

Trust and Distrust

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Editors' Note: Can you both trust and distrust the other side? In fact, we often do exactly that. Lewicki provides practical advice on dealing with trust and distrust in each interaction. Of particular importance to negotiators facing troubled relationships, this chapter shows how distrust is not merely a mirror image of trust: it actually works quite differently. Effective negotiators must learn both to build trust and to manage distrust. This chapter should be read in conjunction with Tinsley et al., Reputations.

Trust indicates a willingness to become vulnerable to another based on confident positive expectations of the other's conduct. It has often been praised as the "glue" that holds relationships together and enables individuals to perform more efficiently and effectively. Trust reduces uncertainty over future outcomes, simplifies decision processes, and provides us with peace of mind. The phenomenon of trust has been extensively explored by a variety of disciplines across the social sciences, including economics, social psychology, and political science.

Trust is critical to negotiation, for several reasons. First, judgments about the other's trustworthiness allow us to begin the negotiation process. If we believed that we could not trust the other, we would probably not want to move toward constructing a deal with them, nor believe what they were telling us during the negotiation process. Thus, trust is essential to both determining the other's credibility in the conversation, and meeting the commitments and promises they make as we move toward agreement. Second, trust enables us to save time and energy in constructing the agreement. If we trust the other, formal agreements can be simpler, shorter and less specific. We do not have to stipulate every possible circumstance in the agreement. Finally, even the most complex and sophisticated formal contract cannot stipulate every detail or possible contingency about the deal; thus, trust enhances the enforcement of deals because each side believes the other will act in the "spirit" rather than the letter of the agreement.

Trust has been defined in many different ways. For example, one commonly accepted definition in the research literature on trust is that "trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."¹ Similarly, others describe trust as "confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct", where confident positive expectations are defined as "a belief in, a propensity to attribute virtuous intentions to, and a willingness to act on the basis of the other's conduct."²

complex relationships: *contrary to traditional, normative views that trust is good and distrust is bad, this new perspective recognizes that trust is valuable insofar as it is appropriate to the context, and that a healthy amount of distrust can protect against the risk of exploitation.* Excessive (blind) distrust, however, is probably as dysfunctional as excessive (blind) trust.

Accordingly, negotiations can be managed most effectively when attention is given to managing the initiation and development of trust, as well as to tempering distrust. In the sections that follow, I describe the origins of trust and distrust and the impact of trust and distrust on negotiations. I articulate strategies for building trust and for managing distrust in a negotiation. Finally, I will suggest several approaches for repairing damaged trust, and conclude by discussing the practical implications of my review for the effective negotiator.

Current Thinking About Trust

Theory on the origins of interpersonal trust has proceeded broadly along three fronts: (1) explaining differences in the individual propensity to trust, (2) understanding dimensions of trustworthy behavior, and (3) suggesting levels of trust development.

Individual Propensity to Trust

Personality theorists have developed one of the oldest theoretical perspectives on trust, and argued that some people are more likely to trust than others.⁶ Viewed as a fairly stable trait over time, trust is a generalized expectation that individuals hold, believing that other people will be trustworthy or can be relied upon. This expectation is rather stable within an individual but varies significantly across individuals; it most likely develops and changes as major trusting events have been honored (or violated) in that individual's history of prior social interactions, and may have its most pronounced effect in novel or ambiguous situations. Developmental psychologists have suggested that the development of a generalized expectancy to trust is deeply rooted in early childrearing practices with parents, siblings and significant others.⁷ Others have suggested that trust may also be biological. [Yarn & Jones, *Biology*]

Characteristics of Trustworthy People

Our trust in another individual (the trustee) can be grounded in our evaluation of his/her ability, integrity, and benevolence.⁸ The more we observe these characteristics in another person, in a given situation, the more likely we will be to trust that person. *Ability* refers to an assessment of the trustee's knowledge, skill, or competency. Trust requires an appraisal that the trustee is able to do a job well, possesses the necessary skills, and will perform in a manner that will meet our expectations. If a person promises to fulfill an obligation or do a job, our judgment of their ability or competence to actually meet the obligation or complete the job will be essential to our willingness to trust them.

Integrity is the degree to which the trustee adheres to principles that are acceptable to the trustor. This dimension leads us to trust another based on the consistency of their past actions with us, the credibility of their communication, their commitment to adhere to reasonable standards of fairness, and the congruence between their words and deeds. Finally, *benevolence* is our assessment that the trusted individual is concerned enough about our welfare to either advance our interests, or at least not impede them. The trustee's perceived intentions or motives are most central. Being supportive of our interests, communicating honestly and openly, and showing willingness to delegate decisions and share power or control with us, are all indicators of one's benevolence.

Although these three dimensions are likely to be linked to each other, they each contribute separately to influence the level of trust in another within a relationship. However, ability and integrity are likely to be most influential early in a relationship, while information about the other's benevolence may need more time to emerge. The effect of benevolence will increase trust as the relationship between the parties grows closer; I discuss this in the next section as I describe two major types of trust.

Two Types of Trust

Recent work on trust has argued that trust and distrust are fundamentally different. In addition, recent studies have shown that there are several different types of trust.⁹ Trust in a 'shallow' (more superficial) relationship is probably different from trust in a 'deep' (more close, intense) relationship; we will define these different types of trust as calculus-based trust and identification-based trust.

Calculus-Based Trust

Calculus-based trust (CBT) is concerned with assuring consistent behavior in the other. CBT is grounded in the assumption that the other will do what they say because (a) they are rewarded for keeping their word and preserving the relationship, or (b) they fear the consequences of not doing what they said they would do. Trust is sustained to the degree that the punishment for not trusting is clear, viable, and likely to occur. Thus, the threat of punishment is likely to be as significant, if not more significant, as a motivator to sustain CBT than the promise of reward.

This form of trust is most consistent with relationships that are largely arms-length market transactions, *or* with the early stages of relationships that might become closer and more personal. In these relationships, the trustor (intuitively or explicitly) calculates the value of creating and sustaining trust in the relationship relative to the costs of sustaining or severing the relationship. Compliance with calculus-based trust is often assured both by providing rewards for being trusting (and trustworthy) and by the threat that if trust is violated, one will either directly pay the price for breaking the agreement, or their reputation for being trustworthy will be hurt and will affect future dealings. A parent trusts his son with the keys to the sports car because bringing the car back in good shape will be rewarded with future opportunities to drive it, *and* because the failure to do so will result in significant loss of driving privileges and an unwillingness to trust the son with the keys or other privileges in the future.

Identification-Based Trust

The second type of trust is grounded in identification with the other's desires and intentions. At this level, trust exists because the parties effectively understand and appreciate each other's wants, desires and values; this mutual understanding is developed to the point that each party can effectively act for the other. Identification-based trust (IBT) thus permits a party to serve as the other's agent in interpersonal transactions.¹⁰ The other can be confident that his or her interests will be fully protected, and that no surveillance or monitoring of the actor is necessary. As the parties get to know each other and identification develops, the parties come to understand what they must do to sustain the other's trust. One comes to learn what really matters to the other, and comes to place the same importance on those behaviors, qualities, expectations and standards as the other does. Using the same example, the parent trusts the son because the son clearly understands the responsibility attached to driving a sports car, empathizes with the risk felt by the parent, and visibly treats the car with extra care and caution.

IBT is the type of trust one might expect to see developed in close friendships, partnerships, or long standing business relationships. Parties affirm strong identification-based trust by developing a collective identity (a joint name, title, logo, etc.); co-locating (working together in the same building or neighborhood); creating joint products or goals, such as a new product line or building a new living space together; and committing to commonly shared values, such that the parties are actually committed to the same objectives and can substitute for each other in external transactions. A suitable metaphor for identification-based trust may be a musical one, such as “harmonizing” or “jamming.” Great identification-based trust can be seen in all kinds of relationships and teams. When people can anticipate each other’s actions and intentions and flawlessly execute a great symphony, a complex surgery, a spectacular touchdown, a flawless relay race handoff, or an alley-oop pass to the basket with one second left on the clock, we see the product of strong, positive identification-based trust.

Current Thinking About Distrust

Distrust is the confident expectation that another individual’s motives, intentions, and behaviors are sinister and harmful to one’s own interests. In interdependent relationships, this often entails a sense of fear and anticipation of discomfort or danger. Distrust naturally prompts us to take steps that reduce our vulnerability in an attempt to protect our interests. Accordingly, our distrust of others is likely to evoke a competitive (as opposed to cooperative) orientation that can stimulate or exacerbate conflict. A distrusting orientation has also been linked to lower job satisfaction, motivation and workplace commitment.

Causes of Distrust

Distrust may arise due to differences in group membership: individuals identify and are positively attached to their in-groups, yet assign negative *stereotypes* to out-group members and may view them with suspicion and hostility. Distrust can also arise directly as the result of *past personal experiences* among individuals, such as when one person breaks a promise to another. Distrust can also result from knowing another’s *reputation*, [Tinsley, et al., *Reputations*] meaning that while there has been no direct personal experience, indirect information may be enough to create distrusting expectations. Finally, distrust is likely to increase with the *magnitude of a past trust violation*, the number of past violations, and the perception that the offender intended to commit the violation.

Some Level of Distrust May be Functional

Although the discussion suggests that distrust can be patently harmful, there are potentially valuable benefits of some distrust. All of us have had experiences where we misjudged another person as credible and trustworthy, only to be exploited. Hence, distrust can be a valuable mechanism that prevents us from falling prey to a naive view of another that allows us to be blind to clues of their untrustworthiness (and thus makes us unwitting co-conspirators to our own exploitation). A certain level of distrust is also vital to preventing excessive group cohesion that precludes sound decision-making (called “groupthink”).¹¹ In addition, a certain amount of distrust allows us to set boundaries around another’s behavior in a way that limits their freedom yet permits functional interaction. (So, for example, I might trust my friend to walk my dog, but not trust them with a key to my house that would let them enter any time they choose). Vigilance toward the other, periodic monitoring of their behavior, and formal contracts are all reasonable and appropriate ways to assure compliance. It also may be necessary to strictly compartmentalize and set “appropriate” boundaries in certain relation-

ships, so that we minimize the areas in which one becomes vulnerable to another. In short, it is possible (and even advisable) to have a “healthy dose” of distrust, particularly with people whom we do not know well.

But Too Much Distrust May Be Dysfunctional

However, distrust can lead to adverse effects as well. Once in place, distrust forms a powerful frame on subsequent events in the relationship, such that even good-faith efforts by the offender to restore the relationship are met with skepticism and suspicion. The result is a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” where every move the other person makes is interpreted as additional evidence that justifies an initial decision to distrust him/her. This distrust not only inhibits cooperation and successful negotiation, but also may result in retaliation that causes the conflict to escalate. [Coleman, et al., *Dynamical*] Taken to its extreme, distrust can give rise to paranoid cognitions—false or exaggerated cognitions that one is subject to malevolent treatment by others.¹² [Jeglic & Jeglic, *Disordered People*] Such perceptions drive individuals to the point of hypervigilance (excessively trying to make sense of every action the other person takes) and rumination (brooding or “stewing” on the meaning of the other person’s behavior and their intentions), resulting in a faulty diagnosis about whether the other can be trusted or not. Distrust leads the parties to reduce their willingness to share information and engage in problem-solving in conflict situations, and hence to be more likely to use distributive bargaining approaches with the other party, an approach that usually overlooks integrative, value-creating opportunities. Distrust can also cause conflicts to escalate, as positions harden and the parties become increasingly reluctant to yield concessions. The negative emotions that emerge with distrust—fear, suspicion and anger—cause the trustor to vilify and demonize the other party. This view becomes especially damaging when the parties use these perspectives of each other to justify retaliatory actions that cause the conflict to escalate out of control.

Two Types of Distrust

Similar to our discussion of calculus- and identification-based levels of trust, we can draw the same distinction between calculus-based distrust (CBD) and identification-based distrust (IBD). CBD is confident *negative* expectations of another’s conduct. These expectations are grounded in impersonal, arms-length transactions where the overall costs of maintaining trust are expected to outweigh the benefits of maintaining trust. We expect that in any encounter with the other, the costs will outweigh the benefits. In these relationships, we have two fundamental choices: either choose to *not* deal with this individual, or, if we must deal with them, then construct boundaries that limit the degree of interdependence and vulnerability inherent in the transaction. In addition, we can put into place systems that allow for monitoring and enforcement so as to assure that distrust can be managed in areas where we might be vulnerable (for example, limited access for joint venture research scientists employed by a competitor). It is essential for the parties to try to establish open communication to clarify their objectives, so both sides can try to ascertain the boundaries that merit trust versus distrust. Alternatively, CBD can be managed by cultivating alternative relationships to satisfy one’s interests. When one has alternative ways to get one’s needs met, the need to trust a specific other decreases. This limits the degree of dependence on someone who may violate the trust.

Identification-based distrust (IBD) is confident negative expectations of another’s conduct, grounded in a perceived incompatibility of closely-held values, dissimilar or competing goals, and/or a negative emotional attachment. We expect that we have little in common with the other; in fact, the other may be a commit-

ted adversary who is out to do us in. IBD denotes incompatible values and goals, and also a negative emotional attachment to the other. Distrust is felt viscerally (in the “gut”) as much as cognitively (in the head). In most cases, we would choose to separate ourselves from people with whom we have strong IBD, and minimize both our interaction with them and our dependence on them. However, there are times when we must continue relationships with these people. There are several ways to cope with this situation. First, our differences with this person may be more imagined than real. Efforts to talk out our differences, often with the help of a third party who can facilitate communications, may help the parties realize possible commonalities (if only there is common distrust that should be managed). However, if this is not effective, the parties will need to identify those specific areas where they need to work together, and “bound” their interactions with each other so that discussions around those issues are careful, controlled, and above board. So, for example, if a colleague and I do not trust each other but have to work together on an important committee, we will limit our interaction to professional work on the committee, but otherwise avoid each other outside those meetings. The parties may also try to work out their differences in other key areas of contention, but if the distrust between them is strong and longstanding, such efforts are unlikely to be productive. Thus, if we cannot learn to live with the distrust we have for each other outside the committee, one of us may have to resign from the committee to keep from impeding its work.

The Impact of Trust on Negotiations

Before discussing the implications of these four forms of trust on a negotiation, we will briefly review the research that has been done on the role of trust in the negotiation process.

Many researchers have explored trust in negotiation.¹³ Early studies were often conducted with more primitive conceptualizations of trust than described here, and in reasonably primitive experimental settings, and hence the findings were rather limited in nature. As one might expect, this early research generally showed that higher levels of trust make negotiation easier, while lower levels of trust make negotiation more difficult. Similarly, integrative processes tend to increase trust, while more distributive processes are likely to decrease trust.¹⁴ Recent research on trust has revealed a more complex relationship between trust and negotiation behavior, as follows:

- Many people approach a new relationship with an unknown other party with remarkably high levels of trust. While people in new relationships might be expected to start their trust of the other at “zero,” in fact, most of us assume that the other can be trusted and are remarkably willing to trust the other, even with very little information or knowledge about the other.¹⁵
- Trust tends to cue cooperative behavior. Parties who trust each other approach each other with cooperative dispositions.¹⁶
- Individual motives also shape both trust and expectations of the other’s behavior. Parties who are more cooperatively motivated report higher initial trust of the other party and more positive initial impressions of the other than those who are individually motivated.¹⁷
- Trustors, and those trusted, may focus on different things as trust is being built. Trustors may focus primarily on the risks of being trusted (e.g. how vulnerable they are), while those being trusted focus on the benefits to be received from the trust. Here we see a negotiator ‘framing bias’ [Korobkin & Guthrie, *Heuristics*] by the sender and receiver that shapes how trust actions are viewed. From the trustor’s perspective, they are more likely to trust when the risk is low, but their willingness to trust does not seem to

depend on the level of benefit received by the person being trusted. However, the receiver is more likely to trust when the benefits to be received from the trust are high, but their trust does not seem to depend on the level of vulnerability feared by the trustor. Moreover, each party reported that they were not particularly sensitive to the factors that affected their counterpart's decision—that is, each could not or did not put themselves in the other's shoes and understand how the other would see it.¹⁸ Thus, trust building might be greatly facilitated if parties can communicate more clearly about the vulnerabilities to be felt or the benefits to be received, and how to manage these effectively.

- The nature of the negotiation task (distributive vs. integrative) can shape how parties judge the trust. In a more distributive context, trustors tend to focus on the risks they face, while those who are in a position to receive and then reciprocate the others' trust focus on the benefits that the trustors have provided them. Given the framing biases about risk,¹⁹ however, neither party tends to consider the other's point of view prior to making a decision whether to reciprocate the other's trust. As a result, the possibilities for trust to break down, or not be fulfilled, may increase because neither party truly understands the risks or rewards as perceived by the other. More reciprocity occurs among individuals who are better at taking the perspective of the other in a negotiation, and can also be 'coached' by encouraging a negotiator to consider the views of the other party in their decision-making.²⁰
- Greater expectations of trust between negotiators lead to greater information sharing with the other party;²¹ similarly, greater expectations of distrust lead to less information sharing.²²
- Greater information sharing tends to enhance effectiveness in achieving a good negotiation outcome (and less information sharing tends to diminish effectiveness in achieving a good outcome), although this effectiveness may *not* necessarily be the result of greater trust.²³
- Distributive processes lead negotiators to see the negotiation dialogue, and critical events in the dialogue, as largely about the nature of the negotiation task (i.e. how to divide the pie). Distributive processes also lead people to judge the other party negatively. Both of these perspectives tend to reduce trust. In contrast, integrative processes lead negotiators to see the dialogue as largely about interests, relationships, and positive affect, and to see the other positively; these perspectives tend to increase trust.²⁴
- Trust increases the likelihood that negotiation will proceed on a favorable course over the life of a negotiation. Researchers have begun to examine key events or 'turning points' in negotiation, i.e. comments or behaviors that turn the negotiation in a more positive (or more negative) direction.²⁵ One study has generally shown that trust increases the likelihood of more facilitative turning points around interests and the relationship, and decreases the number of inhibitory turning points around discussion of a distributive task or negative characterization of the other party. These processes subsequently lead to higher levels of trust at the end of the negotiation, and lower levels of distrust, and the process increases both calculative-based trust and identification-based trust.²⁶
- Face-to-face negotiation encourages greater trust development than negotiating electronically (e.g., on-line). [Bhappu & Barsness, *E-Mail*] There is evidence that parties anticipating an online negotiation expect less trust before the negotiations begin, are less satisfied with their negotiation outcomes, are less confident in the quality of their performance during the

negotiation, trust the other less after the negotiation, and have less desire for a future interaction with the other party.²⁷

- Negotiators who are representing others' interests, rather than their own interests, tend to behave in a less trusting way (be less trustworthy), and tend to expect that the other will be more trusting. As a result of being less trustworthy, negotiators engage in less "give and take" with the other party, and expect the other to engage in less give and take.²⁸

Building Trust and Managing Distrust in Negotiations

Given this review of trust and negotiation research, and the discussion of the four forms of trust (CBT, IBT, CBD and IBD), there are clear action strategies for negotiators who wish to build trust with another party. These strategies are summarized in Table 1. Note that if a negotiator is beginning a relationship with another party, or expects that the relationship with the other party will be no more than a market transaction, then the negotiator need only be concerned about developing and maintaining calculus-based trust (CBT), and managing calculus-based distrust (CBD). However, if the negotiator expects that the relationship could develop into a more intense, deeper, personal relationship, where identification-based trust (IBT) would be more common, then the negotiator should establish calculus-based trust and also work to build identification-based trust. However, this process cannot be rushed, nor can it be one-sided. Trust building is a bilateral process that requires *mutual* commitment and effort, especially when attempting to de-escalate conflict. While one party can initiate actions that may move the trust-development process forward, the strongest trust must be mutually developed, and at a pace acceptable to both parties. Finally, if the negotiator senses that identification-based distrust is building, then he/she should work both to carefully manage the relationship and to minimize contact with the other.

Table 1
Actions to Manage Different Forms of Trust in Negotiations²⁹

How to Increase Calculus-Based Trust

1. Perform competently. Show your ability to proficiently perform duties and obligations.
2. Create and meet the other party's expectations. Establish consistency and predictability. Be clear about what you intend to do and then do what you say.
3. Stress the benefits of creating mutual trust. Point out the benefits that can be gained for the other, or both parties, by maintaining such trust. Keep promises.
4. Establish credibility. Make sure your statements are honest and accurate. Tell the truth and keep your word. Communicate accurately, openly and transparently.
5. Show concern for others. Act in a way that respects and protects other people. Show sensitivity to their needs desires and interests.
6. Share and delegate control. Share power and allow the other to have voice and control over the process.
7. Develop a good reputation. Work to have others believe that you are someone who both has, and deserves, a reputation for being trusting and acting trustworthily.

How to Increase Identification-Based Trust

1. Develop similar interests. Try to be interested in the same things.

2. Identify similar goals and objectives. Try to identify and explore similar goals, objectives, scenarios for the future.
3. Act and respond similar to the other. Try to do what you know he or she would do in the same situation.
4. Identify common principles and values (but not at the expense of being insincere or compromising your values).
5. Actively discuss your commonalities, and develop plans to enhance and strengthen them.

How to Manage Calculus-Based Distrust

1. Monitor the other party's actions. Make sure they are doing what they say they would do.
2. Prepare formal agreements (contracts, memoranda of understanding, etc.) that specify what each party has committed to do, and specify the consequences that will occur if each party does not fulfill their obligations.
3. Build in plans for 'inspecting' and verifying the other's commitments. Specify how you will know if the other party is not living up to their agreements, and establish procedures for gathering data to verify their commitments.³⁰
4. Develop ways to make sure that the other party cannot take advantage of your trust and good will by 'invading' other parts of your personal space. Be vigilant of the other's actions and constantly monitor your personal boundaries.
5. Use formal legal mechanisms if there are concerns that the other is taking advantage of you.
6. Actively engage third parties (mediators and arbitrators) to assure clear communication and create manageable agreements and boundaries.

How to Manage Identification-Based Distrust

1. Expect that you and the other will regularly disagree, see things differently, take opposing views and stand for different ideals and principles.
2. Assume that the other party will exploit or take advantage of you if he/she has the opportunity. Closely monitor your boundaries with this person regularly.
3. Check out and verify information, commitments and promises made to you by the other party. Never take their word as given.
4. Minimize whatever interdependence you have with this party, and strongly manage the interdependencies that you have to have. Be vigilant of their efforts to take advantage of you or your good will. Be controlled and 'distant' in what you say and how you say it to this person.
5. Minimize personal self-disclosure to this individual, so as to not disclose information that could make you vulnerable. Do not share any confidences or secrets; assume you will be betrayed if you do.
6. Always assume that with this person, you should not let your guard down, and that any vulnerability will be exploited.

Rebuilding Trust

A chapter on trust would be incomplete without giving brief attention to ways to rebuild trust that has been broken. Effective trust repair is often necessary to restart negotiations or move them forward. Although the process is difficult, there are steps the offender can take to enhance the likelihood of stimulating the victim's willingness to reconcile, and further the trust rebuilding process. [Waldman

& Lusk, *Anger & Forgiveness*; Brown & Robbennolt, *Apology*] However, rebuilding trust is a process, not an event. As such, it is likely to consume a lot of time and resources. Actions in the short term may be confined to managing distrust. Nonetheless, here are recommendations for rebuilding trust (mostly focused on CBT actions):

- *Take action immediately after the violation.* Offenders should act quickly to engage in restorative efforts. This communicates sensitivity to the victim and the relationship, and avoids the double-burden the victim has to incur by both suffering the consequences of the violation *and* the embarrassment of confronting the offender with the consequences of his behavior.
- *Provide an apology, and give a thorough account of what happened.* Take responsibility for your actions if you are culpable, and express remorse for the harm created for the victim. Your remorse indicates to the victim that you have also suffered as a result of your actions, and the victim may be less likely to pursue vengeance and escalate the conflict. Also, be sure to carefully explain the circumstances that led to the violation, so the victim can understand the events that led you to your decisions. This will help them see the rationale behind your actions and give them a better sense of the values and parameters that are likely to shape your actions in the future.
- *Be sincere.* The victim is closely scrutinizing your motives and intentions, so it is imperative to sincerely strive to repair the harm from the violation. Take action unilaterally and volitionally, and make every effort to show through your words and actions that you genuinely desire to earn the victim's trust again.
- *Be cognizant of the day-to-day history of the relationship.* If the overall history of the relationship is good, and there are few if any past trust violations, the prospects for trust repair are more promising than in relationships characterized by many trust violations or few trust-confirming events. Make it a priority to honor trust on a daily basis in order to provide a conducive environment for trust repair should the need arise.
- *Provide restitution/penance.* Substantiate your verbal claims with concrete actions that demonstrate a good-faith effort to compensate the victim for the harmful effects of the violation. In CBT relationships, what the victim wants more than your kind words is some tangible aspect of the transaction that he/she was counting on.
- *Restate and renegotiate expectations for the future, and be trustworthy in future interactions.* You are likely to be "on probation" for a period, as the victim tests the waters to see if you actually resume trustworthy behavior. Be sure to take this into account, and take proactive steps to manage the expectations of the victim by specifically articulating what standards should be expected. Then commit to following these standards in the future—and, finally, make good on that commitment.³¹

Endnotes

¹ Denise Rousseau, et al., *Not So Different After All: A Cross-discipline View of Trust*, 23 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 393, 395(1998).

² Roy Lewicki, et al., *Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities*, 23 THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 439 (1998).

³ Edward Tomlinson & Roy Lewicki, *Managing Interpersonal Trust and Distrust*, in BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Guy Burgess & Heidi Burgess eds., 2003), available at http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/trust_overview.jsp.

⁴ See Lewicki, et al., *supra*, note 2.

- ⁵ See Roy Lewicki & Carolyn Wiethoff, *Trust, Trust Development and Trust Repair*, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 86 (Morton Deutsch & Peter Coleman eds., 2000).
- ⁶ See, e.g., Julian Rotter, *Generalized Expectancies for Interpersonal Trust*, 26 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 443 (1971).
- ⁷ See ERIC ERIKSON, *CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY* (1963).
- ⁸ See Roger Mayer, et al., *An Intergrative Model of Organizational Trust*, 20 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 709 (1995).
- ⁹ See, e.g., Roy Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, *Trust in Relationships: A Model of Development and Decline*, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE WORKS OF MORTON DEUTSCH 133 (Barbara Benedict Bunker & Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., 1995); Roy Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, *Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships*, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 114 (Roderick Kramer & Tom Taylor eds., 2000); Lewicki & Wiethoff, *supra*, note 5.
- ¹⁰ See Morton Deutsch, *Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical Notes*, 10 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 275 (1962).
- ¹¹ See, e.g., IRVING JANIS, *GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS* (1983).
- ¹² See Roderick Kramer, *The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Organizations*, 18 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 199 (1994).
- ¹³ See Roy Lewicki et al., *Relationships in Negotiation*, in NEGOTIATION Chapter 10 (5th ed. 2005) for a summary of this work.
- ¹⁴ See Mara Olekalns, et al., *Social Value Orientations and Negotiator Outcomes*, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 299 (1996).
- ¹⁵ See Kramer, *supra* note 12; Debra Meyerson, et al., *Swift Trust and Temporary Groups*, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, *supra*, note 9, at 165.
- ¹⁶ See John K. Butler, *Behaviors, Trust and Goal Achievement in a Win-Win Negotiating Role Play*, 20 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 486 (1995); John K. Butler, *Trust Expectations, Information Sharing, Climate of Trust, and Negotiation Effectiveness and Efficiency*, 24 GROUP & ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT 217 (1999).
- ¹⁷ See Mara Olekalns, et al., *The Dynamics of Trust in Negotiation* (Melb. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 2002-09, 2002).
- ¹⁸ See Deepak Malhotra, *Trust and Reciprocity Decisions: The Differing Perspectives of Trustors and Trusted Parties*, 94 ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 61 (2004).
- ¹⁹ See Deepak Malhotra, *Reciprocity in the Context of Trust: The Differing Perspective of Trustors and Trusted Parties* (May 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author).
- ²⁰ *Id.*
- ²¹ See Butler, *Trust, Expectations, Information*, *supra* note 16.
- ²² See Butler, *Trust and Goal Achievement*, *supra* note 16.
- ²³ See Butler, *Trust, Expectations, Information*, *supra* note 16; Olekalns, et al., *supra*, note 17.
- ²⁴ See Olekalns, et al., *supra*, note 17.
- ²⁵ See Gillian Greene & Michael Wheeler, *Awareness and Action in Critical Moments*, 20 NEGOTIATION JOURNAL 349 (2004).
- ²⁶ See Olekalns, et al. *supra*, note 16.
- ²⁷ See Charles Naquin & Gaylen Paulson, *Online Bargaining and Interpersonal Trust*, 88 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 113 (2003).
- ²⁸ Fei Song, *Trust and Reciprocity: The Differing Norms of Individuals and Group Representatives* (Sept. 14, 2004) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
- ²⁹ Based on Lewicki and Stevenson, 1997; Lewicki, McAllister and Bies, 1998; Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000.
- ³⁰ The reader will remember the well-known quote, attributed to President Ronald Reagan: "Trust, but verify!"
- ³¹ See Lewicki & Wiethoff, *supra* note 5; Edward Tomlinson, et al., *The Road to Reconciliation: Antecedents of Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise*, 30 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 165 (2004).