also has the authority to create the procedures necessary to fulfill its charge of issuing labor certifications. The DOL relied on the INA and DHS regulations as authority for the rulemaking. It went through notice and comment as proscribed by the APA.
Appellants challenged the rule on two grounds: 1) the DOL lacks authority to promulgate rules concerning the H-2B program, and 2) even if the DOL has such rulemaking authority, the DOL's rule did not comply with the APA rulemaking requirements. The District Court concluded that the DOL had implied authority for this rulemaking, and the DOL had not exceeded the scope of that authority in issuing the 2011 rule. First, the Third Circuit found that the DOL was correct that it had authority to promulgate this 2011 rule. This authority was derived from regulations promulgated by DHS, and DHS was entitled to Chevron deference in giving this authority to the DOL. Since the Third Circuit determined that the DOL had the rulemaking authority, the Court next went on to decide whether the rulemaking complied with the APA. The 2011 rule was promulgated under the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA, with which the DOL complied. The Court also found that the DOL considered factors relevant to the rule in question, and whether the rule would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Thus, the DOL provided reasoned analysis supported by evidence, as required by the APA. The District Court's decision was therefore affirmed. the full opinion can be viewed at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/124030p.pdf

Panel (if known): Jordan and Vanaskie, Circuit Judges, Rakoff, District Judge

Argument (if known): May 31, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 5, 2014

Docket Number: 12-4030

Decided: February 5, 2014

Case Alert Author: Alexandra Perry

Counsel (if known): R. Wayne Pierce, Esq.; Veronica W. Saltz, Esq.; Leon R. Sequeira, Esq. for Appellants; Geoffrey Forney, Esq.; Harry L. Sheinfeld, Esq. for Appellees; Arthur N. Read, Esq.; Meredith B. Stewart, Esq.; Sarah M. Claassen, Esq.; Elizabeth D. Mauldin, Esq.; Edward J. Tuddenham, Esq. for Intervenors

Author of Opinion: Vanaskie, Circuit Judge

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Mary E. Levy

    Posted By: Susan DeJarnatt @ 02/14/2014 01:50 PM     3rd Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 13, 2014
  United States v. Baker - Fifth Circuit
Headline: Fifth Circuit Rules that Sentence Enhancement for Distributing Child Pornography Does Not Require Knowledge of a File-Sharing Program's Capabilities.

Area of Law: Sentencing.

Issue Presented: Whether the two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) for distributing child pornography contains a scienter requirement.

Brief Summary: Baker pleaded guilty to receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. At sentencing, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas imposed a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) for distribution of child pornography through Baker's use of a file-sharing program. Baker unsuccessfully objected to the two-level increase, arguing that he did not know how the file-sharing program worked. Baker asserted that he was unaware that others could download from his computer, and therefore he could not have knowingly distributed pornography, which he argued was required for the § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) enhancement. Baker appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) does not contain a scienter requirement and affirmed the district court's imposition of the two-level enhancement.

Significance: There is a split between circuits over whether § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) contains a scienter requirement.

Extended Summary: Baker pleaded guilty to receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. At sentencing, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas imposed a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) for distribution of child pornography through Baker's use of the file-sharing program Frostwire. Baker unsuccessfully objected to the two-level increase, arguing that he did not know how the file-sharing program worked. Baker asserted that he was unaware that others could download from his computer, and therefore he could not have knowingly distributed pornography, which he argued was required for the § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) enhancement. Baker appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit held that, firstly, the guideline's plain language illustrates that § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) does not contain a scienter requirement. Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) provides for a two-level increase "if the offense involved [] [d]istribution" of child pornography where the distribution is not to minors or for something of value. The commentary accompanying § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), defines "distribution" as "any act . . . related to the transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor." Use of the word "any" to modify "act" signals that the phrase should be construed broadly, and does not contain an implicit mens rea. The range of examples of "distribution" provided in the commentary further establishes that "transfer" should be interpreted liberally. Moreover, the guideline commentary lists "posting material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website for public viewing" as an example of distribution, and downloading child pornography to a publicly accessible folder through use of file-sharing software is akin to posting such material.

Secondly, the language surrounding the operative definition reinforces this plain-language reading of § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). In the same commentary that defines "distribution" without requiring an express mens rea, the Sentencing Commission defined "distribution to a minor" as the "knowing distribution to an individual who is a minor at the time of offense." The drafters' explicit use of a scienter requirement in this instance indicates that its omission from the definition of "distribution" was not an oversight in need of judicial insertion.

Neither the general presumption against strict-liability crimes nor the rule of lenity applies here, the Fifth Circuit also ruled.

Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) does not contain a scienter requirement, and it affirmed the district court's imposition of the two-level enhancement.

For the full opinion, please see:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/o...ub/12/12-10834-CR0.pdf.

Panel: Circuit Judges Reavley, Davis, and Higginson

Argument Date: 12/03/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 02/12/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-10834

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Kirsty Davis

Counsel: Brian W. McKay, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Monica F. Markley, Federal Public Defender's Office, Northern District of Texas, for Defendant-Appellant Baker.

Author of Opinion: Circuit Judge Higginson

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

    Posted By: Aaron Bruhl @ 02/13/2014 03:14 PM     5th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens -- Fourth Circuit
Headline: NFL Beats Local Fan's Infringement Claim by "Transforming Use" of Raven's Logo

Area of Law: Copyright Law

Issue Presented: Whether the NFL and the Baltimore Ravens' use of the "Flying B" logo in various historical videos and displays constituted fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976.

Brief Summary: Frederick Bouchat submitted a drawing to the Baltimore Ravens franchise that inspired the "Flying B" logo the Ravens used for its first season. After the 1997 season, Bouchat filed his first of many lawsuits against the Ravens and the NFL, alleging that the "Flying B" logo infringed on his copyrighted drawing. In the latest suit filed by Bouchat related to the "Flying B" logo, he challenged the NFL's use of the logo in three videos featured on its television network and various websites. Bouchat also challenged the Baltimore Ravens' display of images that included the logo as part of exhibits in its stadium "Club Level" seating area. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that defendants' use of the logo qualified as fair use.

Extended Summary: In 1996 professional football returned to Baltimore in the form of the Baltimore Ravens. When the team unveiled its logo in 1997, Frederick Bouchat, a local security guard and amateur artist, noticed that the logo bore a striking resemblance to a drawing he sent to the Ravens months earlier. He immediately copyrighted his image and then went on to file five copyright infringement lawsuits against the NFL and the Baltimore Ravens for their use of the "Flying B" logo. This case, the fifth brought by Bouchat, arose out of the appearance of the "Flying B" logo in three videos on NFL.com and a display in the Ravens' Stadium. Bouchat sought to enjoin the NFL and the Ravens from using the Flying B logo, asserting that use of the image infringed his copyright.

Under §106 of the Copyright Act of 1976, owners of copyrighted material have exclusive rights to publish, copy, perform, display and distribute their work. There are a number of exceptions to this general rule that allow the use of copyrighted work without permission from or compensation to the owner. One of these exceptions, the Fair Use Doctrine (17 U.S.C. §107), limits the exclusive rights of the owner and reiterates copyright law's goal to promote creativity. Courts analyzing copyright infringement claims use four factors to analyze fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or for a nonprofit educational purpose; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market for or the value of the copyrighted work. While the first factor is considered the most important, all four factors are weighed together in each case. A finding of fair use is a complete defense to a copyright infringement claim. Analyzing Bouchat's claim, the trial court found that the use of the "Flying B" logo was fair and therefore did not infringe upon his copyright.

Agreeing with the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided in favor of the Baltimore Ravens and the NFL. The court analyzed the four fair use factors, relying most heavily on the "purpose and character of the use" factor. With regard to this factor, the court reasoned that the challenged videos and display "transformed" the "Flying B" logo from a representation of the Ravens' brand (used to differentiate players and to serve as a promotional focus) to an artifact (used as part of a broader historical narrative). This transformative use, which the court defined as one that employs the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original, led the court to conclude that the purpose and character of the use was unobjectionable. The court next discussed the "amount and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole" factor. With regard to this factor, the Fourth Circuit stated that the logo's use was incidental and negligible. The remaining factors, the court went on to say, did nothing to undermine the conclusion that the transformative and incidental use of the logo was a fair use.

To read the full opinion please visit: http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Op...blished/122543.P.pdf.

Panel: Judges Wilkinson, Duncan and Diaz

Argument Date: 10/31/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 12/13/2013

Docket Number: No. 12-2543

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Felichia Pride

Counsel: Howard J. Schulman, SCHULMAN & KAUFMAN, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert Lloyd Raskopf, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees.

Author of Opinion: Judge Wilkinson

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Renée Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 02/13/2014 10:47 AM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  United States v. Bryant -- Fourth Circuit
Headline: Busted Lip Bathroom Brawl Becomes Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Sentencing

Issues Presented: 1. Whether the district court erred in denying Charlie Bryant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 2. Whether the district court erred in calculating Bryant's sentence when it used the Sentencing Guidelines provision for aggravated assault (U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2), instead of the provision for obstructing or impeding an officer (U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4).

Brief Summary: Charlie Bryant was arrested for a scuffle with a Social Security Administration security officer on the floor of a public restroom. The officer suffered a cut lip that needed one stitch. Bryant pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b), for infliction of bodily injury. However, his pre-sentencing report subsequently described the charged offense as bodily injury by use of a deadly weapon. Bryant was sentenced to an enhanced sentence of 130 months. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Bryant appealed the denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing. He also challenged the lower court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but vacated and remanded for re-sentencing.

Extended Summary: Charlie Bryant, a homeless man with chronic mental illness and a criminal record, went to the Social Security Administration ("SSA") to inquire about his benefits. An SSA security officer asked Mr. Bryant to quiet down due to his loud and disruptive behavior. Thereafter, Bryant and the officer became involved in a scuffle. They wound up on the floor of the public restroom, requiring the assistance of two additional SSA employees. During the fight the officer sustained a cut lip that needed one stitch. Bryant pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. §111(a)(1), for assault on an officer in the course of his official duties, and §111(b) the enhanced penalty that is applied when there is bodily injury. During the plea hearing the government explained that it was seeking the §111(b) enhancement due to the infliction of bodily injury on the victim.

Prior to sentencing, a Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") was prepared. Unlike the indictment and statements made during the plea hearing, the PSR stated that the charged offense was a violation of 18 U.S.C. §111(a)(1) and (b) "by use of a deadly weapon." Under the Sentencing Guidelines a sentence may be enhance more significantly if a weapon is involved.

When the sentencing court considered the bodily injury enhancement factor during sentencing, the judge stated there was "some bodily injury...although not much." The judge also noted, "this is a huge sentence that this guy gets for a busted lip." The district court even indicated that the offense took place "with no weapon involved by the defendant." Despite these statements, the court sentenced Mr. Bryant to 130 months under U.S.S.G §2A2.2 for aggravated assault, rather than the lesser enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2A2.4 for obstructing or impeding officers. In Bryant's case, the §2A2.2 enhancement required evidence of "involvement of a dangerous weapon."

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first considered Bryant's challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion. The Fourth Circuit found that the judge adequately questioned Bryant to determine whether he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This inquiry revealed that Bryant was taking medication, but that it did not affect his ability to understand.

However, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. As mentioned above, the sentencing court sentenced Bryant using an enhancement that allowed a substantial increase of Bryant's sentence but required evidence of use of a weapon. The Fourth Circuit first noted that the offense Bryant pled guilty to did not entail the use of a dangerous weapon. While this fact did not preclude the sentencing court from considering any use of a weapon for sentencing purposes, the Fourth Circuit found that the record was unclear as to whether the sentencing court found Bryant used a weapon. Many of the sentencing court's comments suggested that a weapon was not involved in the offense. However, the Fourth Circuit also noted there was evidence to support a finding that a dangerous weapon had been used. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for resentencing.

Panel: Judge Keenan, Wynn, and Thacker

Argument Date: 10/29/2013

Date of Issued Opinion: 01/14/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-4912

Decided: Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished opinion.

Case Alert Author: Magaly Bittner

Counsel: ARGUED: Cindy Helene Popkin-Bradley, CINDY H. POPKIN-BRADLEY ATTORNEY AT LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. William Michael Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Judge Wynn

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Renée Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 02/13/2014 09:15 AM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

  United States v. Aparicio-Soria - Fourth Circuit
Headline: Although Defendant Bites, Sentence Enhancement for "Crime of Violence" Was Not Right

Area of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration, Sentencing

Issue Presented: Whether the Maryland crime of resisting arrest qualifies as a "crime of violence" for purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Brief Summary: After police officers observed Marcel Aparicio-Soria driving erratically, they attempted to pull his truck over. Aparicio-Soria sped off, and in the process almost ran into a police officer and hit another car. After a short chase, police officers deployed "stop sticks" that deflated the tires on Aparicio-Soria's truck, but he continued his escape on foot. Pursuing Aparicio-Soria into a hotel lobby, the police released a K-9 dog and shocked Aparicio-Soria with a Taser three times. He continued to resist, biting one police officer's hand. Officers were eventually able to arrest Aparicio-Soria, and in 2006, he was convicted in Maryland state court of resisting arrest. Sometime thereafter, Aparicio-Soria was convicted of an unrelated offense and deported.

In 2012, Aparicio-Soria was arrested inside the United States and was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after being convicted of an aggravated felony. In sentencing Aparicio-Soria, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland concluded that his prior state conviction for resisting arrest was a "crime of violence" because Aparicio-Soria, among other things, bit a police officer during the hotel brawl. This finding led the court to increase Aparicio-Soria's sentence.

Aparicio-Soria challenged the District Court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines to increase his sentence, contending, inter alia, that the Maryland crime of resisting arrest did not qualify as a "crime of violence" because the state statute did not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force against another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially rejected Aparicio-Soria's claim in June 2013, and affirmed the District Court's determination. However, sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit later reversed course.

Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the en banc court concluded that the District Court improperly considered the underlying facts of Aparicio-Soria's prior conviction at sentencing. The District Court should have used the "categorical approach" to sentencing enhancements, which considers only a prior conviction's statutory elements to determine whether it qualifies as a federal sentencing predicate. Applying this categorical approach to the case before it, the en banc Fourth Circuit concluded that the elements of the Maryland crime of resisting arrest require only offensive physical contact, not the violent force needed for a sentence enhancement under the Guidelines. Therefore, Aparicio-Soria's increased sentence was improper and the case was remanded for resentencing.

Judge Wilkinson, who wrote for the majority in the June 2013 decision, dissented, contending that the Maryland crime of resisting arrest clearly requires violent force and urging the court to consider earlier state and federal decisions involving this issue.

Panel: TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, MOTZ, KING, GREGORY, SHEDD, DUNCAN, AGEE, DAVIS, KEENAN, WYNN, DIAZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Date of Issued Opinion: 01/14/2014

Docket Number: No. 12-4603

Case Alert Author: Sakkara Blanchard

Counsel: ARGUED: Sapna Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Paul Nitze, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Author of Opinion: Davis, J.; Wilkinson, J. (dissenting)

Case Alert Circuit Supervisor: Professor Renée Hutchins

    Posted By: Renee Hutchins @ 02/13/2014 08:40 AM     4th Circuit     Comments (0)  

February 11, 2014
  Aamer v. Obama
Headline: D.C. Circuit finds habeas jurisdiction to hear Guantanamo detainees' challenges to conditions of confinement but declines to enjoin force-feeding protocol.

Area of Law: Habeas Corpus, Military Commissions Act, Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Issue Presented: Whether federal courts have habeas jurisdiction to hear challenges to Guantanamo detainees' conditions of confinement, and if so, whether the court should enjoin a force-feeding program on the basis that it violates either the Constitution or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).

Brief Summary: Petitioners, detainees cleared for release but still confined at Guantanamo Bay, protested their continued confinement by engaging in a hunger strike. The government instituted a force-feeding protocol triggered when inmates' weight reached a level less than 85% of their ideal body weight or they missed nine consecutive meals. In two separate proceedings, Petitioners invoked the habeas jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and sought a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of this protocol on the basis that it violated their constitutional rights and RFRA. Both district courts concluded that the Military Commission Act (MCA) stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear such challenges and denied Petitioners' requests. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the appeals. A divided court held that Petitioners' claims properly sound in habeas corpus and were not barred by the MCA. However, the court found that Petitioners failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and denied the request for interim relief.

The D.C. Circuit first rejected the government's argument that the MCA and the Suspension Clause were implicated in this case. The court found that Boumediene v. Bush struck down § 2241(e)(1), the only provision of the MCA dealing with habeas. The court expressed no view on whether Congress could, consistent with the Constitution, enact legislation precluding courts from exercising jurisdiction over certain kinds of habeas claims, but found it dispositive that Congress has not yet done so.

Turning to the more general question of whether challenges to conditions of confinement are cognizable in habeas, the court found that the Supreme Court had left it open and that the D.C. Circuit had previously resolved it in the affirmative. In Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Hudson II"), the court held that habeas corpus was available to test "not only the fact but also the form of detention," and the petitioners in that case had in fact challenged their treatment while in custody. The court acknowledged a split in circuits on this question but aligned itself with the majority view.

On the merits of the injunction, the court noted that a prison regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Assuming without deciding that the force-feeding protocol does burden fundamental rights and that those fundamental rights extend to nonresident aliens detained at Guantanamo, the D.C. Circuit found the force-feeding protocol reasonably related to the penological interest in preserving the lives of those in custody. The court concluded further that RFRA does not extend to Guantanamo detainees, who do not qualify as protected persons within the meaning of that statute. As a result, the court denied the requested injunction.

Senior Circuit Judge Williams dissented, arguing that neither Hudson II nor any other precedent authorized a conditions-of-confinement claim under habeas corpus.

For the full text of this opinion, please visit http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/i...le/13-5223-1479439.pdf

Panel (if known): Tatel, Griffith, and Williams.

Argument Date (if known): October 18, 2013

Date of Issued Opinion: February 11, 2014

Docket Number: 13-5223

Decided: Affirmed

Case Alert Author: Joseph T. Maher, Jr.

Counsel (if known): Jon B. Eisenberg, Cori Crider, and Tara Murray for appellants.