The Internet & Communications Law
Rosenbloom: Its Time Has Come Again
PETER J. HAGEMAN
What follows is a common story. You have not read this particular one, but you are probably
already familiar with the players and the issues. Billy Jim Sims is the honest and hardworking
deputy to the manager of a sewage treatment facility run by Harper County and a former local high
school football star. Billy Jim's son is now a star receiver on the team, and Billy Jim is
an active booster in the community. Billy Jim's boss, Rip Robbins, secretly runs a high-stakes
gambling operation from his office at the treatment facility, and some local citizens suspect
he's accepted bribes from corrupt officials.
In an attempt to collect a bad gambling debt, Rip threatens to send enforcers after Randy
Jo Ross, one of the plant's workers. Randy Jo calls Kevin Knight at the local newspaper, spills
his guts about the gambling operation, and confirms Kevin's suspicions that Rip is in cahoots with
a Harper County organized crime family.
According to Randy Jo, Rip has shirked many of his responsibilities at the plant and
jeopardized the county's water supply. Unfortunately, Randy Jo mistakenly implicates Billy Jim
in his tale of corruption, an error continued by Alice Salcedo when she backs up Randy Jo's story.
The Harper Valley Gazette prints Knight's article accusing both Rip and Billy Jim of, among other
things, sacrificing public safety to procure mob payoffs. The day after the Gazette prints the
article, Billy Jim holds a press conference to clear his name and sues Kevin Knight and the
Gazette for libel.
The Harper County District Court sits in a jurisdiction where the status of the plaintiff
determines whether the NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan's1 "actual malice" rule applies. Therefore,
to decide the scope of First Amendment protection to which Kevin Knight's article is entitled, the
court is likely to address the following constitutional questions:
- Does Billy Jim's job as an upper-level manager with the county qualify him as a public official?
- Does Billy Jim's heralded high school football career make him a public figure in Harper County more than twenty years later?
- If not, does Billy Jim's active role as a booster for the Fightin' Hogs football team make him a public figure in Harper County?
- Does Billy Jim's involvement in the controversy surrounding safety at the sewage treatment plant render him a limited purpose public figure?
In many jurisdictions across the country, courts are forced to make meaningless distinctions
between the public and private status of individuals. As Justice Brennan recognized in 1971
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,2 the status of the plaintiff should not determine
the breadth of constitutional protection afforded to material concerning matters that could
influence the lives of many. Rather, to protect the core values of the First Amendment to
their fullest extent, the Harper County District Court's focus should be on the information
contained in Kevin Knight's article and the possibility that Rip Robbins' ties to organized
crime could jeopardize people throughout the county.
Yet, in Rosenbloom,3 after years of anticipation by lower courts that the
Sullivan actual malice4 standard would apply to all matters of public concern,
irrespective of the plaintiff's status, Justice Brennan was only one of three Justices
to make the correct decision. Consequently, as suggested above, the "public official,
"5 "public figure,"6 and "limited purpose public figure"7 doctrines have been stretched
to often-ridiculous lengths by courts that are trying to protect "the
prized American privilege to speak one's mind."8
This article traces Sullivan and its progeny and discusses the misguided attempts of courts
across the country to protect First Amendment ideals by focusing on the "differentiation
between 'public figures' and 'public officials' [that has] . . . no basis in law, logic or
First Amendment policy."9 In an opinion issued on June 23, 1999, the Supreme Court of
Indiana confirmed that the time for Rosenbloom has come again.10
From Sullivan to Gertz
Until 1964, constitutional limitations upon common law libel and slander actions did not
exist. With the Supreme Court's opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,11 the country
was in for a dramatic change. Against the backdrop of the burgeoning civil rights movement,
the New York Times published an advertisement on behalf of civil rights advocates accusing
municipal officials in Montgomery, Alabama, of ruthless tactics in response to civil rights
demonstrators.12 Sullivan, the Montgomery commissioner of public affairs, sued the Times,
alleging that his position with the city implicated him in the misdeeds of the local
authorities detailed in the advertisement.13 An Alabama jury awarded $500,000, the entire
amount sought by the plaintiff.14 The verdict was viewed by many as an obvious "punishment
of outsiders for their publications of a deeply unpopular expression."15 Consistent with
the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open,"16 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court concluded that:
[C]onstitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.17
Focusing on the "actual malice" standard,18 the Court barely referred to the public
status of the plaintiff.19 Its opinion was peppered with references to "[f]ree debate"20
and the "general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by
the First Amendment."21 By virtue of the principles on which the Sullivan Court
appeared to base its holding, when Rosenbloom22 reached the Court in 1971, "[l]ower
courts (had) . . . anticipated that the New York Times privilege would be applied to
publications about all public issues and events," without regard to "the public or
private nature of the plaintiff."23 However, only two other members of the Court joined
Justice Brennan in his now-famous plurality opinion.24
In Rosenbloom, the distributor of a nudist magazine sued a Philadelphia radio station
that had branded him as "a main distributor of obscene material in Philadelphia."25 The
distributor was charged with selling obscene material and subsequently acquitted of all
charges "under the instructions of the trial judge that, as matter of law, the nudist
magazines distributed by the petitioner were not obscene."26 After his acquittal, the
distributor filed a diversity action in federal district court,27 and the trial court
rendered a judgment in favor of the distributor.28 The Third Circuit later reversed
on the grounds that a plaintiff pursuing a defamation action involving a matter of
public concern was required to prove "actual malice" under Sullivan to recover.29.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, in hopes of being relieved of the "actual malice"
standard employed by the Third Circuit, the distributor advocated a distinction
between public and private individuals.30 Specifically, the distributor argued that
a public figure's access to the media and the "risk" of being defamed assumed by a
public person, by virtue of his or her public status, created a bona fide distinction
between public and private individuals.31 Justice Brennan responded that a public
person's perceived ability to respond to a defamation more effectively was "too
a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction."32 More importantly, he
characterized the distributor's argument that public persons assume a risk of being
defamed as bearing "little . . . [on] either . . . the values protected by the First
Amendment or to the nature of our society."33 In this connection, Justice Brennan
properly recognized that "The New York Times standard was applied to libel of a public
official and public figure to give effect to the Amendment's function to encourage
ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has any less interest
in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life."34 The Justice went
on to write that a distinction between public and private individuals "could
easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public
and general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while extending
constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of lives of 'public figures'
that are not in the area of public or general concern."35 Extending his view that
the First Amendment was designed to protect ideas, and not certain classes of
people, to all defamation actions involving matters of public concern, Justice
Brennan advocated the application of the "actual malice" standard as enunciated
in Sullivan.36
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stewart, fashioned a
dissent.37 According to Justice Harlan, the standard imposed by Justice Brennan
inadequately appreciated "the limitations imposed by the legal process in
accommodating the tension between state libel laws and federal constitutional
protections given to freedom of speech and press."38 Further, Justice Harlan
took the view that Justice Brennan's standard would "subject[] the press to
judicial second-guessing of the newsworthiness of each item they print."39
To fairly balance the countervailing interests at stake in defamation actions,
Justice Harlan wrote that "the States should be free to define for
themselves the applicable standard of liability of care so long as they
do not impose liability without fault."40
Three years later, Justice Powell's majority opinion in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.41 echoed the sentiments expressed by Justice Harlan in
Rosenbloom. Gertz, a prominent Chicago attorney, became the target of the
ultraconservative John Birch Society by virtue of his legal representation of the
family of a youth shot and killed by a Chicago police officer.42 The Society
labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and "a Communist-fronter" and alleged that he led
an organization that "probably did more than any outfit to plan the Communist
attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention."43 The jury
awarded Gertz $50,000.
In its review of the verdict, the district court followed the principles
espoused in Justice Brennan's plurality and applied the Sullivan standard, "even
though Petitioner was not a public official or public figure."45 The district court concluded
that "the [Sullivan] privilege protected discussion of any public issue without regard
to the status of the person defamed therein."46 Accordingly, the court entered judgment
for the defendant, notwithstanding the jury's verdict.47 Citing the Rosenbloom plurality,
the Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the defendant "could assert the constitutional
privilege because the article concerned a matter of public interest."
Gertz appealed to the Supreme Court "to contest the applicability of the Sullivan standard."49 At the outset, Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the Court, recognized that the First Amendment requires the protection of certain "falsehood(s) in order to protect speech that matters."50 Citing the distinctions between public and private individuals specifically rejected by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom,51 Justice Powell reasoned that public persons should be treated differently.52
Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements
or vigor or success with which they seek the public's attention, are
properly classified as public figures and those who hold government
office may recover for injury to reputation only on clear and
convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. . . . Despite
this substantial abridgment of the state law right to compensate for
wrongful hurt to one's reputation, . . . the protection of the
New York Times privilege should be available to publishers of
defamatory falsehoods concerning public figures and public
officials.
Justice Powell further elaborated on Justice Brennan's opinion in
Sullivan. In his view, the Sullivan standard
states "an accommodation" between preservation of First Amendment values
and the "state interest in the context of libel actions brought by public
persons."54 To buttress this conclusion, he again cited the perceived
differences between public and private persons, focusing primarily upon
his observation that private individuals have not "voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning
them."55 Indeed, wrote Justice Powell, "the instances of truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare."56 According to Justice Powell,
therefore, the private individual "has a more compelling call on the courts
for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood"
and "is more deserving of recovery."57 Accordingly, Justice Powell concluded
that "the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of
private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with
respect to them."58 In this vein, he announced the rule that would
ultimately lead to the current confusion of the public person doctrines:
"[s]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the states
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."59
The Gertz decision left the door wide open for states to adopt
Justice Brennan's position that the Sullivan standard should apply to
"any issue of significant public interest, without regard to the
position, fame, or anonymity of the person defamed."60 Instead, in
most states and federal circuits, the status of the plaintiff
determines the outcome. The path taken by state appellate courts
and federal courts of appeal, in which the status of the plaintiff
is paramount, has muddled the public person doctrines to the point
where any judicial distinction between public and private figures no
longer exists. Furthermore, societal distinctions between public
and private persons have changed so much since 1974 that they are
now virtually meaningless. Nevertheless, some state and federal
courts have taken the public person doctrines to remarkable lengths.
Public Official Doctrine
In Sullivan,61 the Supreme Court provided very little guidance as to the title
or office one must hold to occupy the status of a public official, a situation that was
not clarified in Rosenblatt v. Baer.62 There, the Court recognized that the "public official"
designation is "a broad one" that encompasses "at the very least . . . those among the hierarchy of
government employees who have or appear to have substantial responsibility for or over the conduct
of government affairs."63 Consequently, defamation jurisprudence across the country identifies a
particularly large class of individuals to whom the Sullivan "actual malice"64 standard attaches.
For instance, in Connecticut, for Sullivan purposes, a member of a municipal planning and zoning
commission is a "public official."65 In Florida, hospital administrators66 and harbor masters67 are
public officials for Sullivan purposes, but the facility coordinator of a state-funded nursing home,
employed by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, is not.68 Is there really
a constitutional distinction between a hospital administrator and someone who runs a state-funded
nursing home? Florida courts apparently think so.
Is a schoolteacher a public official? Maybe. In Florida, public school teachers
asserting defamation actions concerning their performance are not required to meet
the Sullivan "actual malice"69 standard.70 However, public schoolteachers in
Illinois and Arizona must clear the Sullivan hurdle to recover.71,72
In Michaelis v. CBS, Inc.,73 citing reasoning in a 1979 decision to the
effect that public official status cannot extend to all public employees,
74 the Eighth Circuit focused on whether a county coroner was a member of Utah
state government's upper echelon.75 For Sullivan to apply, the court ruled that
the defendant was required to show not only that the plaintiff was acting in
her capacity as a government employee, but that she was also "a hierarchical
member of that group, with substantial control over government affairs."76
The court concluded that the plaintiff, acting as the county coroner, was
not a member of the Utah governmental hierarchy and refused to apply Sullivan.77
In Grzelak v. Calmut Publishing Co., Inc.,78 Judy Grzelak was hired as
a secretary in her town's public works department79 after her husband campaigned
for several officials. At some point her boss reported to the town board that she
was habitually late and that she had allegedly engaged in inappropriate behavior
at a local bar, among other issues.80 Grzelak was not "a public figure about
whom considerable editorial comment would be allowed"; but, by virtue of her
status as a "political patronage employee," the Eighth Circuit required Ms.
Grezelak to prove actual malice in order to recover for injuries to her
reputation.81
Although Gertz was intended to give the states substantial latitude
in determining the standard of fault applicable to private plaintiffs in
defamation actions, courts have instead taken the latitude afforded by Gertz
and transformed low-level government employees, who would otherwise
be private plaintiffs, into public officials for Sullivan purposes.
The above-cited cases are just a few examples that illustrate that application
of "actual malice"82 should not turn on an individual's status as a low-
or high-ranking governmental employee. The First Amendment demands that the
standard of fault in defamation actions turn on the content of the speech
at issue.
Public Figure Doctrine
With its roots in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,83 the public
figure doctrine, like the public official doctrine, has not been a
model of clarity. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in
Trotter v. Jack Anderson, Inc.,84 attempting to distinguish between
a public and private figure "is much like trying to nail a jelly fish to a
wall." The difficulty that many courts have with the public figure
doctrine stems from Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz.85 There, the
Supreme Court divided public figures into two classes of individuals:
(1) general purpose public figures who occupy "positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are a public figure for all
purposes in all contexts"; and (2) limited purpose public figures who
"thrust themselves to the forefront of particular controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."86
With respect to the first group, courts were initially confused when
applying the precise language with which Justice Powell attempted to define
the general purpose public figure. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football
Club, Inc.87 involved an article that discussed a professional football
player's contract dispute and retirement. In Chuy, the Third Circuit
arrived at its holding in a curious fashion, applying the Gertz definition
of an all-purpose public figure to arrive at the conclusion that the
football player was a "public figure, at least with respect to playing
football."88 Chuy did not stand for the proposition that professional
athletes are all-purpose public figures. Rather, the Third Circuit
limited the professional football players' public figure status to
instances in which articles are published concerning their playing
abilities or relationships with their teams.89 Despite its determinatio
that the professional football player enjoyed "pervasive power and
influence," the Third Circuit held he was a public figure for only a
limited purpose.90
Similarly, in James v. Gannett,91 the New York Court of Appeals held that a
professional belly dancer was a public figure with respect only to accounts of her
stage performances. The court attempted to identify the element essential to
attaining public figure status as "an affirmative step to attract public attention."92
It is true that the belly dancer in Gannett took affirmative steps to attract public
attention, but did she "thrust herself into the forefront of a particular controversy"
and become a limited purpose public figure or "achieve such persuasive power and influence"
to qualify as a public figure for all purposes?93 Certainly not. Should accounts of the
belly dancer's performance receive heightened First Amendment protection by virtue of
her choice of occupation? No way. Instead of focusing on whether the performer
took an "affirmative step"94 to attract public attention, the court should have focused on
the speech at issue, accounts of belly dancing, and held that Sullivan's
"actual malice"95 did not apply.
These are just two examples of instances in which the plaintiffs did not
qualify as general purpose public figures nor thrust themselves into a
particular controversy to qualify as limited purpose public figures. Nonetheless,
both courts twisted the general purpose public figure doctrine to reach, at least
in Gannet, a rather silly result: application of the Sullivan standard to
accounts of belly dancing.
As articulated by Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz, the
crux of the limited purpose public figure doctrine appeared to be the
existence of a "public controversy," into which defamed plaintiffs thrust
themselv es "in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
"96 Consistent with Justice Powell's definition of a limited purpose
public figure, the Supreme Court, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,97
rejected a publisher's argument that the divorce of two celebrities was a
public controversy that the celebrity had voluntarily entered. Again
rejecting Justice Brennan's plurality in Rosenbloom,98 Justice Rehnquist
wrote that, although "the divorce of two celebrities may be of interest to some
portion of the reading public," the celebrity did not "freely choose to publicize
the issues" and, therefore, was not a limited purpose public figure.99
Justice Rehnquist's reaffirmation of the Supreme Court's
rejection of Justice Brennan's plurality has paved the way for courts
across the country to apply Justice Brennan's reasoning under the
guise of the limited purpose public figure doctrine. Contrary to Gertz
,100 in order to afford broad First Amendment protection to "public controversies" as
defined by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom,101 many courts no longer expressly
require that plaintiffs voluntarily become involved in a controversy to qualify as
limited purpose public figures.
For instance, as articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Trotter,102
the test for a limited purpose public figure requires only that the
plaintiff be a "participant" in a public controversy and "have more than
a trivial or tangential role" therein. Likewise, to determine the
constitutional status of the plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit merely
determines whether a public controversy exists and examines whether
the "defamation (was) germane to the plaintiff's participation in it.
"103 Applying this test in Silvester v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,104 the
Eleventh Circuit rested constitutional distinctions on the plaintiff's prominence in the
jai alai industry. Similarly, in Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc.,
the boyfriend of a woman who died of a drug overdose qualified as a limited purpose public
figure by virtue of his "social contacts" with high-level government officials. The published
material at issue alleged that he waited "several critical hours" to call for help after
the overdose occurred.
Silvester and Clyburn illustrate that, in some instances,
courts are inclined to manufacture the status of the plaintiff to
reach the desired result: application of the Sullivan standard to
matters of public concern.
Can an individual be a limited purpose public figure by virtue of
events that occurred more than twenty-five years earlier?
Remarkably, the answer is affirmative, at least in the Seventh
Circuit. In Milsap v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc.,105 James W. Milsap
sued the publisher of the Milwaukee Journal and three Journal employees
over a published column that detailed the life of former Milwaukee Courier
journalist Carole Malone.106 The column revisited the controversy
surrounding Milsap's then-position, director of an antipoverty center,
that had been chronicled by Malone more than twenty-five years before
publication of the Journal article at issue.107 Recognizing that the
Supreme Court has declined to address the question of whether individuals
can lose their public figure status, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Milsap had continued to be a public figure for a purpose limited
to his performance as the director of the antipoverty center.108 Because
Milsap had involved himself in public controversy more than a
quarter century earlier, the Seventh Circuit required him to prove
actual malice to recover.109 Milsap thus qualifies as another prime
example of the courts' misguided efforts to protect speech on matters
that might interest the general public.
Conclusion
Although individuals like Billy Jim who attempt to lead private lives
often find themselves in the precarious position of being cast in a
negative public light, their status as political patronage employees,
belly dancers, or former star high school football players should not
determine the outcome of the controversy. Unfortunately, only Colorado,110
Alaska,111 New Jersey,112 and Indiana113 have formally acknowledged
that a somewhat unknown individual's status relative to another unknown
individual should not be the basis of core First Amendment distinctions.
The First Amendment demands that the content of the speech remain the focus at
issue.
As the Supreme Court of Indiana recognized in
Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, "a matter . . . of public or general
interest . . . cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved."114 Contrary to Justice Powell's sentiments in
Gertz,115 the court justified this conclusion in part by its
belief that "in most instances there is little disparity in the ability of
private versus public individuals to obtain access 'to the channels of
effective communication' in order to counteract false statements."116 This
observation is particularly timely in light of the Internet, which functions
as a swift and powerful tool to counteract defamation and is available to
millions of Americans, both public and private. If the Gertz
justification existed in 1974, it certainly does not exist today.
With continued communications developments, the courts' difficulties in distinguishing
between public and private figures during the last three decades will only increase. Does
Jane Doe become a public figure if someone posts information about her on a Web page?
Does John Doe become a limited purpose public figure by engaging in an online chat
session about a controversial topic? The answers to these questions and those asked by the
court in Harper County should be irrelevant to the scope of protection the First Amendment
affords. We can continue down the trail blazed by Gertz and further muddy the constitutional
waters, or achieve clarity by applying the test of actual malice to all matters of public
concern, without regard to the plaintiff's status.
Endnotes
- 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
- 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
- Id
- 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
- Id.at 279-80.
- Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
- Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
- Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
- 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
- 376 U.S. at 257-58 and appendix following 292.
- Id. at 258-59.
- Id. at 256.
- 3 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 1.2.2 (1999).
- 376 U.S. at 270.
- Id. at 279-80.
- Id.
- SACK, supra note 15, § 1.2.5.
- Id. at 271.
- Id. at 269.
- 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
- SACK, supra note 15, § 1.2.5.
- Chief Justice Berger and Justice Blackmun. Justice Black
concurred on the grounds that the First Amendment prohibits judgments
against the media in private actions for libel, 403 U.S. at 7, while
Justice Douglas took no part in the opinion, thus preventing Justice
Brennan's opinion from being the opinion of the Court. SACK, supra note
15, § 1.2.5.
- 403 U.S. at 40.
- Id. at 29.
- Id.
- Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 36.
- Rosenbloom, 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
- 403 U.S. at 45.
- Id. at 45.
- Id. at 46.
- Id. at 47.
- Id. at 45-46.
- Id.at 47-48.
- 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
- Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 62.
- Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
- Id.
- Id.
- 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
- Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
- Id. at 326.
- Id. at 329.
- Id.
- Id.
- Id.
- Gertz, 471 F.2d at 807.
- Gertz, 418 U.S. at 331.
- Id. at 341.
- Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 45.
- Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
- Id.
- Id.
- Id. (emphasis added).
- Id.
- Id.
- Id.
- Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
- Id. at 330
- 376 U.S. 254.
- 376 U.S. 254.
- 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
- Id. at 85.
- 376 U.S. at 269.
- Woodock v. Journal Publishing Co., 1 CONN. L. RPTR. 802, 803 (1990).
- Gadd v. News-Press Publishing Co., 412 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
- Scandinavian World Cruises (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Eagle, 525 So. 2d. 1012 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
- Wilkinson v. Florida Adult Care Ass'n, Inc., 450 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied, 461 So. 2d 114 (1985).
- Sullivan, 383 U.S. at 85.
- Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
- Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.W.2d 1218 (Ill. App. 3d 1974).
- Sewell v. Brookbank, 636 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
- 119 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 1997).
- Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
- Michaelis, 119 F.3d at 701.
- Id.
- Id.
- 543 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1974).
- 543 F.2d at 581.
- Id. at 581.
- Id. at 582.
- 383 U.S. at 85.
- 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (former university football coach and athletic director held to be a public figure).
- 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987).
- 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
- 418 U.S. at 345.
- 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
- Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280.
- Id. at 1280.
- Id.
- 353 N.E.2d 834 (N.Y.S..2d 1976).
- Id. at 840.
- Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345
- 353 N.E.2d at 834
- 383 U.S. at 85.
- 418 U.S. at 345.
- 424 U.S. 428 (1976).
- 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
- Times, Inc., 424 U.S. at 448.
- 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
- 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
- Silvester v. American Broadcasting Co., 839 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th Cir.).
- Id.
- 100 F.3d 1265 (7th Cir. 1996).
- 100 F.3d at 1267
- Id. at 1267.
- Id. at 1270.
- Id.
- Id.
- Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982).
- Mount Juneau Enter. v. Juneau Empire, 991 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1995).
- Turf Landowner Repair v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1995).
- Journal-Gazette Company, Inc. v. Bandido's, Inc., 1999 WL 418697 (Ind. 1999).
- Id. at *3.
- 418 U.S. at 344.
- 1999 WL 418697 at *3 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344).
Peter J. Hageman is an associate in the litigation section of the Austin, Texas, office of Jackson Walker, L.L.P.
