Unilateral Conduct Committee E-Bulletin
Issue 53
May 31, 2007

The Section 2 Committee’s monthly E-Bulletin is intended to offer the antitrust community updates and information on the latest developments relating to monopolization law and policy. If you have any comments or suggestions on the E-Bulletin, please e-mail Jay Modrall (jmodrall@cgsh.com), Adam Nyhan (anyhan@constantinecannon.com), Tanya Dunne (tdunne@cgsh.com), Alee Scott (ascott@constantinecannon.com) and Daniel Streeter (dstreeter@rdblaw.com).  

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS SEEKS AMICUS BRIEFS REGARDING BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF COSTS FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING PREDATORY OR ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT IN ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION CLAIMS

Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth , 479 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. March 20, 2007) . Peacehealth, a hospital in Clark County, Oregon, appealed a jury verdict finding that it had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by allegedly excluding competitors through bundling its provision of services Peacehealth monopolizes with services offered by competitors.

Following oral argument, the N inth Circuit sought amicus briefs addressing the following issue: “Whether a plaintiff who seeks to establish the predatory or anticompetitive conduct element of an attempted monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act by showing that the defendant offered bundled discounts to the defendant's customers must prove that the defendant's prices were below an appropriate measure of the defendant's costs. If so, what is the appropriate measure of costs and how should the trial court instruct the jury on the matter of costs? If not, what standard should the trial court instruct the jury to use to determine whether the bundled discounts are predatory or anticompetitive?” 479 F.3d at 726.

Responsive briefs were due to be filed by April 19, 2007. Eight briefs were submitted to the court, including a brief from the American Antitrust Institute, a brief from a group of law professors, a joint brief by Pactel and Visa, and a joint brief from several large corporations, including Genentech, Inc., Honeywell International, and The Coca-Cola Company.

NEW YORK COURT DISMISSES COUNTERCLAIMS IN MEDICAL BILLING CASE, FINDING THAT LITIGATION COSTS ALONE CANNOT BE ANTITRUST INJURY  

The Am. Med. Ass’n v. United Healthcare Corp., et al. , 2007 WL 683974 (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 2007). The plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants in this case are the American Medical Association, two state medical associations and several physicians. 2007 WL 683974 at *1. The defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs are United Healthcare, Inc., several of its related entities, and American Airlines. The underlying lawsuit challenged the policies by which the defendants paid “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) rates for out-of-network services. One of the plaintiffs’ key discovery goals was the disclosure of data used to calculate UCR rates. Id.

In their counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs sought the UCR data as part of a conspiracy to share fee information among competing physicians and thereby fix prices. Id. That conduct allegedly was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at *2. The defendants also alleged that the same conduct, coupled with the specific intent to acquire or maintain monopoly power in order to fix prices, violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaim.

The defendants’ sole alleged injury was the incurring of significant costs in defending the underlying lawsuit. Id. at *4. Even reading the complaint generously, as required on a motion to dismiss, the court held that litigation costs alone could not be construed as injuries of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Id. at *5. Moreover, there was no allegation that anybody other than the defendants suffered this injury. The court therefore dismissed the counterclaim for lack of antitrust standing based on a failure to show antitrust injury. Id.

CALIFORNIA COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS IN RADIOLOGIST’S STAFF PRIVILEGES CASE

Hilton v. Children’s Hospital-San Diego, et al. , 2007 WL 935724 (S.D. Cal. March 7, 2007). Plaintiff, Dr. Saskia V.W. Hilton, is a pediatrician and radiologist on staff at the University of California, San Diego Medical Center (UCSD). 2007 WL 935724 at *1. Defendants are Children’s Hospital-San Diego (CHSD), San Diego Diagnostic Radiology Medical Group, Inc. (SDDR), a radiology services practice group, and four physicians who are shareholders or officials of SDDR and of whom some are also CHSD officials. Hilton alleged that defendants engaged in a horizontal refusal to deal in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, in addition to violating a California antitrust law. All defendants except CHSD moved for summary judgment.

The conduct at issue was CHSD’s treatment of Hilton’s application for computerized tomography (CT) and ultrasound staff privileges at CHSD. Id. CHSD initially rejected Hilton’s application for those services, which she alleged were essential to a radiologist’s practice. Hilton petitioned CHSD to revisit its decision, and for eight months she repeatedly asked CHSD to make a decision on her petition. In response to each such request, CHSD asked her to submit additional paperwork or told her that a decision was forthcoming, but would not provide a deadline for that decision. Hilton finally refused to submit additional paperwork and demanded a decision. Id. A month later, having received no decision, Hilton sued. Id. at *2.

Hilton alleged that CHSD’s treatment of her petition was in bad faith and resulted from a “market division agreement” between UCSD, where Hilton was on staff, and CHSD, where she sought privileges. Id. The agreement, Hilton alleged, was that UCSD radiologists would not practice at CHSD and that radiologists of SDDR (some of whose shareholders were CHSD officials) would not practice at UCSD. Defendants also allegedly agreed that SDDR would refuse to assist Hilton in the treatment of her patients at CHSD. The agreements and the resulting treatment of Hilton’s application by CHSD allegedly amounted to violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and California antitrust law. Id.

Hilton offered evidence that sufficed, for purposes of defeating summary judgment, to show the alleged agreement. Id. at *5. The court held, however, that she failed to show the necessary element of antitrust injury. Antitrust injury requires some showing that the challenged conduct caused some injury to competition within a market, beyond the impact on an individual claimant. Id. Here, Hilton failed to show that other radiologists were excluded from CHSD, that patients could not find alternatives to defendants for their needs, that prices for radiology services increased to supra-competitive levels, or any other evidence that the court suggested would show antitrust injury. As a result, the court granted summary judgment for defendants on both the Section 1 and the Section 2 claims. Id.

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DISMISSES SECTION 2 CLAIMS AGAINST INTERNET SEARCH LEADER GOOGLE

Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc. , 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. March 16, 2007). Kinderstart.com brought a putative class action against Google, Inc. for, inter alia, alleged monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 2007 WL 831806 at * 1. Google moved to dismiss Kinderstart’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  

Kinderstart operates a website offering information on subjects related to young children. Kinderstart enrolled in a Google advertising program called AdSense. Kinderstart alleged that, after enrolling in this program, Kinderstart’s website no longer appeared in response to Internet searches on Google’s search engine. Kinderstart alleged that Google “blocked” Kinderstart’s webpage from appearing in Google search results, leading to a decrease in traffic on Kinderstart’s website and a corresponding decrease in revenue from Google’s advertising program. Kinderstart alleged that “over a 1000 other sites” suffered similar losses in traffic and revenue. Id. at 1-4. Kinderstart alleged that, through Google’s “blocking” of websites, Google attempted to monopolize: (1) the search market (that consists of search engine design, implementation, and usage within the United States); and (2) the search ad market, (that consists of a universe of advertisers who seek and pay for online advertising and who target and reach Internet browsers and users of search engines).” Id. at 4.

The District Court considered the threshold issue of whether Kinderstart correctly defined a relevant market. The court noted, “a ‘market’ is any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified by a monopolist or a hypothetical cartel, would have power in dealing with any group of buyers.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted). In regard to the “search market,” the court held that Kinderstart could no t show that this market was a “grouping of sales,” because Google did not sell its search service. As for the “search ad market,” the court determined that this market was too narrow, because there was no logical basis to distinguish between a “search ad” generated in response to an internet search and other types of internet advertising. Based on Kinderstart’s failure to plead a relevant market, the court dismissed Kinderstart’s Section 2 claims without leave to amend. Id. at 5-6.

To further support its dismissal without leave to amend, the court went on to explain other deficiencies in Kinderstart’s Section 2 claims. In regard to the attempted monopolization claim, the court stated that Kinderstart could not show that Google had an intent to monopolize because Google’s alleged wrongful acts – excluding websites from google.com search results – do not exclude Google’s competitors from the market. In addition, the court noted that Kinderstart is not a competitor of Google. Id. at 6. The court also analyzed Kinderstart’s laundry list of alleged anti-competitive conduct, including blocking websites, filing misleading statements with the SEC regarding its search engine, and price manipulation. The court found that Kinderstart failed to allege the specific facts needed to support these allegations. Id. at 7-10. The court also found that Kinderstart could not show Google had a “dangerous probability” of achieving monopoly power because, despite Google’s dominance in the search engine market, Kinderstart could not show that Google’s rivals were barred from the market. Id. at 10.

In regard to Kinderstart’s monopolization claim, the court found that Kinderstart failed to allege facts supporting the essential elements of the claim. Kinderstart did not allege facts showing that Google exercised monopoly power by excluding competitors or controlling prices, or that Google had the power to eliminate competitors through its control over an “essential facility.” Id at 11-12.

The court rejected Kinderstart’s arguments, holding that Kinderstart had failed to meet the threshold requirements, or any of the elements, for its claims of attempted monopolization and monopolization.

EDITOR’S NOTE – In a separate opinion, the Kinderstart court granted, in part, Google’s motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The court found that counsel for Kinderstart had a professional responsibility to refrain from making certain allegations against Google and should pay Google’s fees associated with the sanctionable conduct. Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 831811 (N.D. Cal. March 16, 2007).

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO DENIES MOTION TO DISMISS ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM AGAINST BIOPHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY

Nabi Biopharmaceuticals v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc ., 2007 WL 894473 (S.D. Ohio March 21, 2007). Nabi Biopharmaceuticals brought an action for patent infringement against Roxane Laboratories, Inc., after Roxane sought approval from the FDA to market a generic version of Nabi’s product, PhosLo, a prescription drug used to treat excess phosphorous retention. 2007 WL 894473 at * 1. Nabi holds three patents for PhosLo – the “105” patent, which was set to expire in April 2007, and the “445” and “665” patents, which will not expire for many years. Nabi alleges that Roxane’s generic version of PhosLo will infringe on the 445 and 665 patents. In response, Roxane asserted counterclaims alleging, among other causes of action, attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. Nabi moved to dismiss the attempted monopolization claim, arguing that Roxane failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome the presumption that Nabi was immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and that Roxane failed to sufficiently plead the elements of its counterclaim. Id. at 2.  

The District Court explained that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine “operates to shield from antitrust liability those who petition the government,” including the initiation and prosecution of a claim for patent infringement. Id. The court explained further that Nabi may be immune from antitrust liability for seeking to enforce its patents unless Roxane provides evidence that Nabi is engaged in “sham litigation” or that Nabi has committed Walker Process fraud. Id. at 2.

The court began its analysis of the “sham litigation” exception by noting, “immunity may be withheld when petitioning conduct is a ‘mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.’” Id. at 3 (citation omitted). The court found that Nabi’s allegations met this exception, rejecting the argument that Roxane had merely alleged a “theory of non-infringement.” The court stated that Roxane sufficiently alleged that Nabi knew Roxane’s products would not infringe any valid patents so that Nabi’s suit was “objectively baseless” and also concealed an attempt by Nabi to interfere with its competitor Roxane. Id. at 3- 4.

In regard to the Walker Process exception, the court stated that in order to show Walker Process fraud, Roxane must show, “by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a misrepresentation or omission, (2) made with intent to deceive the Patent Office, (3) on which the Patent Office justifiably relied, and (4) but for which the patent would not have issued.” Id. at 5 (citation omitted). Roxane alleged that, in applying for the 445 and 665 PhosLo patents, Nabi misled the Patent Office by concealing that these later patents covered essentially the same product as the initial PhosLo patent. The court determined that these allegations were sufficient to meet the Walker Process exception. Id. 5-6.

The court went on to analyze Roxane’s attempted monopolization counterclaim. Nabi argued that the claim should be dismissed, because Roxane failed to allege that Nabi had a “dangerous probability” of achieving monopoly power and that Roxane has failed to plead either an antitrust injury, an injury in fact, or a causal relationship between the alleged violation and any alleged injury. The court rejected these arguments, stating that Roxane had alleged a “dangerous probability” of success by arguing that Nabi sought to foreclose competitors from the market upon expiration of the initial PhosLo patent. In regard to Roxane’s injury, the court found that Nabi’s alleged attempt to exclude competitors was an antitrust injury and that Roxane’s intention and preparation to enter the market demonstrated an injury in fact. With respect to a causal relationship, the court determined that Roxane incurred litigation expense because of Nabi’s alleged actions, as well as exclusion from the market. Id. at 7-8. In addition, the court stated that the fact that Roxane’s application to make the generic drug had not yet been approved should not preclude it from alleging an antitrust injury. Id at 8.

NEVADA DISTRICT COURT DENIES MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SECTION 2 CLAIMS BROUGHT BY MAKER OF “WHEEL OF FORTUNE” SLOT MACHINES

IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp ., 2007 WL 911773 (D. Nev. March 22, 2007) . IGT and Bally Gaming, Inc. are competitors in the design and manufacture of gaming machines. IGT commenced a patent infringement suit against Bally, claiming that several of Bally’s games infringed on patents used in IGT’s “Wheel of Fortune” gaming machine. 2007 WL 911773 at * 1. Bally filed counterclaims alleging, among other things, that IGT’s patents were invalid and that IGT used these invalid patents to unlawfully exclude Bally from the wheel game market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Nevada law. Id. at 2. IGT brought a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Bally’s claims for attempted monopolization of the wheel game market were unsustainable as a matter of law. Id.

The Nevada District Court noted that the misuse of patent rights may amount to a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 3. The court went on to state that, in addition to the typical elements of a Section 2 claim, a party alleging a “bad faith enforcement” claim such as Bally’s, must also provide “clear and convincing” evidence that the alleged offender had actual knowledge that the patents at issue were invalid. Id. at 4.

The court analyzed each of the elements of Bally’s “bad faith enforcement” claims. First, the court determined that Bally had presented sufficient evidence of IGT’s alleged bad faith patent prosecution by providing evidence that the patents at issue were already in use when IGT obtained them and that IGT had misrepresented the prior art involved with the patents. Id. at 4-6. Second, the court determined that Bally had presented sufficient, indirect evidence of IGT’s specific intent to destroy competition by providing evidence that IGT actively sought to enforce patents it allegedly knew to be invalid. Id. at 6. Third, the court considered whether Bally had shown sufficient evidence of IGT’s “dangerous probability of success” in excluding competitors from the wheel game market. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had previously held that, even if Bally cannot prove actual exclusion, the “dangerous probability of success” element can be inferred from evidence suggesting an intent to exclude others from the market. Id. at 7. The court determined that Bally had presented sufficient evidence of IGT’s intent by showing that IGT had, in the past, excluded others from the market by filing lawsuits claiming infringement of allegedly invalid patents. Id. at 7-8. Fourth, the court rejected IGT’s argument that Bally had not suffered an antitrust injury, finding that Bally’s costs in defending the patent litigation qualified as an antitrust injury because Bally had also demonstrated that IGT’s alleged bad faith infringement claims were a “serious threat to competition.” Id. at 8-9.

In sum, the court determined that Bally’s allegations that IGT used allegedly invalid patents to exclude others from the wheel game market were sufficient to survive summary judgment. Based on these same findings, the court also denied IGT’s motion for summary judgment on Bally’s state law monopolization claims and Bally’s Walker Process claim. Id. at 11.

AGENCIES CONTINUE JOINT HEARINGS ON SECTION 2

The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (Antitrust Division) continued their joint hearings exploring Section 2 policy. Sessions on March 7 and 8 concerned monopoly power and market definition, while March 28 and sessions explored remedies in Section 2 cases.

Summaries of these hearings, prepared by Amanda Wait of the Federal Trade Commission and Devin Sullivan of Hogan & Hartson LLP, are available on the Committee’s Unilateral Conduct “Hot Topics” page, located here. More information on the agencies’ past hearings and plans for future hearings is available here.  

AGENCIES TESTIFY BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMPETITION POLICY AND CONSUMER RIGHTS  

On March 7, the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (Antitrust Division) testified at an oversight hearing of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Assistant Attorney General Thomas O. Barnett provided an overview of the Antitrust Division’s recent enforcement activities and policies. With respect to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, he highlighted the Division’s cases against Dentsply and the National Association of Realtors as two especially significant actions. See his testimony here. Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras discussed the joint FTC-Antitrust Division hearings on Section 2 and the FTC-Antitrust Division joint amicus brief urging reversal of the Ninth Circuit opinion in the Weyerhaueser case. See her testimony here.

ECJ UPHOLDS FINE ON BRITISH AIRWAYS FINE FOR ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

On March 15, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld the Court of First Instance’s (CFI) 2003 dismissal of British Airways’ (BA) appeal of a European Commission fining decision for abuse of dominance by offering certain bonus schemes to travel agents (see judgment).

BA had concluded agreements with UK travel agents whereby agents received bonuses in addition to their standard 7% commissions for sales of BA tickets. The details of these bonus commissions varied over time, but they generally shared the feature that the agent would receive a bonus commission of 1-3% depending on the extent to which it had increased its sales of BA tickets relative to a past reference period (the last quarter). Once the sales target was reached, the agent would receive the bonus commission, not only on the additional tickets needed to meet the threshold, but also on all BA tickets sold during the period of assessment. In other words, the rebates applied retroactively back to the first ticket – sometimes called an “all-unit” discount.

Following an investigation after complaints were filed by rival airline Virgin Atlantic Airways, the Commission found that BA’s bonus commission scheme constituted an abuse of its dominant position as a purchaser of travel agents’ services in the United Kingdom, and fined BA €6.8 million. The Commission found BA’s practices were exclusionary; as BA was much larger than its nearest rivals, applying a discount to travel agents’ entire BA ticket sales would make it more difficult for rivals to compete. The Commission also found BA’s bonus commissions discriminatory, because agents selling the same absolute amount of tickets could receive different bonus commissions depending on how large that increase was relative to their respective past sales.

On appeal, the CFI upheld the Commission’s decision (see judgment). Criticisms of the Commission decision and the CFI’s judgment, which formed the basis of BA’s appeal to the ECJ, included: (i) the fact that certain forms of rebate practices were considered abusive with little or no inquiry into their actual of likely effects; (ii) it was perverse to find an abuse in circumstances where, as in BA/Virgin, the dominant firm’s market share fell during the period of the alleged abuse and rivals’ shares increased; (iii) the pro-competitive aspects of rebate practices were essentially ignored; and (iv) a legal test based on whether the rebate was “loyalty-enhancing” was ambiguous, because legitimate price competition has a similar effect. Equally, on price discrimination, critics argued that there was virtually no inquiry into the economic effects of such practices, which are often neutral or pro-competitive.

The ECJ followed the CFI decision in rejecting BA’s appeal. The ECJ’s principal findings of interest are as follows:

• The list of abuses mentioned in the text of Article 82 is only illustrative and not exhaustive;
• Article 82 is aimed not only at practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are “detrimental to [consumers] through their impact on an effective competition structure;”
• The judgment confirms past Commission practice that certain forms of rebates – in particular, individualized “all unit” discounts – tend to have exclusionary effects;
• Rebate practices with an exclusionary effect may be objectively justified by efficiencies (although little or no guidance is provided as to what justifications would suffice); and
• Issues of price discrimination only arise if the disfavored party suffers a competitive disadvantage (which is consistent with the wording of Article 81(c)).

The ECJ rejected BA’s contention that rebate practices cannot be considered unlawful simply because of effects “at the margin.” The ECJ set out a general test for assessing the legality of rebate schemes: (i) whether the discounts or bonuses can produce an exclusionary effect, i.e., first, whether they are capable of making market entry very difficult or impossible for competitors of the undertaking in a dominant position, and second, whether they are capable of making it more difficult or impossible for its co-contractors to choose between various sources of supply or commercial partners. If an exclusionary effect is determined, there must be an examination of whether there is any objective economic justification for the discounts or bonuses granted. The ECJ confirmed the exclusionary effect of BA’s commissions by pointing to BA’s sizeable market share and the facts that BA’s commissions were not tied to objective factors (such as volume), but were individualized and goal-related, and related not only to the marginal ticket sales but to the agent’s total BA ticket sales. The ECJ also rejected BA’s arguments that it was nonsensical to find exclusionary effects when its market share had decreased, and that the CFI’s claim that competitors would have done better absent abusive conduct was circular. The ECJ dismissed these claims, holding, inter alia, that it would not interfere with the CFI’s findings of fact and that Article 82 targets direct prejudice to consumers, as well as harm to an effective competition structure.

On the issue of discrimination, the ECJ rejected BA’s argument that the CFI did not sufficiently analyze the conditions for abusive discrimination. The ECJ deferred to the CFI’s findings on equivalence and competitive disadvantage. With regard to discrimination, the ECJ held that it is necessary to find not only that the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant market position is discriminatory, but also that it tends to hinder the competitive position of some of the business partners of that undertaking in relation to others.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION WARNS MICROSOFT ON INTEROPERABILITY

On March 1, the European Commission sent a Statement of Objections (SO) to Microsoft for failing to satisfy certain requirements of the Commission’s March 2004 decision (see IP/07/269). The 2004 Commission decision found Microsoft had abused its dominant position in PC operating systems to leverage the market for work group server operating systems. The Commission mandated that Microsoft provide interface documentation on “reasonable and non-discriminatory terms” to allow competing work group servers to function on Windows PCs and servers. Microsoft currently furnishes licenses with prices based on whether protocols contain innovation.

The recent SO warned that interoperability materials submitted by Microsoft falsely claim to embody innovation. The software company charges protocol customers for innovation that, according to the Commission’s technical advisors, does not exist. The Commission consequently maintained that current Microsoft royalty rates are unreasonable. Microsoft was given four weeks from its receipt of the SO to reply to the Commission, after which the Commission will impose a daily fine for failure to comply with its 2004 decision.

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Back issues of the E-Bulletin are available here.

Jay Modrall
Vice-Chair, Unilateral Conduct Committee
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Rue de la Loi 57
B-1040 Brussels
+32 (0)2 287 2024
jmodrall@cgsh.com

Adam Nyhan
Constantine | Cannon LLP
450 Lexington Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 350-2772
anyhan@constantinecannon.com

Tanya Dunne
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Rue de la Loi 57
B-1040 Brussels
+32 (0)2 287 2057
tdunne@cgsh.com

Alee Scott
Constantine | Cannon LLP
450 Lexington Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 350-2796
ascott@constantinecannon.com

Daniel Streeter
Ross, Dixon & Bell, LLP
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1200
Irvine, CA 92614-8592
(949) 622-2717
dstreeter@rdblaw.com