Like most corporate law departments, DuPont Legal is
charged with managing the legal exposure of the company.
As part of that task, DuPont Legal assures that the
cost of the legal service is proportional to the overall
corporate objective for which the legal service is deployed.
To a large degree, corporate law departments, like
DuPont Legal, discharge that overall responsibility
by retaining outside law firms to represent the corporations.
In that context and to meet the expectations of corporate
management, the in-house lawyers must review the legal
fees charged by those law firms and assure themselves
and corporate management that those fees bear an appropriate
relationship to the work involved.
That determination continues to bedevil in-house counsel.
The hourly rate, by which we mean any time-based amount
that is used to calculate an overall fee, even so-called
“blended rates” and “discounted hourly
rates,” long has been the predominant method by
which corporate clients compensate their outside law
firms. That subject is closely related to other subjects
that often dominate surveys of in-house counsel: value
and budget pressures. For example, “[w]hen asked
about their biggest management challenges, [respondent
general counsel] are not shy about mentioning budgets….
‘We’re all under relentless cost pressure’”
Of the top five pressing issues that they face, 81.96%
of in-house counsel who responded to a survey listed
“[r]educing outside legal costs” as among
the most pressing. The response achieved a weighted
average score of 2.55, the lowest weighted average score
of any of the responses. (The lower the score, the higher
that response ranked in terms of its pressing nature.)
In addition to the need to control the costs of legal
service while relying more than they might prefer on
the hourly rate, in-house attorneys face the prospect
of periodic increases (often annual) in the hourly rates
that law firms charge. More often than not, law firms
simply “announce” such increases with little
advance notice to the in-house attorney. In some instances,
firms even send invoices to clients without mentioning
that the fees evidenced in those invoices reflect higher
In-house lawyers find the practice of hourly rate increases
particularly problematic and irritating since they face
increased budgetary pressures from year to year. It
all seems to come down to value: do the law firms’
billed fees reflect value commensurate with the amounts
in question? Can a firm’s annual increase in the
hourly rates that it charges represent sufficient additional
The Value Imperative
The question of how outside counsel fees compare to
the value that in-house counsel place on outside counsel’s
performance has plagued in-house attorneys for some
time. In 1997, in-house counsel graded their outside
counsel at 3.4 (out of a highest possible score of 5)
as to whether the charges for legal service were commensurate
with the value of those services, while the outside
counsel gave themselves a grade of 4.3. In 1998, in-house
counsel responding to the same survey gave outside counsel
a C, while outside counsel awarded themselves a B+ that
same year. The gap between the scores awarded to outside
counsel by in-house counsel and those that outside counsel
awarded to themselves on that measure persisted in annual
surveys by that same organization.
For quite some time, authors have explored the idea
of using fee structures to create incentives for outside
counsel to provide legal service more cost effectively
and with a greater direct correlation to the value of
the legal service that those fees represent. The actual
use of alternative fee arrangements (AFAs), however,
has been much less common than one might expect from
the extent of its treatment by consultants and others.
In a survey conducted in 2001, 78.2% of the respondents
reported that during the year 2000, a median of 80%
of the total amount of their companies’ outside
legal work was covered by standard hourly rates. Discounts
from standard hourly rates covered a median of 40% of
their companies’ outside legal work for 55.2%
of the respondents. For no other type of fee structure
did more than 25.5% of the respondents respond favorably
and no specific alternative fee arrangement covered
more than 10% of the work (median) of those respondents
who used that type of arrangement. Thus, despite the
interest of in-house counsel, the hourly rate persists.
A review of the history of the hourly rate and the interest
in AFAs might illuminate the changing role of the corporate
law department and how that change might affect how
corporate clients identify, select and retain outside
The hourly rate was virtually unknown, in respect of
how law firms billed their clients for legal work, until
approximately the middle of the twentieth century. Until
at least the late 1950s, clients’ bills did not
reflect itemized time records, though the firms were
beginning to keep records of how their attorneys spent
their time. Law firms’ bills contained no detail
and merely charged a single amount “for professional
services rendered.” Gradually, management consultants
promoted time keeping to law firms, at least in part
as a means by which the firms could increase their revenue.
By the 1970s, bills increasingly reflected the amount
of time spent on clients’ matters and the fees
were calculated on that basis alone.
The hourly rate served the interests of both law firms
and corporate law departments. For law firms, it led
to a “cost plus” arrangement for billing
purposes that removed all outcome-related risk from
their shoulders. It provided to corporate law departments
a convenient proxy for an accurate measure of whether
the clients received value commensurate with what they
paid for the work. It fit well into an accounting-based
approach to managing legal service and therefore was
well accepted in the 1950s and 1960s.
1. Effects of the hourly rate
Though it did serve, to some degree, the interests
of both in-house and outside counsel, the hourly rate
has several negative impacts on the costs of legal service
and on the relationships between in-house and outside
lawyers. The most significant impact flows from the
fact that the fee borne by the client will bear no relationship
(other than, perhaps, an entirely fortuitous one) to
the value of the legal work delivered because the fee
is determined solely by reference to the amount of time
devoted to the work. The efficiency or inefficiency
of the lawyer(s) whose work is covered by the fee will
have a greater impact on the size of the fee than the
value that the work bears to the client’s need.
Another significant effect of the hourly rate is that
it means that the financial component of the relationship
between the client and the outside lawyer is a zero-sum
game insofar as the client wishes a lower fee and the
lawyer prefers a higher one. A client that tries to
control the costs represented by the fee can only do
so by reducing the number of hours for which it pays
or negotiate a reduced hourly rate. Each of those means
of reducing costs leads to less reward for the lawyer
without changing the dynamics of how that lawyer works
and the effort devoted to the assignment by that lawyer.
In short, either the lawyer or the client “pays”
for the lawyer’s time.
The hourly rate has had adverse effect on the relationship
between the client and the outside lawyer and it is
a subject that both in-house and outside counsel have
frequently tried to avoid in the past. If a client does
not want to grant the lawyer and law firm carte
blanche to bill inordinate amounts of fees, that
client is oftentimes forced to police counsel by after-the-fact
invoice review to insure the accuracy of rates, timekeepers
and agreed-upon activity. A more acceptable approach
would be a prospective or “forward looking”
discussion between the client and counsel to insure
alignment as to anticipated activity, rates, resources,
and costs for the period in question. Under either approach,
however, the hourly rate undermines the relationship
between counsel and client.
As corporate law departments became more sophisticated,
the negative effects of the hourly rate became clearer.
Even as in-house attorneys became accustomed to reviewing
invoices based on detailed time records, they began
to question whether the hourly rate created incentives
for outside counsel that were contrary to their corporate
clients’ interest in cost-effective legal service.
They began to search for ways to more closely align
the interests of the law firm with those of the client,
at least as to cost effectiveness. Such a fee arrangement
would also reflect a closer alignment between the amount
of the fee and the value that the legal work represents
in the eyes of the client. In the earlier-cited 2001
survey, when asked to rank the five most important things
that outside counsel could do to improve the working
relationship between inside and outside counsel, 80.37%
of the respondents listed “[b]e more concerned
with costs.” (The weighted average score for that
response was 2.10. 2001 ACCA Partnering Survey, p. 195.)
This concern for the costs of legal service led to
various efforts by in-house lawyers, particularly in
the insurance industry, which is the largest single
aggregate purchaser of legal services, to control those
costs. During the 90s, a cottage industry of legal fee
auditors arose, at least in part, to relieve in-house
counsel of the tedium of reviewing long, detail-packed
fee invoices. The use of third-party auditors introduced
other issues, such as ethical questions and mistrust
between in-house and outside counsel on account of the
activities of those third-party auditors. See, for example,
Gurnee, “Do audits spell doom for attorney-client
relationships?”, Defense Comment, vol.
13, no. 2, p. 3. See also Brennan, “Driven to
Defection,” The National Law Journal (May
18, 1998), pp. A1, A27.
2. The client’s perspective and AFAs
In-house lawyers consider the value of the legal service
as a necessary, inherent element of the service that
they seek from outside counsel. In order to demonstrate
that the value exists in adequate proportion, in-house
attorneys express interest in AFAs. That interest likely
That interest stems from several sources. First, as
legal fees continued to escalate, in-house attorneys
and corporate management both began to question whether
the total cost justified the effort, when considered
in the context of the specific assignment. In other
words, it is not just the total amount of the fee that
raises questions, but its relationship to the business
matter from which the need for that legal service arose.
Second, the hourly rate leads to focus on the amount
of time that the billing attorneys spend on the matter.
In order to manage the work, the in-house attorneys
must focus on the billing data to such a degree that
it can distract them from more substantive review of
Third, the very nature of a review of time records,
as reflected in an invoice for legal services, is distasteful
to both the in-house and outside attorneys. It suggests
that the former will second-guess the work of the latter
and it often leads to less-than-pleasant discussions
The electronic submission of invoices for legal services
(“e-billing”) can facilitate in-house attorney
review of invoices by identifying instances of erroneous
billings through arithmetic errors, the use of incorrect
hourly rates, the inappropriate addition of timekeepers
and even the allocation of time to the wrong matter.
Much of the tedium associated with invoice review can
be accomplished by the e-billing systems that are now
E-billing offers several benefits in addition to the
reduction of the tedium that has heretofore accompanied
invoice review. It provides in-house counsel greater
control of the process by which proposed rate increases
of law firms are reviewed and approved. It creates a
data-rich environment and allows a far more meaningful
and focused analysis of the work completed. Finally,
it provides the parties with a platform to advance their
dialogue vis-à-vis AFAs.
Can we find an alternative? Clearly a fee arrangement
that does not rely solely on the number of billed hours
to determine the amount owed the outside counsel (i.e.,
an AFA) will eliminate or reduce the need to scrutinize
those time records. Can we expect inside and outside
attorneys to develop AFAs in light of their failure
to do so to this point? Yes, with some preparation and
a great deal more data than they usually have at hand.
To do so successfully, however, they need to understand
the importance of approaching the effort in a true “partnering”
To develop and implement a successful AFA, client
and counsel need to share information. What each knows
about the assignment and about the most effective means
of completing it is very important to the fee arrangement.
That information might consist of internal data and
prior experience. For example, a client might better
understand the firm’s financial needs if it understands
the firm’s internal compensation system or the
cost structure of the firm on which the firm’s
hourly rates are based. Increases in hourly rates are
often justified, in a very general, unsubstantiated
manner based upon increased costs. Rarely, if ever,
do firms substantiate such increased costs or analyze
why they are justified in simply passing those increases
through to their clients without any meaningful attempt
to reduce or ameliorate their impact. Outside counsel
should, at a minimum, demonstrate that despite the impact
on the client of the increases in his or her costs to
provide the legal service needed, he or she has adopted
efficiencies or otherwise worked to offset that increase.
Both parties should err on the side of disclosure.
Some information that is usually kept secret may not
be necessary to designing the fee structure, but disclosing
it demonstrates that the disclosing party trusts the
other with that information. Such demonstrations of
trust can be very effective in establishing the type
of relationship the clients and firms want to have.
If outside counsel truly believes that he or she can
do the work more effectively than can competitors (and
what law firm does not believe that it is the best at
what it does) he or she should be willing to put something
at risk to demonstrate that. Counsel should also be
willing and able to put something on the table that
is important to the client, such as certainty as to
the fee. The client, as part of the same bargain, should
be willing to provide its outside counsel incentive
to share the risk of the engagement. This is manifested
typically by a willingness to pay a premium to a firm
that accepts such a risk and achieves certain agreed-upon
goals. If, for example, client and counsel design the
AFA to provide the client greater budgetary certainty
and that certainty is achieved together with the desired
result, does outside counsel deserve a premium in accord
with the financial risk that she or he accepted?
Use information about the cost of the service in determining
what sort of AFA is appropriate. Don’t simply
guess how much work had cost previously and then use
that guess as the basis for the new arrangement. To
the degree such an estimate fails to achieve the client’s
and firm’s aims, it might set them back in their
Identify benefits and risks for the client and the
firm in any proposed AFA. Sometimes risks cannot be
avoided (e.g., there is a great deal more work than
anticipated, and the firm can’t afford to handle
it all for the agreed-on fixed fee). If the client and
counsel have acknowledged the existence of those risks
and agreed to address them when they (the risks) materialize,
client and counsel will be better prepared to do so
without rancor or feelings of either one having been
undercut by the other.
It is important that both in-house and outside counsel
recognize that they might need to review an AFA periodically.
Any fee arrangement is premised on certain assumptions
and it reflects the circumstances at the time that it
is created. Since that context can change over time,
sometimes radically, client and counsel must be prepared
to revisit the terms of their fee arrangement when circumstances
warrant such a step.
As we mentioned, the hourly rate causes the fee arrangement
to constitute a zero-sum game between client and counsel.
For one to improve its position, the other’s position
must be worsened. One step that in-house and outside
counsel can take together is to search for creative
ways of making the delivery of legal service to the
client more efficient. Such a collaborative effort also
depends on a mutually supportive or synergistic relationship
A client that has significant economic “clout”
may be able to achieve apparent cost reductions simply
by demanding that law firms reduce their hourly rates
and then monitoring extremely closely the number of
hours for which the client pays. That might, however,
be a shortsighted approach for at least three reasons.
First, that approach exacerbates the “zero sum”
aspects of the fee arrangement and it increases the
likelihood that the relationship will be adversarial.
This cuts against the goal of “partnering”
relationships (or even good, old-fashioned client/counsel
relationships), in which the client expects its counsel
to look out for the client’s interests in more
than a very narrow manner. Moreover, a relationship
that is premised on a “zero sum” fee arrangement
is likely to be a short-lived arrangement.
Second, a firm must remain profitable in order to stay
in business. If it charges hourly rates, it can reduce
those hourly rates only so far and remain viable. The
recent decision by the firm of Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison to disband highlights the financial risks in
the legal profession even for firms that, until recently,
were thought to be well positioned in the market.
Third, even reduced hourly rates cannot control the
overall cost of legal service. Such an arrangement merely
puts a premium on the client’s ability to manage
the work and thereby minimize the amount of time devoted
to its assignments. Cost control via reduced hourly
rates therefore has limited utility despite its superficial
A collaborative search for cost efficiencies by client
and counsel is potentially far more effective. It is
more consistent with the type of client/counsel relationship
that many law departments espouse than is a unilateral
approach. Moreover, it enables the parties to explore
AFAs that might take advantage of identified efficiencies.
If they can successfully eliminate steps or activities
previously completed when performing legal service,
they can reduce the cost of providing that service.
And they do so in a way that does not represent an arbitrary
reduction of the fees due counsel. Rather, they can
achieve the same legal protection for the client with
less expenditure by intelligently streamlining the workload.
An example of such efforts might involve a company that,
together with two regional employment litigation firms,
developed pleadings that were made available to local
counsel handling the matters covered by the arrangement.
The two regional firms were responsible for the fees
charged by local counsel but through the sharing of
work product they were able to realize efficiencies
in representing that client that allowed them to successfully
manage that financial risk. Creative retention, dissemination
and re-use of work product constitute an effective cost-control
Further, the discussions about efficiencies may highlight
different characteristics of the representation that
affect its value to the client. The firm and client
should develop a deeper understanding of the work and
the value or risk associated with that work, as well
as the related challenges. This, in turn, will have
implications for the type of alternative fee arrangement
that might be appropriate.
By exploring efficiencies, the client and counsel will
also investigate possible mutual benefits. How can the
client benefit from the fee arrangement? How might counsel
benefit? If they can identify different advantages for
each of them that do not adversely impact the other,
they will have the makings of a workable arrangement
that will be self-reinforcing and therefore self-sustaining.
Each will have something to gain from the relationship.
Neither will have reason to feel unduly disadvantaged.
An effective AFA depends on the ability of the client
and counsel to come to terms on a multiplicity of difficult
issues. Perhaps even more important, however, is the
fact that they may very well have to revisit issues
during the course of the relationship as circumstances
evolve and change. As a result, it is important that
they have a relationship that enables them to address
issues that may arise, whether or not anticipated. In
other words, they need a healthy, respectful relationship.
3. DuPont Legal, the PLFs and AFAs
DuPont Legal’s efforts to implement AFAs might
provide some insights into the difficulties that arise
in the course of such an effort as well as some solutions
that have enabled us to make some headway in that regard.
You should remember that these efforts, despite the
success that we may have achieved, are ongoing and evolutionary.
We do not believe that our current situation represents
the most that we can do and our efforts continue.
The ultimate key to an AFA is to demonstrate an alignment
between the incentives available to the outside lawyers
and the client’s valuation of the legal matter
in question and the resources that will be necessary
to its successful resolution. On a tactical level, DuPont
Legal relies on the lawyer working on the matter to
investigate the possibility of an AFA as well as to
design an appropriate one. The in-house attorney must
identify those matters as to which our in-house clients
would be receptive to a fee arrangement that does not
rely on a mechanical multiplication of a number of hours
by an hourly rate to determine the final legal fee due
the firm. Some of the factors that the in-house attorney
will examine include the level of risk that the dispute
or litigation represents for DuPont, what the possible
return for DuPont might be (this is particularly important
in respect of cases in which the company is the plaintiff)
and the nature of the exposure that DuPont has on account
of the dispute. The last factor might focus on a dispute
over a practice that is critical to DuPont’s business,
as to which a judicial finding of illegality or liability
might be unacceptable.
That in-house attorney, if the matter does qualify for
such treatment, then must educate the outside attorney
as to the company’s goals for the representation
(not relying on simplistic goals like “win”).
At the same time, we expect the in-house attorney to
educate the outside attorney as to the core values that
DuPont Legal wants reflected in the fee arrangement:
certainty, efficiency and clear incentives for the outside
We have negotiated with the law firms that represent
DuPont (the Primary Law Firms, or PLFs, that constitute
the membership of the network of firms and service providers
that work with DuPont Legal on the company’s litigation)
several AFAs. One AFA relates to litigation that involves
the drug Coumadin. More recently, we crafted an AFA
for some intellectual property litigation.
In every case, we make sure to involve the internal
client in the decision to investigate whether an AFA
would make sense and, if it would, the final terms of
the arrangement. We also revisit the terms of the AFA
periodically because the nature of legal work is not
static but it changes over time due to many factors,
many of which are outside the control of DuPont Legal
and the PLFs. Those practices result from our belief
in openness, candor and trust, not only between DuPont
Legal and the PLFs but also between the lawyers (within
DuPont Legal and the PLFs) on the one hand and our mutual
clients on the other.
We also try to reward those firms that agree to effective
AFAs by honoring them within the PLF Network. This positive
reinforcement serves to provide competitive incentives
for the other PLFs to attempt to emulate those so honored.
We believe that positive reinforcement serves to advance
our interest in AFAs much more effectively than would
many other ways of pushing the firms in that direction.
Outside lawyers have expressed some frustration at
the apparent unwillingness or resistance of some in-house
attorneys to AFAs. That unwillingness or resistance
might result from any of several factors, like inertia
(even in-house attorneys are more comfortable with a
known quantity like the hourly rate than an unknown
one, such as a to-be-designed AFA) or unfamiliarity.
Even in the face of that reaction, however, we believe
that outside attorneys will profit from an effort to
engage their clients in discussions about possible AFAs
for several reasons. Most importantly, they will demonstrate
to those clients, simply by raising the idea of an AFA
and attempting to initiate a discussion of the issue,
an alignment of their own interests with those of their
clients. They will also exemplify a concern for the
resources that the matter will require, resources for
which the client will ultimately pay. Even if, after
discussing with a client the possibility of an AFA for
the client’s work, the firm bills that client
on an hourly rate, the firm and the client likely will
discover that their discussion led to a more effective
and more efficient representation of the latter by the
former on account of the enhanced understanding that
the firm realizes about the client's goals for the matter
and as to what is most important to the client in the
course of the representation.
Increases in the hourly rate
In the context of the need for such a healthy, respectful
relationship, law firms’ routine of increasing
their hourly rates periodically, whether annually or
on some other timetable, can be extremely counterproductive.
This results from several attributes of such increases.
First, increases in the hourly rates that law firms
charge their clients eliminate any incentive for the
firms to be more efficient. Law firms typically justify
increases as necessary to allow them to pay higher salaries
to their associates. If a firm imposes (or attempts
to impose) an increase automatically, it obviates the
need for the firm to justify the increases without identifying
any efficiency gains that may offset the proposed fee
increase. The market for legal services for corporate
clients has not relied on competitive pressures to keep
A good relationship between a firm and a corporate
client, which we often refer to as “partnering”
and which we at DuPont strive to establish with the
members of our Primary Law Firm Network, should be characterized
by communication, collaboration, and information sharing.
Circulating redacted AFAs is but one example of the
type of information that our network partners track
and share with one another. Accordingly, DuPont Legal’s
Network of Primary Law Firms provides a platform that
serves to identify best practices that its members can
share for their and DuPont’s benefit.
For a healthier exchange to occur, both client and
counsel need clearer communication with respect to issues
such as productivity, technology utilization, resource
leveraging, increased experience, efficiency and cost
considerations that impact their economic health. By
clearly addressing such issues, they will establish
the basis for the open communication and collaboration
that will serve them well over the course of the relationship.
In short, greater alignment between the parties will
result as to all facets of the litigation.
An AFA should be dynamic, like any good relationship.
The unilateral adoption of fee increases by law firms
undermines that relationship. AFAs, as opposed to the
hourly rate “zero sum” game, underscore
the importance of candor, communication and a greater
understanding by the parties of each other’s financial
We do not mean to say that law firms, if they bill
their clients on the basis of hourly rates, must forever
live with present rates. Such an artificial constraint
on law firms’ billing practices could result in
adverse and unintended consequences for the firms and
their clients. Increases in those rates should, however,
reflect something other than a reflexive price increase
to offset a firm’s inability to control its own
costs. Almost every business in America must consider
the competitive impact of an increase in its prices
for customers before putting such an increase into effect.
Unlike most other businesses, law firms profess to look
after the interests of their clients almost in a paternalistic
sense, yet they often impose rate increases without
any apparent regard for the effect that the increases
will have on their clients’ finances.
We make the point that law firms should expect to,
and their clients should expect them to, justify increases
in their hourly rates. A simple statement by a firm
that an increase is warranted to keep up with the market
is or should meet skepticism at least. Instead, a firm
should provide clients sufficient data to establish
that the firm has settled on the increase as a last
resort and that it has attempted, at least, to avoid
the need for an increase through efforts to more efficiently
achieve the client’s goals. A firm should make
a measured, disciplined, articulated case for any rate
increase that it proposes to impose on its clients.
At the same time, it is only fair that clients share
information with the law firms about their (the clients’)
financial and budgetary goals. If the costs of legal
service consume a greater portion of a company’s
expenses each year, the firms should know that and work
with that client to ameliorate that situation. In short,
give careful consideration to each client and the uniqueness
of that client. The ability and willingness of the client
to assist the firms in various ways should be taken
into account as well when approaching the subject of
fee increases and AFAs. That assistance could take the
form of assisting firms in their own marketing, making
referrals to other law departments, for example, or
even advertising its success with the firms, as DuPont
Legal has done in respect of its Network of Primary
Law Firms. Law departments of whatever size can do such
Greater transparency between clients and law firms
about finances and billing, in both directions, would
enable them to achieve firmer, more supportive relationships.
Together, they would be able to explore how to more
efficiently and effectively deploy the talents of the
lawyers (inside and outside) so as to reach the client’s
business goals most expeditiously.
The hourly rate is still very much alive. Corporate
law departments have a love/hate relationship with it,
however, and long for a viable alternative. They think
that AFAs are more appropriate for much of the work
they assign to outside law firms.
While the hourly rate is still the predominant method
of calculating legal fees, law firms should pay attention
to its effects on their relationships with their corporate
clients. This advice pertains even more strongly to
increases in hourly rates. Their impact on the relationship
between a firm and its corporate clients can be particularly
Given the necessity of the hourly rate, however, at
least in the near future, it is important that law firms
and corporate clients approach it with greater understanding
and appreciation for its strengths and its weaknesses.
Greater transparency between client and counsel and
a higher level of information sharing between them should
at least ameliorate the worst impacts of the current
reliance on the hourly rate.
AFAs provide a challenge and an opportunity to both
law firms and law departments. If those parties can
overcome their internal resistance to experimenting
with AFAs, they will both discover marketing and other
opportunities that will redound to their mutual benefit.
Thomas L. Sager serves as Vice President
and Assistant General Counsel of the DuPont Company
and also serves as the Chief Litigation Counsel. Mr.
Sager helped pioneer DuPont’s Convergence and
Law Firm Partnering Program and continues to have
oversight responsibility. Through his leadership,
this program has become a benchmark in the industry
and has received national acclaim for its innovative
approach to the business of practicing law. In addition,
his responsibilities include oversight for all litigation
and IT support. He received his J.D. from Wake Forest
University School of Law in 1976 and began his career
with DuPont in August of the same year.
Steven A. Lauer is a consultant
based in Maplewood, New Jersey. He spent thirteen-and-one-half
years as an in-house counsel for four organizations,
including one of the largest law departments in the
country. He was responsible for litigation management
for several business units and associated issues,
including counsel selection and management. He was
project director for the effort of the Law Department
of The Prudential Insurance Company of America to
use requests for proposals in its counsel selection
process. As a result of that effort, approximately
60 percent of the company’s outside legal service
was awarded to eighty law firms. He is Managing Director
of Managed Compliance eLearning Services, a joint
venture of PLI and Corpedia Education, and he now
consults with corporations regarding compliance-related
issues, including corporate governance. His telephone
number is (973) 763-6340 and he can be reached by
e-mail at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Until recently, he was Executive Vice President, Deputy
Editor and Publisher of The Metropolitan Corporate
Counsel, a monthly journal for in-house counsel.
Stickel, “GCs Are Crunched By the Numbers,”
Corporate Legal Times, vol. 12, no. 126
(May 2002), p. 1.
2001 ACCA Partnering With Outside Counsel Survey:
Assessing Key Elements of the In-House Counsel/Outside
Counsel Relationship” by ACCA and Serengeti,
page 197 (hereinafter, “2001 ACCA Partnering
Lauer, “Maybe Humpty Dumpty Was A Lawyer,”
Law Department Management Adviser, Issue
No. 213 (December 1, 2001), p. 5, 6.
See, for example, Goehl, “How to Boost
Business and Profits with Creative Pricing: The
Coumadin® Case Study,” accessible at http://www.imakenews.com/sugarcrestreport/e_article000121157.cfm?x=r.
2001 ACCA Partnering Survey, p. 158. See also
R. Rawson, L. Cutliff, W. Alderman & R. Donovan,
“Fee Arrangements,” appearing as Chapter
8 of Successful Partnering Between Inside and
Outside Counsel (West Group 2000, R. Haig ed.),
vol. 1, §8.2, pp. 8-3 to 8-5.
Ross, “The Honest Hour: The Ethics of
Time-Based Billing by Attorneys” (Carolina
Academic Press 1996), p. 16.
See Lauer, “Conditional, Contingent and
Other Alternative Fee Arrangements,” Monitor
Press (1999), p. 42.