To: Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure

From: Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Date: May 8, 2009 (Revised June 15, 2009)

Re: Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee

Introduction

The Civil Rules Advisory Committee met in San Francisco on February 2 and 3, 2009, and in Chicago on April 20 and 21, 2009. Minutes of the February meeting and draft Minutes of the April meeting are attached.

Proposed amendments of Civil Rules 26 and 56 were published for comment in August 2008. The first of three scheduled hearings on these proposals was held through the morning on November 17, before the Committee’s November meeting began. The remaining hearings were held on January 14, 2009, following the Standing Committee meeting in San Antonio, and on February 2 in San Francisco.

Four action items are presented in this report. Part I A recommends approval of a recommendation to adopt the amendments to Rule 26, with revisions from the proposal as published. Part I B recommends approval of a recommendation to adopt the amendments to Rule 56, with revisions of the proposal as published. Part I C recommends approval of a recommendation to delete “discharge in bankruptcy” from the list of affirmative defenses in Rule 8(c) as published in August 2007. Part II recommends publishing a revision of Supplemental Rule E(4)(f), deferring publication until a suitable time for publication along with other proposals.

Part III presents for discussion several items that will occupy the Committee in the near future.
I ACTION ITEMS FOR ADOPTION

A. Rule 26: Expert Trial Witnesses

The Committee recommends approval for adoption of the provisions for disclosure and discovery of expert trial witness testimony that were published last August. Small drafting changes are proposed, but the purpose and content carry on.

These proposals divide into two parts. Both stem from the aftermath of extensive changes adopted in 1993 to address disclosure and discovery with respect to trial-witness experts. One part creates a new requirement to disclose a summary of the facts and opinions to be addressed by an expert witness who is not required to provide a disclosure report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The other part extends work-product protection to drafts of the new disclosure and also to drafts of 26(a)(2)(B) reports. It also extends work-product protection to communications between attorney and trial-witness expert, but withholds that protection from three categories of communications. The work-product protection does not apply to communications that relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony; identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or identify assumptions that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert relied upon in forming the opinions to be expressed.

These two parts are described separately. Each applies only to experts who are expected to testify as trial witnesses. No change is made with respect to the provisions that severely limit discovery as to an expert employed only for trial preparation.


The 1993 overhaul of expert witness discovery distinguished between two categories of trial-witness experts. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to disclose the identity of any witness it may use to present expert testimony at trial. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that the witness must prepare and sign an extensive written report describing the expected opinions and the basis for them, but only “if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.” It was hoped that the report might obviate the need to depose the expert, and in any event would improve conduct of the deposition. To protect these advantages, Rule 26(b)(4)(A) provides that an expert required to provide the report can be deposed “only after the report is provided.”

The advantages hoped to be gained from Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports so impressed several courts that they have ruled that experts not described in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) must provide (a)(2)(B) reports. The problem is that attorneys may find it difficult or impossible to obtain an (a)(2)(B) report from many of these experts, and there may be good reason for an expert’s resistance. Common examples of experts in this category include treating physicians and government accident investigators. They are busy people whose careers are devoted to causes other than giving expert testimony. On the other hand, it is useful to have advance notice of the expert’s testimony.

Proposed Rule 26(a)(2)(C) balances these competing concerns by requiring that if the expert witness is not required to provide a written report under (a)(2)(B), the (a)(2)(A) disclosure must state the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Evidence Rule 702, 703, or 705, and “a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.” It is intended that the summary of facts include only the facts that support the opinions; if the witness is expected to testify as a “hybrid” witness to other facts, those facts need not be
summarized. The sufficiency of this summary to prepare for deposition and trial has been accepted by practicing lawyers throughout the process of developing the proposal.

As noted below, drafts of the Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosure are protected by the work-product provisions of proposed Rule 26(b)(4)(B).

**Rule 26(b)(4): Work-Product Protects Drafts and Communications**

The Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert witness report is to include “(ii) the data or other information considered by the witness in forming” the opinions to be expressed. The 1993 Committee Note notes this requirement and continues: “Given this obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials furnished to their experts to be used in forming their opinions — whether or not ultimately relied upon by the expert — are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure when such persons are testifying or being deposed.” Whatever may have been intended, this passage has influenced development of a widespread practice permitting discovery of all communications between attorney and expert witness, and of all drafts of the (a)(2)(B) report.

Discovery of attorney-expert communications and of draft disclosure reports can be defended by arguing that judge or jury need to know the extent to which the expert’s opinions have been shaped to accommodate the lawyer’s influence. This position has been advanced by a few practicing lawyers and by many academics during the development of the present proposal to curtail such discovery.

The argument for extending work-product protection to some attorney-expert communications and to all drafts of Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures or reports is profoundly practical. It begins with the shared experience that attempted discovery on these subjects almost never reveals useful information about the development of the expert’s opinions. Draft reports somehow do not exist. Communications with the attorney are conducted in ways that do not yield discoverable events. Despite this experience, most attorneys agree that so long as the attempt is permitted, much time is wasted by making the attempt in expert depositions, reducing the time available for more useful discovery inquiries. Many experienced attorneys recognize the costs and stipulate at the outset that they will not engage in such discovery.

The losses incurred by present discovery practices are not limited to the waste of futile inquiry. The fear of discovery inhibits robust communications between attorney and expert trial witness, jeopardizing the quality of the expert’s opinion. This disadvantage may be offset, when the party can afford it, by retaining consulting experts who, because they will not be offered as trial witnesses, are virtually immune from discovery. A party who cannot afford this expense may be put at a disadvantage.

Proposed Rules 26(a)(4)(B) and (C) address these problems by extending work-product protection to drafts of (a)(2)(B) and (C) disclosures or reports and to many forms of attorney-expert communications. The proposed amendment of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) complements these provisions by amending the reference to “information” that has supported broad interpretation of the 1993 Committee Note: the expert’s report is to include “the facts or data or other information considered by the witness” in forming the opinions. The proposals rest not on high theory but on the realities of actual experience with present discovery practices. The American Bar Association Litigation Section took an active role in proposing these protections, drawing in part from the success of similar protections adopted in New Jersey. The published proposals drew support from a wide array of organized bar groups, including The American Bar Association, the Council of the ABA Litigation Section, The American Association for Justice, The American College of Trial Lawyers
Federal Rules Committee, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Association of the Federal Bar of New Jersey Rules Committee, the Defense Research Institute, the Federal Bar Council of the Second Circuit, the Federal Magistrate Judges’ Association, the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, the International Association of Defense Counsel, the Lawyers for Civil Justice, the State Bar of Michigan U.S. Courts Committee, and the United States Department of Justice.

Support for these proposals has been so broad and deep that discussion can focus on just two proposed changes, one made and one not made. Otherwise it suffices to recall the three categories of attorney-expert communications excepted from the work-product protection: those that

(i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony;
(ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or
(iii) identify assumptions that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert relied upon in forming the opinions to be expressed.

The change made adds a few words to the published text of Rule 26(b)(4)(B):

(B) * * * Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

The published Committee Note elaborated the “regardless of form” language by stating that protection extends to a draft “whether oral, written, electronic, or otherwise.” Comments and testimony expressed uncertainty as to the meaning of an “oral draft.” The comments and testimony also reflected the drafting dilemma that has confronted this provision from the beginning. Rule 26(b)(3) by itself extends work-product protection only to “documents and tangible things.” Information that does not qualify as a document or tangible thing is remitted to the common-law work-product protection stemming from Hickman v. Taylor. As amended to reflect discovery of electronically stored information, moreover, Rule 34(a)(1) may be ambiguous on the question whether electronically stored information qualifies as a “document” in a rule — such as Rule 26(b)(3) — that does not also refer to electronically stored information. Responding to these concerns, the Discovery Subcommittee recommended that the “regardless of form” language be deleted, substituting “protect written or electronic drafts” of the report or disclosure. Lengthy discussion by the Committee, however, concluded that it is better to retain the open-ended “regardless of form” formula, but also to emphasize the requirement that the draft be “recorded.” The Committee Note has been changed accordingly.

The change not made would have expanded the range of experts included in the protection for communications with the attorney. The invitation for comment pointed out that proposed Rule 26(b)(4)(C) protects communications only when the expert is required to provide a disclosure report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Communications with an expert who is not required to give a report fall outside this protection. (The Committee Note observes that Rule 26(b)(4)(C) “does not exclude protection under other doctrines, such as privilege or independent development of the work-product doctrine.”) The invitation asked whether the protection should be extended further. Responding to this invitation, several comments suggested that the rule text either should protect attorney communications with any expert witness disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(A), or — and this was the dominant mode — should protect attorney communications with an expert who is an employee of a party whose duties do not regularly involve giving expert testimony. These comments argued that communications with these employee experts involve the same problems as communications with other experts.
Both the Subcommittee and the Committee concluded that the time has not come to extend the protection for attorney-expert communications beyond experts required to give an (a)(2)(B) report. The potential need for such protection was not raised in the extensive discussions and meetings held before the invitation for public comment on this question. There are reasonable grounds to believe that broad discovery may be appropriate as to some “no-report” experts, such as treating physicians who are readily available to one side but not the other. Drafting an extension that applies only to expert employees of a party might be tricky, and might seem to favor parties large enough to have on the regular payroll experts qualified to give testimony. Still more troubling, employee experts often will also be “fact” witnesses by virtue of involvement in the events giving rise to the litigation. An employee expert, for example, may have participated in designing the product now claimed to embody a design defect. Discovery limited to attorney-expert communications falling within the enumerated exceptions might not be adequate to show the ways in which the expert’s fact testimony may have been influenced.

Three aspects of the Committee Note deserve attention. An explicit but carefully limited sentence has been added to state that these discovery changes “do not affect the gatekeeping functions called for by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. * * *.” The next-to-last paragraph, which expressed an expectation that “the same limitations will ordinarily be honored at trial,” has been deleted as the result of discussions in the Advisory Committee, in this Committee, and with the Evidence Rules Committee. And the Note has been significantly compressed without sacrificing its utility in directing future application of the new rules.
“Clean” version of Rule and “Redline” version of Note

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery

(a) Required Disclosures.

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(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony

(A) In General. In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), a party must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.

(B) Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report — prepared and signed by the witness — if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose
duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony. The report must contain:

(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;

(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;

(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;

(iv) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;

(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and

(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.
(C) **Witnesses Who Do Not Provide a Written Report.** Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the witness is not required to provide a written report, this disclosure must state:

(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and

(ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.

(D) **Time to Disclose Expert Testimony.** A party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court orders. Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosures must be made:

(i) at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial;
if evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C), within 30 days after the other party’s disclosure.

(E) **Supplementing the Disclosure.** The parties must supplement these disclosures when required under Rule 26(e).

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(b) **Discovery Scope and Limits.**

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(4) **Trial Preparation: Experts.**

(A) **Deposition of an Expert Who May Testify.** A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a report from the expert, the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided.
(B) **Trial-Preparation Protection for Draft Reports or Disclosures.** Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

(C) **Trial-Preparation Protection for Communications Between a Party’s Attorney and Expert Witnesses.** Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications:

(i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony;

(ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert
considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or

(iii) identify assumptions that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.

(D) Expert Employed Only for Trial

Preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. But a party may do so only:

(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or

(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(E) **Payment.** Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery:

(i) pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D); and

(ii) for discovery under (D), also pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses it reasonably incurred in obtaining the expert’s facts and opinions.

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**COMMITTEE NOTE**

**Rule 26.** Rules 26(a)(2) and (b)(4) are amended to address concerns about expert discovery. The amendments to Rule 26(a)(2) require disclosure regarding expected expert testimony of those expert witnesses not required to provide expert reports and limit the expert report to facts or data (rather than “data or other information,” as in the current rule) considered by the witness. Rule 26(b)(4) is amended to provide work-product protection against discovery regarding draft expert disclosures or reports and — with three specific exceptions — communications between expert witnesses and counsel. Together, these changes provide broadened disclosure regarding some expert testimony and require justifications for disclosure and discovery that have proven counterproductive.
The rules first addressed discovery as to trial-witness experts when Rule 26(b)(4) was added in 1970, permitting an interrogatory about expert testimony. In 1993, Rule 26(b)(4)(A) was revised to authorize expert depositions and Rule 26(a)(2) was added to provide disclosure, including — for many experts — an extensive report. Influenced by the Committee Note to Rule 26(a)(2), many courts read the disclosure provision for disclosure in the report of “data or other information considered by the expert in forming the opinions” to authorize call for disclosure or discovery of all communications between counsel and expert witnesses and all draft reports. The Committee has been told repeatedly that routine discovery into attorney-expert communications and draft reports has had undesirable effects. Costs have risen. Attorneys may employ two sets of experts — one for purposes of consultation and another to testify at trial — because disclosure of their collaborative interactions with expert consultants would reveal their most sensitive and confidential case analyses, often called “core” or “opinion” work product. The cost of retaining a second set of experts gives an advantage to those litigants who can afford this practice over those who cannot. At the same time, attorneys often feel compelled to adopt an excessively guarded attitude toward their interaction with testifying experts that impedes effective communication, and experts might adopt strategies that protect against discovery but also interfere with their effective work, such as not taking any notes, never preparing draft reports, or using sophisticated software to scrub their computers’ memories of all remnants of such drafts. In some instances, outstanding potential expert witnesses may simply refuse to be involved because they would have to operate under these constraints.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is amended to specify that disclosure is only required regarding “facts or data” considered by the expert witness, deleting the “or other information” phrase that has caused difficulties. Rule 26(a)(2)(C) is added to mandate disclosures regarding testimony of expert witnesses not required to provide expert reports. Rule 26(b)(4) is amended to provide work-product protection for draft reports and attorney-expert communications, although this protection does not extend to communications about three specified topics.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) is amended to provide that disclosure include all “facts or data considered by the witness in forming” the opinions to be offered, rather than the “data or other information” disclosure prescribed in 1993. This amendment to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in as one ground for requiring disclosure of all attorney-expert communications and draft reports. The amendments to Rule 26(b)(4) make this change explicit by providing work-product protection against discovery regarding draft reports and disclosures or attorney-expert communications.

The refocus of disclosure on “facts or data” is meant to limit the disclosure requirement to material of a factual nature by excluding, as opposed to theories or mental impressions of counsel. At the same time, the intention is that “facts or data” be interpreted broadly to require disclosure of any material considered received by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients. The disclosure obligation extends to any facts or data “considered” by the expert in forming the opinions to be expressed, not only those relied upon by the expert.

Rule 26(a)(2)(C). Rule 26(a)(2)(C) is added to mandate summary disclosures of regarding the opinions to be offered by expert witnesses who are not required to provide reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and of the facts supporting those opinions. It requires disclosure of information that could have been obtained by a simple interrogatory under the 1970 rule, but now depends on more cumbersome discovery methods. This disclosure will enable parties to determine whether to take depositions of these witnesses, and to prepare to question them in deposition or at trial. It is considerably less extensive than the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Courts must take care against requiring undue detail, keeping in mind that these witnesses have not been specially retained and may not be as responsive to counsel as those who have.

This amendment resolves a tension that has sometimes prompted courts to require reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) even from witnesses exempted from the report requirement. An (a)(2)(B) report is required only from an expert described in (a)(2)(B), reasoning that having a report before the deposition or trial testimony of all
expert witnesses is desirable. See *Minnesota Min. & Manuf. Co. v. Signtech USA, Ltd.*, 177 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Minn. 1998) (requiring written reports from employee experts who do not regularly provide expert testimony on theory that doing so is “consistent with the spirit of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)” because it would eliminate the element of surprise); compare *Duluth Lighthouse for the Blind v. C.B. Brettin Manuf. Co.*, 199 F.R.D. 320, 325 (D. Minn. 2000) (declining to impose a report requirement because “we are not empowered to modify the plain language of the Federal Rules so as to secure a result we think is correct”). With the addition of Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosure for expert witnesses exempted from the report requirement, courts should no longer be tempted to overlook Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s limitations on the full report requirement.

A witness who is not required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) may both testify as a fact witness and also provide expert testimony under Evidence Rule 702, 703, or 705. Frequent examples include physicians or other health care professionals and employees of a party who do not regularly provide expert testimony. Parties must identify such witnesses under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and provide the disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) with regard to their expert opinions. This The (a)(2)(C) disclosure obligation does not include facts unrelated to the expert opinions the witness will present.

**Rule 26(a)(2)(D).** This provision (formerly Rule 26(a)(2)(C)) is amended slightly to specify that the time limits for disclosure of contradictory or rebuttal evidence apply with regard to disclosures under new Rule 26(a)(2)(C), just as they do with regard to reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

**Rule 26(b)(4).** Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is added to provide work-product protection under Rule 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) for drafts of expert reports or disclosures. This protection applies to all witnesses identified under Rule 26(a)(2)(A), whether they are required to provide reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or are the subject of disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). It applies regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded, whether oral, written, electronic, or otherwise. It also applies to drafts of any supplementation under Rule 26(e); see Rule 26(a)(2)(E).
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is added to provide comparable work-product protection for attorney-expert communications regardless of the form of the communications, whether oral, written, electronic, or otherwise. The addition of Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is designed to protect counsel’s work product and ensure that lawyers may interact with retained experts without fear of exposing those communications to searching discovery routine wholesale discovery. The protection is limited to communications between an expert witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and the attorney for the party on whose behalf the witness will be testifying, including any “preliminary” expert opinions. Protected “communications” include those between the party’s attorney and assistants of the expert witness. The rule does not itself protect provides no protection for communications between counsel and other expert witnesses, such as those for whom disclosure is required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). The rule does not exclude protection under other doctrines, such as privilege or independent development of the work-product doctrine.

The most frequent method for discovering the work of expert witnesses is by deposition, but Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) apply to all discovery regarding the work of expert witnesses. The most frequent method is by deposition of the expert, as authorized by Rule 26(b)(4)(A), but the protections of (B) and (C) apply to all forms of discovery.

Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) do not impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the development, foundation, or basis of those opinions. For example, the expert’s testing of material involved in litigation, and notes of any such testing, would not be exempted from discovery by this rule. Similarly, inquiry about communications the expert had with anyone other than the party’s counsel about the opinions expressed is unaffected by the rule. Counsel are also free to question expert witnesses about alternative analyses, testing methods, or approaches to the issues on which they are testifying, whether or not the expert considered them in forming the opinions expressed. These discovery changes therefore do not affect the gatekeeping functions called for by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and related cases.
The protection for communications between the retained expert and “the party’s attorney” should be applied in a realistic manner, and often would not be limited to communications with a single lawyer or a single law firm. For example, it may happen that a party may be involved in a number of suits about a given product or service, and may retain a particular expert witness to testify on that party’s behalf in several of the cases. In such a situation, the court should recognize that this protection applies to communications between the expert witness and the attorneys representing the party in any of those cases. Similarly, communications with in-house counsel for the party would often be regarded as protected even if the in-house attorney is not counsel of record in the action. Other situations may also justify a pragmatic application of the “party’s attorney” concept.

Although attorney-expert communications are generally protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(C), the protection does not apply to the extent the lawyer and the expert communicate about matters that fall within three exceptions. But the discovery authorized by the exceptions does not extend beyond those specific topics. Lawyer-expert communications may cover many topics and, even when the excepted topics are included among those involved in a given communication, the protection applies to all other aspects of the communication beyond the excepted topics.

First, under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i) attorney-expert communications regarding compensation for the expert’s study or testimony may be the subject of discovery. In some cases, this discovery may go beyond the disclosure requirement in Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vi). It is not limited to compensation for work forming the opinions to be expressed, but extends to all compensation for the study and testimony provided in relation to the action. Any communications about additional benefits to the expert, such as further work in the event of a successful result in the present case, would be included. This exception includes compensation for work done by a person or organization associated with the expert personally or by another person associated with the expert in providing study or testimony in relation to the action. Compensation paid to an organization affiliated with the expert is included as compensation
for the expert’s study or testimony. The objective is to permit full inquiry into such potential sources of bias.

Second, consistent with Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) discovery is permitted to identify facts or data the party’s attorney provided to the expert and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed. In applying this exception, courts should recognize that the word “considered” is a broad one, but this exception is limited to those facts or data that bear on the opinions the expert will be expressing, not all facts or data that may have been discussed by the expert and counsel. And the exception applies only to communications “identifying” the facts or data provided by counsel; further communications about the potential relevance of the facts or data are protected.

Third, under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(iii) discovery regarding attorney-expert communications is permitted to identify any assumptions that counsel provided to the expert and that the expert relied upon in forming the opinions to be expressed. For example, the party’s attorney may tell the expert witness to assume the truth of certain testimony or evidence is true, or the correctness of another expert’s conclusions that certain facts are true, for purposes of forming the opinions they will express. Similarly, counsel may direct the expert witness to assume that the conclusions of another expert are correct in forming opinions to be expressed. This exception is limited to those assumptions that the expert actually did rely upon in forming the opinions to be expressed. More general attorney-expert discussions about hypotheticals, or exploring possibilities based on hypothetical facts, are outside this exception.

Under the amended rule, does not absolutely prohibit discovery regarding attorney-expert communications on subjects outside the three exceptions in Rule 26(b)(4)(C), or regarding draft expert reports or disclosures. But such discovery is permitted regarding attorney-expert communications or draft reports only in limited circumstances and by court order. A party seeking such discovery must be obtained unless the party seeking it can make the showing specified in Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) — that the party has a substantial need for the discovery and cannot obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship. It will be rare for a party to be
able to make such a showing given the broad disclosure and discovery otherwise allowed regarding the expert’s testimony. A party’s failure to provide required disclosure or discovery does not show the need and hardship required by Rule 26(b)(3)(A); remedies are provided by Rule 37. A contention that required disclosure or discovery has not been provided is not a ground for broaching the protection provided by Rule 26(b)(4)(B) or (C), although it may provide grounds for a motion under Rule 37(a).

In the rare case in which a party does make this a showing of such a substantial need for further discovery and undue hardship, the court must protect against disclosure of the attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories under Rule 26(b)(3)(B). But this protection does not extend to the expert’s own development of the opinions to be presented; those are subject to probing in deposition or at trial.

Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) focus only on discovery. But because they are designed to protect the lawyer’s work product, and in light of the manifold disclosure and discovery opportunities available for challenging the testimony of adverse expert witnesses, it is expected that the same limitations will ordinarily be honored at trial. Cf. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (work-product protection applies at trial as well as during pretrial discovery).

Former Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) have been renumbered (D) and (E), and a slight revision has been made in (E) to take account of the renumbering of former (B).
B. Rule 56

The Advisory Committee recommends approval for adoption, with changes, of the proposal to revise Rule 56 that was published last August. This proposal has been considered extensively by this Committee in January and June 2008 and again in January 2009. As requested by this Committee, the invitation for public comment was more detailed than the usual invitation. Pointed questions were addressed not only to broad aspects of the proposal but also to fine details. This strategy worked well. The written comments and testimony at three hearings were sharply focused and responded well to the questions that had been presented. Substantial changes were made in response to this complex and often conflicting advice. The result is a leaner and stronger summary-judgment procedure. Everything that remains in the proposed rule was included in the published proposal. Everything that was deleted or modified was addressed by the invitation for comments. The Advisory Committee agreed unanimously that there is no need to republish the proposal for another round of comments addressed to the issues that were so successfully raised and addressed in the first round.

The two issues that figured most prominently in the comments and testimony will be discussed first. The first is restoration of “shall,” replacing the Style Project’s “should” as the direction to grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. The second is deletion of the “point-counterpoint” procedure that figured prominently in subdivision (c). Other significant changes will be discussed by summarizing each subdivision.

“Shall” Restored

The conventions adopted by the Style Project prohibited any use of “shall” because it is inherently ambiguous. The permitted alternatives were “must,” “should,” and — although infrequently — “may.” Faced with these choices, the Style Project adopted “should.” The Committee Note cited a Supreme Court decision and a well-known treatise for the proposition that “should” better reflects the trial court’s seldom-exercised discretion to deny summary judgment even when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant seems entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This change drew virtually no reaction during the extended comment period provided for the Style Project. But it drew extensive comment during the present project.

Studying these comments persuaded the Committee that “shall” must be restored as a matter of substance. From the beginning and throughout, the Rule 56 project was shaped by the premise that it would be a mistake to attempt to revise the summary-judgment standard that has evolved through case-law interpretations. There is a great risk — indeed a virtual certainty — that adoption of either “must” or “should” will gradually cause the summary-judgment standard to evolve in directions different from those that have been charted under the “shall” direction. The Style Project convention must yield here, even if nowhere else in any of the Enabling Act rules.

The divisions between the comments favoring “should” and those favoring “must” are described at length in the summary of comments and testimony. The comments favoring “must” rely at times on the language of opinions and on the Rule 56 standard that summary judgment is
directed when the movant is “entitled” to judgment as a matter of law. More functionally, they emphasize the importance of summary judgment as a protection against the burdens imposed by unnecessary trial, and also against the shift of settlement bargaining that follows denial of summary judgment. The comments favoring “should” focus on decisions that recognize discretion to deny summary judgment even when there appears to be no genuine dispute as to any material fact. They also focus on the functional observation that a trial-court judge may have good grounds for suspecting that a trial will test the evidence in ways not possible on a paper record, showing there is, after all, a genuine dispute. And trial-court judges point out that a trial may consume much less court time than would be needed to determine whether summary judgment can be granted — time that is pure waste if summary judgment is denied, or if it is granted and then reversed on appeal. Still more elaborate arguments also have been advanced for continuing with “should.”

Faced with these comments, and an extensive study of case law undertaken by Andrea Kuperman, the Committee became convinced that neither “must” nor “should” is acceptable. Either substitute for “shall” will redirect the summary-judgment standard from the course that has developed under “shall.” Restoring “shall” is consistent with two strategies often followed during the Style Project. The objection to “shall” is that it is inherently ambiguous. But time and again ambiguous expressions were deliberately carried forward in the Style Project precisely because substitution of a clear statement threatened to work a change in substantive meaning. And time and again the Style Project accepted “sacred phrases,” no matter how antique they might seem. The flood of comments, and the case law they invoke, demonstrate that “shall” had become too sacred to be sacrificed.

The proposed Committee Note includes a relatively brief explanation of the reasons for restoring “shall,” including quotations from Supreme Court opinions that seem to look in different directions.

“Point-Counterpoint” Eliminated

The published proposal included as subdivision (c)(2) a detailed provision establishing a 3-part procedure for a summary-judgment motion. The movant must file a motion identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought; a separate statement of material facts identified in separately numbered paragraphs; and a brief. This was the “point.” The opposing party must file a correspondingly numbered response to each fact, and might identify additional material facts. This was the initial “counterpoint.” The movant then could reply to any additional fact stated by the nonmovant. There was no provision for a surreply by the nonmovant. This procedure was based on local rules in some 20 districts, and was closely modeled on similar provisions in the proposed Rule 56 recommended by this Committee to the Judicial Conference in 1992.

The Committee, after considering the public comments and testimony, has concluded that although the point-counterpoint procedure is worthy, and often works well, the time has not come to mandate it as a presumptively uniform procedure for most cases. The comments and testimony
showed the perils of misuse and suggested that there is less desire for national uniformity than might have been expected.

This part of the proposal provoked a near avalanche of comments. Many comments were favorable, urging that a point-counterpoint procedure focuses the parties and the motion in a disciplined and helpful way. But many of the comments were adverse. Perhaps the most negative comments from practicing lawyers came from those who represent plaintiffs in employment-discrimination cases. They protested that time and again the point-counterpoint procedure fractures consideration of the case, focusing only on “undisputed” “historic” “facts” that are the subject of direct testimony, diverting attention from the need to consider the inferences that a jury might draw from both undisputed facts and disputed facts. Defendants, moreover, have taken to stating hundreds of facts even in simple cases. A plaintiff is hard-put to undertake the work of responding to so many facts, most of them irrelevant and many of them simply wrong. In addition, they protested that Rule 56 procedure stands trial procedure upside-down. At trial the plaintiff opens and closes. On summary judgment the defendant opens and — if there is no opportunity to surreply — also closes. Some complained that defendant employers seem to deliberately manipulate this inversion, making a motion in vague general terms and withholding a clear articulation of their positions until a reply, without the right to file a surreply without leave of court.

Beyond the division in the trial bar, comments came from an unusually high number of district judges. Most of these comments urged that even if the point-counterpoint procedure works well in some cases, and even if it works well in most cases in some districts, the time has not come to adopt it as a presumptively uniform national procedure, even if coupled with permission to opt out by order in any specific case. These comments were backed by extensive experience both with motions presented by point-counterpoint procedure and with motions presented in other forms.

Individual judges with experience in both procedures included two judges from Alaska, which does not have a point-counterpoint procedure, who for many years have accepted regular and hefty assignments of cases in Arizona, which does have a point-counterpoint procedure. Judges John W. Sedwick and H. Russel Holland reported that the point-counterpoint procedure takes longer and is less satisfactory than their own procedure. The District Judges in Arizona have been so impressed by this testimony that they are reconsidering their own procedure.

Courts that have had and abandoned point-counterpoint local rules provide a broader-based perspective. Two illustrations suffice. Judge Claudia Wilken explored the experience in the Northern District of California. See 08-CV-090, and the summary of testimony on February 2. California state courts adopted a point-counterpoint procedure in 1984. From 1988 to 2002 the Northern District had a parallel local rule. The rule was abandoned. It made more work and required more time to decide a motion. It was inefficient and created extra expense. The facts set out in the separate statements were repeated in the supporting memoranda; the separate statements “were supernumerary, lengthy, and formalistic.” Responses often included “objections,” and often included statements of purportedly undisputed facts that were repeated in the supporting memoranda. The objections often were no more than semantic disputes. And matters became really complicated in the face of cross-motions. “[T]he statement of undisputed material facts is a format
that particularly lends itself to abuse by the game-playing attorneys and by the less competent attorneys.” In addition, this format does not lend itself to coherent consideration of fact inferences. Narrative statements are better. “You need to know facts that are not material to understand what happened.”

Judge David Hamilton recounted the experience in the Southern District of Indiana, which had a point-counterpoint local rule from 1998 to 2002. See 08-CV-142, and the summary of testimony on February 2. Motions often asserted hundreds of facts, and “became the focus of lengthy debates over relevance and admissibility.” There was an exponential increase in motions to strike. The separate documents “provided a new arena for unnecessary controversy. We began seeing huge, unwieldy and especially expensive presentations of many hundreds of factual assertions with paragraphs of debate about each one of these.” In one case with a routine motion “the defendant tried to dispute 582 of the plaintiff’s 675 assertions of undisputed material facts.” But the system can work if the statement of undisputed facts is required as part of the brief; the page limits on briefs force appropriate concision and focus. It remains possible to deal with fact inference in this setting, to establish “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence,” by a response that says “See my whole brief. It’s all my evidence. It’s circumstantial.”

The recommendation to abandon the point-counterpoint procedure simplifies proposed subdivision (c). As a matter of drafting, it eliminates the need to refer to “motion, response, and reply.” It facilitates reorganization of the remaining subdivisions. More importantly, it averts any need to determine whether a right to surreply should be added. The arguments in favor of a surreply seem compelling, but a right to surreply could easily degenerate to a proliferation of useless papers in many cases.

Abandoning the point-counterpoint procedure does not mean abandoning the “pinpoint” citation requirement published as proposed subdivision (c)(4)(A) and now promoted to become subdivision (c)(1)(A). The requirement of specific record citations is so elemental that a reminder might seem unnecessary. Regular experience shows that the reminder is in fact useful.

Subdivision (a)

Identifying claim or defense: As published, proposed subdivision (c)(2)(A)(i) required that the motion identify each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought. This encouragement to clarity has been incorporated in subdivision (a).

“Shall”: The decision to restore “shall” is explained above.

“If the movant shows”: From the beginning in 1938, Rule 56 has directed that summary judgment be granted if the summary-judgment materials “show” there is no genuine issue of material fact. “Show” is carried forward for continuity, and because it serves as an important reminder of the Supreme Court’s statement in the Celotex opinion that a party who does not have the burden of production at trial can win summary judgment by “showing” that the nonmovant does not have evidence to carry the burden.
Stating reasons to grant or deny: The public comments addressed matters that were considered in framing the published proposal. No change seems indicated.

Subdivision (b)

Time to respond and reply: As published, subdivision (b) included times to respond and to reply. The Committee recommends that these provisions be deleted. Elimination of the point-counterpoint procedure from subdivision (c) leaves the proposed rule without any formal identification of response or reply. It would be possible nonetheless to carry forward the times to respond or reply. The concepts seem easily understood. But the decision to honor local autonomy on the underlying procedure suggests that the national rule should not suggest presumptive time limits. The published proposal recognized that different times could be set by local rule. Whatever measure of uniformity might result from default of local rules — or adoption of the national rule times in local rules — seems relatively unimportant.

The Committee considered at length the particular concern arising from the decision in the Time Project to incorporate the proposed times to respond and reply in Rule 56 as the Supreme Court transmitted it Congress last March. It may seem awkward to adopt time provisions in 2009 and then abandon them in a rule proposed to take effect in 2010. This concern was overcome by deeper considerations. It seems likely that the proposed Rule 56, if adopted, will not be considered for amendment any time soon. It is better to adopt the best rule that can be devised. And the appearance of abrupt about-face is not likely to stir uneasiness about the process. The time provisions in the 2009 Time Project version are set out in Rule 56(a) and (c). The 2010 rule is completely rewritten, with the only time provision in Rule 56(b). The appearance is not so much one of indecisiveness as one of complete overhaul into a new organic whole.

The published proposal set times “[u]nless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise in the case.” The emphasis on a case-specific order was designed to emphasize the intention that general standing orders should not be used. “[I]n the case” has been removed at the suggestion of the Style Consultant, Professor Kimble, who observes that use of this phrase in one rule may generate confusion in all the other rules that refer to court orders without limitation. The risk posed by a general standing order setting a different time is alleviated by Rule 83(b), which prohibits any sanction or other disadvantage for noncompliance with any requirement not in the Civil Rules or a local rule “unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement.”

Subdivision (c)

Point-Counterpoint: The major change in subdivision (c) is elimination of the point-counterpoint provisions of (c)(2), as explained above. The other subdivisions have been rearranged to reflect this change. No comment objected to this provision, and many judges specifically supported it.
“Pinpoint” citations: The Committee readily concluded that deletion of the point-counterpoint provisions does not detract from the utility of requiring citations to the parts of the record that support summary-judgment positions. This provision has been moved to the front of the subdivision, becoming (c)(1). Paragraph (1) also carries forward the provisions recognizing that a party can respond that another party’s record citations do not establish its positions, and recognizing the Celotex “no-evidence” motion.

Admissibility of supporting evidence: As published, proposed subdivision (c)(5) recognized the right to assert that material cited to support or dispute a fact “is not admissible in evidence.” This provision has become subdivision (c)(2), and is modified to recognize an assertion that the material “cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” The change makes this provision parallel to proposed subdivision (c)(4), which carries forward from present Rule 56(e)(1) the requirement that an affidavit set out facts that would be admissible in evidence. More importantly, the change reflects the fact that summary judgment may be sought and opposed by presenting materials that are not themselves admissible in evidence. The most familiar examples are affidavits or declarations, and depositions that may not be admissible at trial.

Materials not cited: As published, the proposal provided that the court need consider only materials called to its attention by the parties, but recognized that the court may consider other materials in the record. Notice under proposed Rule 56(f) was required before granting summary judgment on the basis of materials not cited by the parties, but not before denying summary judgment on the basis of such materials. This provision, published as subdivision (c)(4)(B) and carried forward as (c)(3), has been revised to delete the notice requirement. Some of the comments had urged that notice should be required before either granting or denying summary judgment on the basis of record materials not cited by the parties. Consideration of these comments led to the conclusion that there are circumstances in which it is proper to grant summary judgment without additional notice. A party, for example, may file a complete deposition transcript and cite only to part of it. The uncited parts may justify summary judgment. Notice is required under subdivision (f), however, if the court acts to grant summary judgment on “grounds” not raised by the parties.

Accept for purposes of motion only: Subdivision (c)(3) of the published proposal provided that “A party may accept or dispute a fact either generally or for purposes of the motion only.” This provision is withdrawn. It was added primarily out of concern for early reports that point-counterpoint procedure may elicit inappropriately long statements of undisputed facts. A party facing such a statement might conclude that many of the stated facts are not material and that it is more efficient and less expensive simply to accept them for purposes of the motion rather than undertake the labor of attacking the materials said to support the facts and combing the record for counterpoint citations. Elimination of the point-counterpoint proposal removes the primary reason for including this provision. The provision, moreover, creates a tension with subdivision (g). Subdivision (g) provides that if the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may order that a material fact is not genuinely disputed and is established in the case. Several comments expressed fear that no matter how carefully hedged, an acceptance for purposes of the motion might become the basis for an order that there is no genuine dispute as to a fact accepted “for purposes of the motion.” The advantages of recognizing in rule text the value of accepting a fact for purposes
of the motion only do not seem equal to the difficulties of drafting to meet this risk. The Committee
Note to Subdivision (g) addresses the issue.

Affidavits or declarations: Proposed subdivision (c)(4) carries forward from present Rule 56(e)(1),
with only minor drafting changes. It did not provoke any public comment.

Subdivision (d)

Subdivision (d) addresses the situation of a nonmovant who cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition. It carries forward present Rule 56(f) with only minor changes. A few
comments urged that explicit provision should be made for an alternative response: “Summary
judgment should be denied on the present record, but if the court would grant summary judgment
I should be allowed time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.” This suggestion
was rejected for reasons summarized in one pithy response: “No one wants seriatim Rule 56
motions.” The Committee Note addresses a related problem by noting that a party who moves for
relief under Rule 56(d) may seek an order deferring the time to respond to the motion.

Subdivision (e)

Subdivision (e) was published in a form integrated with the point-counterpoint procedure. It
has been revised to reflect withdrawal of the point-counterpoint procedure. It fits with courts that
adopt point-counterpoint procedure on their own, particularly by recognizing the power to “consider
[a] fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” This power corresponds to local rules that a fact
may be “deemed admitted” if there is no proper response. But paragraph (3) emphasizes that
summary judgment cannot be granted merely because of procedural default — the court must be
satisfied that the motion and supporting materials, including the facts considered undisputed, show
that the movant is entitled to judgment. Subdivision (e) also fits with procedures that do not include
point-counterpoint. In its revised form, it also applies to a defective motion, recognizing authority
to afford an opportunity to properly support a fact or to issue another appropriate order that may
include denying the motion.

Subdivision (f)

Subdivision (f) expresses authority to grant summary judgment outside a motion for summary
judgment. It reflects procedures that have developed in the decisions without any explicit anchor
in the text of present Rule 56. After giving notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
may grant summary judgment for a nonmovant, grant the motion on grounds not raised by the
parties, or consider summary judgment on its own. The proposal drew relatively few comments.

As published, subdivision (f) required notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond before
a court can deny summary judgment on a ground not raised by the parties. This provision caused
second thoughts in the Committee. The Committee concluded that notice should not be required
before denying a motion on what might be termed “procedural” grounds — the motion is filed after
the time set by rule or scheduling order, the motion is “ridiculously overlong,” and the like. It does
not seem feasible to draft a clear distinction that would require notice before denying a motion on “merits” grounds not raised by the parties and denying a motion on “procedural” grounds not raised by the parties. The Committee proposes that subdivision (f) be revised by deleting “deny” from paragraph (2): “(2) grant or deny the motion on grounds not raised by the parties * * *.”

**Subdivision (g)**

Subdivision (g) carries forward present Rule 56(d), providing in clearer terms that if the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion it may enter an order stating that any material fact is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case. It drew few comments. The Committee recommends it for adoption as published.

The Committee Note has been amended to address the concern that a party who accepts a fact for purposes of the motion only should not fear that this limited acceptance will support a subdivision (g) order that the fact is not genuinely disputed and is established in the case.

**Subdivision (h)**

Subdivision (h) carries forward present Rule 56(g)’s sanctions for submitting affidavits or declarations in bad faith. As published it made two changes — it made sanctions discretionary, not mandatory, and it required notice and a reasonable time to respond. It is recommended for adoption with one change, the addition of words recognizing authority to impose other appropriate sanctions in addition to expenses and attorney fees or contempt.

Several comments suggested that subdivision (h) be expanded to establish cost-shifting when a motion or response is objectively unreasonable. The standard would go beyond Rule 11 standards. The Committee concluded that cost-shifting should not be adopted.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56. Summary Judgment

(a) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.

(b) Time to File a Motion. Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.

(c) Procedures.
(1) **Supporting Factual Positions.** A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(2) **Objecting That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence.** A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be
presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only
the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or
declaration used to support or oppose a motion
must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts
that would be admissible in evidence, and show
that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify
on the matters stated.

(d) When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. If a
nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition, the court may:

(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to
take discovery; or

(3) issue any other appropriate order.
(e) Failing to Properly Support or Address a Fact. If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

(f) Judgment Independent of the Motion. After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may:

(1) grant summary judgment for a nonmovant;

(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or
consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.

(g) **Failing to Grant All the Requested Relief.** If the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may enter an order stating any material fact — including an item of damages or other relief — that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.

(h) **Affidavit or Declaration Submitted in Bad Faith.** If satisfied that an affidavit or declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the court — after notice and a reasonable time to respond — may order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, it incurred as a result. An offending party or attorney may also be held in contempt or subjected to other appropriate sanctions.
COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 56 is revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary-judgment motions and to make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts. The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases. The source of contemporary summary-judgment standards continues to be three decisions from 1986: *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317; *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242; and *Matsushita Electrical Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word — genuine “issue” becomes genuine “dispute.” “Dispute” better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination. As explained below, “shall” also is restored to the place it held from 1938 to 2007.

The first sentence is added to make clear at the beginning that summary judgment may be requested not only as to an entire case but also as to a claim, defense, or part of a claim or defense. The subdivision caption adopts the common phrase “partial summary judgment” to describe disposition of less than the whole action, whether or not the order grants all the relief requested by the motion.

“Shall” is restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment. The word “shall” in Rule 56 acquired significance over many decades of use. Rule 56 was amended in 2007 to replace “shall” with “should” as part of the Style Project, acting under a convention that prohibited any use of “shall.” Comments on proposals to amend Rule 56, as published in 2008, have shown that neither of the choices available under the Style Project conventions — “must” or “should” — is suitable in light of the case law on
whether a district court has discretion to deny summary judgment when there appears to be no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Compare *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)(“Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case in which there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. *Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co.*, 334 U.S. 249 * * * (1948),” with *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)(“In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). Eliminating “shall” created an unacceptable risk of changing the summary-judgment standard. Restoring “shall” avoids the unintended consequences of any other word.

Subdivision (a) also adds a new direction that the court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion. Most courts recognize this practice. Among other advantages, a statement of reasons can facilitate an appeal or subsequent trial-court proceedings. It is particularly important to state the reasons for granting summary judgment. The form and detail of the statement of reasons are left to the court’s discretion.

The statement on denying summary judgment need not address every available reason. But identification of central issues may help the parties to focus further proceedings.

**Subdivision (b).** The timing provisions in former subdivisions (a) and (c) [were consolidated and substantially revised as part of the time computation amendments that took effect in 2009.] These provisions are adapted by new subdivision (b) to fit the context of amended Rule 56. The timing for each step is directed to filing: are superseded. Although the rule allows a motion for summary judgment to be filed at the commencement of an action, in many cases the motion will be premature until the nonmovant has had time
to file a responsive pleading or other pretrial proceedings have been had. Scheduling orders or other pretrial orders can regulate timing to fit the needs of the case.

Subdivision (b)(2) sets an alternative filing time for a nonmovant served with a motion before the nonmovant is due to file a responsive pleading. The time the responsive pleading is due is determined by all applicable rules, including the Rule 12(a)(4) provision governing the effect of serving a Rule 12 motion.

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) is new. It establishes a common procedure for several aspects of summary-judgment motions synthesized from similar elements developed in the cases or found in many local rules.

The subdivision (c) procedure is designed to fit the practical needs of most cases. Paragraph (1) recognizes the court’s authority to direct a different procedure by order in a case that will benefit from different procedures. The order must be specifically entered in the particular case. The parties may be able to agree on a procedure for presenting and responding to a summary-judgment motion, tailored to the needs of the case. The court may play a role in shaping the order under Rule 16.

The circumstances that will justify departure from the general subdivision (c) procedures are variable. One example frequently suggested reflects the (c)(2)(A)(ii) statement of facts that cannot be genuinely disputed. The court may find it useful, particularly in complex cases, to set a limit on the number of facts the statement can identify.

Paragraph (2) spells out the basic procedure of motion, response, and reply. It directs that contentions as to law or fact be set out in a separate brief. Later paragraphs identify the methods of supporting the positions asserted, recognize that the court is not obliged to search the record for information not cited by a party, and carry forward the authority to rely on affidavits and declarations.
Subparagraph (2)(A) directs that the motion must describe each claim, defense, or part of each claim or defense as to which summary judgment is sought. A motion may address discrete parts of an action without seeking disposition of the entire action.

The motion must be accompanied by a separate statement that concisely identifies in separately numbered paragraphs only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed and entitle the movant to summary judgment. Many local rules require, in varying terms, that a motion include a statement of undisputed facts. In some cases the statements and responses have expanded to identification of hundreds of facts, elaborated in hundreds of pages and supported by unwieldy volumes of materials. This practice is self-defeating. To be effective, the motion should focus on a small number of truly dispositive facts.

The response must, by correspondingly numbered paragraphs, accept, dispute, or accept in part and dispute in part each fact in the Rule 56(c)(2)(A)(ii) statement. Under Rule 56(e)(3), a response that a material fact is accepted or disputed may be made for purposes of the motion only.

The response may go beyond responding to the facts stated to support the motion by concisely identifying in separately numbered paragraphs additional material facts that preclude summary judgment.

The movant must reply — using the form required for a response — only to additional facts stated in the response. The reply may not be used to address materials cited in the response to dispute facts in the Rule 56(c)(2)(A)(ii) statement accompanying the motion. Except for possible further rounds of briefing, the exchanges stop at this point. A movant may file a brief to address the response without filing a reply, but this brief cannot address additional facts stated in the response unless the movant files a reply.

Subdivision (c)(1) addresses the ways to support an assertion that a fact can or cannot be genuinely disputed. It does not address the form for providing the required support. Different courts and
judges have adopted different forms including, for example, directions that the support be included in the motion, made part of a separate statement of facts, interpolated in the body of a brief or memorandum, or provided in a separate statement of facts included in a brief or memorandum.

Subdivision (c)(1)(A)(4)(A) addresses the ways to support a statement or dispute of fact. Item (i) Subparagraph (A) describes the familiar record materials commonly relied upon and requires that the movant cite the particular parts of the materials that support its facts positions. Materials that are not yet in the record — including materials referred to in an affidavit or declaration — must be placed in the record. Once materials are in the record, the court may, by order in the case, direct that the materials be gathered in an appendix, a party may voluntarily submit an appendix, or the parties may submit a joint appendix. The appendix procedure also may be established by local rule. Direction Pointing to a specific location in an appendix satisfies the citation requirement. So too it may be convenient to direct that a party assist the court in locating materials buried in a voluminous record.

Subdivision (c)(1)(B)(4)(A)(ii) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials. One party, without citing any other materials, may respond or reply that materials cited to dispute or support a fact do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. And a party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.

Subdivision (c)(2)(5) provides that a response or reply may be used to challenge the admissibility of party may object that material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. The statement in the response should include no more than a concise identification of the basis for the challenge. The challenge can be supported by argument in the brief, or may be made in the brief alone. The objection functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The
burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated. There is no need to make a separate motion to strike. If the case goes to trial, failure to challenge admissibility at the summary-judgment stage does not forfeit the right to challenge admissibility at trial.

Subdivision (c)(3)(B) reflects judicial opinions and local rules provisions stating that the court may decide a motion for summary judgment without undertaking an independent search of the record. Nonetheless, the rule also recognizes that a court may consider record materials not called to its attention by the parties. If the court intends to rely on uncited record material to grant summary judgment it must give notice to the parties under subdivision (f).

Subdivision (c)(4)(B) carries forward some of the provisions of former subdivision (e)(1). Other provisions are relocated or omitted. The requirement that a sworn or certified copy of a paper referred to in an affidavit or declaration be attached to the affidavit or declaration is omitted as unnecessary given the requirement in subdivision (c)(1)(A)(ii) that a statement or dispute of fact be supported by materials in the record.

A formal affidavit is no longer required. 28 U.S.C. § 1746 allows a written unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement subscribed in proper form as true under penalty of perjury to substitute for an affidavit.

**Subdivision (d).** Subdivision (d) carries forward without substantial change the provisions of former subdivision (f).

A party who seeks relief under subdivision (d) should consider seeking an order deferring the time to respond to the summary-judgment motion.

**Subdivision (e).** Subdivision (e) addresses questions that arise when a response or reply does not comply with Rule 56(c) party fails to support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c). requirements.
when there is no response, or when there is no reply to additional facts stated in a response. As explained below, summary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion or reply, much less when an attempted response or reply fails to comply with all Rule 56(c) requirements. Nor should it be denied by default even if the movant completely fails to reply to a nonmovant’s response. Before deciding on other possible action, subdivision (e)(1) recognizes that the court may afford an opportunity to respond or reply in proper form properly support or address the fact. In many circumstances this opportunity will be the court’s preferred first step.

Subdivision (e)(2) authorizes the court to consider a fact as undisputed for purposes of the motion when response or reply requirements are not satisfied. This approach reflects the “deemed admitted” provisions in many local rules. The fact is considered undisputed only for purposes of the motion; if summary judgment is denied, a party who failed to make a proper Rule 56 response or reply remains free to contest the fact in further proceedings. And the court may choose not to consider the fact as undisputed, particularly if the court knows of record materials that show grounds for genuine dispute.

Subdivision (e)(3) recognizes that the court may grant summary judgment only if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed under subdivision (e)(2) — show that the movant is entitled to it. Considering some facts undisputed does not of itself allow summary judgment. If there is a proper response or reply as to some facts, the court cannot grant summary judgment without determining whether those facts can be genuinely disputed. Once the court has determined the set of direct facts — both those it has chosen to consider undisputed for want of a proper response or reply and any that cannot be genuinely disputed despite a procedurally proper response or reply — it must determine the legal consequences of these facts and permissible inferences from them.

Subdivision (e)(4) recognizes that still other orders may be appropriate. The choice among possible orders should be designed
to encourage proper responses and replies presentation of the record.
Many courts take extra care with pro se litigants, advising them of the
need to respond and the risk of losing by summary judgment if an
adequate response is not filed. And the court may seek to reassure
itself by some examination of the record before granting summary
judgment against a pro se litigant.

**Subdivision (f).** Subdivision (f) brings into Rule 56 text a number of
related procedures that have grown up in practice. After giving
notice and a reasonable time to respond the court may grant summary
judgment for the nonmoving party; grant or deny a motion on legal
or factual grounds not raised by the motion, response, or reply
parties; or consider summary judgment on its own. In many cases it
may prove useful to act by inviting first to invite a motion; the invited
motion will automatically trigger the regular procedure of subdivision
(c).

**Subdivision (g).** Subdivision (g) applies when the court does not
grant all the relief requested by a motion for summary judgment. It
becomes relevant only after the court has applied the summary-
judgment standard carried forward in subdivision (a) to each claim,
defense, or part of a claim or defense, identified by the motion under
subdivision (c)(2)(A)(i). Once that duty is discharged, the court may
decide whether to apply the summary-judgment standard to dispose
of a material fact that is not genuinely in dispute. The court must
take care that this determination does not interfere with a party’s
ability to accept a fact for purposes of the motion only. A
nonmovant, for example, may feel confident that a genuine dispute
as to one or a few facts will defeat the motion, and prefer to avoid the
cost of detailed response to all facts stated by the movant. This
position should be available without running the risk that the fact will
be taken as established under subdivision (g) or otherwise found to
have been accepted for other purposes.

If it is readily apparent that the court cannot grant all the relief
requested by the motion, it may properly decide that the cost of
determining whether some potential fact disputes may be eliminated
by summary disposition is greater than the cost of resolving those
disputes by other means, including trial. Even if the court believes that a fact is not genuinely in dispute it may refrain from ordering that the fact be treated as established. The court may conclude that it is better to leave open for trial facts and issues that may be better illuminated by the trial of related facts that must be tried in any event.

Subdivision (h). Subdivision (h) carries forward former subdivision (g) with two three changes. Sanctions are made discretionary, not mandatory, reflecting the experience that courts seldom invoke the independent Rule 56 authority to impose sanctions. See Cecil & Cort, Federal Judicial Center Memorandum on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) Motions for Sanctions (April 2, 2007). In addition, the rule text is expanded to recognize the need to provide notice and a reasonable time to respond. Finally, authority to impose other appropriate sanctions also is recognized.
Published Rule 56(c):

Rule 56. Summary Judgment

(c) Procedures.

(1) Case-specific procedure. The procedures in this subdivision (c) apply unless the court orders otherwise in the case.

(2) Motion, Statement, and Brief; Response and Brief; Reply and Brief.

(A) Motion, Statement, and Brief. The movant must simultaneously file:

(i) a motion that identifies each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought;

(ii) a separate statement that concisely identifies in separately numbered paragraphs only those material facts that cannot be genuinely disputed and
entitle the movant to summary judgment; and

(iii) a brief of its contentions on the law or facts.

(B) Response and Brief by the Opposing Party. A party opposing summary judgment:

(i) must file a response that, in correspondingly numbered paragraphs, accepts or disputes — or accepts in part and disputes in part — each fact in the movant’s statement;

(ii) may in the response concisely identify in separately numbered paragraphs additional material facts that preclude summary judgment; and

(iii) must file a brief of its contentions on the law or facts.

(C) Reply and Brief. The movant:
i) must file, in the form required by Rule 56(c)(2)(B)(i), a reply to any additional facts stated by the nonmovant; and

(ii) may file a reply brief.

(3) Accept or Dispute Generally or for Purposes of Motion Only. A party may accept or dispute a fact either generally or for purposes of the motion only.

(4) Citing Support for Statements or Disputes of Fact; Materials Not Cited.

(A) Supporting Fact Positions. A statement that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely disputed must be supported by:

(i) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(ii) a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(B) Materials not Cited. The court need consider only materials called to its attention under Rule 56(c)(4)(A), but it may consider other materials in the record:

(i) to establish a genuine dispute of fact; or

(ii) to grant summary judgment if it gives notice under Rule 56(f).

(5) Assertion that Fact is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A response or reply to a statement of fact may state that the material cited to support or dispute the fact is not admissible in evidence.

(6) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support a motion, response, or reply must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.
C. Rule 8(c): Discharge in Bankruptcy

The Committee recommends approval for adoption of the proposal to delete “discharge in bankruptcy” from the list of affirmative defenses in Rule 8(c)(1). The proposal was published in August 2007. The proposal was suggested by bankruptcy judges and approved by other experts, who argued that statutory changes had superseded the former status of discharge as an affirmative defense. The Department of Justice provided the only arguments resisting this proposal. Because the question was important to the Department, this issue was withheld when the other August 2007 proposals were recommended and accepted for adoption. Continuing discussions failed to persuade the Department to withdraw from its position. Advice was sought from the Bankruptcy Rules Committee, which voted — over the Department’s sole dissent — to approve adoption of the recommendation.

The statutory basis for deleting the description of discharge in bankruptcy as an affirmative defense is set out in the attached memorandum that Judge Wedoff prepared for the Bankruptcy Rules Committee. The Minutes of the Civil Rules Committee discussion that was guided by Judge Wedoff also are helpful. The decisions cited in the memorandum discussion make two important points. First, every court that has considered the impact of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) on Rule 8(c) has concluded that discharge in bankruptcy can no longer be characterized as an affirmative defense. Second, courts that have looked only to Rule 8(c) without considering the statute have concluded — not surprisingly — that discharge is an affirmative defense. This confusion shows that there is no point in further delay. It is time to decide whether to make the change.

The Department of Justice remains concerned that the effects of discharging a debt arise only if the debt in fact was discharged. A general discharge does not always discharge all outstanding debts. A creditor should be able both to secure a determination whether a particular debt has been discharged, and to collect a debt that was not discharged. These concerns are explored in the attached memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General Hertz. They may warrant adding a few sentences to the Committee Note as a brief reminder of the procedures for seeking to determine the creditor’s rights. These sentences are enclosed by brackets to prompt discussion of the recurring need to define the value of offering advice that goes beyond explaining the immediate purpose of the rule text.

The Department of Justice would like to include some additional advice in the final sentence of the bracketed material in the Committee Note. The full sentence would read: “The issue whether a claim was excepted from discharge may be determined either in the court that entered the discharge or — in most instances — in another court with jurisdiction over the creditor’s claim, and in such a proceeding the debtor may be required to respond.” The Committee believes that whatever value there may be in providing the advice in the bracketed sentences, the additional advice suggested by the Department is both unnecessary and beyond the appropriate scope of a Civil Rule Note.

The Committee recommends approval for adoption of this amendment of Rule 8(c)(1), and approval of the Committee Note.
II ACTION ITEM FOR PUBLICATION

Supplemental Rule E(4)(f)

Supplemental Rule E(4)(f) provides:

(f) Procedure for Release From Arrest or Attachment. Whenever property is arrested or attached, any person claiming an interest in it shall be entitled to a prompt hearing at which the plaintiff shall be required to show why the arrest or attachment should not be vacated or other relief granted consistent with these rules. This subdivision shall have no application to suits for seamen’s wages when process is issued upon a certification of sufficient cause filed pursuant to Title 46, U.S.C. §§ 603 and 604 or to actions by the United States for forfeitures for violation of any statute of the United States.

The question is whether to delete the final sentence as superseded by subsequent statutory and rule developments.

Professor David J. Sharpe, in 07-CV-D, wrote for a Maritime Law Association working group that the two statutes have been repealed. (The “official” edition of the Rules, 110th Congress, 2d Sess., Committee Print No. 6, for use of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, notes the repeal of these statutes in 1983.) Deletion of the reference to these statutes seems warranted; publication should flush out any arguments that other statutes should be invoked.

The question whether to delete the reference to forfeiture actions is somewhat more complicated. New Supplemental Rule G, added in 2006, “governs a forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute.” But under Rule G(1), if Rule G does not address an issue, “Supplemental Rules C and E and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also apply.” Under Rule G(3)(a) and (b) some civil forfeitures are begun by arrest, but others are not. Rule G(8)(d) provides a petition for release of property held for judicial or nonjudicial forfeiture under a statute governed by 18 U.S.C. § 983(f). The Department of Justice has noted that “[b]ecause there never have been post-arrest hearings in forfeiture cases,” thanks to Rule E(4)(f), there was no reason to say more in Rule G. All of this leaves the possibility that arguments will be made to apply Rule E(4)(f) after an arrest of property for forfeiture if the exception in E(4)(f) for forfeiture actions is deleted. It seems likely that most courts would find in Rule G an evident purpose to provide a generally comprehensive procedure for forfeiture actions. But it is not clear that all courts will reach this result. Nor is it clear what policy arguments might be made for applying Rule E(4)(f), apart from the broad argument that there always should be an opportunity to seek a hearing when a court order deprives a person of ordinary control of property. It may be better to recommend publication in a form that offers an alternative stating explicitly that Rule G excludes Rule E(4)(f), inviting comment on the need for this statement.

The Committee recommends publication for comment of this amendment, which is set out in Appendix B.
III INFORMATION ITEMS

Rule 45

The Discovery Subcommittee has been asked to carry forward its initial examination of Rule 45. Many possible questions have been identified. In some ways the most difficult choice will be whether to undertake a complete review of all of Rule 45, reasoning that a second project will not likely be undertaken for several years, or whether to focus on a more manageable set of the more important questions.

Two questions were prominent among the early reasons for examining Rule 45. Some courts have concluded that Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) impliedly authorizes nationwide service of a trial subpoena addressed to a party’s officer because it states limits — 100 miles or within the state — only for a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer. This is an improbable reading in face of the express general limits in Rule 45(b)(2), and it has raised concerns of misuse or even abuse.

A second common problem arises when a nonparty seeks relief from a subpoena issued by a court different from the court where the main action is pending. The nonparty can apply to the main-action court for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1). But a proceeding to enforce the subpoena can be brought only in the court that issued it. Forcing the nonparty to travel to the main-action court to contest the subpoena may impose an undesirable burden. But the main-action court may be in a better position to understand the importance of the discovery in the context of the action, and to integrate this dispute in overall case management. Courts have struggled to find ways to balance these competing concerns.

Several other problems may be noted without implying any ranking of importance.

Rule 45(b)(1) requires that notice be served on each party before serving the person addressed by a subpoena to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things. It does not require notice to other parties when production occurs. Neither does it require notice to other parties of negotiations about compliance between the party who served the subpoena and the person directed to produce. Additional notices might improve the functioning of the rule.

Rule 45(c)(2)(B)(ii) directs that if a person commanded to produce objects, production may be required only by an order that “must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer from significant expense resulting from compliance.” Questions have been raised whether the only way to secure protection is by objecting. Questions also have been raised as to what “expense” is covered — does it include, for example, attorney fees spent to determine what items are relevant, responsive, and not subject to claims of privilege or other protection?

Questions as to location begin with the 100-mile limit that applies in several circumstances. This limit was included in the First Judiciary Act, and apparently traces still further back in common-law practice. Times and travel have changed. Should this limit be reconsidered in general? Or should it at least be reconsidered for document production, which often can be accomplished as readily in one place as another?

Complaints have been made about times to comply. Rule 45(c)(2)(B) directs that an objection to a document subpoena “be served before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served.” That seems to imply that the time for compliance can be set at less that 14 days. Is that appropriate? And when must a privilege log be filed in relation to the time to
object? There also are complaints that attempts are made to use Rule 45 to circumvent discovery cut-offs: is that a real problem, and is it better addressed by a rule amendment or by encouraging more explicit case-management orders?

The only means of enforcement specified in Rule 45 is the contempt sanction of Rule 45(e). Should some other sanctions be added?

A variety of other questions may well be put aside. Examples include preservation by a nonparty — preservation obligations have been put aside in earlier discovery projects. Real problems seem to arise from prehearing discovery subpoenas issued by arbitrators, but the questions seem better addressed outside Rule 45.

Rule 45 plays a vital role in nonparty discovery. Great care will be taken to avoid reaching beyond changes that can be recommended with confidence.

**Rule 4(i)(3): Service on United States Officer or Employee**

Rule 4(i)(3) governs service on a United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the United States’ behalf. Service must be made on the United States. The employee also must be served under Rule 4(e), (f), or (g). The most common methods of individual service are likely to be Rule 4(e)(1) and (2). Rule 4(e)(1) adopts state-law methods of service. Rule 4(e)(2) provides for service by personal delivery to the defendant, leaving a copy at the defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode with a suitable person who resides there, or “delivering a copy * * * to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.”

Personal service, and perhaps particularly service at home, can be unsettling and even dangerous. The question has been raised whether some alternative may be appropriate. The most likely alternative will be to work by analogy to Rule 4(e)(2)(C), which allows service by delivery to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service. The challenge would be to identify a process for designating agents free from conflicting interests and likely to convey prompt notice to the individual defendant.

Preliminary discussion has suggested the possibility that the problems of providing for service on an agent are different for judicial branch employees than for employees of other branches. Suitable agents might include the United States Attorney, the clerk of court, the court itself, or the Administrative Office. Judges may be particularly distinctive defendants for additional reasons. The broad scope of judicial immunity means that most claims against them are likely to be frivolous. Problems of security and harassment may be great.

This topic is important. It may be to difficult to yield a solution either by amending Rule 4 or by proposing legislation. The Committee will study it further, beginning with an effort to gain fact information about service on judges, including actual service experiences and security problems encountered by security officers.

**Appellate-Civil Rules Questions**

The Appellate and Civil Rules intersect at many points, particularly with respect to appeal time and also with respect to appealability. At least two current Appellate Rules Committee projects require attention by both committees. One raises the question whether Civil Rule 58 should be
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amended to require entry of judgment on a separate document when the original judgment is altered or amended on one of the five post-judgment motions enumerated in Rule 58(a). The other addresses the divergent approaches taken by the courts of appeals to attempts to “manufacture finality” in order to achieve present review of a ruling that otherwise would not be appealable as a final judgment. These questions are described fully in the Report of the Appellate Rules Committee.

The two committees have created a joint subcommittee to work on these questions and others that might benefit from joint consideration — new questions may arise from the Bankruptcy Rules Committee’s examination of the Bankruptcy Rules provisions on appeals. The six subcommittee members include three members of the Appellate Rules Committee and three members of the Civil Rules Committee. Judge Steven Colloton will chair the subcommittee.

2010 Conference

Planning for the 2010 Conference has progressed well. It will be held on May 10 and 11 at the Duke University Law School. Judge John Koeltl chairs a large planning committee. The foundations have been laid for new empirical work and authors have been found to present principal papers. The agenda for two full days of discussion has been pretty well set.

The goal of the conference is to determine whether there are problems with federal civil procedure that should be addressed by legislation, court rules, education of bench and bar, or other means. One perspective is provided by asking whether it is true that litigants are increasingly choosing state courts in cases that once would have been brought to a federal court, and if so whether the cause is federal pretrial procedure.

Important empirical work for the Conference will be done by the Federal Judicial Center. The Center will undertake a survey of discovery and related issues built on revisions of the survey it undertook for the Committee in 1997. The survey instrument has been developed and responses will be sought over the early summer. Preliminary results should be available by fall. The Committee is grateful for the Center’s continuing support in this vitally important project.

Empirical work also will be done by the American Bar Association Litigation Section, which will send to all its members with identified e-mail addresses a revised form of the survey by the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System. That survey itself is very interesting, as demonstrated by the presentation at the January meeting of this Committee. Again, this help is most welcome.

The RAND Institute is working on e-discovery. It is hoped that this work will progress at a rate that will enable presentation at the conference. It also is hoped that additional empirical work will be done by Professor Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell.

Appendix A — Proposed Amendments to Rule 8(c), Rule 26, and Rule 56 for Transmission to Judicial Conference and Memoranda from Judge Wedoff and the Department of Justice on Proposed Amendment to Rule 8(c)

Appendix B — Proposed Amendment to Supplemental Rule E for Public Comment

Appendix C — Draft Minutes of April 2009 Meeting and Final Minutes of February 2009 Meeting