PROMOTING COURT ADR:
ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE-OVERCOMING RESISTANCE

I.

SPEAKERS PREFATORY COMMENTS
(Setting the State for the Session)

This session serves as a forum for discussion of a number of questions. First, What are the objections, from various quarters, to court-connected ADR programs? Second, how valid are they? Third, how can a court best answer them? Has the number of civil trials declined? Fourth, can such a decline in fact be attributed to use of ADR? Fifth, what is the full range of values that court sponsorship of an ADR program can advance? Sixth, how can a court develop the healthiest and most synergistic relationship with the private ADR provider community? Seventh, in general, what steps can be taken to effectively promote court ADR? Our hope is that through discussion and a sharing of ideas, thoughts and experiences this session will be productive and stimulating dialogue.

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has become an integral part of pretrial practice. In many districts, its importance has been elevated to more than merely another step in the pretrial litigation process. It has instead become the early focus of pretrial practice. The legal culture in other districts (both bench and bar alike) have approached ADR more passively or have resisted ADR’s continued evolution.

Nationally, there is great variance between ADR programs and practice. There is no uniformity across districts. Similarities and differences abound. While the variety of ADR program models and services offered to litigants is a testament to the growth that has occurred in the courts over the last ten years, the degree of variances makes it difficult to express generalizations about ADR programs and practice. Despite ADR’s growth and contributions to the resolution of disputes both in the public sector and in the context of private dispute resolution, there remains resistance from a number of quarters.

II.
BACKGROUND & DISCUSSION


If ADR is a "movement," its penetration of our legal and political culture remains quite uneven and, at least in some jurisdictions, fragile. Many still remain unconverted. Why? We describe some of the reasons in the paragraphs that follow.

One is the fact that there is a tone of "movement" about ADR that is off-putting to some. The "movement" is accompanied in some quarters by an air of radicalism in spirit and of ambition in claims that can inspire skepticism, distrust, disrespect, even fear-especially among heavily rationalistic and sometimes cynical judges, lawyers, and institutional litigants. The suggestion that mediation could change human nature or work a fundamental re-ordering of the structure and character of our society strikes some important players as naive in the extreme-or conjures images of left-wing political experiments whose stock in the world community has taken a vigorous beating in the last two decades. A related problem is the fact that claims for ADR by the converted, especially for mediation, have been so eclectic and sometimes inconsistent.

These sources of skepticism have been reinforced by the failure of empirical research to "prove" that ADR delivers many of the benefits its proponents have promised. [FN73] Empirical support, especially for some of the least restrained early claims about the potential of ADR, simply has not been forthcoming. Much more work in this arena of scholarship needs to be done, but this kind of work is very difficult, is constrained by ethical and political considerations, [FN74] and is very expensive. Therefore, at least in the near term, we cannot expect to be rescued, or buried, by definitive empirical studies.

Perhaps as important, there have been shortfalls both in consensus and in sophistication about what criteria to use to measure the value of ADR. There are failures in some quarters (both among supporters and among skeptics) to appreciate the full range of contributions to the health of our society that court ADR programs can make.

Against this backdrop, we can look more specifically at where some of the primary perils lurk on the road ahead for court ADR. Peril number one, if not neutralized, could be the source of many other perils. It is, ironically, a process peril. It would be rooted in a failure to recognize, squarely, that we have many constituencies. But it is not enough just to recognize our important constituencies. Serious perils could arise from failures in how we respond to that recognition. With respect to any given constituent group, we might fail to communicate that acknowledgment, or fail to communicate it with sufficient perceived respect. Or we might fail to listen actively and to respond appropriately to the group, or fail to make appropriate adjustments to address the group's concerns. If ADR is to be protected and prosper, we must really listen and it must be clear to our
constituencies that we are listening and responding. In short, we must practice in our policy and political lives what we preach about how to serve as neutrals in individual cases.

Having recognized this potential source of danger, I would like to organize the next part of my discussion of the perils that court ADR faces by focusing, seriatim, on some of our key constituencies. Of course, our single most important constituency is the people—the parties who seek to use the system of justice. Concern about our relationship with that constituency should dominate, as much of this essay suggests, our program design decisions and how we deliver our services. Having acknowledged that fundamental fact, I will consider in the sections that follow possible sources of peril for court ADR programs that derive from our relationships with (1) legislators, (2) judges and judicial administrators who influence court policy and court program funding, (3) practicing lawyers, and (4) what I will call (with apologies to other disciplines and entities) "the Fourth Estate," meaning full-time or part-time professional neutrals and other people who are interested in becoming professional neutrals.

After considering our relationship with these constituencies, I will close by identifying some internal sources of peril—matters about ourselves and our program design decisions that could become sources of danger for court ADR.

A. Sources of Peril in Our Relationships with Legislatures

We will begin by focusing on sources of peril in our relationships with legislatures. Legislatures are a critical constituency for court ADR programs for many reasons. They can provide or withhold sources of authority for court programs. They can provide or withhold the funding without which court programs could not function, and they can provide or withhold critical protections to parties, neutrals and processes (e.g., in the form of privileges for mediation communications and immunities for neutrals) that are considered essential to the viability of virtually all kinds of ADR.

Among the possible perils in our relationship with legislatures, one has emerged recently with particular vigor in California, where a significant number of lawmakers have become very concerned about perceived abuses by corporate America of private ADR. One target of legislative concern has been binding private arbitration, which is viewed in some quarters as a tool that some corporations and health maintenance organizations are trying to use to deprive claimants of their rights under the Seventh Amendment. There also are suspicions that arbitration is used to hide from the public not only dangerous products, conditions, or substandard professional services, but also possible corruption in the private neutral community. This corruption can take the form of bias in favor of repeat corporate players who can be sources of a flow of business to the ADR providers.

There is a risk that perceived abuses of this kind in the private sector would unfairly contaminate the standing of all ADR in the minds of influential lawmakers and the public. The risk
of contamination is particularly great in courts that "outsource" some or all of the ADR services they sanction or that fail to adopt stringent conflict of interest requirements and quality control mechanisms. The more a court depends on professional service providers from the private sector, the greater the risk that legislators will paint court and corporate ADR programs with the same broad brush of suspicion.

To reduce the risk that legislative minds will blur ethically unassailable court ADR programs with perceived corporate abuses of ADR processes it is imperative that the court ADR community take great care to distance itself in the minds of legislators and the public from controversial private ADR providers or schemes. We must be especially careful to make it clear that ADR in court programs is not binding. We also must publicize the measures that are built into court programs to assure the impartiality of neutrals, to empower litigants to force the recusal of a neutral about whom they have real concerns, and to protect litigants from abuses of ADR processes by opponents that are more powerful.

In addition, we must be careful not to make program design decisions that invite a mistaken inference that institutionally selfish motives animate court ADR programs. In particular, we must resist pressures to attach penalties to parties who proceed to trial after participating in an ADR process. We must also be careful not to force only unpopular or nettlesome classes of cases to participate in ADR programs. It is equally important to refrain from sponsoring ADR processes in which the goal of securing settlements is permitted to smother ethical principles or to displace the value of party self-determination.

Ironically, a second peril in our relationships with legislatures is animated by policy concerns that cut in the opposite direction. Legislatures can generate program-distorting pressures by insisting on using only efficiency criteria to assess the value of court ADR. Of course, pressure or temptation to use only efficiency values to assess ADR programs also can come from other quarters, including not only judges, but also administrators within the judicial branch who are positioned to influence funding for court programs. In fact, the danger posed by this limited vision of value may be greatest when it infects the judges who are most directly able to influence court ADR policy and practices. But we focus here primarily on legislatures because they usually control funding for court programs and because legislators feel so much pressure to justify how they spend tax dollars by simplistic cost-benefit accountings.

Missing the main policy point, legislators, judges or administrators whose interest in ADR is dominated by efficiency values are likely to focus on only two criteria when assessing an ADR program's "success" (1) whether it increases the rate or (2) advances the timing of dispositions by settlement. Permitting these two criteria to dominate assessments of success could adversely affect the character and quality of court ADR programs in many different ways. Focusing on these efficiency criteria could result in imposing role-distorting pressures on neutrals. Most obviously, it could cause neutrals to feel pressure to push for settlements and to sometimes cut big ethical corners towards that goal. In ironic contradiction of the core philosophy of mediation, neutrals could be tempted to elevate ends over means by, among other things, covering up significant analytical or informational shortfalls, powering through the parties' emotional or philosophic reluctance to settle,
or choosing to ignore serious misconduct during the ADR process that would undermine respect for the system of justice. [FN75]

Permitting efficiency values to dominate assessments of court ADR programs also could result in neutrals feeling pressure to compromise promises of confidentiality by initiating unauthorized communications with the assigned judge or by responding to solicitations by the judge for information that the ADR rules put off-limits. For example, a neutral who feels an overriding obligation to get a case settled might be tempted to suggest to the assigned judge ways she might manipulate procedure or substance to increase pressure on the parties to settle. The neutral might suggest to the judge that she could make settlement more likely by manipulating the timing of rulings on motions, access to dates for hearings or trials, or by including asides or adjectival editorials in rulings or in comments from the bench.

Preoccupation with using ADR to reduce caseloads can create a host of additional perils. Courts so preoccupied could well be tempted to force more cases or parties to use ADR than might be justified by the contribution ADR is likely to make to the parties' interests (in the individual case). Such courts also might be prepared to sacrifice quality control in ADR services for the sake of increasing the quantity of cases referred, thus increasing the risk that neutrals will not follow prescribed protocols or will perform poorly or unethically. On the other hand, courts whose interest in ADR is dominated by a desire to reduce trial rates might elect to limit access to ADR services to categories of cases the court believes are most likely to settle through ADR processes, thus threatening equality of access across the docket to ADR services.

Preoccupation with generating settlements also might tempt courts to permit only the most assertive lawyers or process professionals to serve as neutrals in their ADR program, or only those who appear to have the most clout with certain types of parties or lawyers. This kind of restriction, whether de facto or by formal policy, would limit access to the pool of court neutrals and limit the kinds of ADR processes that are available through the court program.

This last kind of limitation could be especially harmful. Courts that permit efficiency values to drive them into offering only one kind of ADR process, with that one being assertively evaluative, not only lose or reduce their capacity to be responsive to a range of case-specific circumstances and a variety of party interests and needs (both practical and psychological), they also increase the risk of party disaffection. The more assertively evaluative the mediation process, the more likely parties are to feel that they are being pressured to settle. Roselle Wissler's recently published study of mediations in personal injury cases in Ohio reports that while parties were more likely than not to accept and appreciate assessments of the merits from the mediator, they also were more likely to feel that they were being pressured to settle and that the process was unfair when the mediator recommended a particular settlement. [FN76]

Courts that compel party participation in ADR need to be especially sensitive to these risks. When it is an initiative by the court that lands a case in an ADR process there is a greater risk that parties will feel that they are under some kind of duty (to the court) to settle their case. That feeling, in turn, can encourage resentment-and an inference that the court's real purpose in making the
referral to ADR was not to provide the parties with a service, but to get rid of them. Inviting inferences that the courts are institutionally selfish is not the preferred course.

Moreover, a court risks corrupting both evaluation and mediation when it offers only one ADR process but then expects its neutrals to adjust or manipulate the content or character of that process as they believe the circumstances of individual cases warrant. When a neutral offers an evaluation after caucusing separately with each side, the parties cannot know everything that affected the formation of that evaluation. As a result, they may have less confidence in the objectivity and reliability of the neutral's assessment. When parties believe that the overriding purpose of the neutral's evaluation is to lubricate the settlement process, they may fear either that the evaluation is based simply on the neutral's guess about what settlement terms might be acceptable (her guess about what might work) or that the evaluation is influenced by factors that have nothing to do with the merits of the parties' positions in the case (e.g., some sympathy for a party's predicament or feelings).

The flip side of this concern is that a court that offers only one ADR process risks converting mediation into something that is formless, unpredictable and difficult to prepare for. Such a situation reduces mediation's productivity and increases the risk that parties and lawyers will feel that the process is unfair- because they are surprised by some turn it takes or some element it includes or because they feel unable to prepare adequately for something whose shape and content are so ill-defined and so mobile.

For all the reasons set forth in the preceding paragraphs, those who would insist on using only efficiency criteria to assess the value of ADR programs jeopardize the courts' most precious and only necessary assets: public confidence in the integrity of the processes the courts sponsor and public faith in the motives that underlie the courts' actions. We must take great care not to make program design decisions that invite parties to infer that the courts care less about doing justice and offering valued service than about looking out for themselves as institutions (e.g., by reducing their workload, or off-loading kinds of cases that are especially taxing or emotionally difficult or that are deemed "unimportant").

B. Sources of Peril From Our Relationship with Judges

Now I would like to focus on perils for court ADR that may arise more directly from the constituency that consists of judges. Before we can interact constructively with this extremely important constituency, we must try to understand sources of judicial ambivalence about ADR, or even hostility toward it. I will explore some of those sources in the paragraphs that follow.

Before turning to that task, however, it is important to emphasize that there is no one judicial attitude toward court or private ADR. Rather, there are many different attitudes, sometimes even within an individual judge, and those attitudes are not set in concrete. I do not know which concerns about ADR are most widespread or of the greatest moment (to judges generally or as sources of peril
to court ADR). Nor do I mean to suggest that any one judge shares all of the concerns I will describe. In fact, some of these concerns are mutually exclusive and have roots in diametrically opposed political instincts. But each of the views I will describe is sufficiently likely to occur to at least some judges that we must acknowledge them squarely, take them seriously, and consider open-mindedly their validity and their reach. We must also make changes in our programs where necessary and reassure our critics where we can.

One additional prefatory observation is in order: we need to bear in mind that there is a wide range of sophistication among judges in understanding of the kinds of questions and policy issues about court ADR that we are addressing. We must be careful not to assume too much when we discuss these matters with members of the third branch.

The first of the concerns that can fuel judicial inhospitality to court ADR is fear that ADR threatens the vitality of the jury system as a critical tool of democracy—as an essential weapon to discourage and to discipline abuse of public or private power. There are judges who believe passionately that one of the most powerful and essential deterrents to misbehavior in our society is fear of the jury trial, the public exposure and humiliation it can generate, the great transaction costs it can impose, and the huge damage awards to which it can lead. Some judges fear that some litigants try to use ADR to keep their misconduct out of the public eye, or to conceal dangerous products or conditions from their victims. Other judges are afraid that ADR may be used to reduce the opportunities the courts and the public have to develop new legal norms or to fashion measures to meet threats to public health and safety, to our economic health, or to individual rights. Judges who subscribe to such views are likely to resist any change in the system of justice that appears to threaten the frequency, visibility, or accessibility of jury trials.

The perils with roots in these concerns are greater now than they might have been at other times because, in the federal courts at least, there is relatively widespread awareness among policymakers that the number of jury trials has been falling, as has the percentage of cases terminated by trial. [FN77] Statistics reported by the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts indicate that while 4.3% of all civil case terminations in federal district courts occurred during or after trial in 1990, that figure had fallen to 2.2% by the year 2000. [FN78] Data from the same source show that the number of trials conducted in federal courts was 9,263 in 1990, but had decreased to 5,780 in 2000. [FN79]

Some judges and legislators seem inclined to blame ADR for these declines and to pit ADR against the Seventh Amendment. [FN80] It is not at all clear, however, that court sponsored ADR programs can be blamed, or credited, in any appreciable measure, for the reported changes in trial rates. To some extent, these declines probably are attributable to changes in the profile of cases filed in federal courts over this period. During the 1990s there was substantial growth in categories of cases that rarely proceed to trial: prisoner petitions, reviews of determinations by the Social Security Administration, and actions by the federal government to recover defaulted loans. In 1990, these categories of cases accounted for 28% of the federal civil docket (nationally), but by the year 2000 that figure had increased to 38%. [FN81] While these changes probably do not account for the entire decline in the incidence of trials, that decline would appear much less dramatic if the changes in case
Another potentially significant source of downward pressure on trial rates is the increase in transaction costs that appears to have further infected litigation over the past decade or so. Hourly rates charged by attorneys have increased dramatically, at least in urban areas. It is fair to assume that fees charged by other professionals who often are used in connection with trials, such as physicians, scientists, accountants, jury consultants, and other experts, also have increased. And a trial is likely to be the single most expensive event, by far, in most civil litigation. Today's clients who are cost conscious are more likely to be deterred from going to trial by this financial consideration than they would have been a decade ago. I would guess that the real underlying cause of the perceived trial rate "problem" probably is the expense of litigation-and that what ADR is doing is providing parties who would not go to trial anyway (for financial or other reasons) with ways to search for acceptable terms of settlement that are more satisfying and constructive than the "old" way. [FN82]

In addition to these considerations, we need to remind the judges and policymakers who are concerned about the declining trial rate that no study has generated solid empirical support for the suggestion that court ADR programs have caused a general decline in trial rates. The most ambitious and sophisticated effort in this arena that I know about was attempted pursuant to statutory mandate [FN83] in the mid-1990s by a group of researchers at RAND's Institute for Civil Justice. While working with limited data and trying to analyze the effects of vastly different programs, some of which underwent change during the study period, the RAND social scientists found no statistically significant evidence that, in the aggregate, participation in ADR in the six district courts produced any significant effects on time to disposition, costs, or other measures. [FN84]

Despite serious questions about how real, enduring, or significant the decline in trial rates actually has been, and the possibility that the existence of ADR programs has had little to do with any such decline, we would err seriously if we failed to acknowledge the reality and good faith of the concern about this matter. We must take special care to reassure those who are worried about the trial rate that we fully support parties' rights under the Seventh Amendment. We also must assure them that good court ADR programs and the preservation of those rights are fully compatible. We need to remind our critics that the core value that animates ADR programs is party self-determination and that value is reflected in full respect being accorded to a party's decision that she wants to take her case to trial.

We also need to emphasize that court ADR is not intended to serve as a barrier or hurdle to trial. Rather, litigants can and should use ADR processes to make access to trial more efficient by more reliably identifying the center of the case and then focusing their discovery and motion work more productively on that center. ADR processes can also be used to make the trial process itself fairer by increasing the likelihood that all the really pertinent evidence will be presented and that the
parties and the court will understand accurately all the applicable legal principles.

Moreover, parties can use ADR to determine more reliably whether trial is necessary to achieve their ends. Through an ADR process, they can learn more accurately what they could achieve through settlement. Thus, ADR can teach them more clearly what the alternative to trial really is. Surely providing this kind of valuable information to the people is not something to be feared or discouraged. After all, it is for the benefit of the people that the entire system of justice is supposed to operate. We live in a democracy where our institutions are supposed to be designed to deliver maximum protection to freedom and self-determination.

We shift focus here to the second concern among judges that can serve as a source of ambivalence about court ADR programs. That concern is about money, more specifically, budgets for courts. The financial resources available to the courts to perform their traditional core functions are already strained in many jurisdictions, and some judges and court administrators fear that supporting good ADR programs consumes resources that the courts simply cannot afford to divert. The assumption underlying these concerns is that there is a fixed resource base for trial courts and that diversion of any resources to ADR reduces the courts' ability to manage cases, conduct hearings on motions, and to provide trials. From these premises, some judges conclude that even though litigants may value ADR services, those services should be provided either in the private sector or by some other public body, at least until the courts' resources are substantially increased.

The fact that these kinds of worries are as perennial as the grass does not make them any less real, especially in courts heavily impacted by criminal filings. We must acknowledge resource constraints squarely and work with judges and administrators both to try to increase funding for courts and to keep the administrative costs of court ADR programs as low as meaningful quality control permits. We also should encourage additional research aimed at determining to what extent there are kinds of ADR programs that deliver net reductions in consumption of court resources by reducing inter-party frictions, demand for judicially hosted settlement conferences, hearings on motions or case management interventions, or by avoiding unnecessary trials.

A very different source of judicial skepticism about the place of ADR in courts is concern that ADR processes, especially facilitative mediation, tend to be analytically sloppy. Some judges worry that there is considerable risk that decisions made by lawyers and clients in these settings will be based on unreliable data or inaccurate legal premises, or on a blurring of thinking and emoting about matters relevant under the law and matters irrelevant under the law. They fear all of this will increase the risk that important rights will not be protected and legal norms will not be followed.

In a variation on this theme, some judicial critics of ADR fear that despite rhetoric about the ascendant value of purity of process, mediators in fact may elevate the importance of ends over means. Under this line of reasoning, mediators are believed to be more concerned with achieving the end of settlement than with protecting the moral and legal integrity of the negotiation process. Distressingly, it is by focusing on "their" settlement rates that many mediators measure their success and advertise their ability. [FN85] We found subtle but significant evidence of the kind of ego-blur
that makes some judges anxious about how well some mediators adhere to their own avowed principles in an early version of the Rules of Conduct for Mediators in Court-Connected Mediation Programs for Civil Cases in state courts in California. [FN86] The proposed Advisory Committee Comment to a rule prohibiting promises of results in promotional materials would have read as follows: "This rule is not intended to prohibit a mediator from making statements about his or her overall resolution rate." [FN87] What is both curious and troublesome about this comment is the suggestion that the resolutions reached through mediations are somehow the mediator's (his or her resolution rate), rather than the parties'. This suggestion would violate what is supposed to be the central tenet of mediation—that it is the parties who decide whether to settle and on what terms. If there is a settlement, it is the parties who achieved it, not the mediator.

Mediators are understood by many judges to subscribe passionately to a value system that elevates the virtues of agreement, connection, and social peace above the virtues of protecting rights or pursuing legal entitlements, and that mediators might tend to put moral or social pressure on litigants to accept the same value system. In so doing, a mediator would subtly make parties feel morally inferior if they insisted too rigidly on their rights being honored and enforced. There may even be some fear in judicial circles that mediators, in pursuit of the values they bring to their work, have incentives to blur analysis or to exaggerate risk when clearer analysis or more accurate understanding of risk would make it more difficult to persuade a party to agree to a compromise.

Hopefully these kinds of fears are at least exaggerated, if not entirely misplaced. In addressing them, we should emphasize that we take considerable pains to train mediators to be sensitive about and to avoid these potential hazards. In addition, we need to teach our constituents that mediators take great pride in being true to their craft—the central credo of which is to value process purity over settlement outcome. Thus, the mediators we train focus intently on following practices that are essential to real party self-determination.

A very different kind of concern among some judges is that ADR is intended or can be used to push certain unpopular, or highly emotional and difficult, or politically "unimportant" categories of cases or litigants out of courtrooms and into a second-class system of justice. This fear may be informed by two very different kinds of suspicions. One is that judicial proponents of ADR are lazy—that they just want to reduce their workloads or the length of the lines of litigants waiting to be heard. A second suspicion, informed by deeper cynicism, is that what really animates some judicial and legislative proponents of ADR is a hidden political agenda, the ultimate goal of which is to
reduce or cut off access to our public courts by the poor, the unsophisticated, the most vulnerable and victimized segments of our society. Judges with these kinds of concerns may fear that by blocking access to the courts, ADR programs would block access to the only source of public power that people who have been politically and socially marginalized in our society could use to protect themselves.

In responding to such concerns, we first must be vigilant to ensure that only respect-worthy, service-oriented purposes inform the design and administration of court ADR programs. In advocating our programs, we must avoid the temptation to appeal to the docket-reducing interests of judges, court administrators, and legislators. We must educate our constituencies to understand that neither institutional selfishness nor any political agenda may be permitted to drive court ADR programs. Instead, the purpose of our programs always must be to deliver valued service to litigants.

We also must make clear that there is nothing "second class" about court ADR programs and that litigants use ADR to improve the efficiency and fairness of the administration of justice. Also, we must teach our constituents that litigants and lawyers in overwhelming percentages do not view ADR services as imposing senseless burdens, but welcome and endorse such services because of the special benefits they can confer and because of the opportunities they create to pursue interests that litigants themselves feel are important.

An independent judicial concern at a very different level is that ADR threatens delay or disruption of traditional litigation—that it jeopardizes timeliness of dispositions by eroding the pressure that derives from early and firm trial dates. While we should acknowledge that poorly designed ADR systems or undisciplined referrals to ADR in individual cases could have such effects, we also must reassure judges that these are readily avoidable problems and that there is data showing that well run programs can reduce aggregate times to disposition. Referral orders always should fix deadlines for completing ADR processes and set dates for follow-up case management events. Such orders can impose tight time frames and can require the parties, while they are committing some resources to mediation, to push forward simultaneously with standard case development work, such as discovery and motions.

For judges who remain concerned about the effect of a court ADR program on aggregate (court-wide) times to disposition we should point to the control-group study of the early assessment program in the federal district court for the western district of Missouri. [FN88] That careful study, conducted by social scientists at the Federal Judicial Center, found that cases that were "required to participate in the program have a median age at termination of 7.0 months, while cases [in the control group] not permitted to participate have a median age at termination of 9.7 months"—a 28% improvement attributed entirely to that particular ADR program. [FN89] It also is noteworthy that the RAND study of six very different (and still evolving) ADR programs in the early 1990s found that, in the aggregate, the ADR programs had no negative effect on time to disposition. [FN90]

There is one additional source of judicial ambivalence about (or, sometimes, hostility toward) court ADR programs that I would like to describe. The act of articulating these sentiments risks doing them injustice by over-simplifying and exaggerating them or by abstracting them from
the complex emotional and philosophic context in which they exist, a context that can color their content and reduce their intensity. But the kinds of sentiments and attitudes that I will describe in the next paragraph can be real players in our environment and can be strongly felt, even though they sometimes are articulated only obliquely or not at all.

The gist of these feelings is that court ADR programs threaten both to alter the role of the judge and to erode her importance in our system of government. Squarely acknowledged, these notions would take the following shape: "ADR threatens to change the character of my institution and of my job; it threatens to demand behaviors from me that I do not want to provide or would be no good at. ADR threatens to reduce my importance-to take cases and headlines away from me. ADR threatens to reduce the number of occasions on which I can exercise my power. ADR is, at its core, a criticism and denigration of the centuries old system in which I have flourished and at the top of which I sit."

I have no idea how common feelings like these are, but where they exist they can be real and raw, and they can fuel a deeply rooted, even if not fully self-aware, opposition to court sponsorship of ADR programs. Appropriate responses could include reassurances that our goal is not to radically change the character of judicial institutions or the kind of work most judges spend most of their time doing. Instead, the goal is to supplement the core services courts long have provided and to add to those services rather than to displace or subtract from them. We also need to make it clear how much we respect the hallmark features of the civil adjudicatory system and the jury trial in particular, and how completely we agree that the preservation and strengthening of that system is essential to the long range health of our society. There will always be a place for litigation-a big, central, indispensable place. One of our goals is to help make sure that the societal resource that our civil adjudicatory system constitutes is well used and really is available when it is needed to perform the critical functions only it can perform.

3. Sources of Peril From Our Relationships with Practicing Lawyers

Lawyers have been indispensable sources of support and service in a great many court ADR programs. Many court ADR programs exist today only because of initiatives taken and hard work performed by lawyers. In some courts, the judges have agreed to adopt ADR programs only after and because leaders of the bar have urged them to do so. Lawyers are credited with inventing and promoting, first in the private sector, several of the types of ADR processes that have been incorporated into court programs. So we must never forget that a great many lawyers have been our leaders and our allies over the quarter century since the Pound Conference.
We also need to acknowledge, however, that not all lawyers understand or accept ADR and that we could jeopardize court ADR programs if we do not appreciate sources of peril in our relationship with counsel. Lawyers could undermine or sabotage court ADR programs by failing to inform clients that they have ADR options, failing to accurately consider the pros and cons of those options with their clients, or by actively discouraging their clients from trying to use ADR or from participating in good faith in ADR events. Lawyers also may undermine ADR programs, more subtly but no less significantly, by failing to take full advantage of the potential in an ADR proceeding when they prepare for and attend it. Sometimes failings of these kinds are attributable to ignorance, sometimes to inertia, sometimes to fear of unfamiliar processes and fora, of loss of control over inputs to and from the client, and sometimes to greed.

Good court ADR programs must attack ignorance, inertia, and fear by (1) educating lawyers [FN91] and client groups, (2) building into the ADR and case management program a series of incentives and pressures to give real and fair consideration in each civil case to the use of ADR (with full inputs to and from clients), and (3) establishing and publicizing tight quality control mechanisms aimed, in part, at reducing lawyers' fear that the neutral will not be competent or will displace them or invade their relationship with their client.

What about lawyers who permit self-interest to compromise their loyalties to their clients? Many successful lawyers would argue, of course, that the dichotomy posed in this question is false, that there is no difference between being client-oriented and being self-oriented, between client interest and self-interest. They would contend that the more intelligently client-oriented lawyers are, the more business success they enjoy. But even for lawyers who view such notions with cynicism there can be at least some convergence in ADR programs between their personal interests and the interests of their clients (and of the courts).

As sophisticated lawyers understand, it can be very profitable to incorporate active use of ADR opportunities into a broader litigation strategy or a more comprehensive system for addressing client needs. The goal of such lawyers is not necessarily to make more money in any particular case, [FN92] but to increase the overall volume and quality of work they attract. The story goes as follows. Not all the time, but many times, ADR processes increase clients' understanding of their situation, and make them feel that they have reliably identified their options. It reduces their fear that they are missing undiscovered opportunities or making decisions on the basis of guesses in which they have no real confidence. ADR processes also reduce clients' transaction costs, produce agreements that otherwise would not be accessible, and enhance their satisfaction with both the terms of disposition and the process leading to it. Happy clients are more likely to be happy with their lawyers. Clients who are happy with their lawyers are likely to use those same lawyers again and are likely to refer additional clients. All this means more business for the lawyer who has used ADR to the benefit of his clients.

There is another important way that ADR processes can serve personal interests of lawyers. Being involved in ADR processes can improve the quality of a lawyer's professional life and make the lawyer feel better about being a lawyer. It can be very satisfying to help clients explore prospects
for settlement earlier and more reliably, to enhance the efficiency and rationality of dispute processing, and to improve the interpersonal dynamics that attend negotiation and litigation. Sour or friction-riddled dynamics between lawyers are major sources of professional dissatisfaction among litigators. Moreover, client disappointment in or misunderstanding of a lawyer's work can be a source of frustration and loss of income—and of malpractice actions. ADR, intelligently used, can reduce the risk of client disaffection with counsel's work and can make the day-to-day dynamics in which lawyers make their living much more pleasant.

It also can be useful to remind lawyers that they need not fear that using ADR will make them any less effective protectors of their clients' rights or less vigorous pursuers of their clients' interests. We need to make sure that counsel understand that there are a wide range of ADR processes and that some of these processes focus primarily on evidence and law. We also need to teach lawyers that even participation in ADR processes like facilitative mediation-processes that can reach into arenas beyond law and evidence—need not compromise counsel's ability to accomplish what his client hired him to do. Being firm, resolute, and analytically sharp are not mutually exclusive with being courteous, thoughtful, and intellectually open. Agreeing to participate in a mediation is not tantamount to agreeing to compromise important interests or to replace keen, self-interested analysis with a soft, affect-dominated interpersonal exercise. By agreeing to participate in mediation, neither lawyer nor client agrees to give up anything. Rather, lawyer and client merely agree to try using an additional process tool to search for what is best for the client. Mediations are designed to help parties understand more clearly what their own underlying interests are and to help parties use their own squarely identified values to prioritize those interests. A good lawyer, a lawyer who wants to energetically do as much for his client as the circumstances permit, embraces the use of tools that help him and his client more reliably and comprehensively understand both their own situation and their options for going forward.

D. Sources of Peril in Our Relationships with the Fourth Estate

As indicated earlier, I use the phrase "fourth estate" here to refer to lawyers and others who make or want to make some or all of their living by serving as ADR neutrals. Outside the world of organized labor relations, this group certainly was nothing approaching an "estate" at the time of the Pound Conference. Over the past fifteen years, however, that has changed.

I use the phrase "estate" because it suggests a group of size, force, and apparent longevity—an institutional player of significance. We need to acknowledge that this estate exists and that ADR neutrals have emerged as players of policy and political significance. We need to attend to our relationship with this group.

At the outset, it is important to point out that the fourth estate is hardly a monolith. It is, rather, a complex and loose aggregation of sub-groups between which there can be considerable differences of policy view and interests. Different sub-groups of this estate can have different kinds of tensions with or concerns about the courts and their ADR programs. One subset might worry most about the courts corrupting mediation. Another subset might worry most about the courts preempting the field, while another might worry most about the courts adopting policies (about confidentiality,
compensation, or conflicts of interest) that could threaten the vitality or integrity of private ADR, especially private mediation.

But even though the fourth estate is complex and internally fragmented, it has demonstrated an ability to organize itself for some purposes into a powerful lobby. This lobby can affect public policy in arenas that can have considerable impact on judicial institutions and processes. For example, this estate can affect legislation conferring privileges or other confidentiality protections on people who participate in mediation.

The most important reasons for attending to our relationship with the fourth estate, however, are that it and the courts have much more in common than not in common, and members of this estate can be significant sources of learning and service for judicial institutions. Working synergistically, courts and the fourth estate can do much good. It follows that we must work to reassure the private ADR provider community that the courts have no ambition or capacity to preempt or dominate the ADR field. The policies that we adopt for court ADR programs about such sensitive matters as compensation and confidentiality are not aimed at undermining demand for or limiting the character of ADR in the private sector. Instead, they are rooted necessarily in sensitivities that are unique to the roles courts play as institutions of government in our democratic system.

To make our interaction with the fourth estate as thoughtful and constructive as possible, however, we need to understand sources of potential tension between courts and the private ADR provider community. As explained in the paragraphs that follow, there will not always be perfect interest alignment between the courts and at least some subsets of private neutrals. In lobbying legislatures and filing amicus briefs in litigation, organizations of neutrals (primarily mediators) believe that they are trying to protect the integrity and viability of the mediation process itself as a value that is independent of the courts as institutions and of individual parties. In fact, some mediators would contend that the value of mediation derives primarily from the degree of separation, the degree of difference, between mediation and the judicial process. Some mediators believe that mediation as a process holds vastly greater social promise than the judicial process. Some believe that it has the potential and the power to literally transform, not only the dynamic through which individual disputes are resolved, but also the character of the parties to the disputes, of their value
priorities and their most fundamental orientations.

In this vision, mediation as a process holds the promise of transforming our society, even of transforming human nature. Indeed, in its most ambitious proponents, this vision may even reject the concept of "human nature," at least to the extent that phrase suggests that "nature" (as primitively understood) need play a dominant role in human interactions and institutions.

But even mediators who are less sanguine about the transformative potential of mediation are likely to believe that preserving its vitality is a matter of great importance that is in substantial measure independent of society's interest in preserving the integrity and vitality of judicial institutions. Further, some mediators would take the position that there is so much social value in promoting mediation as a process that if an irreconcilable conflict arises between the values critical to mediation and the values critical to the court system (at least on the civil side), or even values critical to the parties to a particular mediation, the court system and the parties must yield.

Tensions of these kinds surfaced in two recent cases in California, Rinaker v. Superior Court, [FN93] and Olam v. Congress Mortgage. [FN94] In Rinaker, a teenager was accused in a juvenile court proceeding of conduct that would be deemed criminal if he had been an adult. [FN95] He believed that his accuser in the juvenile court had made admissions during an earlier mediation that would help exonerate him. [FN96] When he subpoenaed the mediator, Ms. Rinaker, to testify, she vigorously resisted, invoking protections and prohibitions on disclosure of mediation communications that had been enacted by the state legislature after successful lobbying by organizations of private mediators. [FN97] Ms. Rinaker took the position, as a matter of sincere principle, that her protections under the statutes were absolute and that the juvenile court defendant's interests could not be sufficient to outweigh what she viewed as the more compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the mediation process. [FN98]

The California Court of Appeals respectfully disagreed, holding that, if necessary, a mediator's statutorily rooted privilege against being compelled to disclose confidential mediation communications can be trumped (even in a nominally civil proceeding) by the constitutional rights of a defendant under the confrontation and due process clauses. [FN99] The court so held even though the applicable statutes did not recognize an exception in the situation the Rinaker court faced.

The conflict between the views of the mediator and the views of the court in Rinaker was stark. The mediator believed passionately that not even a demonstrable need to preserve fundamental constitutional rights should be permitted to jeopardize the sanctity of mediation confidentiality, and thus to jeopardize (in her view) both the philosophic core and the practical viability of mediation as a distinct process. On the other hand, the court's response to the dilemma it faced evidences acute judicial sensitivity to the singular and immensely important role of the courts to serve as the primary source of protection of fundamental (in the constitutional sense) civil rights, especially rights subject
to abuse or invasion by majorities acting (through legislation sometimes actually secured by a
special interest group) at the expense of minorities.

Another force likely at play in Rinaker was the court's passion for protecting the
constitutional integrity of its own processes. In this case, the rights that were pitted against the
mediator's interest in not breaching confidentiality promises were rights directly bound up in and
critical to the fairness of the judicial process. Unlike mediators, courts exercise the immense power
of the state. Sensitive to the responsibility that attends exercise of power, and of the moral duties that
arise from the capacity to compel radical changes in the circumstances of the people who come
through the judicial system, judges are deeply committed to doing everything they can to make sure
that they exercise power justly and in strict accordance with the law. They also commit to ensuring
that the processes over which they preside are fair, and that the public perceives and believes in the
thoroughgoing fairness of the procedures and rules through which their courts can force changes on
them. Ultimately, what is at stake here is nothing less than the public's confidence in our democratic
form of government—because it is that government's power that the courts wield.

Shades of a similar kind of confrontation are visible in Olam v. Congress Mortgage. [FN100] Unlike the Rinaker case, the issues in Olam, where there were no criminal law undertones, did not
implicate the confrontation clause. Nor did the Olam court reach arguments that might have been
raised under the due process clause. But like Rinaker, the situation in Olam triggered a direct
conflict between values dear to the mediation community and values dear to the courts. On one side
was the mediators' interest in not being compelled to breach confidentiality promises, and the
mediators' belief (legislatively supported) that being so compelled posed a grave threat to mediation
generally. On the other side were substantive legal rights of great consequence to parties who had
turned to the court to protect those rights, the court's capacity to perform its institutional function,
and a threat to public confidence in how courts exercise the power of our government.

Ms. Olam was the plaintiff in the underlying case. [FN101] She was a single woman in her
mid-60s with demonstrable health problems, some instability of judgment, no job and limited
resources. [FN102] The defendant was a mortgage brokerage company from which Ms. Olam had
borrowed money in the early 1990s. [FN103] She had defaulted on her payments, and several
attempts to resolve the matter by agreement had failed. [FN104]

Ms. Olam had a very poor relationship with her lawyer, who had failed to file important
papers for the final pretrial conference, exposing Ms. Olam to the prospect of a trial in which only
documentary evidence submitted by her opponent would be admitted. [FN105] At stake in the trial
were Ms. Olam's only assets and her primary sources of support—equity in two modest properties,
one of which was her residence. [FN106]

In this setting, with encouragement from the court, the parties participated in a mediation one
week before trial would commence, with no prospect of a continuance. [FN107] The mediation was
hosted, at the court's request, by the Program Counsel to the court's ADR program, who was an
employee of the court and one of the two professionals on staff most responsible for the design and
implementation of the court's ADR program. [FN108] The mediation began in the morning and
continued, without substantial interruption, until 1 a.m. the next morning, when, teary-eyed, Ms. Olam agreed to sign a settlement agreement. [FN109]

Under the terms of that agreement she gave up all her claims against the defendants and all her rights to damages, received no money, would lose immediately one of the two properties in which she had an interest, and would face a payment schedule that would make it difficult, at a minimum, to keep the other property. [FN110] So, the terms of the agreement created a real risk that she would lose all her property and would be unable to support herself even at a very modest level. To repeat, this agreement was reached at the end of a 14-hour process hosted by a court employee—an employee whom the public might reasonably fear was animated in some measure by a desire to please the court by orchestrating a settlement.

Ms. Olam arrived home about 1:30 a.m. [FN111] Around 10:00 a.m. that same day she called the judge's chambers, apparently feeling considerable stress about what had happened during the mediation. [FN112] The judge declined to speak with her. [FN113] Subsequently, she refused to sign a formalized settlement contract. [FN114] Additional efforts to settle were undertaken, but to no avail. [FN115] She fired her lawyer. [FN116] Defendants then filed a motion to enforce the terms of the agreement the parties had signed at the end of the mediation. [FN117]

In response, Ms. Olam contended that she could not be bound by the terms to which she had subscribed her name because at the time she signed the document (the document that the court's mediator had played a major role in drafting) she was incapacitated by her emotional and physical state, and by the stress of her situation, from exercising meaningful freedom of will and from making any legally competent commitments. [FN118] She contended that her lawyer had done virtually nothing to assist or protect her in this setting. [FN119] She also emphasized that her lawyer's failures to comply with pretrial rules both had created the prospect of a completely unfair trial and had given her lawyer a keen incentive to pressure her to agree to a settlement (rather than go through a trial a week later saddled with such huge evidentiary disabilities and then face the prospect of a malpractice action). [FN120]

It was in this setting that the defendants were demanding that the court use the power of the state to force an older, partially incapacitated woman to adhere to settlement terms that could well leave her destitute. Is it remarkable that the court was deeply concerned both about doing the right thing, under the law, and about using procedures that would encourage the public to believe that the court was doing the right thing?

As the hearings on the motion to enforce the agreement unfolded, both Ms. Olam and the brokerage defendants decided that they wanted the mediator to testify about what happened during the mediation. [FN121] Both parties apparently felt that testimony would be critical to their ability to secure their rights. The mediator declined to agree to testify and, on the court's active invitation, invoked his protections under California statutes which appeared to confer on mediators absolute protection (except in circumstances not implicated here) against being compelled to testify about mediation communications. [FN122]

In addressing this problem, the Olam court attempted to follow principles it drew from
Rinaker. Trying to apply these principles in this different setting, the court concluded that it was permissible under California law to compel the mediator to testify—despite the fact that (as in Rinaker) the language of the applicable statutes did not recognize an exception for the kind of circumstance the Olam court faced. In construing the legislation to permit the court to compel the mediator to testify, the court in Olam emphasized that testimony was essential to doing substantive and procedural justice and to being perceived by the public as so doing, that the integrity of the court and its ADR program were under direct attack, and that all the participants in the mediation (except the neutral) wanted the mediator to testify and waived their own privileges and protections. [FN123]

Vocal segments of the mediation community took strong exception to both the holding and the reasoning in Olam, in part on the ground that by judicially carving out an exception to the mediator's privilege in these circumstances the court was creating a serious threat to party confidence, generally, in the promise of mediation confidentiality. A threat to that confidence, the critics urged, created a serious threat to party willingness to use mediation at all.

The point here, of course, is not whether Olam correctly or incorrectly understood and applied California law. [FN124] Rather, the point of this discussion of Olam is to show that occasionally there can be tensions between the mediation community and the courts that implicate, directly, values and interests of great significance to both. It is important to the health of ADR to recognize that fact and then to engage in mutually respectful, thoughtful discussion of the issues raised on such occasions. During such discussions, however, it is critical to keep clearly in mind how much courts and the mediation community have in common—how many values and interests they share, and how often their purposes and philosophies are in harmony and synergistic.

There is one additional policy arena of potential tension between court ADR programs and the private ADR provider community that warrants mention here: compensation for neutrals. Some courts and parties will want neutrals to work at economy rates, or pro bono, while organizations of neutrals are likely to press for payment at professionals' market rates (agreeing to perform only limited work for free as a public service). While lobbying for higher levels of compensation may be vulnerable to cynical inferences about self-interest, organized mediators would contend that their real purpose is to protect against compromising the quality of mediator services. They would argue that if neutrals are not paid at market rates, the quality of neutrals will suffer, or the quality of the effort that neutrals are willing to commit to individual cases will suffer, thus harming the integrity and viability of mediation generally.

Courts must strike an appropriate balance in this arena between permitting the views and interests of private providers to dictate public *142 policy, on the one hand, and, on the other, compromising the quality of the processes courts offer or jeopardizing the viability of the private provider market, in whose robust health the courts have a substantial interest.
E. Perils with Sources in Ourselves

Our focus shifts here to perils whose primary sources are internal to the community of supporters of court ADR. Having already strained your patience, I will not explore in detail any of these perils. Rather, I will simply identify (not in order of importance) and comment briefly on each—knowing that they have been, or will be, subjects of thorough examination in other settings.

1. A Generalized "Good Faith" Requirement

The first such peril arises from the temptation to impose on parties and their lawyers a generalized requirement to participate in "good faith" in our ADR processes. [FN125] Of course, external constituencies (most obviously legislatures) also could be a source of this peril. However imposed, such a requirement could do considerable damage without yielding sufficient offsetting benefits.

We note at the outset that we are aware of no evidence that there is much participation in "bad faith" in court ADR. So the problem at which a requirement of good faith would be aimed appears small, at worst.

In sharp contrast, the problems that imposing such a requirement and trying seriously to enforce it [FN126] would generate are considerable. Except with respect to very specific kinds of conduct, like not showing up for the ADR event or not submitting required papers in advance [FN127] (problems that can be addressed quite effectively through specific proscriptions), "good faith" is an elastic, vague concept whose content can vary dramatically in the eyes of different beholders. Attempting to hold parties to a poorly defined requirement can breed fear, resentment, and a sense that the court is being unfair.

A broad definition of "good faith" participation also would intensify risks of invasions by mediators of spheres protected by work product law—invasions that could intensify resentments and discourage voluntary participation in court programs. [FN128] Moreover, imposing a good faith requirement could distort the role of the ADR neutral, especially for mediators. This could happen by converting the mediator, in part, into a "judge" of the quality of the parties and lawyers' participation. Such a requirement also could increase the occasions for neutrals reporting to the court about the content of mediations, thus intensifying parties' concerns about the reality of promises of confidentiality.

Concerns about such matters could distort the way the parties participate in mediations, causing them to fear rather than trust the neutral, perhaps even increasing the temptation they feel to try to manipulate the neutral into becoming, in effect, their agent. Finally, a formal, rule-imposed good faith requirement also might increase the incidence of motions for sanctions, either as tactical maneuvers or simply as a result of one side misunderstanding what underlies an opponent's conduct during the ADR event. An intensified risk of motions for sanctions could, in turn, foster distrust across party lines, causing parties to retreat into formality and caution, exactly the opposite kinds of behaviors deemed essential to the success and distinctiveness of mediation.
2. **Degeneration of Process Differentiation**

Like the imposition of a generalized good faith requirement, the devolution of court ADR programs into one hybrid but largely evaluative process could have several dangerous consequences. The risk of such a devolution occurring is real, especially in court-connected programs, where ADR always occurs within the context of pending (or at least threatened) litigation. We have learned that participants in mediation often pressure neutrals to provide substantive analytical input. [FN129] Even if the process being offered is intended to take the form of purely facilitative mediation, the neutrals often are drawn into an evaluative mode, at least in some portions of the ADR event. We also have learned that parties to early neutral evaluations in our court often want the neutral to help facilitate settlement negotiations. There can be pressure on our evaluators to convert ENE into what becomes, essentially, an evaluative mediation.

In my view, it would be a serious policy mistake to permit such pressures, or poor training and quality control, to blur lines of distinction between ADR processes. [FN130] If we fail to maintain clear differences between processes and permit all court ADR to become some blur of evaluative mediation and a settlement conference we will needlessly compromise our ability to be responsive to the full range of values and needs that litigants bring to our courts. We will reduce the occasions on which parties perceive the court as reaching out to them, trying to help them pursue the goals that are most important to them. Offering only an evaluative form of ADR also could increase the risk of parties inferring that the courts' only real interest in the program is getting cases settled, thus reducing occasions for parties to feel grateful to the court for providing a party-oriented service. Moreover, the more that "evaluation" pervades an ADR process, the greater the risk of the "litigization" of that process, which in turn, reduces the capacity of ADR to contribute in unique ways to problem solving. [FN131]

Relying on a single blended process that includes both evaluative and facilitative techniques risks corrupting both mediation and evaluation. In the eyes of many, mediation has a special contribution to make only when the neutral encourages a broader and deeper sweep of inquiry and leaves the "evaluating" to the other participants in the process. The capacity to tap the potential of non-evaluative mediation processes would be lost if court programs encouraged or recognized only forms of mediation with a substantial evaluative component. Similarly, a blended approach would endanger one of the principal advantages of ENE: the confidence that each participant can have, because of the design of the process, that he or she knows all the input that the neutral has received from the parties and their lawyers before the neutral produces his or her evaluation. In mediations and settlement conferences, by contrast, the use of private caucusing prevents parties from knowing everything the other participants have told the neutral, which can undermine confidence in both what the basis is for the neutral's "evaluation" and in its impartiality.

Permitting distinct processes to devolve into one largely evaluative but malleable hybrid also would compromise courts' ability to develop coherent and teachable process protocols and to establish straightforward and consistent ethical guidelines that neutrals could learn and follow with confidence. These difficulties would impair both training of neutrals and quality control.
The more like a smorgasbord an ADR process becomes, the greater the risk that the neutral will make poor judgments about which process route to follow or which techniques are appropriate. As these risks increase, so does the likelihood that neutrals in the same court program, hosting what is nominally the same kind of ADR process, would use different procedures in similar circumstances. If neutrals in the same program use different procedures and techniques in parallel settings, it becomes appreciably more difficult for parties and lawyers to predict what will occur in any particular ADR event.

As predictability of process declines, so does the parties' ability to prepare adequately, which not only jeopardizes the usefulness of the ADR event but also increases the risk that parties will feel that the program is unfair. Parties are more likely to be resentful when they encounter turns in the process which they did not anticipate. Turns in process that parties do not anticipate are more likely to be viewed as inconsistent with the court's rules and of dubious propriety, or as offending deeply rooted feelings about what the appropriate roles of lawyers, clients, and the court are. [FN132] An ADR program that spawned resentment toward the court, instead of gratitude, could hardly be considered an improvement in the administration of justice.

3. Program Rigidification

The prospect of ADR program Rigidification raises two primary concerns. The first is the possibility that the way we institutionalize ADR programs could encourage, both in parties and counsel, dependency, complacency, and passivity about ADR (in particular) and settlement (in general). We need to design into our systems incentives and prods that will discourage litigants from simply sitting back and waiting for the ADR service that the court offers or compels. We must look for ways to encourage litigants to take the initiative to pursue settlement earlier and on their own. [FN133] There is a growth curve in the history of ADR in most jurisdictions. Early in that history, before the local bar and litigant groups have developed a substantial appreciation for the benefits that ADR has to offer, courts may need to push litigants into ADR experiences. At some point, the angle of that learning curve will decline substantially and it is at that point that we need to be sure that our systems do not thoughtlessly force parties into ADR when it would likely not be productive for them. To do so discredits the court and makes its motives look institutionally selfish. In contrast, by engaging in real, open minded dialogue with litigants to determine what they need and whether there is a real prospect that they would benefit from a referral to ADR the court encourages respect for itself and a perception that it understands itself as fundamentally a service institution.

Moreover, if our rules and practices make ADR easier (and less expensive) to fake than to escape, we risk corrupting and de-valuing ADR. Parties who feel forced into ADR when it has little to offer them are more likely just to go through the motions and to be perceived by the neutrals and other parties as so doing. Such rituals without real prospect of reward can erode the public's confidence in both the court and in ADR, and foreseeable bad experiences with ADR are not likely to encourage parties to consider its use when it really could deliver value.
4. Overestimating ADR's Contribution

Another peril with an internal source is that we will assess ADR program value with myopic self-congratulation or through ideological filters rather than with an accurate understanding of what our programs really are delivering and a square acknowledgment of their limitations. One source of this concern is a pattern I have noticed in responses to some surveys that ask parties, lawyers, and neutrals to report what occurred at an ADR session and to assess the contributions the ADR process made. In this pattern, which is reflected in surveys as disparate as those undertaken as part of the RAND study of ADR in six federal district courts in the first half of the 1990s [FN134] and those we conduct on an ongoing basis in the Northern District of California, the reports from the neutrals are consistently much more favorable than the reports from the lawyers or the parties. The lawyers usually are at least a little more positive than the parties, but often the gap is greater between the neutrals and the other participants.

Results of recently completed surveys in the Northern District of California are illustrative. [FN135] When asked whether the mediation in their particular case helped the parties bridge a communication gap, the affirmative response rates were 22% for parties, 19% for lawyers who represented parties in the mediations, but 47% for the mediators. When asked whether the mediation clarified or narrowed issues, 71% of the mediators said yes, while only 35% of the lawyers shared that view (our instrument did not pose this question to clients). There were similar substantial discrepancies in views about whether the mediation had included discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties' legal positions: 86% of the responding mediators reported that such substantive discussions occurred, but that view was shared by only 66% of the responding lawyers and only about half of the litigants.

This pattern of pronounced differences between the perceptions of mediators and the perceptions of lawyers and litigants should prompt us to ask some serious questions of ourselves and to launch substantial efforts to answer them. Are we, in the mediation community, self-delusional? Is ideology, or the need for self-justification, distorting our vision? Are we giving ourselves credit for contributions that are only at the margins of the case or of the parties' concerns and that do not matter much to parties and lawyers? Or are these differences in perceptions attributable to our failures to teach, to help parties and lawyers understand what they actually are accomplishing during our mediations? Even if our perceptions are accurate and theirs are not (I seriously doubt that the differences can be explained solely on this basis), we disserve our craft and our programs if we are not educating the people we serve to appreciate all the different things they accomplish through their mediations.

At the same time, we also must take great care to avoid the perils that we would create if we were to promise our constituencies or ourselves that our ADR programs will deliver more than they can. Creating unrealistic expectations would unnecessarily invite judgments under inappropriate standards, thus both jeopardizing appreciation for what the programs are in fact accomplishing and generating falsely premised disappointment and disaffection. We increase the risk that both our constituents and we will turn away from this work if we succumb to the temptation to claim too much.
As important, inflated expectations or promises could tempt us to cut process or program design corners that could compromise values that are essential to public confidence both in ADR and in the court system. If we promise "results" as measured by specified effects on the courts' dockets, for example, we will feel pressure to increase settlement rates and that pressure could lead us to pressure our neutrals to elevate ends over means or to insist on using only one assertively evaluative approach even when parties would be comfortable only with a purely facilitative process. Or if we strain our resources to try to serve the greatest possible number of cases we take serious risks with quality control and thus with the character of the work done in the courts' name. So we must discipline ourselves to abjure the temptations that beset unbridled enthusiasts. Ours is not a movement rooted in unconditional faith, but simply an effort to better serve.

5. Underestimating the Importance of What We Are Trying to Do

The temptation to over-promise, however, may not be the greatest peril with an internal source. Ironically, that peril could well be underestimating the importance of what we are trying to do.

Even with expectations firmly rooted in reality, we will experience disappointments. We will make mistakes-in policy, in program design, in training, in administration, in response to problems. There will be occasions in which our neutrals perform poorly or even violate principals we hold dear. There will be occasions in which lawyers or parties abuse our processes or fail, completely, to understand or respect the spirit in which we try to work for them. There are people, not in insignificant numbers, who are not animated by values or interests that we respect and whose conduct will not change regardless of the process setting.

There are many more people, however, who will understand and appreciate the spirit that drives our service and who will find real value in what we do. It is for that reason that adding substantial ADR services to the pretrial process and thereby reaching out to litigants, encouraging them to decide which interests are most important to them, permitting them to choose or fashion a procedure that is tailored to pursue those interests and that offers them an opportunity to reclaim power over and responsibility for how their dispute is resolved—might just be the greatest single reform in the history of this country's judicial institutions.

FOOTNOTES

[FN73]. The most famous example of a major study failing to generate empirical proof that court
ADR programs save time or money, in the aggregate, is RAND's. Kakalik et al., supra note 13.

[FN74]. There are political or policy barriers, for example, to conducting "controlled" experiments with real cases and real litigants-especially in a system where the people look to the courts to protect or secure important rights. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Center, Experimentation in the Law; Report of the Federal Judicial Center Advisory Committee on Experimentation in the Law 10 (1981).

[FN75]. Examples of misconduct or ethical dilemmas that a neutral might encounter, but ignore due to pressure to achieve a settlement include (1) learning in private caucus that a lawyer or party is intentionally hiding key evidence, (2) seeing a lawyer manipulate his own client into accepting terms that are good for the lawyer but obviously not in the client's best interests, (3) seeing a stronger party manipulate a weaker party into accepting settlement terms that are transparently unfair (i.e., that clearly fall far short of the weaker party's entitlements under the law or that infringe rights of the weaker party that the law would protect), or (4) seeing parties and counsel collude on settlement terms that are illegal (e.g., in violation of anti-trust laws).

[FN76]. Wissler, supra note 14, at 684. Ms. Wissler found no correlation, however, between a mediator offering an assessment of the merits of the case and the likelihood that parties felt pressured to settle. Id. Surprisingly, she found a positive correlation between mediators offering substantive assessments of the merits of the case or parties' positions and their feeling that the process was fair. Id. Curiously, her data also suggest that "[i]f the mediators kept their views of the case silent, parties felt less pressured by the mediators to settle than if the mediators disclosed their views." Id. at 684-85.


[FN79]. See sources cited supra note 78. The reliability of this data is subject to some question. The sources of the data are hundreds of different clerks in different courts-not all of whom work with the same level of competence or with the same reporting conventions. Some clerks or courts, for example, may have reported evidentiary hearings as "trials," while others have not. Interestingly, the rate of decline in jury trials over the decade of the 1990s was appreciably less (21%) than the rate of decline in trials to judges (55%). Id.


[FN82]. See Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True: Comparing Mediation and Negotiation through Research, 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 131, 133 (suggesting that mediation processes can deliver value to a litigant that often is not accessible through traditional lawyer negotiated settlement processes).


[FN84]. Kakalik et al., supra note 13, at 4. This empirical analysis of the six court ADR programs, as implemented, "provided no strong statistical evidence that time to disposition . . . [was] significantly affected, either positively or negatively . . . We have no justification for a strong policy recommendation because we found no major program effects, either positive or negative." Id. at 34, 40-41, 48, 50. While yielding some evidence that the studied ADR programs increased the percentage of cases terminated by settlement agreement, that increase appears to have been attributable, at least in significant measure, to a decrease in the percentage of terminations by motion, and while the samples were too small to support generalization, it appeared that participation in ADR had no effect on trial rates in half of the studied districts. Id. at 105, 173-74, 210. There was evidence in the other half of the districts that the percentage of cases that ended up in trial was smaller in the group assigned to ADR than in the group not assigned to ADR. Id. at 71, 138, 243.

[FN85]. I am not aware of ethical guidelines or rules for mediators that prohibit the inclusion of "settlement rates" in advertising or promotional materials. See, e.g., CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations, 13, § VIII (2000) (prohibiting false or misleading claims about services, but permitting inclusion of "settlement rates").


[FN87]. Id. This proposed provision was later withdrawn. Fortunately, this part of the commentary was deleted before the California Judicial Council formally adopted the new rules on April 19, 2002.
The comment that was subsequently withdrawn was included in a version of the proposed rules that was circulated for public comment in the late fall of 2001.


[FN89]. Id.

[FN90]. Kakalik et al., supra note 7, at xxx. We have no strong statistical evidence that time to disposition is significantly affected by mediation or neutral evaluation in any of the six programs studied. There was no statistically significant difference in the time to disposition between the ADR sample cases and the comparison cases in five of the six ADR programs. Id. The researchers inferred that the longer times in the sixth district were attributable to the fact that the judges there tended to refer to the ADR program the cases that they believed would be more difficult to settle. See id.

[FN91]. Education of lawyers will be especially effective if it is conducted by visibly successful lawyers and by judges who are highly respected and viewed as worldly and practical.

[FN92]. Although creative lawyers sometimes negotiate compensation incentives for early dispositions.


[FN96]. Id.

[FN97]. Id. at 163.

[FN98]. Id. at 165.

[FN99]. Id.

[FN100]. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. The purpose of the discussion of Olam in the text is not to defend its reasoning or holding, both of which have been the objects of thoughtful and sometimes telling criticism, but to explicate tensions that can arise between the judicial community and the mediation community.

[FN101]. Id.
[FN102]. Id. at 1118.
[FN103]. Id. at 1113.
[FN104]. Id. at 1113-14.
[FN105]. Id. at 1116.
[FN106]. Id. at 1142-43.
[FN107]. Id. at 116.
[FN108]. Id.
[FN109]. Id. at 1117.
[FN110]. Id. at 1147 n. 61.
[FN111]. Id. at 1117.
[FN112]. Id.
[FN113]. Id.
[FN114]. Id.
[FN115]. Id.
[FN116]. Id. at 1118.
[FN117]. Id. at 1113.
[FN118]. Id. at 1118.
[FN119]. Id.
[FN120]. Id. at 1143-44
[FN121]. Id. at 1129.
[FN122]. Id. at 1130.
[FN123]. Id. at 1138-39.
[FN124]. Because a federal court issued it, the Olam opinion could make no authoritative pronouncement about the meaning of California law. No California court has subsequently addressed the issues that the Olam court confronted. In Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., the California Supreme Court discussed Rinaker with apparent approval and then described Olam, without clear expression of either approval or disapproval. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 1, 15-16 (Cal. 2001).

[FN125]. For deeper treatment of considerations that should inform this debate, see John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2002) (suggesting less risky means to achieve some of the ends that are being pursued by proponents of imposing a generalized "good-faith" requirement); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 575 (1997) (offering considered support for imposing such a requirement).

[FN126]. It is generally not considered healthy for courts to adopt rules they will not seriously enforce.


[FN128]. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1987); Dayton, supra note 80, at 935-37.

[FN129]. See Wissler, supra note 14, at 684-85 (reporting generally more positive participant views of mediation when the neutral offered assessments of the merits of the parties' positions). The view that movement toward a hybrid form of mediation is both inevitable and positive is well articulated in Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 247.


[FN131]. For more development of this concern, see Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 11, 29.

[FN132]. For example, lawyers (and sometimes clients) are likely to be taken aback if a neutral pushes to meet privately with a party without his counsel, or seems set on displacing counsel by aggressively criticizing his analysis or approach.

[FN133]. Sharon Press, Director of the Dispute Resolution Center in the Office of the State Courts Administrator in Tallahassee, Florida, sensitized me to the risks described in this section. She has become concerned that in some cases lawyers may accurately determine that ADR will yield no significant benefit to their case, but decide to go through the ADR motions anyway because they believe the court would not excuse them from participation even if they made a detailed and good
faith showing in support of such a request.

[FN134]. Kakalik et al., supra note 13, at 24, 44, 47-48.

[FN135]. Survey results on file with the author and the ADR unit in the Northern District of California. It is important to emphasize that the return rates on the questionnaires from which the data in the text are taken was quite low for parties (25%) and for lawyers who represented parties in mediations (35%), while the return rate for mediators was much higher (67%). It is possible that the differences in response patterns reported in the text are attributable, in some measure at least, to the differences in response rates. While RAND also reported substantial differences in response rates (11% for parties, 45% for lawyers representing parties in ADR events, and 67% for neutrals), it seems unlikely that these differentials are sufficient to explain the parallel patterns, given their consistency across such diverse programs and in response to so many different questions. Kakalik et al., supra note 13, at 24.