Florence Thépot is a final year PhD candidate at University College London and a Fellow of the UCL Centre for Law, Economics and Society. She graduated from Sciences- Po, Strasbourg with specialization in Economics and Finance (2008). She holds a Master’s degree in European Economic Studies, with specialization in Law and Economics of competition – from the College of Europe, Bruges (2009). She is currently visiting the research center Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée of the University of Strasbourg. In the past academic years Florence taught Economics of Competition Law to LLM students. Her professional experience also includes work at Linklaters LLP in the Competition law/Antitrust group, (2011/2012) and work at the European Commission in the Directorate General for Internal Market and Services (2009/2010).
Florence’s PhD explores the interaction between competition law and corporate governance, and seeks to see to what extent the rules of competition should further get within the boundaries of the firm. After examining issues at the interface of competition law and corporate governance such as individual sanctions, derivative actions, disqualification orders and corporate compliance programs, she is currently working on the issue of structural links between competing companies, namely minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates. During her research visit in Washington D.C, Florence will be looking at the US perspective on those issues. The European Commission is currently reviewing the possibility to address the existing enforcement gap around these issues. In contrast, the possible anti-competitive effects arising from those structural links are captured by US antitrust law provisions. In addition, the Clayton Act provision on interlocking directorates constitutes a rare statutory interaction between antitrust law and corporate governance. In the light of the US experience, and on features related to specific corporate landscape and history, she will seek to make normative suggestions for EU competition policy.
She is a Ph.D. student at the University of Hamburg and research assistant at the Max Planck Institute for comparative and international Private Law in Hamburg. She obtained her degree in Law from University of Hamburg in 2011. Her work at the Max Planck Institute is characterized by research assistance regarding the organization of lectures and seminaries, including stand-in lectures in the area of European and German competition law. Besides her research subject she held a university teaching position and regularly conducted tutorials in legal methodology at the University of Hamburg in the academic year 2012/2013. Her main field of work is composed of European and German competition Law, in particular she concentrates herself on vertical restraints and the effects of the Internet. Further she is interested in the areas of conflict between competition law and other national objectives like services for the public as well as media diversity.
During her stay in Washington D.C. as an ABA Antitrust Section Scholar in Residence she will work on her research project entitled “Resale Price Maintenance – A Fresh Assessment under the Lens of Competition Law”. The project is part of her doctoral thesis and aims to provide a broad economic and comparative legal analysis of resale price maintenance within the legal frameworks of the United States, the European Union, Germany and Switzerland.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s overruling of the long-standing rule against minimum resale price maintenance agreements in 2007, there evolved a wide discussion about a potential necessity of a change also in the European treatment of resale price maintenance. Indeed, in 2010 the European Commission reacted somewhat to that shift by focusing on efficiency justifications for resale price maintenance in the Guidelines. The research develops a systematic reprocessing of all economic arguments in favor and against resale price maintenance agreements; especially it considers the influence of the internet era on that topic and will evaluate the findings from a policy perspective. In comparative hindsight she will scrutinize the different approaches in the United States and in Europe to RPM and shed light on commonalities and distinctions of these jurisdictions and their sensible prospective exposure to vertical price restraints.